So, I remember very well the time when all this... job about compiling the text of the interim agreement as well as the... ABM Treaty was finished. It was in Helsinki in May 1979, and Minister Semyonov who was the head of our delegation at that time he went with all these documents to Moscow, to present them to the leaders of our states, that is General-Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon for them to sign these documents. And well, there was kind of a festivity for us after very... energetic efforts to reach an agreement... to have that kind of an occasion and to live through it. And we were left behind the rest of the delegations and I remember watching the procedure of signing these documents in Moscow, in Kremlin on the TV. While there was the feeling of great success... which was achieved by our two countries in a very important field which in fact I felt it this way that period of time and I feel it now, that it really opened the way to the whole process of the limitation of strategic weapons and that is a very important process, and I strongly believe that it should be continued.

CAN YOU GO BACK TO THE FIRST MEETING?

Well, the first contacts with the American delegation I, I wouldn't say there was something special about it; we started rather smoothly, and both sides immediately began working seriously, raising concrete problems and discussing them in detail, though they were new problems never before discussed at the Soviet-American negotiations. So... both sides were extremely fair and attentive in their formulations and I think that kind of an atmosphere of being exact and I would say strict in the formulations serious it became the atmosphere of the negotiations all through.

APPARENTLY DURING SALT I, IT WAS THE AMERICAN DELEGATION WHICH PRESENTED PROPOSALS, IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OR WEAPONS, AND THE SOVIETS RESPONDED, DO YOU REMEMBER IT THAT WAY?

Uh... proposals were made by both sides, and this is the only way, to achieve a solution. They would discuss the proposals of both sides and in the end, though, it was possible to come to an agreement.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY MISUNDERSTANDING THAT WAS BASED ON CULTURE, MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT ONE IS INTENDING OR TRYING?

I don't think there were any special difficulties to this score. Um... what was important since the very beginning to try to translate correctly English text into Russian, and to establish the, I would say, even certain clichés so that not to mix up things. Because the problems are important and you have to, convey them in a certain established language. And it is true, I think, of both sides. And this job was done also, and I remember even our interpreters to consult with each other about the meaning of this or that sentence this or that expression, and even up to this day that kind of work continues.

SO IT CREATED SOME STANDARDS OF DEALING WITH EACH OTHER ABOUT THESE KINDS OF SUBJECTS.

Oh, yes. That's that's exactly the problem. Um you have your own I must say how can say list of special terms... describing the strategic problems... so we do we have the same. And we have to make them coincide in meaning, in order to achieve a common language; there is no other way.

DO YOU REMEMBER SPECIFIC PEOPLE IN THE AMERICAN DELEGATION?

It would be difficult for me to comment on the behavior of Paul Nitze at that time or Gerard Smith or Raymond Garthoff whom I remember very well and whom I mean, especially Paul Nitze or Raymond Garthoff; I met them since that time several, on several occasions. But at the time of SALT I, I was not in the position to have long conversations with them on the subject matter. I was much lower level than they were in that period. But still I remember, some conversations with Paul Nitze, when for instance we went to... different places in Finland in the intervals between the meetings and I remember him telling the story of his life and he was quite human, and you know, you should, I think, judge the behavior of this or that participant in a negotiations, whether American or Soviet by the result of the negotiations, and the result was a success.

WE WERE TOLD BY MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION THAT THE SOVIETS PREFERRED TO DISCUSS PRINCIPLES RATHER THAN SPECIFICS.

This is not my impression. Um from time to time due to my participation now, in the nuclear and space weapons... talks I refer myself to the scripts of the negotiations. And there you may find, if you read them a lot of details raised by the Soviet side as well as a lot of general problems raised by the American side, and vice versa.

WHAT WAS YOUR IMPRESSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GERARD SMITH AND VLADIMIR SEMYONOV? I KNOW THAT IT'S NOT A MATTER OF PERSONALITIES, BUT...?

Mmmm.... To my mind both of them are diplomats of a very high standard and I think their personal relationship was normal and businesslike. Personally, it seems to me, and that is my conviction they...made a lot to achieve agreements which came through in the end.

THERE IS A CRITICISM LEVIED VERY OFTEN BY PEOPLE WHO OPPOSED THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT SAYS THAT THERE IS A DYNAMICS OF THE NEGOTIATION, WHICH IS IT DOESN'T TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT BOTH NEGOTIATORS WANT VERY MUCH AGREEMENT, AND ARE NOT AS CAREFUL.

