You received instructions from President Eisenhower and from Secretary Dulles before you left for Vietnam. Why did they think an American presence was necessary there, and what were their assessments of your chances for success?

Well, actually, we had an American presence in Vietnam, an ambassador there. Ambassador Heath, Donald Heath. But Heath's tour was about up, and he was due to relieve, to be relieved and Ambassador Harrington, who was our Representative in Hong Kong, had not yet reported into duty there, and ah, President Eisenhower knew that I had visited ah Vietnam on a couple of occasions. As a matter of fact, I had gone down there first in 1933.

Ah. I was stationed in the Philippines at that time and had an opportunity to go up, purely as a sightseer. I went up very largely to see the great ruins of Angkor in Cambodia, but I'd traveled up through the area where much of the fighting later on occurred, particularly through the rubber plantations, and then in, in about 1951, as I recall rightly, ah, Marshal de Lattre, who was the French Commander in Vietnam invited me ah down to Vietnam st... to take a look see.

I think very largely in order that, that our government could have a better understanding that the French were running into. So, I met Marshal de Lattre in Saigon, flew up with him to... and incidentally, young John Kennedy rode on that plane. He was a young congressman from, at that time.

But did Dulles and Eisenhower discuss with you a little bit of a history of why we were there and ah how Vietnam figured in our stance against communism? That's what I meant really...

Oh, I see. Yes...Yes, they did and ah, ah, Dulles particularly felt that our chances of success, that is, our chances of reinforcing the French and preventing the takeover of Vietnam by the communists wasn't better than about 50/50, as a matter of fact.

Did he say why?

Well, because the French had just been defeated at Dien Bien Phu... The, the ah the communists had the French on the run from a military standpoint. The, after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the French had asked us for help and ah we had said, no, we couldn't do anything then, but later as the condition got worse in Vietnam, then it was quite apparent that the French were not going to be able to hold off ah the communists. Then, they decided to ask for help from the United States, both ah military help and military aid from ah, from the monetary standpoint.

Did you get any sense from Dulles of that particular intensity that he ha... felt about fighting communism and holding the line in South Vietnam? Can you talk a little bit about that?

Yes. Of course, Mr. Dulles ah was a strong anti-communist and he felt that we had to draw a line somewhere to stop the communists, and out in the pacific it would be, it would involve Si... Vietnam. So, he emphasized that point. That we would have to do our best. And, this is one of the reasons to stop communism, and this is one of the reasons, I imagine, that they wanted to have a military man go down there to try and reinforce and reorganize the local Vietnamese army and to strengthen the French temporarily, but only temporarily.

Then, what was to happen? O... if this was only a temporary assignment?

Well, I was to develop a program then for aid to Vietnam, not solely military aid, because we already had a very competent man down there, military man in Mike O'Daniel. Old Iron Mike. And, ah, no, they wanted someone who had some experience in international affairs and who might draw up a program of military and economic aid ah that would reinforce the local government of Diem.

Right. Could you tell us the story of your arrival in Saigon? Who wasn't there and why?

Yes. Well, I had been associated with ah the commanding general of the French forces ah down there as on a as a member of the standing group of NATO. After I retired as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eisenhower had asked me to stay on active duty as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group, and my opposite number in the French was General Paul Ely. So, I had gotten to know Ely and had a good ad... a good deal of admiration for him, and we had a very friendly basis.

When I arrived in Saigon, my first intimation that the French were not too enthusiastic about my coming (chuckle) was that Paul Ely was not there at the airport to re... to help greet me which in French courtesy condition would have been the thing to do. So, I realized then that the French were not going to be too enthusiastic. Ely had gone up to Da Lat, D-A-L-A-T, up in the mountains which was a summer capital of ah Vietnam at that time.

But, rather than take affront at that, since I was going to have to get along with Ely and we had gotten along well, as a members of the standing group, I decided to go up and visit de Lattre. So, the first thing I did was to fly up there, call on Paul and he began to melt a little bit after I explained my mission and, thereafter, why we got along handsomely together.

Why was he and why were the French unhappy about your mission?

Because they wanted to still retain a French presence, as they called it, in Vietnam. In other words, they still wanted in the backs of their minds and hearts, they still wanted to have French, ah, as a maj...France as a major ally, as you might say, and guide to the Diem government.

