I WANT TO START WITH THE NOTION OF THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION.

Good. And how the issue was closed by Star Wars...you know... I am not a... military man...who works on these weapons. But... of course I think it was very difficult to not to produce something which was already underway in the United States. And one of the... most, I would say, controversial things, and the whole idea of the preservation of parity and strategic stability which, when we have such problem all the time, because... almost in every major strategic systems, the Uni-, the United States had, has... the lead in the beginning every time, after war... world war period. And in all (?), they started for example, MIRVing... and there was an attempt from American side to get some very serious advantages over the Soviet Union they fixed the number of launchers, and they had SALT I agreement, which produced the ceilings, but at the same time, signing SALT I agreement, the American side started very rapidly deployment of MIRV, ICBMs and SLBMs. And of course such enormous increase of warheads created a great deal of concern in the Soviet Union, and in my view it was quite justified that our task was to demonstrate to the American side that, that we'd cope with this challenge, and for us, because our major bulk of our strategic war heads and launchers one, was on the ground-based leg of our strategic triad, it was quite natural to have major emphasis in MIRVing, producing, them for ICBMs. And we....designed and deployed such ICBMs with, MIRVs and... with large number of warheads, up to 10 warheads, as it was agreed in SALT II...

SO YOU'D SAY THAT THE SS-18 WAS A RESPONSE TO AN AMERICAN MIRVING OF THE MINUTEMAN?

Not only of the Minuteman. You know we knew about this MIRVing problem since at least since early '60s, and... we... should think about these consequences, and... of course... I think that if the United States do not proceed with MIRVing, probably we wouldn't have our own problem, program of MIRVing of our ICBMs and SLBMs. And your MIRVing, your MIRVing program was not only for Minuteman, it was also for... we knew about MX already... we knew about Poseidon, we knew about even Trident 1 and Trident 2... in the '70s. I know it had a different name at that moment; it was not yet C4 or D5. But it was the advanced program for SLBMs, and we knew about this. And... C4 and especially D5, are quite new kind of MIRVed SLBMs, comparable with their potential with your ICBMs, with Minuteman 3 and even with MXs. And the logic of this... strategic interrelations, strategic nuclear interrelations, led us to produce... the comparable threat to the United States.

AT THE SAME TIME, WHEN THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY WAS PRESENTED, THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF TALK ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION CIVIL DEFENSES.

You know... we have of course our civil defense system and... civil defense activities, but I think that it would be... would be quite wrongly interpreted as an attempt to... create such conditions which would permit us to think about... the winning of all-out nuclear war.

WHAT WOULD BE THE PURPOSE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL CIVIL DEFENSE LAWS?

First of all, in my view, the level of our civil defense activity is very much exaggerated in the United States. Especially by late Secretary of Defense Weinberger and his associates. And it's quite understandable was one of the justification of SDI. Though these things are quite different. Uh, there are some similarities, of course, between different type of defenses. Air defense ballistic missile defense, and civil defense. But at the same time there are very substantial differences. Civil defense is not the other sides. Uh, capability is like it would be in the case of deployment—, deploying space-based weapons. And civil defense, I think, is a useful thing for many purposes like, we've had the Chernobyl and mainly civil defense people and civil defense forces were there. And, they did a very important job there. And we cannot guarantee that such things wouldn't happen anymore. Our civil defense formations worked also actively and in many cases very effectively in many other cases when we have, for example, some naturals disaster, catastrophes in the region, for example. There were very severe floods there, you know, and they were extremely useful in such situations. I think that the main purpose of civil defense is for such kinds of catastrophes.

MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, JUST PUT IT IN TERMS OF A SOVIET PERSON, RATHER THAN A SCHOLAR.

Yes, sure. Of course the response of the Soviet citizens was very negative to all of these statements. And it contributed a great deal to Soviet-American tensions, tension. At this moment, and the, I know, from many of my personal contacts and I lectured a lot in different Soviet audiences. Of course, it was regarded as a very negative thing, I think in Soviet-American relations.

HOW DID YOU THINK? WHAT DID YOU THINK HE WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE? WHAT DID IT MEAN TO YOU PERSONALLY?

