WHEN DID YOU FIRST HEAR ABOUT YOU KNOW, YOUR MISSION AND HOW WAS IT DESCRIBED TO YOU AND IF YOU COULD DESCRIBE GETTING YOUR FORCE TOGETHER?

Uh, I first heard of my mission in the uh, televised uh, speech by the Commander-in-Chief then President Kennedy.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE WHAT YOU DID IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS OR THE NEXT FEW DAYS?

Well, I heard of his schedule of the speech uh, I called all of my commanders together to listen to it. And that action set up a uh, what I consider the--the ultimate uh in--in planning effectiveness. If you can have your group--your subordinate commanders altogether and your staff altogether and I did with few exceptions. Uh, you uh, you start from the very genesis uh, of national policy to the part that you're going—and then progress through the planning phases to—to prepare yourself for the part that you—your forces are going to play.

...BUT HE DIDN'T SAY WE'RE GOING TO INVADE CUBA?

No, no he sketched out the--the problems in terms of the threat as he--as he foresaw it and what the--the Cubans uh, or what the Soviets were doing in terms of—of the uh, uh, equipment and the forces that they were moving in the direction of--of Cuba.

DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT YOUR FEELING WAS WHEN YOU AND THE OTHERS SAT THERE WATCHING THIS PRESIDENT KENNEDY SPEECH?

Are--I think our first feelings uh, uh were that we needed an evaluation uh, of--of Castro's capability to--to control uh, the uh—entire uh, Cuban spectrum of participation uh, in this. And uh, we prepared our plans uh, with the knowledge coming in piece meal in a piece meal basis as to what the Cuban reaction might be and what their capabilities to—to react to—to our intercession in their internal affairs might be.

WHEN DID YOU GET YOUR ORDERS TO... TO SAIL? WHEN DID YOU GET THE NEWS THE CALL TO GET THE SHIPS READY? CAN YOU JUST DESCRIBE IN SOMETHING LIKE MINUTE LIKE WHAT YOU DO 72 HOURS...

Uh, let me organize my thoughts before I start talking there. Uh, at the time, when the President's speech was scheduled uh, all uh, subordinate commanders uh, had been ordered to report to me for contingency planning. Uh, I think it went without uh, uh, saying that they knew what the uh, objective would be. But we announced the objective after the President had uh, given us his message. And at that time I had my warning orders to commence planning uh, to mount this force out uh, in the— in accordance with the uh, standard plan which required us to mount out a force of this size in 72 hours. Uh, our flagship was as far away as—was up in Fort Lewis, Washington and they were the last naval element to join us. Uh, so the planning went forward uh, completely orderly, uh, and the only problem uh, that we uh, had to— where we had to vary from those things that we knew we had to do like the tonnage of ammunition and so forth to be moved uh—is that we did not get initially the uh, amount of--of uh, uh, civilian cargo transportation that was needed to move our explosive across the highways and to our ports of embarkation which were uh Santiago, the Silver Stand uh, uh, El Toro, uh, there were a total of five points of embarkation.

WHAT I'D LIKE TO HEAR VERY CLEARLY AND CRISPLY IN A LIST PERHAPS, IS WHAT YOUR MISSION WAS, HOW QUICKLY YOU GOT IT TOGETHER AND WHAT YOU DID?

My mission was to sail within 72 hours with the uh, task force to exit the Panama Canal to be prepared to seize uh, oh, Santiago--...to seize Santiago and to march on Havana.

LET'S GET THAT AGAIN. HOW MANY DAYS WOULD THAT HAVE BEEN AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH THEN THAT YOU GOT YOUR MISSION...

Well, I—I—I had it at the time that President spoke.

SO YOU GOT THAT AT THE SAME MOMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT, OR SHORTLY BEFORE...

Well, yeah, I had it in dispatch uh, form.

MAYBE YOU CAN START WITH THAT.

