SO THE FIRST THING SIR RICHARD IS, CAN YOU REMEMBER WHAT THE REACTION AMONGST PEOPLE THAT YOU KNEW YOURSELF IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WAS IN 1946 TO THE PASSAGE OF THE MCMAHON ACT IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH CUT US OFF FROM ATOMIC SECRETS?

Well I wasn't in the Ministry of Defense in 1946. I was still in the Admiralty.

WELL, MORE GENERALLY SPEAKING?

The reaction among the people who were directly concerned to it, there were a very limited number of course, the thing was kept extremely close, was one of considerable shock. But I think the circumstances in which it happened, the defection of Klaus Fuchs, all that the reaction of the Americans I suppose was understandable. But it was a break in the special relationship which had persisted all through the war and which had had its first knock, of course, by the abrupt end of Lend-lease by Truman immediately after the war ended.

YES. IN FACT I DON'T THINK KLAUS FUCHS HAPPENED UNTIL TWO OR THREE YEARS LATER, THOUGH.

Well, I'm not sure I can't remember what did cause the, what was the immediate cause.

JUST CONGRESS PASSED THE ACT, REALLY. I MEAN THEY THOUGHT IT WAS THEIR SECRET AND NOBODY ELSE.

Leave that bit out then and I'll stop before I had any reference to him.

IF I COULD ASK YOU TO JUST HAVE ANOTHER CRACK AT IT BUT NOT REFER TO THAT, COULD I? I MEAN WAS IT NOT A BIT STRONGER THAN, IF YOU COULD JUST GIVE US SOME SENSE OF WHY IT WAS SHOCKING. I THINK YOU SAID TO ME ON THE PHONE BEFORE, YOU KNOW, THAT WE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE THING ALL THE WAY THROUGH THE WAR AND THIS HAD BEEN, TO SOME EXTEND, OUR IDEA. IF YOU COULD JUST FILL US IN ON THAT.

OK. I'll do it again then if you want.

SO WHAT WAS THE REACTION TO THE MCMAHON ACT?

Well, I think the reaction was one, among the people who were directly concerned, one of considerable shock, because the original work on the atom bomb had been done in this country. It had been transferred to the United States during the war because our resources were not great enough to produce a product in reasonable time and to be suddenly cut off from that cooperation, which had gone on and we had been joint teams on everything all the time was obviously a great shock.

DO YOU THINK IT'S AT ALL TRUE TO SAY THAT ONE OF THE MOTIVATIONS FOR DECIDING TO GO AHEAD WITH BRITAIN'S BOMB WAS, "WELL, WE'LL SHOW THEM," OR PERHAPS THAT IF WE MANAGED TO MAKE OUR OWN THEN THEY'LL LET US BACK IN AGAIN.

Well, I don't think it was a sort of tit for tat idea. I think the Attlee thought and Bevin thought and there again, the decision was taken by a very small group of people, the Cabinet didn't know, was that it was necessary to go on because of the power of the weapon and the need for the UK to have it.

I MEAN JUST TALK ABOUT THAT, THE SECRECY WHICH WAS HELD. DID ANYONE IN YOUR CIRCLE IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OR THE ADMIRALTY THEN, DID THEY KNOW ABOUT THAT DECISION? IN FACT YOU WERE IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AT THAT TIME.

Well, I knew of it, I knew that there was a group of people in the Ministry of Supply under Lord Portal who were doing this work. But, beyond that, I knew very little.

WHY DO YOU THINK IT WAS KEPT QUITE SO SECRET AS THAT. I MEAN CAN YOU GIVE US AN IDEA OF THE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING THE DECISION.

Well, I can't answer that. I think this was probably the way Attlee worked. I think he was always one for keeping things, you know to the narrowest possible circle and I don't think he thought it was necessary to say anything in particular. And of course, when it was announced by A. V. Alexander in May, 1948 that we were developing an atomic bomb, it passed almost unnoticed in parliament and by the public.

IT CERTAINLY WASN'T A CONTROVERSIAL DECISION?

No, not at all.

WHY DO YOU THINK THAT WAS? CAN YOU GIVE US AN IDEA OF THE ATMOSPHERE OF HOW BRITAIN THOUGHT OF ITSELF PERHAPS AT THAT TIME.

Well, I think we still thought of ourselves as a world power at that time and that this was the sort of weapon a world power needed to have.

NOWADAYS ENGLISH PEOPLE TEND TO THINK OF THEMSELVES AND CERTAINLY AMERICANS TEND TO THINK OF BRITAIN AS "A EUROPEAN COUNTRY." IT WAS A VERY DIFFERENT ATMOSPHERE IN THOSE DAYS WASN'T IT? PERHAPS YOU COULD...

Oh, very different.

WHAT WAS IT LIKE?

I mean, the period immediately after the war was devoted to picking up the pieces and reconstructing the Empire, by getting Singapore back, Hong Kong back, and recovering the position we had before the war had started. And that was right up to 1955, I suppose it was. We still, all the thinking of the Chiefs of Staff and politicians was that Britain was still a world power and had to equip itself accordingly.

WHILE YOU WERE IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN THOSE FAIRLY EARLY YEARS '46, '48 WHERE DID EUROPE, THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE FIGURE IN BRITISH DEFENSE PRIORITIES? WHAT WERE THOSE PRIORITIES?

Well, it didn't really figure all that much, I think as compared with the...

COULD YOU START AGAIN AND SAY THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE DIDN'T FIGURE ALL THAT MUCH

I think the defense of Europe didn't figure as more important than other aspects of defense policy, and it was the defense of the United Kingdom that was one of the three pillars of strategy at that time, and it was only when the Berlin airlift, the Berlin blockade and the airlift began in 1948 that thoughts turned to the defense of Europe. And with that, of course, the defense of the United Kingdom, and that led directly on to the establishment of Western European union and subsequently, to the NATO alliance in 1949.

SO YOU MENTIONED THREE PILLARS OF STRATEGY. WHAT WERE THE THREE PILLARS?

Well, this relates really to the paper by the Chiefs of Staff, to which you referred in your notes, the 1952 policy which was done after the conservatives came back into power in 1951 and it was done Mr. Churchill took the position of Ministry of Defense himself for the first few months of the government. And the Chiefs of Staff were asked to produce a paper on global strategy, which they did and that was based on the three pillars. One, the defense of the United Kingdom, which involved, of course, the defense of Europe. One two, the Middle East. The protection of British interests in the Middle East. And three, the Far East, with bases at Hong Kong and Singapore. And that was the, that was the policy of the UK as a global power really right up till much later than that. Of course, there were some people in the in the government and some in the civil service who thought that Europe was the dominant theme. I mean, I did myself. I, myself have wished us to go into the Schumann plan, and the European Coal and Steel community as the first link with Europe, I would also have liked to see us go into EURATOM. And still more, of course, later on in 1958 to go into the Messina treaty and become part of Europe. That was not sought right at that time. The, the government preferred to be independent and that feeling still lingers on I noticed with Mrs. Thatcher's attitude to the EMS, which old ideas die hard, I think.