What were their views of the communists and a possible communist takeover? I mean, did they have a different about holding the line than we Americans did?

No, I don't think so. They were, they were very much interested in preventing the takeover and the only tak... and the only persons that could, or the only nation that could take over would be the, the communists. Not nation, but a group, at, would be the communists and ah, ah, oh...

Viet Minh? Is that what you mean?

Beg pardon?

Let's cut for a minute, please and rest. Do you want to have a sip of water?

Ya.

Could you tell us the story of your meeting with Dulles?

I reported to Mr. Dulles ah and ah was met by a number of men from the State Department and one or two from the Department of Defense also. Mr. Dulles emphasized the fact that, in his judgment, the communists would take over, unless the United States came to the aid of the French, both economically and to a certain extent, from a military point of view. He said that the, he thought the chances of our success would be not greater than about 50 percent, but that he thought it was worthwhile, cause Mr. Dulles was strongly anti communist, and he was trying to build up a wall around the world, actually, to hold back the advance of communism, and this was part of that program.

Excellent. Next one was, you arrived at the airport, a, Ely didn't meet you, we heard that. What were your impressions of the political situation in that country when you arrived?

Well, when I arrived (chuckle) in Saion, Saigon, it was chaotic. There's no question about that. The very day that I arrived, the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese army ah Hinh, H-I-N-H, was inveighing against Diem and ah his presence there over a radio that was supported, as a matter of fact, by US aid. Well, I put a stop to that right off the bat, I can assure you.

I got to know Hinh later on, and ah I thought one of the first things that I ought to do is to make clear to General Hinh that I was going to support Mr. Diem which was part of, one of the major points of my instructions from General Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles. And, Hinh said that he was going to stay on and he hinted that he would start a rebellion. I assured him that if he did that, then all military aid to Vietnam would cease, and so, finally, by putting pressure on Hinh, I got him to leave town, oh, in about a week. And, he, aaaa, as a matter of fact, he never returned again. He came back once part way, but he never got back into Diem, into, into ah Vietnam.

I guess you made quite an impression on him?

What was your assessment of what Diem was faced with when you arrived?

Well, he was faced with a mountain of problems. First of all, he was ah, he was a Roman Catholic, and a very devout one in a Buddhist country, which was a mark against him right off. He was really from the north, or north central part of the country where Saigon and the political rulers of the country were down in the south. So, they had ah that against him also. In addition, he had, he didn't have any great political skill. Maybe we could touch on that perhaps a little later, but he was also faced with the opposition from three organized groups in South Vietnam.

First, the Cao Dai. These names are fascinating to me. The Cao Dai was a, was basically a ah sect that had charge of, had control rather, over a large part of the farm, farming country or the rice producing area of South Vietnam. They were ahh, had their own little army, which the French had supported on the side, which was not pro Diem. In addition, there was another group known as the, the ah, the Cao Dai.

Let's cut.

Did I say Cao Dai first?

Ya, you said...

Tell... Go ahead.

Tell me about these sects that were lined up against Diem?

There were three of these groupings. All very powerful. Each with its own private army. Ah. First the Cao Dai. I think these names are fascinating to me. Ah. The Cao Dai were a Buddhist group who controlled a great deal of the, the best farmland in old Cochinchina. They had their own private army which was supported, privately on the side, by the French. Strongly anti Diem.

The next group was the Hoa Hao, another wonderful name. They were headed by a man by the name of Phuong and they had their own private army and controlled another section of the farmland. Ah, down in, in ah South Cochinchina. The third group was another interesting one called the Binh Xuyen, B-I-N-H X-U-Y-E-N, headed by a, by a guy that would have made his way very nicely in the Chicago underworld of that time. Bay Vien was his name. He controlled the secret police mind you of Vietnam.

He also controlled all the houses of prostitution and the gambling joints in Cochinchina... in Cho Lon, the French, the suburb of Saigon, and this was the source of his strength, the monetary, money end of it. These three groups were tolerated by the French, and as I say were supported, to a certain extent, on the side. None of them was very enthusiastic about having this Catholic pure man ah as head of the government, you see. So, the all constantly threw up opposition against him.

Excellent. Can you talk a little bit now about the other group that was a problem for Diem, which was the communists in the countryside? What was your assessment of this, of their strength and the quality of their organization?

