DID YOU FEEL IN OCTOBER 1981 THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION MADE A MISTAKE IN NOT GOING AHEAD WITH CARTER BASING SYSTEM FOR MX?

I believed in October of 1981 that the Reagan Administration had placed domestic politics in front of what were the clear national security interests of the country and the understanding that had been reached with Congress and with our allies about what the United States was going to do with ICBM modernization.

DURING NEXT YEAR, HAD DID TOWNES PANEL LOOK TO HIM — BASING MODES, THROUGH DENSE PACK.

Well Charlie Townes I think did an absolutely admirable job of trying to elucidate, examine every possible technical option for ICBM survivability, to ICBM basing, in the years 1982, '81 and '83, small portions of those two years. He basically was searching for a technical solution to what was essentially a political problem. And I believe that it was doomed to not being a successful venture because of the problem of ICBM basing in this country is not a country which permits a wonderful technical solution that will avoid all the difficult policy issues and political issues that confront our country in this area.

WHEN REAGAN DISCARDED THE MPS, DID WHAT HAPPEN MEET WHAT YOU THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN?

My view was that the Reagan Administration had placed domestic politics ahead of what was in the country's national security interests. And that the understandings which had been reached both with our Congress and with our allies was breeched when he decided to abandon the racetrack form of basing that the Carter Administration had proposed.

ASKS PROBLEMS TOWNES RAN INTO IN SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION

Charlie Townes did an admirable job of examining all possible technical solutions to ICBM basing. There is no more honest or capable individual in this country to examine that question. And he did so completely objectively and I think extremely effectively. However. In my judgment the Townes Panels during 1982 were unlikely to become successful because in my judgment there isn't a technical solution to the problem of ICBM basing in this country. It is impossible to find a mode of basing which is simultaneously of low cost, can resist even the most determined Soviet attack, and doesn't require any infringement on the public spaces of this country. So the problem we had was basically a political problem of how do we want to meet those competing requirements in any ICBM... basing decision.

WHAT WAS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DENSE PACK PROPOSAL?

Well at the time the closely spaced basing proposal was put forward, in my view there had not been an adequate amount of data collected to really defend some of the claims which were made for it. More importantly, there had been an inadequate consultation with a wide variety of interested parties, especially in Congress to give it any credibility with the country. And third, I believe that the Administration's efforts to propose the closely spaced basing to Congress was done without sufficient care. There wasn't one individual high civilian senior Administration individual in charge, and therefore it was doomed to become a butt of jokes rather than a serious alternative. Dense pack came too late, without sufficient technical support and without sufficient advocacy to have a real chance of, of being considered as a serious proposal. It looked like a quick idea that was put forward to remove the President from an uncomfortable position after his cancellation of the racetrack system.

WHAT WAS ESSENCE OF SCOWCROFT COMMISSION'S PURPOSE IN 1983?

In my view the Scowcroft Commission was put together, asked to come together, by the President to really help solve a very serious political problem in the country, that is what were we going to do about ICBM modernization. And the idea of the President, as I understood it, in discussions with him and with his senior staff at that time, was not to find a magical technical solution, which as I have indicated I don't think is present, but to find a reasonable middle ground which would gain the support of a large part of a political spectrum, both Republicans and Democrats, both liberals and conservatives, behind a program for ICBM modernization which would be neither too much nor too little, and where there would be the continuity of attention to it by many Administrations and many Houses of Congress, so that one had some confidence that some sort of program would actually take place. The job of the Scowcroft committee was to find that middle ground. That program which matched reasonableness with prudence, and where there was enough of a consensus which would assure that the programs would actually take place over time.

WERE MEMBERS OF THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION CONCERNED ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PHILOSOPHY TOWARD DEFENSE?

Many members of the Scowcroft Commission were well known critics... Many members of the Scowcroft Commission were known to be critical of the Administration's steps toward national security and foreign policy in general. Harold Brown, Bill Perry were members of the prior Carter Administration, Jim Schlesinger, Al Haig who had been Secretary of State were known to be... more Republican oriented individuals who were also critical of the Administration. So it was a Commission composed of people who were questioning about both the ideas and the ability of the Administration in a national security area.

WHY WAS THE ADMINISTRATION FORCED TO CALL FOR ADVICE FROM ITS CRITICS?

Because...

