WE'RE GOING TO BEGIN WITH THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. BUT FIRST OF ALL, GIVE ME A DEFINITION. JUST TELL ME IN REAL SIMPLE WORDS, WHAT IS THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY, OR WHAT WAS THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY?

The window of vulnerability refers to, in my judgment, the entry of what we call the counterforce age of nuclear weapons where instead of threatening civilians and populations alone by aiming missiles at cities, instead we have the age where missiles are aimed at the other side’s retaliatory capability. What this means is the Soviets have put 75 percent of their strategic missiles into those weapons that are capable of destroying our minuteman missiles located in the Middle West and western United States, literally to target those silos directly and to destroy them and limit our ability to retaliate.

IN YOUR VIEW, WAS THAT CONSCIOUS SOVIET POLICY, TO PUT THEIR ENERGY INTO ICBMS? OR WAS IT THE FACT THAT THEIR STRONG SUIT HAS ALWAYS BEEN ROCKETRY?

The Soviets’ military strategy is somewhat different from our own and it’s referred to often as damage limitation. The Soviets believe that should a war ever occur, something that they accept, then their objective is to insure that they are not the losers. And preemption, the threat of first strike, is key to their overall strategy and has driven their strategy. And it has driven their placement of so much emphasis, 75 percent of their overall strategic forces, in those particular weapons whose sole value, really, or sole distinction, is in their capability to carry out a first strike.

PUT THAT IN SOME HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR US, WILL YOU? BECAUSE THAT CLEARLY WAS NOT IN THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, WE HELD ALL THE CARDS.

I think it’s very, very important for people to realize that there really are two chapters, at least, in the history of the nuclear age. The first experts refer to as counter value deterrence where we had missiles that were not terribly accurate, carried very large warheads and were typically aimed at either population centers or were aimed at major industrial centers. These could wreak enormous damage, but there really was no advantage at all in initiating a war with these weapons. Really, this was the age of clearly no perceived winner. In the middle ‘60s, that began to move into what we now refer to as the counter force age where instead of targeting cities and population centers, we could more precisely, more surgically, target the silos in which land based missiles are located. This led to the erosion of stability that we refer to as the window of vulnerability. And the serious implication here is that someone might conceivably envision an advantage in going first. It’s that advantage, that perceived advantage in going first, that is that you will lose less by going first than by waiting for the war to happen, is that that has created the erosion of stability that has made the task of managing nuclear stability increasingly difficult from the years of President Kennedy on down to, I'd say, reaching a particular crescendo in the years of Ronald Reagan.

WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION COMES TO POWER, AT SOME POINT IT’S CLEAR IT’S GOING TO WIN AND PEOPLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION ARE SITTING AROUND THINKING, “WHAT CAN WE DO? WHAT DO WE WANT TO DO WHEN WE GET IN IN THIS AREA OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS?” AND THERE'S A SENSE, I THINK, OF A CRUSADE. IS THE NATION IS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE IN THIS AREA AND WE HAVE TO DO SOMETHING TO CHANGE THAT.

Certainly, I think the early years of the Reagan Administration were characterized by a strong belief that we all held; that restoring a commitment to national security as our number one priority and certainly nuclear stability was one of, if not the single, highest priority, was an absolutely essential objective that we held. And that made the first two years of the Reagan Administration place strategic modernization at absolutely top priority. And so we began to modernize all three arms of the strategic triad, of land, air and sea based forces as a single strategy.

HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOUR MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC FORCES WITH THAT BEGUN UNDER THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION, JIMMY CARTER?

My perception was in the Carter years, there was a belief that our foreign policy should be driven heavily by a doctrine of establishing a human rights focus. In the Reagan years, there was no question that, if you wish, the importance of human rights was recognized, but we also felt the absolute necessity of maintaining an adequate military capability to insure that modern day deterrence was acceptable. And therefore, we placed the overall priority of strengthening our military up to match the Soviets military capability as a number one priority of our entire administration, and carried it throughout the Reagan years.

NOW, AS I RECALL DURING THAT PERIOD, REAGAN’S DEFENSE BUDGET PRETTY MUCH SAILED THROUGH CONGRESS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THAT PROGRAM, IS THAT...?

I would say that the first two years of the Reagan Administration were easy years in terms of our budgets being accepted. I would say that after the first two years, it became increasingly difficult as we began to wrestle with the question of Congress’s difficulty in setting priorities; relative priorities for anything. Of course, we felt very strongly that defense was a neglected priority and was, in general, the first priority that any government owed to its citizens. But when it came to trading various subsidies or so-called income distribution programs for defense, became an almost impossible political dilemma.