Well, of course, they had proven their strength by defeating the French army.

Can you start over and say well, the communists had proven their strength?

Oh, the pro... the communists, of course, had proven their strength by defeating the French at ah oh goodness...

Bien Phu... You can start it over again.

Ya. Well, of course, the communists had had proven their strength by defeating the French army at Bien Phu, a short time before the French finally asked for help. As a matter of fact, at that time I was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs. No. I had just left the JCS. They had asked for, for very strong help on the ground.

General Ridgeway sent, who was my successor as Chief of Staff of the Army, sent a party over to, to Vietnam to survey the situation and recommended against it and had I been on active duty I also would have recommended against the idea of putting American troops on the ground in Vietnam. This was a different story from ah Korea. See. Annn—and a lot of people have this confused. In Korea, we went in under the aegis of the United Nations. Had we gone into Vietnam at that time, we would have done it as we later did, on our own, and this made a vast difference in the general attitude of the Congress and of the American people.

I agree. Um. But let's go back to the communists in the countryside. When you arrived in Vietnam, what was your assessment of their strength?

Well, their, st... they were very strong. They controlled most of the roads, for example, that led from the north down into Saigon. You had to be very careful and had to have protection and the French, to travel around in the countryside. The French had put up a series of, of outposts along the main highways, and there were constant ah ah sabotage against them an, and hijacking of people that were traveling north and south.

So, it had to be done with a military escort. Of course, I flew most of the time from Saigon. When I, when I went up to see General Ely in Da Lat, I flew there, but I also traveled a good many of the roads at various times. But, the communists dominated the countryside, particularly to the north of Saigon. Ah. They had practically full control, not exactly but de facto control of the countryside.

When we talked before, you told me a little bit about your sense of their organization and how they worked. Could you expand on that a bit? Sort of ah start again by saying that they controlled a lot of land, but why? Why were they so strong at this point?

Well, the communists had wormed their way into control of the south, not entirely against the wishes of the countryside people, because they had opposed the French. They were ah the French didn't always ah ah use the best judgment in handling the local people, and ah the, the communists felt that they could do better and had persuaded the farmers, for example, and the people on the countryside, that they could get more from a government not controlled by the French, even though it was controlled by the communists. And, so, basically, a goodly portion of the people in the countryside were... they were not so much pro communists as they were anti French, and anti Diem, after Diem took control.

Very good. What were your first impressions of President Diem when you first met him? What do you remember? You know, what did he look like and how did he strike you?

Right. Well, of course, as soon as I arrived in, in Saigon I called on President D-I-E-M. He spells it Z-I-E-M but it's pronounced Ziem. He met me, as he often did later on, at the head of some marble steps that led up from the entrance to the Norodom Palace which he had taken over, and as I looked up the stairway there, here was this short, pudgy little man ah not at all impressive in appearance, but very polite and very solicitous of greeting me ahhh in a friendly fashion, because he knew that I was coming over to help him to establish a government there.

My impression of him was that, even at this moment, was that he was not a man of great strength. Quite a good deal of personal charm, but he didn't impress me even then as a man who would be strong, as he later proved to be. And, of course, I had no idea how competent he was at that time.

Ah. Most people that we talk to, whatever complaints they have about Diem have a certain amount of personal affection for him.

I came to know him and to develop a personal affection for him in a mild way. Ah. He was, in my judgment, a completely honest, dedicated patriot, given to trying to help his country as best he could. And, so, I always had a personal ah touch of affection ah for him. I got to know him very well. I saw him frequently and I always found him quite direct in his dealings with me, but there was always in the back that he didn't agree with what we were trying to do, but we got along very well on a personal basis.

Did you sense the influence of his brother and his brother's wife? Can you talk a little bit about this family?

Right. Drink of wa... a bit of water here.

Okay. Did you have any difficulties in dealing with Diem and in getting him to take action?

Had a great deal of difficulty ah getting him to take action. He would, he was an Oriental, after all, and the Orientals are pretty devious in what they do ah in promising as compared to what they do in action. And, furthermore, Diem was a very shy man naturally. He didn't, he was a mandarin, really above the level of the average ah farmer, for example, in in ah the countryside.