BUT HOW WAS THE BOMB, AGAIN GOING BACK TO THIS PERIOD IMMEDIATELY POST-WAR AND WHEN BRITAIN WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP ITS OWN BOMB, HOW WAS IT THOUGHT OF AT THAT TIME? WAS THE TERM DETERRENT KNOCKING AROUND IN DEFENSE CIRCLES, OR DID PEOPLE JUST THINK THAT IT WAS A WEAPON THAT IF ANOTHER WAR CAME, WE WOULD NEED TO USE?

At that stage, it was a weapon that we thought might have to be used, and it wasn't really until the 1954, I suppose it would be that deterrence began to dominate thought.

MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THAT GLOBAL STRATEGY OF APRIL OF '52 VERY CLEARLY SPELLED OUT THE NOTION, REALLY FOR THE FIRST TIME, THAT YOU COULD RELY ON ATOMIC WEAPONS TO DETER WAR AND THEREFORE DIDN'T NEED THE HUGE CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE NECESSARY TO FIGHT ONE. DOES THAT COINCIDE, IS THAT YOUR RECOLLECTION OF THE GLOBAL STRATEGY PAPER?

Well that would be true if you're thinking purely of global strategy. But of course, everything was governed by the need to maintain forces in Europe and for the airlift. That was why conscription went on until 1957.

SO YOU WERE ACTUALLY INVOLVED QUITE CLOSELY WITH THE LISBON CONFERENCE. WEREN'T YOU IN THE...

I was at it. When I went to the military committee in, I suppose it was in February, the beginning of February 1953, 1952, and I went through all the meetings there at which the force goals were discussed by the military committee. I was there with Jack Schlesser and Bill Elliott and the other, the other people, the chiefs of staff were all there, of course, as well. And then the King died and all the top brass had to go back to London for his funeral and so the humbler members of the group, such as myself, were entertained by the Portuguese government for a couple of weeks before the ministerial conference took place.

SO THAT CONFERENCE, THERE WAS A VERY CONSIDERABLE CONVENTIONAL FORCES CALLED FOR. COULD YOU PERHAPS OUTLINE WHAT THE DECISIONS WERE AT THAT CONFERENCE AND HOW SOON PEOPLE DECIDED THAT IT WASN'T REALISTIC?

Well, I think they, the military had worked out what forces were needed to do what they were required to do, which would be to repel or deal with an attack by the Russians in Europe if there was one. And the ministers accepted that and, and gave an undertaking of good intentions, I suppose is the right way to describe it, that they do their best to fulfill them, but that it very soon became obvious, of course, that internal political considerations, financial constraints, economic problems were going to put the brake on and make it very difficult to do that. And this, of course had all come out of the three-wise-men exercise as the burden-sharing exercise in Paris in 1951, which led to led to all this.

WELL NOW GOING SLIGHTLY OUT OF ORDER OF COURSE, IT WAS AROUND ABOUT THAT TIME THAT CHURCHILL HAD COME BACK AND THE CONSERVATIVES WERE BACK IN POWER BY THE TIME.

October, '51.

RIGHT. IS IT NOT TRUE TO SAY THEN THAT THE GLOBAL STRATEGY PAPER, WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON ATOMIC WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE BY THE THREAT OF RETALIATION WAS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE KIND OF MASSIVE FORCE LEVELS THAT WERE BEING ADVOCATED AT LISBON.

No. I mean, they were taken into account in the force goals that were produced. There was no distinction drawn between the two. And it wasn't really until considerably later that people began to think that conventional forces could be reduced because of the deterrent power of the strategic nuclear forces.

OF COURSE THE AMERICANS FROM EARLIER ON HAD BEEN QUITE KEEN OR BEEN DETERMINED THAT WEST GERMANY WOULD HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE TO EUROPE'S DEFENSE. WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS ABOUT THE PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS THAT ENSUED BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY? COULD YOU TELL US ANYTHING?

Well, you're quite right in saying that there was great pressure, from the Americans in particular, for the rearming of Germany. And the French, of course, did not wish to see the revival of German national armed forces if it could possibly be prevented while admitting the case for having German man-power available for the defense of Western Europe, and this led to the production of the Pleven plan, which I suppose was 1952 and to very prolonged negotiations in Paris, from '52 to '54. I suppose at which I, in which I participated as a British observer, which eventually, of course, were vetoed by the French really because they were not prepared to see their national forces submerged in anything in anything else, even had the idea of the European defense community proved practicable, which I think it was very doubtful if it ever would have been.

WHAT WOULD YOU RECALL ABOUT THAT PERIOD? YOU WERE OBSERVERS YOU SAY. WHAT WERE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS LIKE?

Well, prolonged, I think is the word, is the word I would use. You know, beat around the subject without really ever getting anywhere in particular. And there was a great deal of skepticism I think about the basis of the plan all the way through.

WHAT WAS THE PLAN IN FACT?

Well, it was to produce a European defense community with European armed forces under supernational command which would have been, to which the individual nations of Western Europe would contribute. And knowing what we know of the history of France and De Gaulle it's not really surprising, I think that it didn't come off.

SO IN 1954 THAT COLLAPSED AND EUROPE WAS FACED WITH WHAT? I MEAN WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY?

Well, I think the thing it directly led to so far as the UK was concerned was the pledge to keep two divisions on the continent for a period of fifty years which was a commitment that no British government had ever contemplated giving before.

SO ONCE AGAIN WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF THE BREAKDOWN, FROM THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW? THE BREAKDOWN OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY TALKS?

Well, it was a very severe blow, of course to the morale of the Western European countries and it was in order to help in dealing with that and to prevent a total collapse of morale that the British government agreed to make the commitment to station British armed forces on the continent of Europe for a period of fifty years, which was an unprecedented commitment for any British government to make.

BUT WHY DID IT NEED TO DO THAT? I MEAN WHAT WAS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THAT AND GERMANY AND FRANCE.

Well, it was a gesture on our part, an indication on our part that we would not ourselves withdraw from Europe, which would have been the traditional British policy of course, to withdraw into the United Kingdom and retain one's freedom of action.

TELL ME WERE YOU AWARE AT ALL AROUND THIS TIME, BETWEEN '52 TO '55, OF THE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN NATO WITHIN SHAPE OF STRATEGY POLICY TOWARDS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE DECISION BY EISENHOWER AND HIS SUCCESSOR GRUENTHER AND SO ON THAT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE GOING TO BE THE ANSWER TO THE FORCE IN BALANCE. WAS THAT SOMETHING THAT YOU WERE AWARE OF AT THE BRITISH MINISTRY?