LET ME MAKE AN OBSERVATION, SEE IF YOU AGREE WITH THIS. REAGAN GETS BIG SUPPORT, A LANDSLIDE VICTORY, AND PART OF WHAT APPEALS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I THINK, WAS THE FACT THAT HE WANTED TO BUILD UP OUR STRENGTH. BUT ISN'T THERE ALSO A LOT OF CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE PEOPLE THAT WE WANT ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS WE WANT A MILITARY BUILDUP? AND THERE WAS A GREAT HESITANCY IN THE FIRST FEW YEARS OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO TALK ARMS CONTROL?

I think there certainly has been for many, many years a paradox in America. That on the one hand, our citizens do want a strong defense, and the Reagan years, there was no question that that was a crescendo for support. But there also is no question that the American people feel somehow that arms control is a sign of calm, cool relations between us and the Soviet Union. So there is on the one hand a desire to support military development and buildup, and at the same time there is a desire that may be apparently contradictory to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviets. They both say the same; what the American people want is security, and they see that there are more than one way of achieving that.

WAS THE ADMINISTRATION AWARE OF THAT, I WANT TO SAY DILEMMA, BUT THAT'S NOT QUITE THE RIGHT WORD. I MEAN, HOW DID THEY RESPOND TO THIS PRESSURE FOR TALKS AT A POINT WHEN THEY SAID, “WE'RE NOT READY TO TALK YET. WE'RE NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO TALK?”

I'd say early in the Reagan years, we all recognized the fact that arms control is, was, and will continue to be one of the tools that a president has to maintain and negotiate our security. But that in the past, it had been perhaps if not the only tool, it had been certainly the most focused upon tool. And what we wanted to erect, if you wish, was a selection of tools; first, a strong nuclear strategic force. Secondly, a strategy for arms control. And finally, and perhaps most importantly, it ultimately came to development of SDI. These are each means by which a president can achieve a condition of nuclear stability, a condition of no advantage in either side for a nuclear war ever occurring. But I'm afraid that over the years, the fact that these are each tools for that purpose of achieving stability had often been lost in the crescendo of public attention paid to arms control alone.

LET ME ADD THE QUESTION, AT THE TIME DURING THIS EARLY PERIOD, THIS IS PRE SDI STILL, IN ADDITION TO THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, THERE WAS TALK OF A CIVIL DEFENSE, A MUCH MORE AGGRESSIVE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM THAN THE NATION HAD BEFORE. THERE WERE VEILED REFERENCES, THERE WERE REFERENCES TALKED THAT NUCLEAR WAR, IF IT TOOK PLACE, COULD BE WON. NONE OF THIS VERY DIRECT, BUT KIND OF IN THE BACKGROUND. AND I WONDER, WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION WAS THERE TALK IN TERMS OF THE MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS, THAT THIS WAS NECESSARY TO GO TO THE BARGAINING TABLE IN A STRONGER POSITION? OR WAS THE THOUGHT THAT IF A WAR DID BREAK OUT, WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SURVIVE IT AS WELL AS WE POSSIBLY COULD?

I think few people doubt that Ronald Reagan recognized, and does recognize very well, that one can be far more successful at the negotiating table when dealing from a position of strength than the reverse. And so early on, the President very publicly in a very openly stated his desire to strengthen our defenses for that among other purposes, no question. The role of defense, civil defense, never really played a very significant role either in strategic modernization or certainly in our negotiating posture at all. Many strong conservatives in America have felt, and perhaps do feel, that civil defense is an important objective. But under our analyses it really did not appear to be a very practical way for America.

WERE WE POSITIONING OURSELVES, THOUGH, TO EMERGE SUCCESSFULLY FROM A WAR IF ONE BROKE OUT?

We most certainly were not, and did not, know how in the early days of strategic modernization to find a way to defend America, or to directly limit our losses. The objective of strategic modernization was to deter war from ever occurring.

LET’S GO TO SDI. LET ME PREFACE THIS QUESTION BY ASKING THIS, AND MAYBE YOU CAN THINK OF A WAY TO TELL US THIS SHORTLY. AT THE TIME THAT THE PRESIDENT’S SPEECH CAME OUT, THERE WAS A LOT OF TALK IN THE PRESS ABOUT HOW WELL, LET ME THINK OF ONE OF THE STORIES. “TELLER WHISPERS IN THE PRESIDENT’S EAR, ‘STRATEGIC DEFENSE,’” AND MALCOLM WALLOP, WE KNOW IN CONGRESS, HAS BEEN ARGUING THIS FOR YEARS AND DANNY GRAHAM FORMS HIGH FRONTIER AFTER BEING ONE OF THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORS AND TRANSITION TEAM, I THINK, EARLIER. AND SUDDENLY THE PRESIDENT SAYS, “BOY, THIS IS A GREAT IDEA. AND GEORGE, GET TO IT AND LET’S WRITE THIS UP,” AND DA DA DA. AND THE SPEECH COMES OUT. ALL RIGHT, THAT WAS IN THE PRESS AT THE TIME. CAN YOU TELL US BRIEFLY LIKE HOW THE ACTUAL ORIGINS OF NOT THE IDEA OF DEFENSE IN GENERAL, BUT THE IDEA OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, THAT INITIATIVE, HOW THAT PERCOLATES UP OR DOESN’T, OR WHATEVER?