Well, it's not so easy to answer in a short way, short way. That's very, in my view, very complicated. Of course, there are, in my view, some definite political goals and purposes behind it. I think one of the goals was to consolidate the nation, I mean American nation around such regional interpretation of the Soviet Union, to perpetrate the Soviet Union as a main enemy and opponent of the United States and international arena. To stimulate the activities in the United States which would mean very...emphasis on military preparedness, And so on and so on. And on that offense of course it was a reflection of some of his stereotypes, and stereotypes of the whole political say, not just party but the group which was behind him. Conservatives, right conservatives, and even ultra-right conservatives who built what are presented as the political coalition behind the President of the United States. But at the same time, my guess is that this very anti-Soviet and very militaristic rhetoric created not only just side effects in the United States and Western Europe, but in that respect just the opposite effect. It frightened the American public. It frightened the public in Western Europe, and not just the public, but many politicians, many political leaders, and the response to this rhetoric created such substantial pressure for change for the better that now we see the fruits of this. That's the dialectics of the political process.

THERE WAS EVEN THEN, I THINK, AT ONE TIME A STATEMENT BY REAGAN THAT THE WAR-PEACE COMMITTEE WAS MANIPULATING THE ( ) MOVEMENT. DO YOU REMEMBER THAT?

Oh yeah. I don't remember the Reagan statement, but I read a lot of such stuff in different newspapers in the West. And we just, I would say, that's nothing new in this statement, we hear such things since 1970.... Oh, sure. I would be, of course, it was, I think it's -- It's so wrong that it does need to be commended.

TELL ME YOUR FIRST REACTION, BEFORE ANY KIND OF PROFOUND REFLECTIONS, IF YOU REMEMBER IT, TO THE SDI PROPOSAL. I DON'T KNOW IF YOU REMEMBER IT, BUT IT CAME TOGETHER WITH THE PROMISE THAT SUCH A TECHNOLOGY WOULD MAKE WEAPONS AND ABSOLUTE (?) AND TECHNOLOGY WOULD BE SHARED WITH SOVIET UNION AND ALL OF THAT. DO YOU REMEMBER YOUR INITIAL, IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THIS?

From the Soviet Union?

YOURS, NOT—

My own? Yes, I remember just after this Star Wars speech of March 23rd, we decided to establish our research group on this subject....and myself. And to analyze very seriously what would be, what are the possibilities to build this space-based shield? What are the capabilities, at least theoretical different types of lasers, of particle beam accelerators, kinetic keel mechanisms and so on. Uh, we decided to study this very seriously, very seriously. And not only to explore the technological side of it, but also to put this issue, this technological problems into broader strategic and political-psychological context. All for me, it was, I would says I just didn't pay any serious attention to their idea of sharing technology with the Soviet Union, because first of all I knew that we don't need it. Because we are not going to build such a system. Why do we need to do such things? We have a lot of other problems in our economy and our industrial technological development. And for us it was from the very beginning the idea totally unacceptable. Because we really felt quite a different set of priorities in our society. That's one point. Another point. Of course we, even if we have a different set of priorities, and even if we decided that we would be interested in such kind of technology transfer or exchange we could not believe in what was said, facing quite the opposite actions of the United States in other areas of technology transfer. At this moment the United States has tried to tighten all these constraints on technology transfer. Even some, I would say, very simple things were prohibited from export to the Soviet Union at this moment. Uh, personal computers, which are not so sophisticated computer hardware was not allowed. Many of them, many types of the to export to the Soviet Union. And how could we imagine that for example the United States would share with us super computer technology, And super-computer technology with artificial intelligence is the core of the battle management system, and the battle management system is the core of the whole space-based, so called, shield. Therefore, nobody in this country took seriously this idea. From the very beginning we just did not think it was even worth discussing with the Americans. It was, I think, one of the propaganda tricks in the United States. Maybe, of course, there were some people in, on the other side of the Atlantic who really believed in what was said. Because, you know, one of the phenomenas of propaganda is that people start to believe in their own propaganda. That's one point. And another point, you know, Americans themselves, that's quite understandable and a commonly shared feature of human psychology. They tend to believe in themselves as a very kind and very idealistic minded Uncle Sam who gives other nations for nothing all the benefits of American society and great American technological development.

YOU HAVE SOME DOUBTS?

Yeah, I have more and more doubts --

THERE WERE STATEMENTS MADE AT THE SAME TIME THAT IN FACT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE DEVELOPING SOME SIMILAR CAPABILITIES, AT THAT TIME THE SOVIET UNION HAS TESTED A SATELLITE KILLER, AND THAT THE MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM, THE GOULASH SYSTEM, CAN BE UPGRADED, AND OTHER THINGS. LET'S TALK ABOUT SATELLITE KILLING. WAS IT PERCEIVED AS ANY SUCH THING, OR WAS IT PART OF SOMETHING ELSE? WHAT WAS IT?