Uh, the—the mission assigned uh, to me was to mount out the forces assigned uh within 72 hours--uh prepared to transit the Panama Canal and shipping assigned uh, and to land seize Santiago and to march on Havana.

HOW MANY MEN DID YOU HAVE, HOW MANY SHIPS DID YOU HAVE, CAN YOU GIVE US A...

There were...

IN SORT OF A LIST FORM.

There were uh, about uh, 47 amphibious types, about the same number of supporting types, gunfire uh, carriers and so forth. Uh, there were, a troop list, the total troop list was uh, about 17 thousand ground troops uh, and uh, about 8 thousand uh, uh, aviation troops. Uh, and another 25 hundred uh, supporting forces, not under my command. For instance there was a CIA detachment that was not in the—that's an example uh, so I don't know what that totals up to, I didn't add it up in my mind. But that's a, well something in excess of of uh, 30 thousand and I would uh—but the exact troop list will be available uh, at Quantico.

AND WHAT HAPPENED WHEN YOU UH, GOT THROUGH THE CANAL?

Of course, well the situation as we proceeded changed from day to day. When we got uh--uh through the uh, canal uh, the uh, commander of the amphibious force and myself were ordered to a conference uh, up in Norfolk uh, with the uh, Commander-in-Chief uh Atlantic and we were asked uh, uh, uh, if we had sufficient forces to accomplish the tasks assigned, uh if we had any uh, shortages uh, I said, generally with the situation that it now is we have adequate forces. Uh, but and we have enough supplies but we don't have enough gas. Uh, and we didn't get uh, uh, an additional—additional fuel supplies that was left hanging in the air with a rather facetious remark that well uh, you can capture the gas that you don't have and uh, I responded with a facetious mark—a remark that I don't think it's—has the right octane rating. And that was left hanging. And—

WHAT WAS YOUR PLAN. CAN YOU BRIEFLY DESCRIBE TO US WHAT THE OPERATION WOULD HAVE ENTAILED IF YOU'D GOTTEN THE WORD TO GO?

It would—it would have been an assault, uh, uh, landing uh, on the uh, north uh, uh, uh, west flank of uh, Santiago. Uh, the seizure of San Juan Hill uh, uh, as--as Teddy Roosevelt uh, uh, did it--modernized uh, the um, consolidation of a beach head to include uh, Santiago and—and the San Juan Hill and then the uh, uh, reorganization to the march on Havana. And our feeling or my conclusion was that uh, uh, the Cubans would resist bitterly uh, for Cubans or until their nose was bloodied, maybe for a couple of days. Uh, and then they would generally uh, support uh, our operations, at least they would not interfere.

WHAT—

--But that is no longer the case now, I know.

WHY DID YOU FEEL THAT AT THE TIME?

Uh, on the basis of uh, uh, the conclusion that we have that Castro really had not uh, crystalized uh, his control of—of a Cuban nation. And also, uh, we didn't hold the Cuban military uh, into high a regard.

WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING WHEN YOU HEARD THAT YOU WOULDN'T HAVE TO CARRY OUT THIS MISSION WHAT WAS THE FEELING ON THE SHIPS, AND THE FEELING AMONG THE MEN?

Uh, it was one of—of--of general relief initially but then the—the--the feeling uh, started to ferment in my own mind that well, if we don't do this now, uh, it's going to give us problems later. Uh, and that feeling grew and grew and uh, Vietnam was the problem later.

WHAT RELATIONSHIP DOES WHAT YOU'VE DONE IN CUBA HAVE TO DO WITH WHAT THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM?

Well, I feel that had we been successful in Cuba that Vietnam would—would never have occurred with the support uh, active support of the Chinese communists uh and the active and passive support of the Soviet Union. Uh, they would have uh, would have seen that uh, we were determined and—and—uh our— our determination would have prevailed.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT A LITTLE CLEARER. WHAT'S THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE CUBANS?

Uh, no I don't think there's any specific relations at that time and I doubt that there is now. There may be.