It is difficult for him to get down to their level. I did persuade him to take one trip out of Saigon, to go back up to his home province, and it was a great success and he came back enthusiastic about it. But, I could never get him to go back again. He was just shy and he didn't have the, the natural ah political ah know how as to how to get out and meet people. Just wasn't in him. His brother was a different story. Ah. His brother ah Nho...

Nhu.

Nhu.

Start over and say his Brother, Nhu.

His brother Nhu and hi... Nhu's vixenous wife, who really were the powers behind the throne, behind Diem (coughing in the background. Pause.)

You want some water.

Were your conclusions? What was your assessment of Diem's abilities as an administrator?

Well, why I liked the man and had a great administration for his personal honesty, I soon came to be convinced that he lacked administrative ability. He simply, first of all, he was a mandarin. He couldn't get out and at the level of the people of the countryside. It, that was beneath his tradition as a mandarin of the old school. The second thing was that he was dependent ah too much on his family. He had five brothers all told, but the most important one was Brother Nhu and this man and his wife who was a vixen of the first order, they came to dominate in Diem in almost every political sense, at any rate. Behind the scenes only.

You never saw his brothers in public to amount to anything. At least, I didn't. They, the Vietnamese did because ah his wi... Nhu's wife organized the women's support for Diem, and she was very active political and very skillful also. Diem, himself, didn't have that kind of skill. He was a fine man personally but he lacked administrative ability, and ah that was one of his basic faults.

One of the major aspects of that was his inability to delegate authority to anybody, that is, to anybody that had ability because, frankly, what Brother Nhu and ah the Diem family were endeavoring to do I became convinced was to set up a Diem dynasty or a Nhu dynasty as a replacement of the Bao Dai dynasty of the past. This was their real objective. I'm convinced that Diem’s objective was the improvement of his country.

Improvement of the conditions of life of the people, improving of the financial and other conditions. But, this was not the case, in my judgment, for the Nhu family. They were out primarily for the benefit of the Nhu family, the traditional business of having a family dominate the political aspects of the country. So, I could never get him to broaden his government, which was one of, one of Mr. Dulles' admonitions to me when I first went out there, was to try to get the government to be more representative of the people.

I could never get Diem to take in anybody of real ability to assist in the organization of the government, or to organize ah a modern type of an assembly to guide him. Later on, I did develop a seven point program for the improvement of the government, which covered all aspects of my mission, not solely the military aspects of it. Cut for a minute. Now, would you want me to go into this...

How did the presence of a lot of Catholic refugees from the north affect the situation in the south?

Well it's important to understand that, when the Geneva accords were made, an agreement was made with France to divide Vietnam at the 17th parallel. And, anyone north of the parallel was permitted to move south and vice versa, anyone south of the parallel, could move north, if they chose. About 900,000 Catholics, under their village Catholic priests moved from north to south. There was only a handful of people that moved from south to north to get away from the Diem government.

These refugees, as I say, came down under their parish priests. They were settled ah by parishes in areas that were prepared for them by the South Vietnamese government. But, they remained as Catholic enclaves in a Buddhist country, and very much as the southerners following our Civil War objected to the carpetbaggers that came from the north and took over a good many of the political posts in the south, so, also, the South Vietnamese, Buddhists, strongly objected to this Catholic groupings of the Diem adherents who came south.

They were never really assimilated into the, into the people of the south. They never had any part in the government later on. They became foreigners so far as the southerners were concerned. And, and this affected the general support of the countryside for the Diem government. It was referred to as a Catholic government, for example, and this was reinforced by the visits of Cardinal Spellman, who came over to visit Vietnam during my time there.

And, when he arrived ah banners were put up in the streets ah hailing this archbishop, or this cardinal, hailing the Catholic Church with the colors of the, of the cardinal, and this didn't set, sit very well with the, with the Buddhists either, of course. In addition, after Spellman had been there, there were two different high ranking Catholic prelates who came while, at the invitation probably of Diem, although I don't know that this was the case, and each time we had the same hubbub about a Catholic government, which the Buddhists in in ah Vietnam never agreed.

I finally decided to ask ah, I don't recall whether I contacted Cardinal Spellman, whom I knew personally, or whether I, I persuaded Diem not to invite any more Catholic prelates there, because politically, it was ah, it was not an asset. It was a counter asset to the Diem government. His government became known to the opponents as a Catholic government, which didn't sit very well with the Buddhists.