Oh, yes, certainly. But I think it came a little earlier than you're suggesting. I think they were actually in position by 1952, if I remember correctly.

NOT REALLY. NO I DON'T THINK SO. I THINK THE FIRST TACTICAL WEAPONS; DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU CALL TACTICAL REALLY, THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN 3 OR 4 BOMBS AVAILABLE TO AIRCRAFT BY '52. THE FIRST CANNON WAS LATE '53.

The Long Tom or whatever it was called. I can't remember exactly, but my own recollection is that, you know, that they accept, tactical nuclear weapons had been accepted certainly within the period you're mentioning. I would have thought myself, perhaps slightly earlier.

WELL LET ME ASK YOU ANOTHER QUESTION, DECEMBER 1954 THERE WAS A NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AT WHICH SACEUR WAS AUTHORIZED TO PLAN ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. WAS THAT A CHANGE, WAS THAT A CHANGE FROM 1952?

I'm guessing here, so you'll have to check this, but I would guess that tactical nuclear weapons were first deployed in the American forces on the continent and it was only subsequent to that that they were extended to other forces in Europe under what was called the "key of the covered" policy, whereby the other armies had the missiles themselves but the warheads were retained by Americans would only have been issued in a crisis, in time of need.

OK. DO YOU ACTUALLY RECALL THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE AMERICANS, THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THEY HAD TESTED AN H-BOMB WHICH CAME IN '54, ALTHOUGH THE TEST HAD BEEN 18 MONTHS EARLIER.

Yes, I recall that.

WHAT SORT OF IMPRESSION DID IT MAKE ON YOU?

Well, it was a new and extremely alarming development, or course, and an enormous increase in the power of the weapons. And it, again, changed the, changed the, the picture greatly from the atomic level to the thermonuclear level of destruction that could be caused and it led on, of course, to a decision by the British government that they also should develop a hydrogen bomb or thermonuclear weapon which was announced in 1955, I think, in the, in the defense white paper of that year.

WAS THAT A CONTROVERSIAL DECISION AT ALL, AS FAR AS YOU RECALL?

I don't recall that it was controversial in any particular way. Of course, most defense policy subjects of this kind were controversial and caused great divisions politically, but I don't remember this one being more so than any other of that kind.

WHAT ABOUT WITHIN THE DEFENSE COMMUNITY? WAS THERE ANY LOBBY FOR SAYING, "WELL REALLY YOU KNOW WE'RE NOT REALLY GOING TO BE ABLE TO KEEP UP WITH THIS OR WE CAN'T DO IT." OR WAS THERE A PRETTY GOOD CONSENSUS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY

No, I think there was a consensus to go on within the community and I don't recall any statement by a scientist or anybody like that that it was beyond our capabilities to develop it and of course, it was well before the time when you had to consider manufacture.

LET ME JUST GO BACK TO THE TIME CHURCHILL CAME BACK INTO POWER. WAS HE SURPRISED TO FIND HOW FAR ADVANCED THE ATOMIC PROGRAM WAS, DO YOU KNOW?

I think they were surprised to, yes, I think they were surprised to discover that it had gone on and been sustained from the time in 1947 that Attlee took the decision to go ahead.

DO YOU RECALL WHAT HAPPENED ABOUT THE MONEY? 'CAUSE THE MONEY WAS NEVER PASSED THROUGH PARLIAMENT WAS IT? DO YOU RECALL ANYTHING ABOUT THAT?

No, it was nothing to do with it. All I can say is it was nothing to do with the defense budget, which I was very much concerned with, but the funds for that were provided separately.

NOW CHURCHILL WENT TO SEE TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER FREQUENTLY DURING THOSE FIRST COUPLE OF YEARS OF HIS TENURE AND WAS TRYING HARD REALLY TO REESTABLISH THE ATOMIC SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH THE MCMAHON ACT HAD BROKEN DOWN EARLIER, I MEAN WERE YOU INVOLVED AT ALL WITH THOSE ATTEMPTS?

I went with him on the first visit to Truman, on, over the new year in 1952, I suppose it was. We were due to, we went on the Queen Mary and we were due to sail on New Year's Eve and the anchor stuck in the hawse pipe so we were delayed twenty four hours, much to everybody's concern. But we made time up on the on the voyage, and I was also a humble participant, of course, in Churchill's reception in New York when we arrived there and we were taken off the Queen Mary by a US Coast Guard vessel at the Ambrose Light and then steamed up into the river, the East River with fire floats playing on all sides and every sort of thing. To be greeted by I suppose the largest guard of honor that had ever been laid on by any country for anybody in the, and the, that was a tremendous moment naturally enough.

SO THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS ALIVE AND WELL, BUT WHAT ABOUT THE ATOMIC SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP?

Well the wasn't one.

DID CHURCHILL TRY TO GET IT?

They were debarred from doing that and I think it was clear at the time that the political atmosphere in the United States was not such as to make it feasible to amend it.

DO YOU THINK YOU COULD SORT OF TURN THAT INTO A STATEMENT? DID CHURCHILL TRY TO GET SOMETHING DONE ON THAT? IF SO PERHAPS YOU COULD TELL US SOMETHING?

Well, I don't know whether he did or not, but he certainly didn't do it in any milieu when I was present. But, he had all sorts of interviews, of course, and private interviews with the President and whether he did that or not, I don't know.

BUT THEN CAN YOU JUST TELL US AGAIN ABOUT THE, WHERE THINGS STOOD AS FAR AS THE SHARING OF ATOMIC KNOWLEDGE WAS? BUT PERHAPS PUT IT INTO A SENTENCE FOR US SO THAT WE CAN UNDERSTAND IT WITHOUT MY QUESTION GOING BEFORE IT.

Well, there was no sharing of atomic knowledge because it was debarred by the McMahon Act, and it wasn't until 1958 that that situation was changed.

BUT WHAT WAS THE CLIMATE IN '52, '53 THAT PREVENTED THAT HAPPENING? DO YOU REMEMBER ANYTHING LIKE THAT?

Well, I think going back to what we were saying before, Klaus Fuchs had defected by then and the fact that a great deal of knowledge had been fed to the Russians was known, and of course would have obviously had prejudiced any possibility of getting any change in the United States legislation.

WAS CHURCHILL HIMSELF UPSET BY THAT? WAS HE CONCERNED WITH THE ANGLO-AMERICAN, HE AS A GREAT FAN OF THE ANGO-AMERICAN SPECIAL...