Oh, yes. To my mind, it would be extremely strange if a negotiator comes to a negotiating table with a desire not to achieve an agreement. It sounds rather absurd. Um... especially in the kind of business we are talking about that is the curbing of the armaments race. The goal itself is so important that one should expect the other side to start and lead negotiations with the aim of achieving an agreement. Uh... and what is of great importance is that both delegations, Soviet delegation as well as the American delegation consisted, and they still consist now at different negotiations we are having of the representatives of different... organizations, different departments from the government. So this is not a, a personal undertaking to have these negotiations and achieve an agreement. This is the undertaking of the side. And besides both, as far as I know the United States as well they are very carefully supervised by the government, and not as I said by some specific agency, but by a group of agencies. And in that kind of a procedure ensures I think both the American side as well... as on the Soviet side the acceptance of the decisions which correspond to the national if you may, or state interests of both sides.

WERE YOU AT THE TIME AWARE OF THE SECOND CHANNEL?

Yes, the Soviet side knew about it and the American side knew about it too. -- You know I said about the role of the governments which supervised the whole process of negotiations. This is the final responsibility of the governments, to conclude agreements, and as far as the delegations are concerned, they prepare text on which they reach an agreement and returned to their governments, and they say the last word. And the leaders of the state in the end sign them.

YOU KNOW THAT ON THE AMERICAN SIDE THERE WAS A FAIR AMOUNT OF CRITICISM THAT THE PROCESS WAS DESTRUCTIVE... DID YOU GO TO A PARTY WHEN THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED? YOU WERE STILL IN HELSINKI RIGHT?

Yes, we were, yeah, we were staying at our hotel the American delegation stayed at some other place, I don't remember exactly what was the name of the hotel but we were in a different place, and so we stayed as we were. There were the, there was no joint party.

WHAT HAPPENED WITHIN DELEGATIONS AT HELSINKI?

We applauded.

DID IT TAKE ...THE PREPARATION OF THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT?

No... I did not in fact that was made here, in Moscow, all the preparation; at that time, as far as I remember, very close to Vladivostok; that took place a session of the negotiations between the... delegations, and so all the preparatory work for Vladivostok was made on our side in Moscow. If I remember correctly, that was my impression at that time.

DO YOU CARE TO COMMENT ABOUT KISSINGER?

HOW DID YOU FEEL AT THIS TIME ABOUT SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER?

I think Kissinger's role at that time as the US Secretary of State was important in... the preparation of the agreements in SALT I, and again... I must say I made my conclusions about his activities at that time by the results of what was achieved.

TELL ME ABOUT IT. TELL ME ABOUT THE RESULTS OF SALT II.

Oh, well of course the work which was done during SALT I helped a lot in discussing things further on when SALT II started. SALT II began by the end of 1979 the... major difference in the circumstances was the change of place. We... started to meet in Geneva, without change in places and going... first to Helsinki, then to Vienna. Oh... well, and there were some changes in the composition of the Soviet delegation as well as of the American delegations but the core of the dele-, delegations remained the same. And I think to my mind it also helps that sometime when you obtain certain personal knowledge of your counterpart to... make things smoother in the negotiations. Though of course this is only I must say a human touch. The most important thing is the position of the side. Um... so working on the basis of the ABM Treaty as well as of the interim agreement there was a good impetus for us, though it took both sides how many, seven years to achieve SALT II there was a baseline... from which the work was done. This is important.

THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS WAS THAT OF LINKAGE.

What do you mean by linkage?

LINKING THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION OF THE WEAPONS WITH POLITICAL CONFLICTS WHICH ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED?

No, we didn't discuss that kind of regional issues, let us say, or any kind or any other issues of that kind at the negotiations between the delegations. We sticked to our topic. It does not mean that the Soviet side is against cooling down these regional conflicts, not at all. Uh we are in favor of solving these problems as well, but to our mind corresponding forums should be used for this purpose. While the purpose of curbing the arms race of limiting offensive limiting strategic weapons, belongs not only to the United States and the Soviet Union; this is a task of paramount importance. And I'm of the conviction that if this problem is solved it will be of great benefit to a positive change of the situation everywhere and in this connection all these the regional issues can be solved much more successfully.

DIDN'T THOSE REGIONAL ISSUES AT TIMES AFFECT THE ATMOSPHERE, IF NOT THE SUBSTANCE?

Of course I cannot speak for the American delegation but I'm speaking about the feelings of myself my colleagues and as I told you previously we sticked to our job; we think that a lot of issues not related to the questions which we're discussing should not be the obstacle for achieving an agreement on nuclear arms. This is the issue, if you may, of all life and death... for everybody, and we consider it of paramount importance, and the question of linkage, in the style as it is sometimes raised by some people, let's say in the United States I don't share that kind of an approach.