From my observation, there's only way that the Strategic Defense Initiative emerged and developed. And that was as a, in the mind of Ronald Reagan, as a logical conclusion or extension to two years of strategic modernization. A challenge that was not so easy as closing the window of vulnerability might have implied. The SDI did not emerge because someone whispered in the President’s ear or because he believed there was a simple, clear cut solution that was the equivalent to a shield over America. It was another option, another means, a better means, for managing nuclear stability. But one, along with offensive modernization and along with arms control.

CAN YOU TELL US A STORY, AN ANECDOTE ABOUT HOW DOES HE CALL YOU INTO HIS OFFICE ONE DAY AND SAY, “WRITE THIS?” DOES HE DRAFT IT?

Well, it’s interesting to me that I saw tendrils, if you wish, of SDI emerging probably from early in ’81 and I know others from the years even before the President was elected. I think that the President would join most Americans in abhorring the genocidal weapons, nuclear weapons to begin with. But I think the recognition that defense is a logical, super logical, part of a country’s means for national security, was there, definitely. The President was aware of ballistic missile defenses, both logically and in considerably greater detail. And as the real magnitude of the challenge of maintaining nuclear stability, of stemming the erosion that had been occurring over, I believe, the decade and a half or two decades before, the increasing need to have new tools, if you wish, to carry out the functions and responsibilities of the presidency emerged more and more clearly until one day, I guess, my, in retrospect, my first exposure was when the President began to talk about an overall strategy for the United States based upon defenses as well as offenses. And it wasn't just defense against ballistic missiles. It was instead of tanks against tanks, it was highly intelligent anti-tank munitions derived from the information age technologies, if you wish, against tanks rather than, I said tanks against tanks, all the way out to defenses against ballistic missiles. So it was a move to a strategy that emphasized the technologies of defense rather than relying so heavily, as we have, upon the technologies for offense.

WAS THERE A PARTICULAR MEETING OR A CABINET MEETING OR ANYTHING THAT COMES INTO YOUR MIND AS A KEY MOMENT?

I don't think that there were any clear origins in cabinet meetings or even National Security Council meetings. I think the origins of SDI, first of all, were entirely in the President’s mind. The origins of SDI cannot, in my judgment or experience, be traced back to a cabinet meeting or a National Security Council meeting. But they can, assuredly, be traced back to Ronald Reagan and only Ronald Reagan. First, the President is a very independent individual and whispering in his ear and suggestions of others, I think, have been tried many a time and have very rarely shaped his opinion, especially on matters of which he was deeply engaged. SDI is a perfect example. SDI definitely draws from the President’s views of morality and views of long-term, endurable history. But most of all, it derives from the complexity as he experienced it, of maintaining a stable nuclear balance between us and the Soviet Union. It derives from clear sense of the lack of simple tools with which to assuredly close the window of vulnerability and a clear sense that future presidents would need far more tools as the legacy he leaves to them than the collection that had been left as his legacy.

AT THE TIME, THE SPEECH WAS A SURPRISE TO MANY PEOPLE OUTSIDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION, FOR SURE. PEOPLE REACTED, “MY GOODNESS, WHAT IS THIS?” WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION, WAS THERE SURPRISE AT THE SPEECH, AS WAS REPORTED AT THE TIME IN THE PRESS?

I would say that the surprise that the SDI speech achieved in the public was comparable to that which was received in the government as a whole. And, in fact, even many members of the White House were not really aware of the speech until hours before it.

Many people have searched high and wide for various origins of SDI. And I think I can say more than, I can say with higher certainty than I can say of any other thing I saw in my years in the White House, that there never was any single initiative taken by the Reagan Administration that was so thoroughly created and invented in Ronald Reagan’s own mind and experiences. It was his decision, it was his creation, and it was aided and assisted by others, but nevertheless it was his deep set of experiences that were acquired during the first two years of strategic modernization and the difficulties that surrounded it to lead him to take that step that very few of his advisors encouraged him to take. It is the only issue I know where Ronald Reagan has actually said, in this case to Hugh Sidey a year or two later, that “Yes, this was one that I conceived of and that I took on my own.” For a man who has always had on his desk a slogan which says “there is no limit to what a man can do if he doesn’t care who gets the credit,” I would say that this one issue of SDI stands unique in Ronald Reagan’s term as President, and I think it should be recognized as such for, if nothing else, for just plain sheer historical accuracy.

