IN '78. TALKING ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS. YOU SAID THAT YOUR INTENTIONS WERE TO ACHIEVE HEGEMONY OVER EUROPE AND THE BEST WAY WAS TO OUTFLANK EUROPE THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE HEGEMONY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TO OUTFLANK THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH AFRICA. I'D LIKE SOMEHOW TO GET THAT IDEA OUT, BECAUSE I THINK IT'S A GOOD ONE. BUT IN 1976 WHEN CARTER WAS ELECTED WHEN YOU FIRST STARTED PUTTING OUT YOUR PAPERS, OR EARLY '77... MY QUESTION IS, WHAT WAS YOUR PERCEPTION IN TERMS OF SOVIETS INTENTIONS, OF WHAT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR CUBAN PROXIES WERE DOING IN ANGOLA? WHAT DID THAT TELL YOU? DID THAT WORRY YOU? WHAT DID IT TELL YOU ABOUT SOVIET INTENTION?

Well it seemed to me to confirm what I thought for a long period of time. And that was that the Soviet Union was interested, in fact what, it... Their doctrine their calls for a continuous expansion of what they call the socialist world, but they really mean the communist world, and which they call the camp of peace and freedom. And they've, well they are dedicated to expanding that as much as they possibly can. And certainly Mr. Khrushchev made that evident when he discussed publicly his view of peaceful co-existence. That peaceful co-existence was a way of maintaining a situation in which the Soviet Union could vigorously support wars of liberation... which is the same thing as saying, trying to expand the camp of peace and freedom.

BUT DID YOU SEE THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA AS BEING, OR WHAT MARSHALL SHULMAN WOULD CALL THAT STRATEGIC OPPORTUNISTS. SCOOP JACKSON WOULD SAY THEY'D BEAT ON A DOOR AND IF THEY CAN GO IN, THEY GO IN, BUT THAT'S DIFFERENT FROM A GRAND DESIGN. WHERE WAS THE ANGOLA THING GOING TO LEAD?

Except that I'm saying that the grand design was exactly spelled out by Mr. Khrushchev in his definition of peaceful co-existence. Soviets always use words which mean almost the reverse of what they mean to us. So peaceful co-existence does not in any way mean peaceful. In fact, he spelled it out as being the doctrine under which they proposed to support and actively support what they call wars of national liberation, which are in fact wars conducted by a small conspiracy of men dedicated to communism who attempt to take over by forceful means. You know, perfectly normal countries.

WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS GOING ON 1978 IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, WHEN THEY WERE IN ETHIOPIA?

There they were torn between -- Let me begin again because... With respect to the situation in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, in both countries the Soviet Union had been working hard to create an infrastructure of those who shared their point of view and were prepared to take over the countries. They had made much more ca ... progress in the, in the Horn of Africa than they had in Ethiopia. They then had -- they decided however, that Ethiopia was a much more important country than was Somalia in the Horn of Africa. Therefore they switched their effort and they decided to back Ethiopia against Somalia and that's what happened at that time.

WHAT WAS THE ULTIMATE GOAL? WERE THEY INTERESTED IN ETHIOPIA FOR THE SAKE OF ETHIOPIA?

The ultimate goal of the whole policy of peaceful co-existence was to make progress on the basic goal laid down by Lenin of a world largely composed of socialist, communist states, in which the Soviet Union would be the prime mover, that th -- they couldn't really make progress. They'd been rather checkmated. And Europe, by our efforts in the buildup of NATO, therefore the thing to do was to make progress in the Third World. And in that world, the, the right doctrine as from their standpoint was the doctrine of peaceful co-existence, and the support of what they called wars of national liberation, which as I say were, small groups dedicated to communism prepared by fair means and foul to take over those countries. And that they were doing this in Africa and they were doing it in Angola. They were doing it in Ethiopia and had been doing it in Somalia. And what was really the idea of the entire policy was that if they could make progress through a wide duct through Africa and connect that with control over Yemen and then various countries in the Middle East, if they could really then get control over Southeast... Southwest Asia and Africa, and the belt down through the equatorial part of that, there they would have the United States isolated at least to a, a bar to one flank of the European segment and the Eurasian land mass.

DO YOU SEE A CORRELATION BETWEEN THESE GEOPOLITICAL MOVES IN THE SEVENTIES AND THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPING OF LARGER AND LARGER NUCLEAR FORCE?

I do indeed.

WHAT IS IT?