ARE TALKING ABOUT COMMUNISM OR

That's--I'm talking about--about the--about the—the—the—uh, venturesome uh, uh, attitude of the--of the whole communist structure. They—they—they probe they back and they fill and they test and they don't think uh, they're not given to taking chances.

CAN YOU GIVE US THE SENSE OF--WHERE YOU PLANNED TO LAND, HOW QUICKLY YOU PLANNED TO GET TO HAVANA AND HOW YOU PLAN TO DO IT?

Well, I mean the uh, uh, I planned on landing on a narrow front with uh, uh, ah, assault battalions in column, uh, followed in ...by a uh, artillery and--and armor and so forth, the standard landing plan uh, which could be modified by signal as the uh, situation unfolded, uh, then to secure uh, an operating uh, base uh, and advanced by a echelon uh, and we had really no—no uh, plan for link-ups. See we were to link up in the vicinity of Havana with uh, the northern landing force, which consisted of uh, the second marine division and uh, uh, 3 army divisions.

CAN YOU GIVE ME A SENSE OF THAT WHOLE INVASION FORCE THAT HAD BEEN ORGANIZED? BRIEFLY DESCRIBE WHERE THEY ARE AND WHO THEY WERE AND WHAT THE PLAN WAS?

Well, there was an armor division from the Fort Hood, Texas uh, there was an airborne division from uh, Fort Bragg uh, there was a core headquarters from uh, uh, Fort Bragg. Uh, the second marine uh, amphibious force uh, from uh, uh, North Carolina and Cherry Point uh, and that consisted of the air-ground team, marine air ground task force was my task. That was the uh, and then there was my force on the uh, southern landing force, uh, which I had described uh…

HOW MANY PEOPLE IN TOTAL INVOLVED IN THIS INVASION?

Well, it's suspected--see if I remember accurately that far back, about a hundred and twenty thousand altogether.

CAN YOU TELL ME THAT AGAIN AND GIVE ME THAT LIST AND SAY THERE WERE A HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND APPROXIMATELY WHATEVER, READY TO INVADE CUBA?

Well, alright. But ther-- the force--The northern landing force consisted uh, of approximately a hundred and twenty thousand uh, troops, organized uh, uh, uh, into a--an army corps consisting of one armor division, one airborne uh, division and uh, uh, the marine, no there were uh, one armor division, one airborne division, and uh, there was an infantry division, there was 3--3--a 3 division corps and the marine air ground task force.

[QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE 125 THOUSAND ESTIMATE INCLUDED HIS MEN AS WELL]

Uh, no. No.

CAN YOU TELL ME THAT AGAIN WITH THE HESITATION?

Yeah.

DO A NICE TIGHT ONE.

The troop list in—included a more or less standard uh, army corps consisting of a--an armor division, an airborne division, an infantry division and their essential force troops uh, supporting air uh, plus a marine air-ground task force consisting of one marine division and the marine air uh, wing with their supporting elements.

AND THE TOTAL NUMBER?

The total number uh, amounting to uh, a hundred—about a hundred and twenty thousand and then—and then my force.

CAN I ASK YOU AGAIN TO DESCRIBE THAT SAME THING ABOUT THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS THAT WERE COMING IN FROM THE NORTH, OF YOUR PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS ALL TOGETHER.

The uh...northern landing force consisted of a more or less standard array core consisting of an armored division, an airborne division uh...and an infantry division uh...suitably reinforced by...by standard reinforcements for a total of about a hundred and twenty thousand men. Uh...my force uh...consisted essentially of a marine expeditionary brigade which was then not standard, now is standard uh...totaling uh…about uh...well, say 32, 33,000 men built essentially about a reinforced infantry regiment.

AND WHAT WAS THE PLAN? CAN YOU GIVE US A SENSE OF WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF ALL THESE PEOPLE HAD GOTTEN THE WORD? HOW QUICKLY THEY THINK THEY COULD HAVE DONE IT AND WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE DONE?