Oh tremendous, I think, yes. I think he was more concerned with the political relationships between the United States and the UK and the special relationship in that sense, rather than in any specific way related to the atomic matters.

WHAT DID YOU DISCUSS WITH THE AMERICANS WHEN YOU WENT OVER? WHAT WAS BEING DISCUSSED IF ATOMIC MATTERS WEREN'T?

Oh, the whole of the European situation. The attitude of Russia, of course, and general political, global survey that was, but the main object of the visit was to reestablish the relationship, of course.

WHAT WAS THE FEELING, AND I DIDN'T ASK YOU THIS, SHOULD HAVE DONE, BUT WHAT WAS THE FEELING IN EUROPE AT AROUND THE TIME WE'VE BEEN DISCUSSING THE LISBON GOALS PERIOD, WHEN OF COURSE WE HAD THE KOREAN WAR RAGING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE WORLD. WAS THERE A GENUINE FEAR OF IMMINENT INVASION FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO EUROPE?

I don't, I don't think I would say that there was a fear of an imminent invasion, but there was great uncertainty and unease about the intention of the Russians, which of course, dated back to Yalta and the abandonment of Yalta by the Russians and the general attitude of hostility, the Iron Curtain and all the rest of it indicated by the Berlin Blockade, of course, and then subsequently by the Korean War, which was another manifestation of Communism in action. And I think, it obviously made everyone feel very uneasy.

WHAT WAS THE ACTUAL STATE OF EUROPEAN DEFENSES IN '50, '51. WHAT WAS THERE TO STOP THE RUSSIANS, IF YOU LIKE?

Well, the American forces in Europe, the British forces in Europe and the French forces in Europe, I supposed would be about what it amounted to.

WHAT DID THAT AMOUNT TO IS WHAT I'M REALLY ASKING?

Well there was still very large forces there because the occupation forces were all still there and hadn't really begun to be run down all that much. So there was still great numbers of people on the ground. But of course, with conscription they weren't all that highly trained, or, or highly effective.

I MEAN THERE'S A PHRASE THAT'S USED BY A GREAT MANY PEOPLE I TALKED TO ABOUT THERE WAS NOTHING TO STOP THE RUSSIANS. WHAT ABOUT THE PHRASE, "THE ONLY THE RUSSIANS NEEDED TO GET TO THE CHANNEL WAS SHOES." OR BOOTS IS IT?

I think that's true. I think that would have been true.

DO YOU THINK, BECAUSE SOME OF THE REVISIONIST HISTORIANS CERTAINLY FEEL THIS STRONGLY, THAT THE FIGURES THAT WERE GIVEN AT THE TIME AND THE PEOPLE APPEARED TO BELIEVE IN, 175 SOVIET DIVISION AND WE HAVE TWELVE, OR WHATEVER. I THINK EISENHOWER HAD TWELVE AT THE BEGINNING OF NATO. THAT KIND OF MASSIVE IMBALANCE AS IT WAS PORTRAYED AT THE TIME. DO YOU STILL THINK THAT WAS A FAIR AND TRUE PORTRAYAL OF THE STATE OF PLAY?

Yes. I think the figures were perfectly accurate.

SO HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THAT? YOU SAID THERE'S QUITE A LARGE NUMBER OF OCCUPATION TROOPS IN GERMANY SO HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE FORCE BALANCE AT THAT TIME, THE BEGINNING OF NATO?

Well, it was overwhelmingly in favor of the Soviet bloc.

COULD YOU PUT IT INTO A SENTENCE FOR US? WHAT WAS OVERWHELMING?

The preponderance of ground forces in particular.

IF I COULD JUST TRY TO GET A STATEMENT OUT OF YOU SO I DON'T HAVE TO USE MY QUESTIONS, YOU KNOW WHAT I MEAN? HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE SITUATION, THE DEFENSE SITUATION AT THAT TIME?

Well, I would describe it by saying that the Russians and the Soviet bloc had enormous forces on the ground in, right up to the frontier, eastern frontier of Western Germany. And that the forces on the other side were first very much smaller and much less well trained and organized.

RIGHT, WHY DO YOU THINK, YOU SAID YOURSELF THAT THE V-BOMBER FORCE WAS FINALLY DECIDED IN 1954. WHAT WERE THE MAIN JUSTIFICATIONS IN BRITISH EYES FOR THIS REALLY VERY CONSIDERABLE EXPENDITURE OF TIME, EFFORT AND MONEY ON A BRITISH DETERRENT?

Well, I think two answers really for that. First, that it was thought to be necessary for the position of the UK as a world power that it should have this force within its armory. And the second subsidiary that I think is still an important consideration was that it was an insurance policy against the risk of the United States turning isolationist again at any particular date.

EVEN THOUGH THE UNITED STATES HAD COMMITTED TROOPS TO EUROPE, WHICH WAS NEVER DONE BEFORE. I MEAN THAT WAS STILL FELT TO BE A REAL DANGER IN '54, THAT TIME AND DATE. WAS IT?

Well I think it was felt to be a sufficient of a risk to justify having an independent deterrent force of our own, but the main reason, of course, was one that it was thought to be militarily necessary for a power, a global power as the UK then considered itself to be.

AND YET THERE WAS NEVER ANY CONSIDERATION THAT ANYTHING OTHER THAN A SOVIET AGGRESSION IN EUROPE WAS LIKELY TO TRIGGER THE USE OF THAT DETERRENT. WAS THERE EVER ANY IDEA THAT TO DEFEND SINGAPORE OR EGYPT OR SOMETHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE LIKELY TO BE USED?

Not at that time. I think later on the, if I remember correctly the, the V-bomber forces based in Cyprus were committed to CENTO, I think it was. This was later of course, in '50, it was about '54. But again, without any, as far as I know, anyway, any plan to use them, in that, in that theatre, but they would have been used again, against Russia, of course. It was the object of CENTO and SEATO was the containment of the Soviet Union.

WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF SUEZ ON BRITISH DEFENSE THINKING? WAS THERE ANY EFFECT OF IT, DID IT HAVE ANY LASTING EFFECT?

Well it had, it had a tremendous effect, I think in the sense that it destroyed many illusions. It had been demonstrated, you know that the kind of operation that it was thought to be was really not feasible in the world of that time, and that we had to rethink our position. Of course, by then a great deal of rethinking had gone on. But we were shown to be too vulnerable to external events, I think, to make it possible to plan for any similar kind of independent operation, or operation of the kind that Suez was from that time on.

THE FRENCH REACTED TO IT WITH A CONSIDERABLE FEELING OF BITTERNESS AGAINST THE US. AND THEREFORE A FEELING THAT THEY COULDN'T RELY ON THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED STATES, THE ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES WAS UNWISE. WHAT WAS THE REACTION TO THE UNITED STATES AS A REACTION TO SUEZ, MILITARILY I MEAN.