That's a very good point, you know. Uh, I have had many discussions with my American colleagues and American officials on so-called Soviet SDI. And what is portrayed by the proponents of the SDI in the United States as a Soviet SDI? Well, some pieces you just mentioned. The ABM ballistic missile defense site around Moscow, our anti-satellite system, and radars and...laser and so on and so on. But what is American SDI? Look at what is the core of the whole idea of building this multi-layered ballistic missile defense system. These are particle beam accelerators several types of lasers, eximer(?) three electron chemical laser, both ground based and spaced. But the main emphasis was on space-based components, at least of these things. And different kinetic kill mechanism, included electromagnetic...gun and so on. And x-ray laser, of course. Uh, and when you compare it even with what was portrayed by the official American propaganda as the Soviet SDI, you would find no comparison. And it's just for those who, ordinary people do not care very much about the real stuff...technology, just I think, it was not fair play. You know, anti-satellite system, especially, of this kind, of such kind which we were developing until recently, is in no way a system which could be used for ballistic missile defense. It could be used for other purposes. It could be used as a counter measure against space-based beam, as a space mine for example. But it's not for interception of either launchers or warheads. In no way. What we have around Moscow is the traditional ballistic missile defense ground launch interceptors. And according to the original concept of SDI, that's of secondary importance, compared to the space-based weapons. Radars, that's, they are also traditional radars. We have a small number of radars for ballistic missile defense purposes around Moscow, in Moscow, inside, and we have other types of radars which operate also as a part of our Soviet SDI force. That's quite wrong. It's not a fair presentation of our efforts. And about anti-satellite system which was under development in the Soviet Union, I should add that in August, August 18, 1983, they announced...moratorium on its testing in space. Andropov said it during the meeting with the group of senators headed by Clayborn Pell. And we still have this moratorium. And, we also appreciate that similar moratorium was due to the reactions of the Congress is on the United States side. And I hope that we should come to terms to prohibit anti-satellite weapons, and that I think will be a very important impact for the sake of strategic stability.

THERE IS A SENSE OF A SHIFT IN SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING, IN THE SHIFT OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND GORBACHEV. I RECOGNIZE IT BUT I CANNOT ARTICULATE IT. COULD YOU ARTICULATE WHAT HAPPENED TO THE MILITARY STRATEGIC THINKING, THEORETICAL OR...AND THE PRESENT STRATEGIC THINKING IN THE SOVIET THINKING. IS THERE A SHIFT? DO YOU RECOGNIZE IT?

You know, there were I think several very important conceptual elements introduced into our strategic thinking. Especially after the 27th Party Congress. After the speech of the Secretary General there, and the discussion of strategic matters during the 27th Party Congress. Uh, one of the major elements was the introduction of the idea of a reasonable sufficiency. Second was the idea that parity, strategic parity doesn't guarantee the stability. And third, that security, international security has at least four dimensions, four major components. Along with military and political components there are also economic—

— ARMS CONTROL, BUT I THINK ON THE STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL LEVEL, I THINK HIS THINKING WAS, "MAYBE NOT THAT FAR FROM REAGAN-?

No, that's wrong. He strongly believed, for example, in the non-first use commitment of the Soviet Union.

WELL, BUT THAT'S BECAUSE—

And that's, it's a very real and very important thing. It was, had the profound effect on ( ).

I MEANT TO COMPARE THE MILITARY OPERATIONAL THINKING UNDER BREZHNEV. I DON'T THINK IT WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE MILITARY OPERATIONAL THINKING UNDER REAGAN. NOT NECESSARILY THAT THESE TWO PEOPLE IN TERMS OF THEIR INTENTION, TO COMPARE. I DON'T THINK SO. BUT YOU KNOW I THINK THERE WAS RECOGNITION THAT WAR WOULD BE A TERRIBLE THING, BUT THERE ALSO I THINK ON A MILITARY LEVEL, THE THINKING WAS THAT, BY GOD, IF WE HAVE TO DO THIS WE CAN DO THIS.