Uh...I...I felt that the southern landing forces' initial mission-- the seizure of Santiago would be accomplished within uh...48 hours. Uh...the reorganization would depend upon the casualties uh...suffered uh...and the attitude uh...of the Cuban people. But within a matter of 3 or 4 days uh...we would have been able to launch uh...or uh...advance on uh...Havana. Uh...the casualties would have been uh...moderate uh... throughout and then would have uh...dropped off to essentially zero.

WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? CASUALTIES WOULD HAVE BEEN MODERATE?

Well uh...moderate casualties -- that's a generic term but it...it means to me that uh...

...WHAT WAS THE TACTICAL PLAN?

Uh...if it was a diversion...

CAN YOU TALK TO ME...

That ...if it were a diversion ...that fact was not known to me. But that's -- If I had been the next higher echelon commander, I would have not let myself know that it was a diversion because ...that dilutes your enthusiasm for what you're doing.

WHAT SORT OF CASUALTIES WERE YOU EXPECTING?

I was expecting uh...moderate casualties and I'd define moderate causalities as those that you could sustain with the forces you had uh...for uh...a 10 day or uh...2 week uh...period uh... which would be long enough to... to start your replacements uh...rolling into...into the system. Uh...I don't know what the replacement plan uh... of headquarters Marine Corps was uh...for this uh...exercise.

THESE ARE ALL STRANGE EUPHEMISMS TO ME. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT PEOPLES LIVES AREN'T WE?

That's right.

HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT?

Well 10 percent of your force. But that's a...that is a...is a uh...factor that uh... may change with the theater of operations. The length of your supply lines and...and all sorts of things will condition it.

SO YOU"RE SAYING THAT IF THIS OPERATION HAD GONE AHEAD YOU MIGHT HAVE LOST 3000 MEN...

That's uh...Those are reasonable numbers, yes.

COULD YOU SAY THAT IN YOUR OWN WORDS?

Well uh...I would say that uh...uh...we were prepared to accept moderate casualties which I would define for this purpose as uh... 10 percent of your active strength or about 3000 men on the South and uh...uh... 10 percent of 120,000 men on the North. Uh...the number who would return to duty would probably be uh...oh, half the causalities that you would sustain.

WHAT DID YOU DO THEN? YOU GOT THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL AND YOU WENT UP TO NORFOLK FOR YOUR MEETINGS AND THEN WHAT HAPPENED?

Then uh...we were told that uh...we might be uh... kept in the Caribbean for an extended period of time and what where our recommendations so far as our employment for over an extended period. So I got together with the uh...amphibious task force uh...commander who accompanied me to Norfolk and...in a plane assigned to me. I had my own uh...airplane for that purpose. And we decided that we would keep one third of the force in training on Vieques Island. We would keep one third of the force uh...at sea. And we would keep one third of the force visiting liberty ports because our presence in the Caribbean uh...needed to be advertised. And liberty port...uh... liberty calls were a good way to do that. And that plan was approved and we went...went into execution.

YOU"RE TALKING ABOUT NOW AFTER KHRUSHCHEV HAD AGREED TO REMOVE THE MISSILES? IS THAT THE PERIOD YOU"RE TALKING ABOUT?

No that was the period of waiting for what Khrushchev was going to do. That was...that was... And we did...we completed I guess almost one... one cycle of that. Our...our liberty took place uh...in uh...well, we had several...several liberty ports. Uh...uh...our training was on Vieques. Uh...and we made everybody uh...had to make practice landing on...Vieques. We umpired standard training problems. We practiced with our new body armor. This was the first time that we had uh...deployed with body armor. We had some uh...some uh...new uh...anti-tank uh… grenades and so forth. We needed to familiarize with. We did rifle requalifications and so forth.

HOW MUCH DO YOU THINK THIS WHOLE INVASION TASK FORCE WAS FOR REAL AND HOW MUCH WAS IT A PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON KHRUSHCHEV?