Well, the reaction was, I think one of great bitterness at the time when the pound nearly collapsed and everything happened. But, it was followed very quickly by a feeling that as soon as possible, the relationship must be repaired and restored. And I was, I went with Duncan Sandys in January, 1957 to New York and Washington to begin the process. Or to try to begin the process and we were definitely right in the deep freeze at the time. I remember a very chilly lunch with Henry Cabot Lodge at the United Nations their United Nations delegation in New York and then going on to Washington and doing the rounds with all the people that one normally saw and being greeted with considerable frostiness wherever we went.

BUT TWO MONTHS LATER

That was repaired at Bermuda, of course, in March 1957, and that, Macmillan was determined to restore the old relationship so far as he could and this was the first, the Bermuda meeting in 1957 was a bridge-building exercise, which was really very successful.

WHAT CAN YOU REMEMBER ABOUT THAT CONFERENCE?

Well I can only remember being there, really. But again, I mean most of the restoration of relations were done personally by Macmillan and Eisenhower and Selwyn Lloyd and Foster Dulles. And we were the briefers and the entourage rather than active participants at that time.

THE ONE PRETTY IMPORTANT DECISION THAT WAS TAKEN AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE WAS THAT BRITAIN WAS GOING TO HOST INTERMEDIATE MISSILES, WHICH EVENTUALLY ARRIVED THE NEXT YEAR.

That's right. I was greatly involved in the discussion of that, of course.

WHY, I MEAN THIS WAS AFTER ALL SIX MONTHS BEFORE SPUTNIK WHICH GAVE A GREAT DEAL MORE MEANING APPARENTLY TO THAT AGREEMENT. BUT AT THAT TIME WHY DID THE AMERICANS FEEL THAT THEY WANTED TO HAVE INTERMEDIATE MISSILES IN BRITAIN?

Well, it was a strengthening of the deterrent, I think.

CAN YOU ELABORATE ON THAT?

A, A new weapons system which in their eyes, and I think in British eyes, strengthened the effectiveness of the deterrent.

WAS THERE A QUID PRO QUO ARRANGEMENT?

It was really a consequence, it was really a follow-up of the earlier decision at the time of the Berlin Airlift to have American B-29s, bomber forces stationed in the UK. It was a naturally development as the evolution of weapons went on.

DURING THIS PERIOD, SAY BERMUDA, MARCH '57 THROUGH JULY OF '58, THERE WAS A WHOLE SERIES OF MEETINGS BETWEEN MACMILLAN AND EISENHOWER AND SO ON.

Well, there were two that I, I remember. There was the the Bermuda one in March and there was the Washington one in October, which was immediately after the Sputnik went up and which, of course, revealed to the West the advanced state of Russian technology. And and it was at the Washington meeting that the decision was made to request Congress to repeal the McMahon Act and to allow nuclear cooperation again between the two countries.

NOW WHAT WERE THE FACTORS THAT LED TO THAT DECISION. WAS SPUTNIK VERY RELEVANT TO THAT?

I think so. Yes, I think it was felt, you know, that the overwhelming superiority of the United States in nuclear weapons might not last all that long if the Russians are in a state to produced them themselves and to deploy them themselves, and of course, that proved to be absolutely correct.

AND OF COURSE, HAROLD MACMILLAN HAD AN H-BOMB IN HIS POCKET BY THAT TIME EFFECTIVELY. I MEAN HE, BRITAIN HAD LET OFF AND H-BOMB JUST BEFORE THEN.

We had the Montebello test in 1950 really.

NO BUT THIS THE H-BOMB. I'M TALKING ABOUT CHRISTMAS ISLAND, THIS IS IN '57.

The H-bomb. Christmas Island, that's right, '57 yeah, that's right yeah. The Montebello one, was the earlier one with the atom bomb. Yeah that's right.

DID THE FACT THAT BRITAIN HAD PRODUCED AN H-BOMB SO QUICKLY REALLY AND SO EFFECTIVELY, RATHER FASTER IN TERMS OF THE DEVELOPMENT TIME THAN THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN. DID THAT...

I think it certainly must have effected the Americans in thinking that they really hadn't got all that much to lose if we were so far advanced as we were.

WHAT DO YOU THINK WERE THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE AMERICANS TO AGREE TO TRY TO CHANGE THE MCMAHON ACT AND TO GET BACK WITH A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP?

Well I, I would think that the chief reason why the American government decided to ask congress to change the act were first of all, the evidence that the UK had made a great deal of progress on its own without the American information being available to it, and that, that then there was not so much to lose as they might have feared otherwise. And I think the other reason was, the tensions of the time, which made them wish to make a political gesture of great value to us. I think those were the, the two main reasons.

AND WAS IT A VALUE TO THE BRITISH?

Oh, yes.

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT THE ADVANTAGES WERE THAT WE GOT FROM THAT ARRANGEMENT?

Well, not directly, because I wasn't myself personally concerned with the technicalities of development of nuclear weapons, and it would be very much more in the field of the scientists, and engineers and the atomic energy commission, and the uni... the atomic energy authority, and the United States atomic energy commission where the relationship was re-established and there were really no policy issues of the kind that I might have been involved in at, I was concerned with at that time. I think it was entirely scientific collaboration.

ONE OTHER THING THAT DID HAPPEN WAS THAT THE WAR PLANS BEGAN TO BE COORDINATED MUCH MORE, TOO. DID THEY NOT? THE TARGETING AND THOSE KINDS OF THINGS.

Yeah.

WERE YOU INVOLVED WITH THAT SIDE OF THINGS AT ALL?

No, not really. I mean, that was done by the milita... the chiefs of staff and the, and the actual targeting. I wa... I was not directly in... involved with that.

DO YOU RECALL WHAT HAROLD MACMILLAN'S REACTION WAS TO THAT DECISION IN OCTOBER OF 1957? CAN YOU TELL US HOW HE REACTED TO IT?

Well I think as it was the principal thing which Mr. Macmillan had in mind when we went to Washington in October 1957 for those meetings, I think it was one of extreme satisfaction that he got. It was the one prize that he wanted to get, and did get from the, from these meetings.

DO YOU THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY, IN A SENSE, THAT IT WAS A CULMINATION IN A WAY OF AT LEAST ONE OBJECT OF THE BRITISH EFFORT TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS OVER THAT WHOLE PERIOD?

I think it was a culmination of Macmillan's own wish to rebuild the relationship with the United States and to re-establish it, I think his principle concern was political rather than technical, but the technical benefits, of course, were very great. But I think the chief feeling he had in mind was that this really put the crown on his own efforts to rebuild the relationship with the United States. And that really not all that long after, the Suez episode and deep freeze into which the relationship had gone a... as a consequence of that. And it was only nine months, after all.