You know the non-first use commitment of the Soviet Union, which was made if I'm not wrong in June of 1982, and it was a very big article by Ustinov, who was the Minister of Defense at that time, explaining what it means. It was not just a declaration, you know? And you cannot do such a thing without understanding how it would affect the military people. And Wistinoff explained in his article and for all the Soviet citizens and for our military establishment what it means in operational terms as well. And, unfortunately, it was not noticed, besides some...experts what was said by Wistinoff and other people after him, military people, what non-first use means. Non- first use commitment is a very serious thing from the pure...point of view. It, of course creates additional requirements for the strategic nuclear forces. And not only for the strategic nuclear forces.

SURVIVABLE SECOND STRIKE.

Pardon?

SURVIVABLE SECOND STRIKE.

Yes, yes, survivable second strike. And Ogarkov supported this idea very actively, and Ogarkov stated several times that we have very substantial nuclear potential now and we feel confident that we can deliver second strike capability, And in his recent book and I think a very important book, which is called "History Teaches Vigilance" he stresses once more the importance of our non-first use commitment. And this is now the part of our military doctrine that's also operationally a very important thing.

BUT ARE YOU SAYING, BY IMPLICATION, THAT UNTIL THAT TIME THE OPERATIONAL THINKING OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THAT IF ONE HAS TO GO, ONE HAS TO GO FIRST?

I wouldn't say so, but, of course you know this non-first use commitment was not as firm as it was after 1982. And I think that on the whole our behavior in the nuclear age demonstrated that we behaved more responsibly, more responsible than the United States. Ands we have several times in post-war history moments are very dangerous confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. And in all of these cases, when we were very close to at least to the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, there was a very substantial difference between our behavior and American behavior. Of course, we used several times very strong words, very strong words. But the United States, several times, used not only words, but increased the readiness of American nuclear forces. Ands this very fact in my view demonstrates a substantial difference between the attitude of our political and military leadership with the potential use of nuclear weapons. And knowing many Soviet military professionals, those who still are in the service, and those who are gone, who retired, I discovered that—, and comparing them with American professionals, not with them but with many, I discovered that our military are more realistically thinking. They really know better what war means. And they are not so, I would say enthusiastically playing all these theoretical games. Uh, there's different types of strikes, and so on and so on. And maybe I'm not, I as I said, I was not so exact about American military. Usually these are civilian theoreticians who overplay these things. And maybe American military now are more realistically thinking about these things than many civilian so-called "armchair" strategists. But our military people, they, they still are very much influenced by the legacy of World War II. And the number of forces and just the number of very difficult situations, crisis situations when the very survival of our country was at stake, created quite a different attitude over the use of force in general. And of course, to the idea of the role of nuclear weapons. But of course there was a period of time in our military thinking, and it was reflected in many respects in the military strategy book edited by Marshal Sokolovsky, when people were thinking about nuclear weapons as a just extension of the capabilities of already existing weapons. But by the '70s, it changed very substantially, and Marshal Ogarkov wrote about it very eloquently in his book which I mentioned before. He said that now we came to the time when the mere use of nuclear weapons under the great question. It's not so more the weapon in the traditional sense. It's something beyond. Beyond traditional attitude of military...use of different kinds of military means.

HOW WILL YOU CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY TO THE GORBACHEV ERA? WHAT HAPPENS ON, AGAIN, ON THE OPERATION OF—

I think that a very important step was made when the Warsaw Treaty Organization announced its military doctrine in Berlin in May, 1987. It contains both a political, a political-military part of the doctrine, and it also has some very important implications for strategic operational part of it. Not—, and then there were very important elaboration of this doctrine, both in the writings of our new Minister of Defense, General Yazov, and the writings of Gariv (?), who is the...and several other people. A small contribution was made by my colleague and friend, General Larionov and myself, who also wrote a piece about the Battle of Kursk, and its in the context of the contemporary defensive doctrine. And I could tell you a few words about that Battle of Kursk model. The Battle of Kursk was extremely important in our World War II experience, because it was the time when we almost gained the strategic initiative, or were very close to it. It was the summer of 1943, after two years of very difficult, and I would say, brutal battles with (Nazi Germany?), and... were defeated twice very severely near Moscow and Stalingrad, but still we were extremely strong. And they were preparing for a very strong offensive. It was their last hope to gain the strategic initiative. On other hand, we were... we felt ourselves very strong by that moment. And under the suggestion of Marshal Zhukov, the decision was made not to start offensive for us, but to wait until the Germans start their offensive. And on the first... at the first stage to have defensive operation. And it was... this design proved itself to be very successful. And German offensive, though it was actually much stronger than in 1941, it will sound strange, but it was really so. They had much more sophisticated hardware, tanks, aircraft. It was very effectively, and successfully stopped, and the best German tank divisions were practically destroyed, and after that Germans until the very end of war were never able to concentrate in one single place such forces.