You're asking me to now make a...an evaluation which I don't think was really ever made on the national level. If you read uh...uh...from... from...what's been written uh...about Kennedy — both the Kennedy's, Robert and Jack --I don't think you'll find an answer to it even in anything that has been uh...written then.

WHAT DID YOU FEEL AT THE TIME?

I felt it was for real.

CAN YOU PUT THAT INTO A BIGGER...WHAT WAS THE MOOD ON THE BOAT? CAN YOU GIVE US A SENSE HOW YOU FELT?

Well, I visited every element of the task force. I'd make a uh...a command visit to...to somebody ashore or afloat uh...on a daily basis. Uh...and I would bring them uh...the latest tactical picture as I saw it. And it was...it was accurate on the basis of the reports that I was getting. We had people...actually, we had people ashore uh...in Cuba that were...were making clandestine uh...reports to us. So we knew pretty well uh... what was going on there. And we had uh…reports of aerial reconnaissance, submarine reconnaissance. And I even made a personal reconnaissance myself of our preferred landing beaches as I was returning from our Norfolk visit. And did that from a uh...a uh...twin engine transport plane. And we were unmolested. We weren't bothered.

BUT WHAT WAS THE MOOD ON THOSE SHIPS? WHAT WAS THE MOOD AMONG YOUR OFFICERS AND AMONG THE MEN?

Uh...was one of very...of seriousness. There was no uh...they leaned on... on every... every word that I said on every visit that I made. And uh... I was very truthful and forthright with them. Uh...and when they had to practice and so forth in the discomfort of body armor and so forth — And that first body armor we had was pretty damn cumbersome uh... -- And they...they themselves had seen whole blood loaded and coffins loaded. Uh...and they had uh...uh...their first aid training had been stepped up. And their shipboard indoctrination and so forth. And they...they were ready. There was no question about that.

THERE WASN'T ANY SENSE -- YOU KNOW IT'S HARD FOR ME, HARD FOR ANYONE WHO WASN'T THERE 25 YEARS LATER TO GET A FEELING OF THE MOOD AT THE TIME. WAS THERE ANY SENSE AT THE TIME THAT THIS WAS NOT FOR REAL? WERE THE GUYS ON THE BOATS PREPARED TO DIE, DIDN'T THINK THAT THEY WERE OUT THERE AS A DECOY OR AS A BLUFF?

No, I...I think uh...uh...you may uh...Kennedy's that speech of Kennedy has been preserved, because I've seen it once since then. My wife and I have looked at it. And I think you can get a pretty good sense of uh...what he was preparing the country for. And uh...uh...my own personal feeling was that I had been given a mission that I should be prepared in all seriousness to carry out. Uh...because we had had uh...well of course we were in the process then of...of increasing our participation in...in Vietnam and we were orienting our...our uh... training toward the far east.

WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

Uh...that uh...my...my feeling has really generated Uh...is different now than it was then. Uh...I felt that uh...the disparity uh...in weapons uh...or the superiority that uh...weapons uh... were in the possession of the United States uh...would make uh...Khrushchev blink. And I was convinced that uh...when we came back that that was the reason that he had blinked. But uh... in...in my uh...planning uh...uh...as an officer for the Center for Defense Information since I retired uh...I've come to realize uh...the increasing inflexibility of nuclear weapons as uh...as a means of making your national will uh...credible. Uh...and as we approach equivalency uh...that credibility becomes increasingly difficult to achieve. However uh... mature contemplation uh...of what did make Khrushchev blink has led me to conclude that it was the conventional force that we've described plus the naval blockade that really made him blink. And uh...the motivating reasons for coming to that conclusion are the fact that he continued improving that deployment for a six-month period. All of which time he was looking down uh...or looking up at the superiority nuclear weapons wise that the United States possessed. And he even went so far as to put nightlighting devices in there so he can continue improving the sites with impunity. But just as soon as it became evident to him that uh...he was facing a conventionally superior force that he blinked. And the timing — I think it was a reasonable period from the time that he could get a report on those coffins and that whole blood on the docks and being loaded to uh...on our ships uh...in Panama --the time between that occasion and the time he made his decision was uh...was a reasonable period for him to conjecture and do what he did.