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The Reagan White House correctly perceived that it was not going to be possible to have Congressional approval of an ICBM modernization program without a group of individuals who were viewed as being non-partisan...

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The senior members of the Reagan White House I believe correctly appreciated that it would impossible for any plan for ICBM modernization to be approved by Congress and to have a chance of actually being implemented unless a group of individuals who were viewed as being objective, non-partisan and not beholding to the Administration, actually gave a seal of approval to it, and advocated its balance, its meeting a military need, and being in the interest of long-term arms control. Without that kind of independent justification, for a case, the Reagan Administration was not going to have anything passed by the Democratic House of Representatives and at that time a Democratic Senate.

ALMOST ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION AGREED IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO GO AHEAD WITH DEPLOYMENT OF MX.

I do not believe that every member of the Scowcroft Commission believed that it was essential to go ahead with MX immediately. I do believe that most members of the Scowcroft Commission thought that it was very important that we undertake ICBM modernization. The Soviets were known to be increasing the capability, both in quality and quantity of their ICBM force, and it was believed that we had to find an ICBM modernization program that first of all would improve the survivability of existing forces, and secondly which would place the United States relative to the Soviet Union in a position where arms control on long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles was more possible rather than less possible. It was true that the MX was one of the few missile systems available to carry out such an ICBM modernization program. The problem was not the missile, the problem was the basing mode.

WHY AFTER SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REJECTIONS OF PUTTING MISSILES IN SILOS, WHY WAS IT FINALLY THE ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION THEN, BUT NOT EARLIER?

The reason that the MX in Minuteman silos was an acceptable recommendation for the Commission to make was because it did not stand alone as the solution to the ICBM problem. It was part of a three-element program, an inseparable three-element program which consisted first of all of the small ICBM with its attention on mobility, with attention on having fewer rather than more warheads per launcher, which provided for the survivability of the ICBM force as one part of the triad. It importantly consisted of a new approach to arms control which stressed war heads rather than launchers, again pushing toward survivability in contrast to simple numbers. And third element, the third element, was the MX portion, putting it in silos, showing the Soviets, providing an incentive to the Soviets to say, listen, if we don't do something about both reducing, both sides reducing our ICBM force, you will have the same vulnerability with your ICBM force that we in the United States face currently. The important aspect of the MX deployment in Minuteman silos was it demonstrated to the Soviets the resolve of the United States to place the ICBMs of the Soviets at the same risk that their actions with the ICBM systems like the SS-18 that were in place, or the SS-24 and 25 that they were planning, placed our ICBMs at risk. And accordingly it was a way of saying to the Soviet Union, we both have an interest in reducing the levels of our ICBM forces. I believe, I believe many other Commission members believe, that without putting the MX as part of our program, the Soviets had absolutely no incentive to negotiate a reduction in their long-range intercontinental ballistic missile forces.

HAD CONGRESS—

No, it had been proposed before, if. It had been proposed before that MX should be based in Minuteman silos. But it was not part of a program which looked at arms control aspects and which looked at an element of the ICBM force as being very survivable. And therefore it had been unaccepted, not reached acceptance in Congress or with many observers of national security because it was looked at as being a cheap alternative and a rather aggressive alternative to our ICBM problem.

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So I believed that the solution standing by itself would be, would be viewed as being un-stabilizing, because it would mean that you had MX missiles in targetable, soft, relatively vulnerable Minuteman silos. But it became very acceptable as part of an overall package, an overall package of these three elements that I mentioned before. The small ICBM, the new approach to arms control, and the MX in the Minuteman silo. To be candid about it, it also had a very important political aspect for those more conservative members of Congress, for those members of Congress which had had a long term commitment to the MX system, it provided something for them too. It did help reach a political consensus. So there is an element of that in the program as well. But standing by itself it would not be acceptable as a defense measure.

WAS SURVIVABILITY OVERSOLD? THAT CONGRESS LOST SIGHT OF OTHER FEATURES OF MISSILE?

I think that the survivability question for the ICBM forces had been highly oversold. First of all it had been overpromised. The many Secretaries of Defense had gone to Congress, many Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force indicating that the most important objective of a missile basing system was the survivability to Soviet attack. That most, that property of invulnerability to Soviet attack must be seen in the context of all of our forces. It proved to be a false... hope that one could get a completely survivable force. Secondly...