DO YOU THINK THAT FOR MACMILLAN PARTICULARLY, UH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE ALMOST MORE IMPORTANT FOR THEIR POLITICAL SYMBOLISM AS IT WERE, THAN FOR THEIR ACTUAL NECESSITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF BRITAIN? IS THAT A FAIR STATEMENT?

Well, I think they had great political significance to him. There's no doubt whatever about that, but I don't think you could say that he wrote them off as a military weapon or anything like that, and that therefore it was exclusively political. I think it was a combination of the two, but with politics, as always really in his handling of affairs, being uppermost in his mind. Because he dealt so very largely in terms of his personal relationships with people like the President, or, Dr. Adenauer... other statesmen in the world.

WELL AROUND ABOUT THAT TIME, OF COURSE, A VERY STARTLING, TOWERING STATESMAN CAME BACK INTO ACTION IN THE MIDDLE OF 1958, DE GAULLE CAME BACK IN FRANCE. NOW HIS REACTION TO THE CULMINATION OF THIS PROCESS TO THE BRITISH AGREEMENTS WITH AMERICANS THAT WAS SIGNED IN JULY OF '58 FOLLOWING THE AMENDMENT OF THE MCMAHON ACT WHICH INCLUDED THE NUCLEAR PROPULSION SYSTEM FOR SUBMARINES THAT WERE GIVEN TO THE BRITISH. HIS REACTION TO THAT WAS TO ASK FOR SIMILAR TREATMENT OR EVEN BETTER TREATMENT FOR THE FRENCH AND HE DIDN'T GET IT AND HE WAS VERY UPSET BY THAT. DID YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THAT AT THE TIME? DO YOU THINK THE FRENCH SHOULD HAVE BEEN TREATED SIMILARLY?

Well, looking -- if, if you regard the situation with hindsight, I think one might say reasonable that there wasn't any sensible reason for saying that the French should not have been treated in the same way, but when you're dealing with things of this kind, which have such enormous significance, it's understandable I think, that the, the United States did not want to extend the circle more widely than they were, they felt it necessary to do. And that was why I think it was kept to the United Kingdom. I think the other reason was that the United Kingdom had a, was much further advanced than the French in the development of the weapons.

WHAT WAS, DID YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE, WELL, YOU KNOW, WHAT MACMILLAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH DE GAULLE WAS AT THAT PERIOD, AS DE GAULLE GOT MORE AND MORE HOSTILE TO THE ANGLO-SAXON DOMINANCE OF NATO AS HE SAW IT. I MEAN, WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT THAT? DO YOU THINK THAT WAS AT ALL JUSTIFIED?

Well I wasn't personally concerned at all with the relationship between De Gaulle and Macmillan or De Gaulle and the a... the United States President, but-

DID YOU HAVE ANY CONTACT WITH THE FRENCH, AT ALL?

One saw this, of course, and sort of general prickliness of relationships with the French and particularly in NATO at this time when the French really, pretty well withdrew from the from collaboration in NATO.

DO YOU THINK THE FRENCH WERE AT ALL JUSTIFIED IN REGARDING NATO'S BEING BASICALLY SORT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CLUB? AT ANY RATE, THAT IT'S LEADERSHIP WAS SO DOMINATED BY THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH.

Well, I think the... the... the French did feel that it was an Anglo-Saxon, primarily an Anglo-Saxon relationship, but, I think they also saw that it was of great significance to them as part of Europe for the defense of an area which France formed such an enormous part. But it caused tremendous problems, of course, on if and when it was thought that passage of forces through France might be denied were there any emergency and it, it suddenly didn't make, didn't make things at all easy.

THE DUNCAN SANDYS 1957 WHITE PAPER WHICH MORE EXPLICITLY THAN ANY OTHER, SAID THAT BRITAIN WOULD RELY ON NUCLEAR DETERRENTS AND REDUCE IT'S CONVENTIONAL MANPOWER. YOU WERE INVOLVED WITH THAT WERE YOU?

Yes, I was. I wrote it. I think a... That's not literally true, but th... I certainly had a... great hand in the preparation.

SO IF YOU COULD DO THAT FOR US, I MEAN, COULD YOU OUTLINE FOR US WHAT WERE THE MAIN STRANDS OF THAT WHITE PAPER IN 1957?

Well, perhaps with a little background first, I mean, Macmillan became prime minister when Eden resigned. And, Antony Head was then minister of defense. And Macmillan wished to have economies made in defense expenditure, and he asked Antony Head to stay on as minister on certain conditions, including a policy of reduction of expenditure and Antony Head would not accept that. So Duncan Sandys was appointed instead, on the same basis. So that the scene was set at that time for some reduction in defense expenditure, and one of the main elements of defense expenditure was of course, the maintenance of very large forces of conscripts. And this was one of the principal reasons why the 1957 white paper announced the ending of conscription, though it would be fair to say, that, long before that time, the chiefs of staff and the service ministers and the Ministry of Defense had considerable doubts about the value and cost effectiveness of conscription as a means of maintaining the British forces. The other two elements in the white paper, which I think when you were f... one the statement that in addition to and maybe later in substitution for the V-bomber force, ballistic missiles would be developed. And the other statement which caused the greatest heat, I think, of all was, the one that said that the role of the Navy in a future war was somewhat uncertain, which caused immense consternation, of course, among the th... in the Navy as... as... could, could well be understood. And the role of British forces in defense of overseas territories was also redefined. I mean, the old commonwealth relationship was pretty well destroyed in that paper by statements that we had to defend colonial territories overseas and make a contribution to defense. But the old idea of the commonwealth as an entity of significance in defense policy really disappeared at th... at that time. And as a corollary of... of... m... the first part of what I said was there was much greater emphasis placed on the deterrent power of nuclear weapons and of the, on the significance of the British element in the deterrent forces as contributing to that.

NOW, WHY WAS THAT? DO YOU THINK THAT WAS FOR CONVENIENCE SAKE OR BECAUSE IT WAS, WAS THERE A CHANGE OF HEART ABOUT THAT OR WHAT? THIS RE-EMPHASIS, THIS EMPHASIS ON THE BRITISH DETERRENT.

I don't think it was really, a re-emphasis of it. I think it was, as I said before, crystallization of statements that had been made over, and the thoughts that had been thought over a considerable period, probably five years before the, the defense white paper. And that it wasn't really anything new in itself. It was the fact that it was stated there as part of a cohesive defense policy, I think that made the impression that it did.