COULD YOU GIVE ME THAT ANSWER IN A SHORTER VERSION?

En route to Panama, we were ordered to uh...to take what actions we could uh...in...in the interest of psychological warfare. Uh...and we had deliberately left coffins behind and we had left blood behind because it wasn't uh...available and the medicos wanted to fly it to Panama anyway. So we loaded whole blood and a hundred coffins onto the carrier Iwo Jima and dock sided in Panama, and made sure that there was a good audience to see it. And then we sailed. Uh... time went by -- uh...enough time went by for Khrushchev to digest uh...that information and uh...it finally has become my conclusion that he blinked because of the conventional opposition that was staring him in the face and not the nuclear opposition uh...that uh...was facing him.

...NOT TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED, FILMED AND PUBLICIZED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. IT WASN'T A...

See we didn't clear...we didn't clear that... that loading of that stuff in Panama with anybody. We just went ahead and did it and...and told our boss that we had done it. And uh...he just says, Your so and so acknowledged and...we never knew whether he liked it or not.

BUT YOU COULD OVERDO THE EXHIBITION OF...

And that has been, in my view, sadly over done. Uh...the Grenada thing, the uh... stationing of carriers off of the coast of Nicaragua and so forth has uh... discredited our national will immensely.

WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE ESSENTIAL LESSONS OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS TO KNOW AND REMEMBER TO HELP US TODAY?

The essential lesson, I...I...I think there are essentially two of them. Uh...number one we must evaluate and recognize the limitation of nuclear threat or nuclear blackmail in a situation of essential parity. Number two, we should not overplay our uh...intentions uh...in terms of uh...exhibiting our national will to force our uh...demands uh...upon a force with whom we are not at war.

DO YOU THINK THAT HAPPENED IN THE MISSILE CRISIS?

Uh…essentially no. And I think there you've got to uh...got to measure uh...you got to better...have a better understanding of the... of the uh...uh...press and media plan than either you have queried me on or that I have...have uh...expressed.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

Uh...because...actually, we didn't have a uh... a media plan. Uh...I... I...forwarded all of uh...anything that I wanted to say press wise to our common superiors in Norfolk. And uh...I was never quoted uh...and I was never quoted when we got back to Santiago on anything. As a matter of fact, I was never even interviewed.

CAN YOU TELL ME AGAIN YOUR INITIAL SORT OF ORDERS RIGHT AT THE BEGINNING? HOW YOU HEARD THEM, WHAT YOU HEARD, AND WHAT YOU DID IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS?

Well the Commander-in-Chief uh...alerted the nation and uh...alerted uh...me simultaneously. Uh...almost simultaneously uh...we were told what to do and the length of time we had available to do it. And we were to round out this... these forces which I have described within a 72-hour period uh...prepared to transit the canal, seize Havana -- or seize Santiago, march on Havana. Units reported to me. Commanders reported to me for...for planning. Uh...coincident with the commander in chief's television message and our planning cycle started.

COULD YOU TELL ME THE SAME STORY AGAIN?

I don't know...I get my Rs and Xs mixed up.

NO, ITS GOOD, I'D JUST LIKE TO TRY TO...[BACKGROUND COMMENT]

Well, coincident with the Commander-in-Chief's address to the nation, that same address informed me of what my mission was going to be. Uh...was followed very shortly by a troop list uh...which I was permitted to uh...recommend modifications. There are two. It consisted essentially of a marine amphibious brigade an air-ground uh...team uh...built around the reinforced uh... infantry regiment uh...and a reinforced uh... marine air group -- about 30,000 people including essential supporting forces. Uh...my uh... subordinate commanders reported for planning coincident with the Commander-in-Chief's address. And planning and loading continued around the clock in a strictly conventional manner uh... as we had done in many exercises except that we were now loading actual gasoline, actual explosive, actual allowances of weapons and spare parts, emergency rations -- the whole gamut. And that continued uh...until we were loaded 71 hours later uh...proceeding out of the Santiago Channel.