... The issue is that many Secretaries of Defense, many Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force, had gone to Congress, had said that a missile basing system was going to be invulnerable, was going to be survivable to any kind of Soviet attack. That has proven to be a false hope. It is technically not possible or at least exorbitantly expensive to have a basing mode which is invulnerable to all parts, all kinds, all imaginable types of Soviet attack. Such survivability, survivability cannot be obtained.

WAS HE A SUPPORTER OF THE DE-MIRVING CONCEPT OF STABILITY? OF GOING TO THE MIGETMAN?

I personally was a supporter of going to a method of arms control, accounting, which counted warheads rather than launchers. I think one of the very bad aspects of SALT I was that it chose to focus on launchers, counting numbers of launchers. Giving both sides the incentive for putting as many possible warheads on each launcher as possible. Thereby reaching a situation of instability where there was a great advantage to going, striking first. It seems to be that there was an overwhelming reason for going to a arms control basis which relied on numbers of warheads, rather than number of launchers. To get away from that destabilizing aspect of counting launchers rather than warheads. So I was very much an advocate of that method of calculation. I also was a very strong advocate of the small missile. I must admit that when it becomes mobile, which I also advocate, whether it carries one warhead or two warheads, is less important than the survivability that comes from mobility. Well the first question is, avoid many warheads on one launcher in a fixed land-based silo, but if you have mobility, like as proposed for the small missile, or mobility like you have in the submarines, whether you have one or two or a few warheads per launcher is less important than the survivability which comes from mobility. The key issue is not MIRVs. The key issue is vulnerability of the ICBM force

WHY DIDN'T THE COMMISSION TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO GO TOWARD VISION OF A DE-MIRVED COMPETITION?

Well first of all let me way that I was for the small missile, I was for mobility of the small missile, but it is not in my judgment the case that it should only be a necessarily be a single warhead missile. It could, as presently designed, eventually have two warheads on it. The important issue was the mobility, the small size of the missile, and the fact that it was an invulnerable basing mode. To be sure it was costly, but that was the price that one had to pay to put our ICBM force posture in a manner which was stable and avoided the possibility of nuclear war as much as rational calculation can reach. I also believed that it was essential to provide the Soviets with an incentive to negotiate arms control agreements with respect to ICBMs. 500 small mobile launchers by themselves would not be enough to give the Soviets an incentive, in my judgment, to negotiate in a serious matter on arms control. The MX part of the program that we put forward was intended principally to show the Soviets that we had the resolve to put their ICBM force at risk in the same manner that they had our ICBM at risk. So it would be in our mutual interest to reach balanced force reductions on both sides. Absent the MX part of the program, it would not have had my support, because I do not believe, I do not believe that there was a credible basis for thinking that the Soviets would have negotiated an arms control agreement.It took all three aspects of the proposed program to gain my personal support to the result.

SCHLESINGER ARGUES WE NEEDED A CREDIBLE WAY OF EXTENDING DETERRENCE TO EUROPE, AND THAT WAS TO HAVE A MIRVED MISSILE THAT COULD STRIKE MILITARY TARGETS. HOW CAN ONE RELATE THAT TO THE ARGUMENT FOR BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS?

Well the number of military targets that is required for extended deterrence is a function of the size of the military forces in both the Soviet Union and the United States. So as you pull down the number of SS-18s or SS-20s, as you pull down the number of ICBM targets, you lower the requirements for the number and kind of forces you need to provide extended deterrence. There was of course a difference within the Commission...

... There was of course a difference within the Commission about the importance of extended deterrence and the credibility of extended deterrence from the ICBM forces of the United States. I must say I joined with James Schlesinger in believing that an important purpose of the ICBM forces of the United States is to provide extended deterrence, to provide a political linkage with our allies in Europe to give them the assurance that we have the means, and the will, to deter Soviet aggression should it occur against them in Europe.

WHAT IS A CREDIBLE MISSION FOR AN MX MISSILE IF THE SOVIETS INVADE EUROPE?

The credible mission for an MX missile in Europe, in the event of a war in Europe, is that it has the capability of prompt destruction and accurate destruction, of Soviet military targets. I want to make it clear, I'm not proposing the use of MX missiles in response to a Soviet conventional attack in Europe. I am proposing that the existence of the MX missiles and their prompt, accurate military destruction potential, is important in the calculation of the Soviet general staff, in deterring them from considering a conventional or chemical or nuclear attack in Western Europe or on the flanks of NATO. The purpose of those missiles is to deter such attacks, not to be used necessarily in the case of such attacks. It's a very subtle difference but an important one. You can figure the military forces to prevent violence, not to be used in times of violence.