Very good answer. Um. You eventually concluded that Diem wasn't going to make it, and you reported this to Washington. How was your report received in Washington, and in particular, what was Senator Mansfield's reaction?

Ya. Well, after I had ah developed a program to assist the Diem government in a very broad way, not solely in a military way, which Diem never really tried to implement, I became convinced... Well, that fact, plus the fact that I was never able to persuade him to bring into the government anybody of real ability. That, he would never be able really to, to, to create a government that would be truly representative of his ah adherents in the south, and much to my regret, I finally had to report to Washington gradually that I was becoming convinced that Diem didn't have the political skills nor did he have the personality to really manage a government in Vietnam, and I so reported to Washington.

As a result of that, ah, the adherents of Diem in Washington, particularly in the Congress, Senator Mansfield who at that time I think was Head of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, a Mrs. Green who was a very powerful force in the house and one or two others, mostly Catholics, where that slant ah began to develop a backfire against any thought of removing Diem.

I ha... I hadn't suggested at that time that we give up on Diem but I wa... I did point out to Washington that I was becoming convinced that Diem would not make the grade. Later on, after I came back to Washington and discussed the situation here with members of the State Department and some of the Congressmen also, and probably with ah Senator Mansfield, although I don't recall that for certain, I then went back to, to Saigon.

Hold on. We're out of film.

What were your conclusions about Diem and how was your report received in Washington?

Well, my final conclusion after much thought and much, I must say, heart wringing frankly because I liked Diem but I became convinced that he did not have the political knack nor the strength of character, politically, to manage this bizarre collection of people in, in, in ah Vietnam. I could never get him to broaden his government, which was one of the chief objectives that I'd received from Mr. Dulles. Ah. He wouldn't take in anybody who had real ability, and the reason was not so much Diem himself as it was these two people ah behind the throne who really managed the country.

Brother Nhu and his wife, Madame Nhu. They di... they wanted to build up the a Nhu government frankly, and so I could never get Diem to broaden the government, as he should have, if it was going to be a success. When I finally became convinced of that, I, I really then had to come to a decision as to whether I was going to recommend continued support for Mr. Diem or not. This was brought to a head by the fact that Paul Ely had said that no longer could he support Diem. He had only supported Diem halfheartedly anyhow.

So, I finally had to report to, to Washington that rather than waste additional money in supporting an army for Diem and giving condi... continued economic aid, that we would finally have to decide whether we were going to do that or whether we were going to try some alternative. And, I finally recommended that, unless Diem could broaden his government, could show political acumen to manage the country, then we ought to finally withdraw our support.

This was vigorously opposed by Senator Mansfield, by Senator Kennedy and by ah Mrs. Kelly in the House, who was another Catholic. There was this little Catholic group. I happen to be a Catholic, but nevertheless, I became convinced that there was to great a, an influence in Vietnam of ahh Diem and his Catholicism, that this was mitigating against his ability to keep contact with the people and to establish leadership for the people as a whole. And, I so finally had to report to the Congress.

What were, what was Lansdale's relation to an influence on Diem, and what was your relationship with Lansdale?

Well, he had considerable influence with Diem, ah Lansdale did. He was out there without really as far as I can recall, without any official government position from the State Department at least. But, he did have considerable influence on Diem. He had stayed with Diem ah during a gre... a good deal of the time when he was out there. He also had considerable influence with Brother Nhu, because he was convinced that Diem did have the ability, which I became convinced Diem did not have.

So, as far as I know, Lansdale was giving one set of recom... of advice to his representatives in the State Department who was Allen Dulles ah who probably was responsible for his going out there. Allen Dulles, you may recall, at that time was head of the CIA. And, while Lansdale never officially admitted that, de facto he was a CIA man, as far as I know, out there at the time. It, the point came finally when I had to make clear to Lansdale that I was the, the ambassador there and this is one of the things that Ike emphasized to me when he read my instructions.

He said, Joe, this is the best set of instructions that I've ever read that was given to an ambassador because you are in charge of all aspects of the Embassy and this is where Lansdale and I parted company. According to Lansdale, he finally one day up and left at that. I don't recall that and I've never been able to confirm that. I assure you that had he left, he would never have come back again. This might have put me in ah opposition to some of the people here in Washington, but it never occurred.