Well I thought... I think they saw the larger nuclear force as being a method of guaranteeing them that they would not be subject to the threat of US intervention backed by the threat of the US escalating any military confrontation, which might result there from. After all, they'd lived through the war resulting from their fomenting of the attack by North Korea into South Korea and they'd had, had -- were having a lot of experience with uh, uh, or had had a lot of experience with the war that they fomented in Southeast Asia by the attack of North Vietnam into South Vietnam, and its repercussions. And they understood that there was some point in which the United States might have not only back local resistance to these aggressive acts but might in fact at some time, if it were in a superior nuclear position, escalate to nuclear responses. And they wanted to be sure that that would be an impossibility by building up their nuclear forces.

SO THEY BUILT UP THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE SEVENTIES. DID YOU FEEL THAT THIS MADE OUR U.S. LAND ICBM FORCE VULNERABLE? WHY WAS IT VULNERABLE?

It was vulnerable because it b... It wasn't then that vulnerable but you could see that it was becoming more vulnerable. What they were doing was increasing, first of all, the number of their ICBMs. Secondly, they were increasing the size of those ICBMs. Even in 1971, '72 they were deploying the SS-9s which were more than double the size of our I-largest missiles. Uh, so that they had what we, one calls throw weight, the capability to throw large weights of material into intercontinental or-orbit. And they were then working hard on accuracy. And as they progressed toward getting then our silos would be vulnerable. And they are today and you could s... foresee it happening and you could see it then. And it did happen.

WE TALKED TO PAUL WARNKE AND HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO SPEND TWO WARHEADS FOR EVERY ICBM. THAT'S TWO THOUSAND WARHEADS. AND YOU ASSUME 50 PERCENT INACCURACY OR MALFUNCTION. THAT'S THREE THOUSAND WARHEADS AND IT WOULD STILL LEAVE 70 PERCENT OF OUR DETERRENT FORCE –

He's talking nonsense. It just -- those figures are just not correct.

WHY IS IT NONSENSE?

Because the reliability of Soviet systems is greater than that.

WHAT IF THEY GOT THE WHOLE –

And we don't -- whether it requires two warheads or not depends upon the level of damage that you wish to achieve.

BUT WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER TWO LEGS OF THE TRIAD?

The other two legs of the triad are in a different position. Clearly th-the submarine leg of the triad is the prime thing that we are, have been and continue to rely upon because of its relative invulnerability. The bomber force's vulnerability is in part dependent upon the fact that it co-exists with the ICBMs. An attack on the bomber force would alert the ICBMs or would give the President the option of firing the ICBM. An attack on the, on the ICBMs would give the bomber force the time to get up in the air and be invulnerable. Therefore it is the combination of having an ICBM force and a bomber force which really protects you in those two legs. Now the question of the survivability SLBMs in part depends upon there being other, the other two forces being there. If the Soviets could concentrate solely upon the ICBMs, I think we'd be in great danger.

WAS YOUR CONCERN SIMPLY WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN AN EXCHANGE OR WAS IT THE PERCEPTION OF SUPERIORITY EVEN IF THERE WERE NO EXCHANGE?

It was both. And the two were intermitly... intimately related. One's perception of what might happen politically ex... and exchange depends in part about what one thinks and what one thinks the Soviets would think about the relationship in the event there were an exchange. Therefore the two are not separable.

ARE YOU SAYING SUPERIORITY PAYS POLITICAL DIVIDENDS?

I'm saying exactly that.

WELL –

Now let me be more explicit about it. It isn't a direct relationship, one with the other, because the side that is facing a superior e-enemy knows that it must exhibit more courage. Otherwise it is in dreadful shape. And therefore one doesn't see the direct relationship in actions between superiority and inferiority. But there nevertheless is a very clear relationship between the two and at some time, one gets a breaking point. Where clearly of uh, very inferior country would certainly not even consider uh, escalating with respect to a superior country. Now there are measures, there are questions of degree involved. And these are hard to have judgments on and they're hard to make. I mean, one should avoid making absolute statements on these things. I'm trying to say precisely what the factors involved are.

WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE THE SOVIET GOAL WAS IN NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL, OR SALT II IN PARTICULAR? WERE THEY SEEKING SUPERIORITY?

I think they certainly –

CAN YOU SAY THE SOVIETS?

I'm talking about the -- well... The Soviets in SALT II were certainly trying to avoid restrictions which would inhibit them from obtaining a militarily superior strategic nuclear force.

WAS THAT THE SAME AS OUR GOAL?

We certainly also did not want to see the Soviets attain a superior nuclear f... uh, nuclear force. Our goal was to assure, if we could, that neither side would be able to have a useful superior force. Although, clearly, we had a greater concern about the Soviet side of it than about our own. We'd lived through a period where we clearly had a superior force and we'd used it with res... We'd exercised great restraint during that period.