DOES THAT WORK IF THEY HAVE PROMPT RESPONSES AIMED AT OUR MILITARY TARGETS?

It is that whole issue about how much...

ASKS HIM CONCEPT OF SHIELD AND SWORD.

Well the reason that, what is so interesting about ICBMs that extend a deterrent, goes back to the basis of NATO. Which is summarized by the arm patch which all NATO soldiers wear, the emblem of NATO, which is a shield and a sword. The sword being the ICBM forces which the United States has, the nuclear forces of the United States, and the shield being the conventional forces of allies in Europe. That is at the essence of the political alliance which makes up NATO. Now as you accurately point out the Soviets developed a capability against U.S. ICBMs. The U.S. has a capability against Soviet missile systems. The credibility of that shield and sword symbol becomes more and more questioned, and therefore the political fiber of the alliance becomes more and more strained. And it is that whole question about what you place, replace to make a credible contribution to deterrence that we of the United States and the NATO allies together, that led to the whole theater nuclear force issue which may be tomorrow, we will have a treaty removing those theater nuclear forces from being part of the political alliance between the United States and its European allies.

ASKS COMMISSION'S REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S SPEECH.

The Scowcroft Commission members were uniformly surprised and uniformly, I think, horrified would not be too strong a term, that the President of the United States would make a major public address changing the whole basis of strategy from one which was based on deterrence to a new concept of strategic defense without any consultation with the President's own commission charged with the responsibility of achieving a political solution to a very complicated subject. And all the members I think were, it would be fair to say were, stunned at this presidential announcement and believed that it made their task, our task, a great deal more difficult. And actually had the opportunity to meet with the President and discuss it. And we found ourselves all, certainly I was, not only technically skeptical, but also very political skeptical, about the prospects of SDI being able to replace the problems of deterrence with a magical new technical system for avoiding the horrors of nuclear arms.

AND REYKJAVIK FURTHERED THOSE DOUBTS?

But Reykjavik occurred after the Commission was through with its work. The President's speech on Star Wars occurred in the midst of the deliberations of the Commission. It was quite a different circumstance. We, all the Commission members responded to Reykjavik as private citizens. We no longer were sitting as an active commission. But Star Wars was in the midst of our deliberations.

WHAT DID DEUTCH PANEL DO?

Well the so-called Deutch Panel was a task force of the Defense Science Board. The Secretary of Defense wanted the Defense Science Board to undertake a study of the technical health and prospects for the small ICBM in its hard mobile launcher. And fundamentally what our task force was asked to do was to review the progress of the program and ask was it able to provide survivable ICBM basing for the small ICBM at affordable cost relative to several other alternatives.

SINCE AIR FORCE IS NOT SO INTERESTED IN SMALL ICBM AS IN MX, AND CONGRESS IS UNEASY ABOUT COST OF MIDGETMAN, IS HE OPTIMISTIC WE WILL MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION?

The fundamental conclusion about the small ICBM on mobile launchers is that it is survivable against any credible kind of Soviet attack. Not against all conceivable Soviet attacks, but very survivable against all credible Soviet attacks. But that survivability is expensive. And in my judgment it is the price worth paying for a survivable ICBM force. The elements of Congress or elements of the U.S. Air Force may believe that it is not a price worth paying, that you do not need that survivability given other elements of our strategic forces, for example, submarines. In my view the Congress of the United States, the politics of the United States, will lead one inevitably toward seeking that survivability for our ICBM forces. And so I predict that we will move towards mobility and we will move towards those more survivable mobile land-based systems but which are however, very expensive. I should note that the Soviets have already moved to such systems. And I have already begun to understand the importance of moving to mobile systems in order to obtain survivability.

ASKS HIS JUDGMENT OF RAIL GARRISON.