Okay. Uh.

Now the other man that had a good deal of influence with Diem was from Michigan State University. Ah. Mr. Wesley Fishel.

Can we start that over?

Ya. Start that over, please.

Ya. The other man who, aside from the government representatives, who had a good deal of influence on Mr. Diem and his brothers, was Wesley Fishel from Michigan State University. They had a contract, I think, maybe before I got out there with the Diem government to develop a police force independent of the Binh Xuyen, for example, which was a good move, of course.

But Wes Fishel had ambitions also to take over, not only that aspect of it, but a good many other things. And, ah, with the support of the State Department, I finally had to make clear to Michigan State that, while we appreciated what Wesley Fishel was doing, it was my job to develop a broader program, a... aspects of the economic ah assistance that we might give to Vietnam. And, Fishel accepted that.

Cut for a minute. Ahm.

How important was aid from America to the survival of the Diem government in these early days?

I think it was crucial. Certainly so far as the military aid was concerned. We had to develop an army that was, that would really fight. We had a very able man, Mike, General to Mike O'Daniel there, and I had no direct responsible for that. I delegated that to Mike, and he supervised the training, but this cost money and so we did give the Vietnamese government ah military aid in order that they could, while they reduced the numbers of the standing army to three combat divisions, enough money was given to Mike O'Daniel so that he could begin the training of noncommissioned officers and Vietnamese officers, because an important point was that the Fre... former French officers retained their command in any cases over the ah the Diem forces, even though they were anti Diem.

They had dual citizenship. They were, were, retained citizenship as French officers and as Vietnamese. And, this was one of the good things that Diem put a stop to. He, he said you've got to either be Vietnamese or you're going to be French. And, he made that part of it effective. So, the military aid was an important financial assistance but in addition to that, through MDAP , I can't even remember what those initials mean, but it was the military aid, rather the ah economic aid which was administered by Leland Barrows ah which, which supported the Diem government, particularly in aiding the farmers out in the field, trying to get Diem to parcel out the land, which was owned by the absentee owners of the French, and turning that over to the Vietnamese.

He never really accomplished that, and this was one of his big failures with respect to the, the people in the countryside. The peasants. They had little or no results from the economic program. It was essential from the Vietnamese point of view because they had to keep up some exports and the only way they could export was their rubber. They had fine rubber and big rubber plantations which later became the scene of vicious fighting later on. So, they were dependent on us for both economic aid and for military aid and it was substantial. I don't remember the figures, but it was substantial aid.

Cut, please. I wonder if we could...

Could you describe the economic aid to the Diem government particularly as it related to the refugees and how important it was to them?

Well, I've already covered part of that. In addition to giving them economic aid, which assisted in the parceling out of land to the peasants and things of that ilk, the other aid that they needed was to settle the refugees. These 900,000 refugees from the north who came south. They had ah to build enclaves which involved the construction of tents into which these people could live. Ah. Other facilities. Set up little enclaves separate from the existing towns, for example, or villages. This cost money, and ah an important aspect or important assist that we gave to them in the settlement of the refugees was in this field. We did, they did need some financial help in order to be able to do that. And, it was, I think, an essential part of the overall aid which we gave to the Vietnamese.

Okay.

General, you can begin counting. Now look at the book and begin counting. You have the book open. You have the book open and you're looking at it. And count to yourself to five, slowly.

Aren't you glad the ordeal is over?

Oh, I don't mind it. It's always fascinating to me to...

Let's do it one more time.

Just a moment, General. Right. Be looking at your book and begin counting to five.

I'll bet you're glad this is over now, that we'll all go away. We'll pack up and that will be the end of it.

Right, ha, ha. Oh, you've been very kind and very cooperative and very constructive.

Just a moment.

All right, General, begin looking at your book and count to five. You didn't count to five.

Oh, too soon, huh?

Just a little bit too soon.

All right. You start again.

Count to five and then close the book slowly.

You received instructions from Eisenhower and Dulles before you went out to South Vietnam. I know that they briefed you extensively before your departure. Could you tell us a little about what they said about South Vietnam and what was important about the American presence there?

They didn't say too much about that.