NOW ANOTHER THING THAT I'M NOT SURE IF IT STATED IN THE WHITE PAPER, BUT IT CERTAINLY IMPLIED WAS THAT THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE RHINE WAS GOING TO BE REDUCED CONSIDERABLY IN NUMBERS AND WAS GOING TO RELY ITSELF ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH WERE TO BE EVENTUALLY BOUGHT FROM, OR THE DELIVERY VEHICLES WERE TO BE BOUGHT, BUT THE WARHEADS WOULD BE SUPPLIED BY THE AMERICANS. NOW, THEY --

If I, if I remember this correctly, I think they, the strength of the British forces on the continent was reduced from seventy eight thousand to sixty four thousand. But I think it was accepted by NATO and the military at the time that with the equipment that those forces would then have had, they would be as effective as the larger forces had been beforehand. And that, of course, implied the use or the holding of tactical atomic weapons in th... with those forces.

NOW IN FACT, IT WAS SOME YEARS BEFORE THEY GOT TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS FROM THE AMERICANS, WASN'T IT? WAS THERE A BIG GAP THERE?

Yeah. Well, there w... yes. I think there was.

DID YOU IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, ACTUALLY THINK ABOUT, WAS THERE MUCH THOUGHT GIVEN AT THAT LEVEL TO THE STRATEGY OF THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IF I CAN USE THOSE WORDS IN JUXTAPOSITION, AS OPPOSED TO THE STRATEGIC DETERRENT, THE V-BOMBERS. I MEAN, DID PEOPLE REALLY THINK THAT THESE THINGS WERE GOING TO WORK, OR WEREN'T GOING TO WORK, OR DID THEY CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH HOW THEY WERE GOING TO BE USED?

I th... they w... well they were intended to be used of course, forward as against opposing forces advancing upon them. I, but at that time, when the state of knowledge about radiation and fallout and all the rest of it, they were accepted as being perfectly reasonable weapons to use in a tactical battle on... con... in continental Europe. I mean, the fact it would have devastated quite a large part of, of Germany had to be accepted, of course as, as part of that, but I think looking back on it now with the knowledge that there is today about that one wonders whether it was ever really a sound policy to, to have adopted, but in the state of knowledge at the time, I think it was.

WERE YOU AWARE, DO YOU THINK, OR DID YOU WORRY AT ALL IN THE BRITISH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ABOUT THE NUMBERS OF THESE WEAPONS THAT, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, EITHER THE BRITISH ARMY OR THE DUTCH OR THE BELGIANS OR THE GERMANS WOULD EVER, AND AMERICANS THEMSELVES OF COURSE, EVEN MORE SO, WERE BEING SORT OF POURED INTO EUROPE OVER THIS QUITE SHORT PERIOD?

No. I don't think so because the warheads were retained by the Americans and would not have been issued to the forces on the ground except at a moment when the alliance itself had taken a decision that that point had been reached when it was necessary to do that. So the mere presence of the carriers of the weapons in the forces, I don't think caused any particular concern at that time. I certainly can't remember that it did.

BUT THE WARHEADS OF COURSE WERE THERE TOO. I MEAN, THEY WERE--

Yeah. But they were in American custody. They were on the ground, they were i... in the, in the country, of course.

BUT, I MEAN, IT MIGHT HAVE CONCERNED YOU THAT THERE WERE SEVEN THOUSAND WARHEADS WHO'S, WHOSE EVER CUSTODY THEY WERE IN. DON'T YOU THINK?

Well, I don't think i... it... I don't think it did. I mean, it was thought it was necessary that they should be there and they this was long before the days when, I don't know what you, whether you mean somebody might have gone in and pinched one or what?

NO, I JUST MEAN THAT THE SHEER QUANTITY, GIVEN, AS YOU SAY, THE DEVASTATION THAT WOULD HAVE RESULTED IF EVEN A SMALL PROPORTION OF THEM HAD BEEN USED. I WONDER IF PEOPLE W... I SUPPOSE WHAT I'M ASKING IS WERE PEOPLE ASKING, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, EITHER IN NATO, SHAPE, SO FAR AS YOU KNOW ABOUT, WHAT WERE GOING ON THERE. OR IN THE BRITISH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, "LOOK, HOW MANY OF THESE THINGS DO WE REALLY NEED?"

Well they were, that they'd certainly have thought about that. I mean, that would be part of the force plans and the force goals and the numbers a... allocated to each army would have been worked out by the military as the minimum that they needed to do the job that they'd have to do if they were used.

THE MINIMUM.

They weren't issued, you know, high, wide and handsome in any... any way like that.

WHAT ABOUT THE, I MEAN DID THE BRITISH, DID YOU HAVE ANY SAY OVER THAT AT ALL IN THE SORT OF STRATEGY AREA OF BRITISH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, OF HOW MANY OF THESE THINGS WERE GOING TO BE NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE NORTHERN SECTOR OF GERMANY WHICH THE BRITISH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR?

That would have been done in the military committee of NATO in which the British chiefs of staff were, of course, represented. So they'd have been participants to that decision. And of course they'd have formed their own view before that about what the British forces, the British element of the NATO forces needed.

AROUND ABOUT THIS TIME, THE TIME THAT THE THOR MISSILE WAS ARRIVING AND THE H-BOMB TEST HAD HAPPENED, AND SO ON, THE BEGINNING OF AN UPSURGE WHICH LED TO THE REALLY QUITE WIDESPREAD PROTEST OF THE EARLY '60S IN BRITAIN CND, AND SO ON, AND THE LABOUR PARTY. WHAT WAS THE REACTION TO THOSE PROTESTS? IF ANY, I MEAN, WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION, PERSONAL REACTION TO THOSE PROTESTERS? DID YOU THINK THAT THEY, WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THEM?

Difficult to say. I think that there's at this length of time, I, I think I felt, myself, that it was quite legitimate for them to protest, but the protests were not significant enough and their arguments were not strong enough to justify a change of policy about the use and possession of, of the weapons.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE REACTION TO THE WHITE PAPER, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE? WHAT WAS THE REACTION IN GERMANY?

One of, I think the reaction in Germany after the 1957...

COULD YOU START AGAIN? I'M SORRY. I STARTED TALKING.

Yes. I think that the reaction in Germany to the 1957 white paper was one of considerable shock and alarm that British conventional forces might be much reduced. And, it was for that reason, that Macmillan decided to go to see Adenauer, which he did in May 1957 and gave a masterly exposition to him of the policy in the white paper which, I think, went a considerable way to reassure the Germans that there was no weakening of British intentions to play a full part in the defense of Europe. And that the abandonment of conscription in particular, would increase rather than reduce the effectiveness of the British forces. Though, the numbers would obviously be smaller than they had been. It was a very successful visit, that one. It went off in a very congenial way.