Yes. The MX proposal to not base MXs in Minuteman silos but to put them on railroad trains in fact buys you some greater survivability, especially if you have strategic warning that is, hours of warning about the possibility of a Soviet attack, rather than 30 minutes warning about a Soviet attack. That is a basic system which does provide some greater survivability than putting MX in Minuteman silos. And alternative would be and one which I find extremely interesting, is the so-called Carry Hard system where one has basically inexpensive silos, very, very simple silos and one MX missile carried in a canister which is hardened to withstand the damage of nuclear attack. And moves the MX and its canister between several different silos, thus presenting the Soviets with the problem of having to target not one silo with its Minuteman missile in it, but to target many, many silos where the Minute...where the MX missile might be as it is carried, with its hardened capsule, from location to location. That strikes me as another alternative way of basing MX. Which would lead to a great deal of survivability and probably more than the railroad train when costs are taken into account.

SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES FEEL THE PRICE OF THE SMALL MISSILE IS EXORBITANT BECAUSE OF THE HML, THAT IN EXISTING SILOS IT WOULD PROVIDE ALMOST THE SAME DETERRENT BECAUSE IT WOULDN'T BE A VALUABLE TARGET. WHAT'S HIS RESPONSE?

I believe that that argument is not correct. The proposal by some to put the small missile or several small missiles in an MX, in a Minuteman silo or in a larger silo, in my judgment maintains the high attractiveness of having several warheads at one fixed land-based site, and therefore is a vulnerable basing mode and contributes to instability rather than stability. So I do not favor putting the small missile, one or several in fixed land-based silos except perhaps as a transition to another basing mode which would have the survivability that we've advocated, namely a mobile form of basing. So while I would foresee that kind of basing as a transition, unless it went to some more survivable, mobile basing scheme, I would not support it for the reasons mentioned. Moreover we've already understood that if you just want warheads, that the cheapest way to do that is to purchase MX. But we know that that's not enough. There must be a survivable basing mode as well.

ASKS FOR ANECDOTES ABOUT ASPIN AND DICKS WORK AS LIAISONS BETWEEN SCOWCROFT COMMISSION AND CONGRESS.

I don't have any anecdotes about

One of the obviously political new aspects of the Scowcroft Commission was the ability to work with some of the at that time junior members of the House of Representatives in reaching a political consensus. And it was... rather an innovative matter to work with Congressman Aspin and to work with Norm Dicks and Al Gore at putting together a substantial number of younger, more moderate Democrats behind an arms control and ICBM modernization program, where prior to that time matters on defense in the House were normally seen to be the province of an older, longer tenured, more conservative element of the Democrat membership of the House. So working with Norm Dicks and Les Aspin and Al Gore were a way of politically opening up the House in the area of defense and certainly was what made it possible for the Scowcroft Commission to turn from a situation where there were 60 votes against any ICBM modernization program in the House of Representatives to one where there were 60 votes in favor of the consensus... the Scowcroft Commission put forward.

HOW DID THEY WORK IT OUT?

Well I must say to briefly summarize how we did it, in quotes, would be a difficult task, but it was a very systematic program. The members of the Commission were politically very sophisticated and each of us took responsibility for Senators, for Congressmen, for Presidential candidates, this is before the 1984 Presidential election, for members of the press, for public... for different interests groups in the public. And we systematically went out and discussed with many, many individuals and had lunches and breakfasts and dinners, and private meetings with Congressmen and the answer is yes. We spoke with Congressmen and Senators all the time. And each one of us had a significant number who we had relationships with. I had had, from my time in government had worked with some people, we'd spent time working with them. But it was very, very highly organized. And very, very carefully done. It was due to the elegance and sophistication and wisdom of the chairman that we were able to get so much done in working with Congress. But it was really very highly organized. It wasn't haphazard.

SHOULD WE HAVE GONE AHEAD WITH THE 200 MXS IF WE COULD HAVE?

No. I think, and here I probably differ from Harold Brown, I differ maybe several other members of the Commission. I believe that the Commission's recommendations are more in the long term interest of stability and arms control and national security and strength, than the racetrack proposal, which as you may recall, called for 200 MX systems as being the initial deployment. I might point out however that neither has been implemented by the country, so that it is hard to compare, do you like your failed solution than to some other failed solution. The fact is that as we sit here and speak there is no agreed upon, credible, sensible ICBM modernization program for this nation.

WOULD HE CHOOSE MX OR MIDGETMAN?

How are you basing the MX and how are you basing this Midgetman?

RAIL GARRISON AND HML?

I would vote for the small missile. I'm not supposed to say you. But it's a...there is no chance of that happening I might say. I... let me be careful since you are showing this in '89. I don't think there's any chance of that happening.