BUT IF –

And we could not be that confident of what the Soviets might do if they had a superior military force.

BUT IF SUPERIORITY IS -- IF WE ONCE ENJOYED IT AND IT'S GOOD AND IT PAYS POLITICAL DIVIDENDS, WHY WASN'T IT OUR GOAL?

Because it didn't seem to be feasible with the realities of what we could do, what the congressional support we could get, the impact upon our economy. We did not think it was, you know, consistent with the American attitude to in peace time fully mobilize. Y-y-your degree of mobilization. It would be necessary against the determinant opposition of the Soviet Union to maintain a clearly superior nuclear force, would have required, you know, not a, a defense budget of six be... six percent of our GNP but of, you know, of what the Soviet's is. You know, eighteen percent. That kind of thing.

DID THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER -- WAS SUPERIORITY PART OF YOUR AGENDA?

No, because we did not think it was possible, but we thought we should do everything that was necessary to prevent the Soviets from achieving superiority. It's easier to prevent the other fellow from having a useful superiority than it is to maintain one oneself. We thought one could do the second task.

YOU OPPOSED PAUL WARNKE'S NOMINATION. WHY DID YOU DO THAT?

Because it was perfectly clear that having been a most useful person, he had been in the Pentagon and had been a tower of strength in the Pentagon. But afterwards, when he got out, he suddenly flipped to a point where he truly believed in unilateral disarmament which I thought was extremely dangerous.

HE SAYS THAT THAT'S THE WAY PEOPLE CHARACTERIZE HIS USE BUT THAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT RECIPROCAL RESTRAINT.

He wasn't really. I can quote you -- I can find statement after statement from in which in fact said the reverse.

YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH HIS THESIS OF APES ON A TREADMILL?

I am indeed.

WHAT IS IT AND WHAT WAS WRONG WITH IT?

He was suggesting we get off first and then the Soviets clearly would get off. There isn't any indication of that at all. It was Harold Brown I think who correctly stated it when he said that, when we arm the Soviets arm. When we don't arm, the Soviets arm.

BUT HE SAYS THAT WHAT HE MEANT IN APES ON A TREADMILL WAS THAT IF WE GOT OFF, IF WE MIGHT ENCOURAGE THEM TO GET OFF, IF THEY DIDN'T GET OFF, WE COULD GET BACK ON. THAT HE WAS ASKING FOR RECIPROCAL RESTRAINT, NOT UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT.

I can understand, but once you get off, once you engage in unilateral disarmament then it is very hard and dangerous to attempt to ca-catch up act.

WARNKE SAYS HE FORESAW A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS, SALT II, III, IV AND SO ON. AND IT'S LIKE CLIMBING DOWN A TREE. YOU CAN'T GET RID OF ALL THE HEAVY ICBMS AT ONCE. CLIMBING DOWN A TREE BRANCH BY BRANCH, OR STEP BY STEP. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THAT APPROACH?

I don't think there's anything wrong with that approach, but I do think that it does not follow that because you can get one agreement that you can get a better agreement later. And we've had the ABM Treaty for a long period of time. It's very difficult to get a better treaty in the f... in that field.

STEP BY STEP... YOU BROADCAST ABOUT IT, CAN WE EVEN WALK THE PLANK, STEP BY STEP...

You can walk the plank. You can walk step by step, yes. The step by step is something, you know, it's a good objective providing you do it. But whether you can do it or not -there's no evidence that you can do it.

WARNKE TOLD US THAT THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER HAD NEVER SEEN AN ARMS AGREEMENT THAT IT LIKED, SAID YOU WERE LIKE GROUCHO MARX. HE WOULDN'T WANT TO JOIN ANY CLUB THAT WOULD LET HIM IN.

I think that's in, completely unfair comment. I believe that there's no one who had as much to do with the ABM Treaty than I did. I think the um, I'm sure that the, the nonproliferation treaty would not have been ratified except for my support. I don't believe anybody had any more to do to working out the limited test ban treaty than I did. I think he's just talking balderdash.

WELL OF THESE TREATIES THAT YOU SAW AND PARTICIPATED IN AND LIKED SUGGESTS THAT YOU FEEL IT IS POSSIBLE TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE SOVIETS. YOU DID SAY IN '79 IN SOME HEARING THAT QUOTE; I CAME TO THE CONCLUSION IN 1974 THAT IT WAS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO SEE ANY WAY TO GET AN EQUAL TREATY AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DO OURSELVES THOSE THINGS WHICH WOULD MAINTAIN FOR US AN ADEQUATE DETERRENT. THAT SUGGESTS THAT DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE SEVENTIES YOU DIDN'T FEEL WE COULD NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS.