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?

The implication is that now according to our new military doctrine, as it was stated by several of our leaders, the major form of operations in the case of war, and it is regarded... it is related to general purpose forces and conventional weapons first of all, will be not offensive ones. Will not be offensive operation or counter-offense, it will be defensive operation. That's maybe one of the major shifts in all our strategic thinking after World War II.

WAS THERE COMPARABLE WORK DONE ON THE NUCLEAR STRATEGY?

Ah, in nuclear area as I said, the major events in that... in the development of our thinking was 1982 statement on the non-first use. And after this a lot of work was done to implement it on the operational level. To train, to develop the proper hardware and so on and so on. And now it's reemphasized. And if you ride.. if you read the writings of our professional military in different of our journals you will find...

I'LL HAVE TO TALK TO THEM.

Yeah.

LET ME SHIFT AGAIN TO... YOU JUST CAME BACK FROM THE SUMMIT. CAN YOU GIVE ME SOME SORT OF PERSONAL IMPRESSION OF WHAT WERE THE RUSSIANS FEELING ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED TO THE AMERICANS? DID THEY GO THROUGH THE KIND OF TRANSFORMATION THAT YOU HOPED FOR?

My... it's not the professional assessment, but just as you asked, feelings. And sometimes feelings are...important than just professional assessment. Ah, you know, my feeling is that Americans got... got tired, and even frustrated living with this, I would say, abnormal tension in Soviet-American relations. Ah, and there was the feeling in my view among many Americans that there was some kind of relief to this tension. And I think that the Administration and President himself personally, they just understood it. One of the maybe strong sides of Reagan was that he... he was responsive to some changes in atmospherics. Yes, and that's., that was one of my first impressions when I arrived in Washington, and it was even strengthened during the days of the summit. And I met with very many different people there during summits, both with profession a with experts on Soviet-American relations and strategic problems, with people from the Hill and some people from the Administration. But... and the majority of them had some kind of feeling, or feeling. Ah, I think it's good. Because you know, it's really abnormal. It's real abnormal. We have to change really substantially our mmmm, relations. Um, it's just imperative. And I would say that we should work together not just to prevent the war, not just to get rid of this threat of nuclear holocaust, but we should work together just to create better life. Because it's also pretty bad to live in a miserable... in a miserable way, which is created by this permanent tension. We could live for many decades without war, just threatening each other, but the live would not be so pleasant. You know, and I think that people on the both sides of the ocean appreciate very much the results of the summit in such a way.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS IN THE CORE OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN CONFLICT?

You know, I'm... I'm almost sure that we were able, we had some chance at least to avoid what...after World War II. And being a student of the history, not just Soviet-American relations, but in general, I find more and more that along with some fundamental basic laws which cannot be changed by one human being or even a group of human beings, at least in the period of their life, there are some factors which could affect very dramatically the particular situation and particular...relations, particular relations, even between states. And there... there is... this is my very strong belief that in spite all of our differences and deep-rooted factors for our conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, there are really, I think very real chances, maybe, not great, but substantial changes... chances to avoid what we had, to avoid what we had after World War II. At least, the most unpleasant, and the most dangerous situations which we had after World War II.