YOU HAVE SOME MEMORIES OF THAT AT ALL?

Well, I remember Macmillan making a masterly speech at the dinner after the first formal meeting that we'd had with a, with Adenauer in which he gave a magnificent survey of history and fitting the white paper into its historical context, which he'd been extremely good at and very much liked doing. I've heard him do that with Eisenhower as well, and other people and that and the two things I can remember, first of all Adenauer being a great connoisseur of German wine, displayed great dissatisfaction with what had been laid on for us at the official dinner. I think there were twelve different kinds of wine laid on and he sent his secretary chancery, who was a very senior civil servant, down to the cellar to bring something better than what had been provided. And I can remember Dr. Globker coming back with his arms filled with bottles of different kind and Adenauer inspecting them magisterially and passing them for consi... as fit for consumption at the dinner. The other thing I remember is a lunch on the Rhine steamer the next day at which we had a small table of about eight, I suppose, with Macmillan and Adenauer as the two principal characters and myself and others in attendance. When Adenauer gave us a great disquisition on the effect of climate on politics. But punctuated this by periodically rushing to the side of the ship and waving frantically at another one that was going by. We realized afterwards that this was all part of his election campaign and astute man as he was, he didn't miss any opportunity of registering himself with the German voter. So. That tho... those are the sort of personal memories that I'm afraid remain more firmly in the mind than many of the policy issues about which we've been talking.

DID YOU MEET FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS AROUND THIS TIME?

Yes. I did.

WHAT WERE YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF HIM?

Oh, he was a very strong, buccaneering type of character. A very powerful minister of defense and very good, I would say. And very easy to get on with. And we had many discussions with, with him. Duncan Sandys and I would go over and see him with Hallstein or one of his secretaries of state in the, in the Ministry of Defense and very friendly relationship was established, uh.

WHAT WAS HIS ATTITUDE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS FAR AS YOU KNOW? EITHER TO TACTICAL ONES OR OTHER ONES.

Well I think he accepted that they were necessary as part of the organization for the defense of Western Europe. I, he certainly didn't raise any specific issues about them so far as I'm aware and certainly I never remember him you know, suggesting that Germany should have them or anything like that.

YOU DON'T. BECAUSE, I MEAN THERE WAS SOME CONCERN IN SOME QUARTERS THAT HE WAS HINTING THAT THAT INDEED MIGHT BE AN OBJECT OF GERMAN POLICY.

Well, I can't recall him doing that in my presence. He may, you may well be right about that. All I can say is that my own recollections do not include anything of that kind.

THERE WAS AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT I WAS TALKING TO BEFORE I CAME OVER HERE WHO DESCRIBED HIM AS PROBABLY THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN EUROPE. THAT'S NOT A JUDGMENT YOU WOULD AGREE WITH?

Not at that time, no. I don't think I would. Well, I don't, I'm not prepared to say not, not even now, but... but I don't think so, no.

HM.

He was very robust and had a, you know, very strong views on everything.

JUST LOOKING BACK ON THE WHOLE DECADE, REALLY, BETWEEN 1946 AND 1950 WELL, LATE '50S, WHICH LED TO, WELL, WHICH WAS A PERIOD OF QUITE SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT BY THE BRITISH OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR OWN AND WAS SHORTLY TO BE SUPERSEDED BY A PERIOD THAT'S LASTED EVER SINCE, ALMOST A DEPENDENCE, SOME WOULD ARGUE IT ANYWAY, DEPENDENCE ON UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP. DO YOU WISH THAT WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO SUSTAIN AND RETAIN A POSITION OF COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE AS INDEED THE FRENCH HAVE DONE? IN RETROSPECT, IN HINDSIGHT?

I don't think it would have been realistic you know, to expect that we could have maintained a position of complete independence. And, if only for the reason that the buildup on the Russian side of both short-range and long-range strategic weapons has been so immensely greater than anybody foresaw, at that time. And I think the, the significance of the British element in the allied deterrent forces naturally shrank with the buildup of the Americans in -- to match the in... in keeping pace with or ahead of the Russians. I think the perspectives changed. Not that I would say that that is, you know, saying that the British forces are insignificant. After all, when you think of them they could do an enormous amount of damage. I think sufficient damage to make the effect on the, on the Russians you know one of great hesitancy in using them on their side.

Ahhh...

To me, I mean the deterrent is you know, it's a balance of fear, or a balance of our need is what you can say. I mean if you, unless you can guarantee that you can knock out the other side's deterrent forces in the first go, so that they have no chance of hitting you back in a significant way, then the effectiveness of the deterrent remains, in my opinion, anyway. And I think that is still true now. And I think we've become perhaps rather obsessed with the balance of forces and the buildup of enormous forces far larger than necessary for any military purpose. This is obscure. The real significance of, even a limited number of weapons capable of doing such vast damage as they can.

WELL, TO A GREAT EXTENT, THAT BUILDUP WAS GOING ON DURING THE YEARS WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT IN THE UNITED STATES. AND THEY ENDED UP WITH AN ARSENAL BY 1960 THAT'S AS BIG AND MEGA-TONNAGE AS IT'S EVER BEEN. WERE YOU CONSCIOUS OF THAT AT THE TIME? WERE YOU CONCERNED ABOUT IT AT ALL? DID YOU EVER HAVE CAUSE TO REFLECT ON IT?

Well, I think it was not a thing that I reflected about very much because I don't believe in reflecting about things, and try about, over which one has absolutely no control. It seems pointless.

IS THAT WHY YOU THINK THAT POSSIBLY PEOPLE WHO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE BEING INEFFECTIVE? I MEAN, PEOPLE DO FEEL THEY DO HAVE NO CONTROL.

Oh, certainly. Yeah. That's true. But I mean that is an emotional, rather than a logical reaction, I think, and I think basically that is CND is a moral and emotional force. And does not, in my opinion, anyway, stand up, you know, on other grounds other than that. I respect and I myself couldn't agree with them.

SO, DO YOU THINK THAT THERE IS ANY SENSE IN WHICH MORALITY IS INVOLVED WITH THE KINDS OF DECISIONS THAT YOU HAVE HAD TO MAKE PROFESSIONALLY OR OTHER PEOPLE IN THAT AREA HAVE TO MAKE PROFESSIONALLY?

I think you have to, you have to consider whether you've you know, go beyond all bounds, but on the whole line, I think I support George Kennan keep that sort of consideration out of politics to the maximum extent. And you, you can't have a sound, in my view, you can't have a sound and effective policy if you base it entirely on that sort of consideration.

ON WHAT SORT OF CONSIDERATION?

Well, moral and emotional sorts, about you know, what kind of weapons you use or what particularly in the case of the deterrent when the i... the whole of its effectiveness depends on its not being used.