I didn't think that at that time we could get an equal treaty. And we haven't been able to. We tried.

HAVE YOU LOOKED AT THE FUTURE? DO YOU THINK IT'S POSSIBLE -- IS SOMETHING THAT'S AGREEABLE TO YOU GOING TO BE AGREEABLE TO THE SOVIETS?

I, my view is to try. I believe it is possible. I think we've made a lot of progress. I think we're much further along toward a START agreement for instance than we've been at any time in time in the past.

LET'S GO BACK TO VANCE –

And I think I've had something to do with that.

LET'S GO BACK TO VANCE'S MISSION TO MOSCOW IN MARCH OF '77. REMEMBER, THEY WANTED THE COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL TO CUT HEAVY MISSILES FROM 308 TO 150. DID YOU AGREE WITH THAT GOAL?

I agree with that goal, but the other part of it was that we agreed that we would make no improvements in our strategic forces beyond those that we then had. Wouldn't add to them or improve them. That would have guaranteed the Soviet Union in perpetuity complete freedom of concern about any danger to them from an attack against their forces by us, because our forces had very little, in fact zero, what is called counterforce capability against Soviet silos. Now the, this would not have guaranteed a reciprocal for us. We would have been under increasing danger I thought while they would have been under none. I've talked to some of my Soviet friends since that time and they say they deeply regret that they didn't accept Mr. Vance's proposal.

WHEN THEY DIDN'T GIVE UP ON THE HEAVY MISSILES AND WE HAD TO, IS THAT WHEN YOUR COMMITTEE REALLY WENT INTO DEEP CUTS IN THE SOVIET OPPOSITION?

No. I don't remember a connection between the two.

WASN'T YOUR MAIN CONCERN ABOUT THE TREATY THAT WAS NEGOTIATED THAT OUR ICBMS WERE STILL VULNERABLE?

Yeah, but there were many things that I thought were of dubious validity and did not correspond with what the executive branch was saying about the SALT II Treaty. And it was those things that I talked about.

TAKE THE MX. DIDN'T THE MX -- ALLAYED YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR LAND-BASED FIXED MISSILES.

We didn't have an MX deployed.

THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WAS GOING TO DO ONE.

But say -- words saying that you're going to deploy something are quite different than actually being able to deploy it.

HAD THE MX BEEN DEPLOYED AND BEEN CONSISTENT WITH THE TREATY, WOULD THAT HAVE ALLAYED YOUR FEARS?

It would have allayed part of my fears. I would have thought it much better if we'd been able to get rid of both the MX and the Soviet missiles of that, of the size of the MX which in, the s... in, the terminology of the ABM Treaty is a small missile. The A... The MX is not a heavy missile in the terms of the treaty. But I, if we'd gotten rid of the 1... the missiles of the size of the MX and those larger therefore that would have been much better than having to deploy the MX in large numbers ourselves.

BUT WE COULDN'T. AND I KNOW AT THE TIME YOU WERE CONCERNED THAT THE TREATY DIDN'T ALLOW THE MX BASING MODE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS CONSIDERING.

I thought we should have the right. I thought this was a very unfair and unequal provision. By and large it seems to be right that the Soviets and we should have the same rights under a treaty. There is no reason why the Soviet Union should have preference in the treaty with respect to the rights that it has than we. So I objected it, that even though it was not our intention and the Chiefs did not want to deploy a missile as heavy as their large missiles. Still, I thought it was not wise to give them the rights while we did not have the rights.

YOU SAID AT THE TIME THAT YOU FELT THAT THE TREATY DID NOT ALLOW THE BASING MODE FOR THE MX THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS CONSIDERING. CARTER AND VANCE BOTH TOLD ME IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS THAT THEY NEVER HAD ANY DOUBT THEN OR NOW THAT IT –

I have complete, I had complete doubt then and I have complete doubt now that what was contemplated by the basing mode they were talking about was in fact in conformity with the language of the treaty. The treaty quite clearly says that it is not permitted to have, to move silos or to add additional silos or to replace, to yes, move to different location silos, or to have additional ones. Their basing mode did in fact contemplate what I would think would be replacing launchers. And they didn't -- the treaty doesn't talk about silos. It talks about launchers. But still, I'm absolutely persuaded that he is wrong about that and the executive branch was wrong about it.

YOU WERE CONCERNED MORE IN YOUR TESTIMONY THAN THE SPECIFICS OF THE TREATY. WERE YOU TRYING TO ALERT AMERICA? WHAT WAS YOUR MAJOR CONCERN?