WHERE WERE YOU WHEN SALT II WAS SIGNED?

Where I was? Uh... well when it was signed... I was in Vienna, and I was in the hall where it was signed. In fact I traveled with Ambassador Karpov to Vienna carrying in my bag the text of the treaty to be signed. It was prepared in Geneva. So... I think the American delegation did the same.

HOW DID YOU FEEL?

That was a major event, and I felt not only relaxation after very difficult job we did, especially in the last several weeks before the whole text of the treaty was ready. But... the major feeling was that of joy, that of something really important was happening, and really did happen. And I think that was the atmosphere of the this hall in the Harbor Palace. That was really a lofty atmosphere. And again... I felt that the next very important barrier was taken, a very important step was made in the process of SALT, in the process of limiting strategic armaments.

...SOMETHING THAT WILL REFLECT HIS FEELINGS AND HIS EMOTIONS?

Really I wouldn't dare to quote him because that was long ago, and I can only say about the general feeling which both of us felt, had at that time. That was the feeling of joy, the feeling of the very important responsibility fulfilled by us, as far as the delegation was concerned. And we really expected a... many more important event to come, but is signing of the treaty by the leaders of our state, and it happened and well, we... returned home... both of us feeling that some part of our efforts was there in this important undertaking.

YOU KNOW THAT MOST OF THE PEOPLE WHO NEGOTIATED SALT I WERE EITHER FIRED OR REMOVED FROM THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SCENE, WHILE PEOPLE LIKE YOU HAVE PROGRESSED AND ADVANCED. IS THERE ANY EXPLANATION FOR THIS THAT COMES TO YOUR MIND?

Well, it's difficult to explain that kind of things, because you know the fates of people, they are couriers, they depend upon many things, on very unexpected circumstances. Uh... speaking about the Soviet side I must say that here we have a continuity of a political line in our efforts to achieve with the American side important and effective agreements about limitation of strategic weapons, nuclear weapons. Um... so what really did happen to the members of American team is to be explained by the participants of your film from the American side.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE RUSSIAN TEAM?

Well, once we... tried just for ourselves to... enumerate all the people who participated in the negotiations since 1969, and at one point we... refused to continue, because we counted rather many people. So... if you... speak about the heads of the delegations here they are Semyonov became, and he served for many years as our ambassador to Bonn; Ambassador Karpov now is chief of one of the departments dealing with disarmament in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador Semyonov also works with the Ministry, and I suspect he also gave you an interview. That was you who took the interview of, on Ambassador Semyonov at his flat, as far as I know?

THAT'S RIGHT.

I don't know it was you now; I suspect it was you. Because he told me about this interview. So this is, uh--

DID HE FIND IT INTERESTING?

Oh, yes, he did. And he enjoyed it very much and —

SO DID WE.

Oh, good. He has quite some something to look at his place.

YEAH, BESIDES HIS WIFE.

Yes....

UH.

So, this is a very short history I mean about the personalities we had two chief of the nego-, the two chiefs of the negotiation from the Soviets.

AND THEY BOTH PROSPERED CAN YOU MAKE IT A SENTENCE...?

Oh, I see, I see. Oh, so, from the Soviet side we have had during the whole process of the negotiations on strategic weapons since 1969 the two heads of the delegations. The first one was Minister Semyonov, and second Ambassador Karpov, who is now the head of our delegation in Geneva at the Nuclear and Space arms talks. So here, as I said how history is short, I mean it deals only with two persons.

WHICH HAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF HUMANITY IN TERMS OF SATISFACTIONS AND TENSIONS AND SO ON.

Oh, it's of a very broad question.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY INCIDENTS THAT YOU FOUND ENTERTAINING?

I started racking my mind about it when I heard the same question put to General Lebedev. And I really... remember a story told me by one American colleague from the American delegation after the signing of the SALT treaty. And unfortunately I don't remember the name who exactly... told me so, and I couldn't try to guess so that, not to make a mistake. But the story was to the effect that when the members of the American delegations went to Vienna carrying with them the copy of the English copy, their copy of you know, the treaty they put it into in an attaché case. And this attaché case was to go through this mechanism which feels for all kinds of you know, unnecessary subjects that, you know at the airport. But when it came through this mechanism this American gentleman found out that there were two attaché cases that, exactly the same. And so at first he was really at a loss which was the right attaché case. But then they found it out properly, and so... they proceeded to Vienna, so everything... went all right. Well, this is one of the... small episodes which I can remember.

ANY MORE?

Next time, perhaps.