AND WHAT WERE YOUR ORDERS? WHAT WERE YOU SUPPOSED TO DO?

Uh...my orders were to seize Havana...or seize...

COULD YOU START THAT SENTENCE AGAIN?

What the hell are we...what war are we fighting? ... My orders were to land on the coast of Cuba, seize Havana. Land on the Coast...My orders were to land on the coast of Cuba, seize Santiago and march on Havana.

WHAT CHANCE DO YOU THINK YOU HAD OF SUCCESS?

Uh...at that time the chances of success were a hundred percent. Unquestionably.

WHY? CAN YOU GIVE US A SENSE OF THE OPPOSITION YOU EXPECTED?

I expected the opposition to be moderate to heavy initially. I felt that the Cubans would get a bloody nose within a couple of days. And from that point on they would either be receptive uh...to our intrusion or they would not object to it.

DID YOU FEEL THE WORLD WAS ON THE EDGE OF MASSIVE WAR AT THAT TIME?

No, I did not. And I felt that the uh...the uh... young Commander-in-Chief was actually proceeding uh...with caution.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THAT A LITTLE MORE FOR US? I MEAN SOME PEOPLE HAVE SAID, INCLUDING ROBERT MCNAMARA -- AND ONE NIGHT, I THINK HE SAID TO US, HE WENT HOME FROM THE PENTAGON AND WONDERED IF HE WOULD WAKE UP AND SEE MORNING.

I never felt any...

WHAT WAS THE FEELING AMONG YOUR PEOPLE AND YOU YOURSELF?

Well, the feeling was one of uh...of uh... uh... this is what we train for. Uh...we're dedicated to the defense of our country and if this is required, let's get on with the show.

YOU MUST HAVE KNOWN ABOUT THE NUCLEAR THREAT...

Of course we did.

THE SOVIETS HAD MISSILES BACK IN THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS THE ONES THEY WERE ERECTING IN CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES HAD A COUPLE OF HUNDRED. WHAT DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT AT THE TIME?

There was nothing I could do about it. But there was something I could do about the readiness of our conventional forces. I didn't lose any sleep over it. And I don't believe I'm being braggadocio in uh...in saying that, because I... I had been dealing uh...with...with military operations conducted under the threat of nuclear weapons since 1946. Since the dropping of...of weapons on Hiroshima.

DID YOU HAVE ANY TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN YOUR ARSENAL?

They were...there were not... We were ordered not to take any nukes with us. That would be uh...uh...for later echelons.

SO THERE WERE NONE ON YOUR BOAT?

No.

THEY WEREN'T IN A NORMAL PART OF YOUR ARSENAL OR YOUR WHATEVER YOU CALL IT...

Well uh...for instance if -- the on...the weapons that we had at that time were the Honest John rockets -- could be either conventional warheads or...or nuclear warheads. And uh...we didn't have any honest Johns with us. They weren't in my troop list.

MAYBE IN MANY WAYS IT'S EASIER FOR PEOPLE LIKE YOU AND THE OTHER MARINES OUT THERE ON THE BOATS WHO HAD A MISSION TO ACCOMPLISH AND A DUTY TO TO PERFORM --EASIER FOR YOU THAN SOME OF THOSE GUYS SITTING IN THE KREMLIN OR SITTING IN THE WHITE HOUSE TRYING TO MASTERMIND WHAT...

Well, I don't know. McNamara was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Air Force in World War II so uh... he should have had some feel for it.

I MEAN EASIER IN THE SENSE OF BEING WORRIED ABOUT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. I MEAN YOU GUYS HAD A JOB TO DO AND THE GUYS BACK IN THE WHITE HOUSE HAD A JOB TO DO, BUT THEY WERE SITTING AROUND A TABLE TRYING TO STRATEGIZE THE WHOLE THING...