No, I was particularly concerned about the specifics of the treaty and that the Senate before it voted for ratification should understand exactly what the treaty provided and they should understand what the probable and even possible consequences of that, of those provisions should be. That's what I was concerned about. That's what I testified to.

BUT YOU ALWAYS STOPPED SHORT OF SAYING THAT YOU RECOMMENDED THAT THE SENATE NOT RATIFY THE TREATY.

I'm not sure that I always did but I certainly tried to ref-refrain from s-stating that. When Senator Mathias asked me whether I was recommending to him that he ratify or not ratify I said that, that is your business. That is the Senate's business to decide upon whether a treaty should ratify. My business is to try to answer your questions to make it as clear as I can what the treaty's terms are. What it provides and what it doesn't provide and what the probable consequences are of those provisions in the treaty.

CY VANCE SAID THAT YOUR TESTIMONY WAS VERY DAMAGING TO THE RATIFICATION PROCESS.

It was indeed. And the reason it was damaging was because the executive branch was not correctly describing what the provisions were and what the consequences might be.

I DON'T QUITE UNDERSTAND THIS. YOU THOUGHT THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY WOULD BE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD GAIN RELATIVE TO US OVER THE COURSE OF THE TREATY?

I did indeed. And they have.

HOW DID THE TREATY ALLOW FOR THEM TO GET STRONGER WHEN THERE WERE EQUAL CEILINGS?

But there weren't equal rights. There were equal ceilings in numbers, but the treaty did not limit the, the throw weight, did not limit accuracy. The result has been that they've been, since the treaty, since the date when the treaty would have taken effect, there's been an enormous increase in what is called the throw weight of the Soviet missile force. But in particular of its counterforce potential. In fact I think its counterforce potential, in other words, its ability to take out US hardened silos, has gone up by a factor of ten. So if anybody thought that treaty was really somehow rather limiting the threat to the United States, it just wasn't. And it didn't. And it hasn't.

AND ALL THIS HAS BEEN DONE UNDER THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY.

Exactly.

WERE YOU DISAPPOINTED WHEN CARTER WITHDREW THE TREATY OR DID YOU CARE?

Well I thought he did the correct thing although I thought the treaty had no chance of going through in any case.

I FIND IT IRONICAL THAT YOU AND, I THINK, ABOUT FIFTY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE PRESENT DANGER, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, WHEN YOU ALL GOT INTO THE ADMINISTRATION, WE JUST DIDN'T HEAR SO MUCH ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR ICBMS, WE DIDN'T ADAPT A MOBILE BASING.

Well we have heard a great deal about this vulnerability of our ICBMs. The question at issue has been, What do you do about it that you can do within the provisions that the Congress will approve? It's a tough problem. A great deal of work has gone into it.

SO YOUR INTEREST IN THIS HAS NOT SLACKENED SINCE YOU'VE...

It hasn't slackened one bit.

DID YOU, IN WARNKE'S NOMINATION CONFIRMATION HEARING, DID YOU CALL HIS VIEWS ASININE?

I believe I did. I thought they were. And I still think they were.

HE SAYS THAT HE WAS -- HE LISTS A BUNCH OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT HE WAS IN FAVOR OF INCLUDING THE CRUISE MISSILES AND SO ON.

I don't deny that. I'm not saying he was against every weapons system. I'm just saying that the net of what he was proposing was in fact what he said in that Apes on a Treadmill thing, and that is, We ought to get off the treadmill. We oughtn't to compete with the Soviet Union and then hopefully the Soviets would respond. I said, We'd done that and it doesn't work.

HOW DID WE DO THAT?

Well for a long period of time we did not add to our nuclear forces. Good gosh, you look at the comparison between what we did in the long period from, I guess from '69 to '78 or even to today. How many new ICBMs have we deployed? None.

BUT HE SAID WE WERE THE FIRST TO DEVELOP THE WEAPONS SYSTEM AND THEN THEY WOULD MIMIC US.

That isn't, that isn't a true statement. We gave them the thermonuclear weapon. I believe it is correct to say that the first nuclear weapon deployed or even tested was tested by them. It isn't true. And the cruise missiles, my goodness, they were working on, you know, highly accurate cruise missiles for a much longer period than we, continued in, even after we abandoned our cruise missile work for a long period of time. So it just isn't so what he says.

THAT'S FINE. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

You did induce me to what I don't like to do. [Into an ad hominem argument. What I p... thought we were going to talk about was, you know, what happened and so forth and so... And you certainly brought it up to date and brought it into an on... ad hominem argument which I really kind of resent to be perfectly frank with you.]