BE SPECIFIC --

Let's... yes, OK, let's be specific. For example, we know now better that there were the people in the United States who were for sharing with us the secret of nuclear weapons. Maybe we were not so much interested in getting these secrets from the pure technologic point of view because we've had very good, our own physicists. And the idea of nuclear bomb was in the air, it was not so much a secret. Of course there were so many — very many technological, and technical difficult problems to solve. And we solved it ourselves without stealing American secrets. Ah, you know, and there are some very strong proofs for it. But from the political, psychological point of view of course it would be of extreme importance, extreme importance, especially taking into account that specific features of psyche of Stalin. We know now, we discuss it now, very actively, that he was a man who was very suspicious of many other people. And of course there... there's dramatic change in American literature, and the immediate behavior of Truman affected his thinking very much so. And a combination of what was done by Truman. And I think he did a pretty bad job for this... for the Soviet American relations and of course to the United States themselves through the Soviet American relations. And the combination of... Truman's behavior just... just after the death of Roosevelt. He stopped, for example, the shipment of many items under lend-lease policy with nuclear bomb. And I think we even knew some of the statements in the very inner circle which were made by Truman, at least some rumors went through different channels to Stalin. Created very special attitude of Stalin to Truman and American intentions and so on. And it was some kind of chain reaction which created, I think, different... attitude of our literature at that time. Soviet-American relations not speaking about Soviet-British relations. Stalin was in special relations with Churchill. I know he didn't trust him and I think he was right this time. I do not agree with many things which were made by Stalin, but in this case I agree with him. And if here was a different attitude to this issue, you know, more openness from American side, you know, more I would say desire really to treat us as equals, at least because the major... the lion's share of losses and efforts to defeat Nazis, on our part. I think we could be in a quite different.... We would have enough... a lot of conflicts anyway, over the issue of democracy, human rights and so on and so on. But probably we would have quite different, for example, approach toward the future of Germany. And they probably would solve this issue differently. Probably we wouldn't have Korean War and other very devastating things in our relations. That's my indirect, and so I am sorry. My answer.

WOULD YOU CARE TO REPEAT THE FIRST ONE, YOUR FIRST REACTION TO THE QUESTION, WHAT IS THE CONFLICT ABOUT? I KNOW THAT THE CONFLICT HAS A HISTORY BUT WHAT IS IT ABOUT?

You know, the conflict... the conflict is about, of course you your theoreticians of history, of politicians, tended to think about United States as a very non-ideological society. But that's quite wrong. That's quite wrong in my view. The United States is much more ideological society and much more ideologically minded even political system than for example, Western Europeans are now. And Soviet Union, of course, also was from the very beginning very ideological minded, state and the system. And ideology is not something artificially created by a group of intellectuals, you know. Ideology is rooted, of course, in the social structures, in political systems and so on. And you have your manifest destiny, and we have our manifest destiny. And there was, I would say, the great clash between two manifest destinies quite opposite in very many respects. And it was not just the coincidence of subjective factors, that the United States was the last state among capitalist states, which recognized officially Soviet Union. But the history of more than 70 years after great...revolution demonstrated that a lot of things are changing. And we have to be much more realistic about our own system, about its problems and even failures. And I think that the United States had a lot of chances American people had a lot of chances to look at the United States more critically, and more I would say, mmmm, even negatively of what was accomplished by the United States both inside and outside. And I hope that this self- critical attitude of your people and our people to ourselves first of all,...would be major factor which will affect Soviet-American relations and our capability to deal with each other and to deal with the rest of the world. We still believe in our basic values. Still believe... in our founding fathers' ideas. And I think that now now after this year or so in our development, which we are very critical about, now we even more... more rely not by words, but by heart in the ideals of our founding fathers, of the ideas of Lenin and his close associates. You know, and what we are doing now, we are trying to restore... to restore what we are... we're fighting for and starving for. But it does not contradict at all with what I said about more realistic a view on ourselves and on the United States. And what we could accomplish with the United States. And I have also some other source, you know. I need, now I have a little bit different view. For example, on what... where are the roots of our collaboration during WWII? During WWII. You know it was not just a very pragmatic, in my view, alliance. Of two in a spirit for example of real politic of European powers of 18 or, 18, or 19th century. To some extent, yes. There was some element of it. But on the other hand, I would say that...

COME OUT TO THE CONCLUSION. COME OUT TO THE PRESENT.

I should say that during WWII, our countries, our people were fighting for the common cause. Not only in sense of the survival of the states, and the nation. But we were fighting also for the common cause in sense of preserving and developing democracy. And I think that if we take the ideas of our founding fathers of the democracy, socialize the democracy, and there ideals of American founding fathers of democracy. There were the, though they were different founding fathers, I am much more in favor of Jefferson than in favor of Hamilton for example. We would find that some basic elements are very, very similar. And both for your society, and four our society, for our basic democratic ideals, though they were not developed by that... that moment. Nazi's and Fascism was the greatest enemy. And let's remember for example that when the Nazi's came into the power, they first destroyed Communists, then social democrats. Then they destroyed old centrists. And they finished with conservatives. Chancellor Brüning who practically opened the door for Hitler. Had to escape and he went to Switzerland and was afraid all the time being assassinated and so on.