I don't think there's uh...much difference between being killed with a nuclear weapon or a conventional bomb.

WERE YOU CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF YOUR FAMILY?

Certainly.

DID YOU HAVE FALLOUT SHELTERS? DID YOU THINK...

My...actions with respect to my family uh...were...were standard, I think. Uh...uh...I assured myself that all of the families, all of the dependents of troops uh... embarking uh...would be taken care of in...in their housing — wither government quarters or civilian housing that they were then occupying. We checked that out completely. And they...they... we were on temporary duty and they uh...my family stayed in...in quarters at Pendleton for the period of this.

I KNOW THAT THERE WERE REPORTS THAT QUITE A FEW AMERICANS LEFT THE BIG CITIES AND HEADED FOR THE HILLS AND THAT SORT OF THING. THAT THERE WAS REALLY A LOT OF FEAR AMONG THE POPULACE OF A NUCLEAR...

It was never evident to me. No. I didn't... never felt that way.

WHY? YOU HAD FAITH SOMEHOW THAT WE"D NEVER REACH THAT STEP? THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD EVER REACH THAT STEP?

It wasn't a problem that I could deal with. Hadn't had uh...25 years to develop the antipathy towards nuclear weapons. I think we...uh... that — At that stage we were considering uh... we dealt certainly with nuclear weapons, but we considered them battle field weapons. And a different order of magnitude than you had ever dealt with before. And I sat for uh...for several months on this reorganization board. I think I mentioned it. May have mentioned it uh...to you which considered the changes in weaponry uh...tactics, techniques, formations and so forth. And that's when we came up with the helicopter assault force. Which gave us the capability to concentrate rapidly, accomplish our tasks and then disperse. And within 5 years uh -- And of course we had...I had in my force the first capability to do that that had ever been deployed: the Iwo Jima. And I had uh...one battalion uh...lifted battalion landing team in my task organization. And uh...I was using that uh...in my uh...plan. That was...it was to be a reserve unit to exploit or to reinforce uh...uh...the rest of mine. It was really my secret weapon. And that would uh... uh...in my judgment, would have...would have made the Cubans — They would have folded when they saw all of those helicopters sailing over the horizon. They were not inclined to want to protect their homeland to that extent.

SO YOU WEREN'T CONCERNED ABOUT ANY OF THOSE NUCLEAR MISSILES BEING FIRED DURING A ...?

Yes, I was. But we had standard formations that uh...where you could uh...you could accept say the casualty of one battalion landing team --the launch ...M — We had the sea echelon concept which makes provision for dispersion. And we were still developing it. We were still practicing with it, but we had it in our organization.

WHAT DOES THE SEA ESCHELON CONCEPT MEAN?

Well, that disperses your combat uh...uh...elements so that you don't lose more of any given combat element than you choose to lose to a single nuclear weapon. And of course you...you come up with a...with a normal size weapon and you can determine what that dispersion uh...should be.

THERE'S QUITE A FEW MILITARY PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN COMBAT WHO HAVE COME AROUND TO THIS VIEW THAT YOU NOW HAVE OF THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE"S STILL MANY MILITARY PEOPLE WHO HAVEN"T CHANGED THEIR THINKING IN THIS WAY. WHY DO YOU THINK THIS IS? WHAT DO YOU THINK IS NECESSARY?

The...the planning uh...within the Defense Department and within the services has not kept pace with... with national policy. Our national policy has completely laid down and says in unequivocal terms that we are prepared to reciprocate in any strike that...that's made on us by an adversary. We're not going to make a preemptive strike. But every year the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense still go up on the hill and say, we do not foreswear a first strike. Because we want to leave — they don't say this, but that's what they mean — they want to leave that question mark in the minds of their potential adversaries. And Weinberger keeps repeating himself saying that we are not planning a preemptive nuclear war. But we are planning to adequately respond. They've used several terms... and so forth to describe....