NOW, WE KNOW THAT BY NOW EVERYBODY’S PRETTY MUCH ON BOARD SDI WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. IT IS SUPPORTED BY EVERYONE. BUT FOR THE HISTORICAL, WELL, NOT EVERYONE, BUT BY MOST PEOPLE. BUT FOR THE SAKE OF THE RECORD GOING BACK NOW TO ’83, MARCH ’83, THE DAYS AFTER THAT MARCH 23RD SPEECH, WHAT IS THE REACTION WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION? IS IT DIVIDED OR WHAT?

Well, first, there really were very, very few people who knew prior to March 23rd, 1983, that the SDI speech would be part of, a major part of, the President’s next defense speech. A majority of those who knew were those who were assisting the President in the development of it and were clearly supportive, to say the least. Now, this is not to say that the issue of strategic defenses had not been discussed or debated. It certainly had over the previous two years. For example, had been discussed in context of defending an MX basing mode known as defense pack or closely spaced basing. It certainly had been looked at as a growth option. So the whole issue of strategic modernization and nuclear stability had been discussed up, down and sideways. But SDI, as an initiative, as an element in this particular speech at this particular time, was not widely discussed throughout the administration. And the criticism, if you wish, was not high until perhaps the day of the speech and that was more result of people trying to understand exactly what the significance of it was to be that evening.

WHAT BRINGS PEOPLE AROUND? I MEAN WHAT HAPPENS, WE'RE GOING DOWN THE ROAD IN THE FUTURE, I WANT TO GET BACK TO THE SPEECH, BUT GOING DOWN THE ROAD, WHO GETS PULLED AROUND AND WHY? YEAH, CAN YOU TALK ABOUT INDIVIDUALS OR CAN YOU TALK ABOUT DEPARTMENTS? I DON’T WANT TO GET YOU IN...

I don’t indulge in much of this.

NO, I KNOW.

But, I would say that as the SDI speech began to take flesh, let’s say, to assume clarity, certainly a natural, very human resistance to change mechanisms that we all experience, were revealed. Certainly the State Department, I think, was well known to be the least supportive element. Their concerns were reactions of our allies, especially in NATO, of course. And they argued amongst themselves, within the Defense Department. There were concerns amongst some that it would take money away from other programs. But certainly as we have seen, there's never been a stronger supporter of SDI other than the President himself than Secretary Weinberger was. So I would say within the defense community, support was strong. I would say within the foreign policy establishment, support was weak. And I would say within the political elements of the President’s administration, there were concerns as to what the implications would be. But those were the same concerns they felt any time the President spoke on matters of national security.

PUTTING SDI IN PERSPECTIVE, AND LET ME ASK THIS LITTLE DIFFERENT QUESTION HERE, I MAY BE WRONG ABOUT MY FACTS HERE, SO CORRECT ME IF I AM, I THINK THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL FUNDING FOR ABM RESEARCH AND ASAT RESEARCH IN THE PRESIDENT’S FIRST DEFENSE BUDGET. SDI AS ANOTHER REQUEST FOR FUNDING, BRINGS THOSE PROGRAMS UNDER A NEW UMBRELLA. I GUESS WHAT I'M ASKING IS WAS SDI A PACKAGING TECHNIQUE FOR WHAT WAS ALREADY GOING ON, OR WAS IT A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE?

Many people have wondered if SDI was really a package, if you wish, to include the 20 year old program of anti-ballistic missile defenses or anti-satellite technologies, or whatever. I think I can certainly say that from a White House perspective or most certainly from Ronald Reagan’s perspective, that was not the objective. It wasn't even a recognized possibility, no more than was the perfect defense arguments that were used later. Those were amongst the surprises. As the bureaucracy, if you wish, chose to begin to put some flesh on the bones of a real SDI program over the succeeding year to follow the President’s objectives, of course the initial elements were the Army’s anti-ballistic missile program and some also encouraged our anti-satellite weapons, although that really didn’t become part of the program. But again, it’s the natural resistance to change mechanism. You draw as much as you possibly can upon what is familiar. And when you run out of that, you then begin to look at the new. That is what happened with SDI, and I would acknowledge that it perhaps slowed down the first year or two of the program’s development.

LET ME ASK YOU, THIS IS A LONG, COMPLICATED QUESTION AND I DON’T WANT YOU TO THINK I'M LEADING YOU DOWN A TRICKY ROAD HERE, SO I'M GOING TO SAY THE WHOLE QUESTION EVEN THOUGH IT’S IN THREE PARTS. I GET THE SENSE, OR FROM THE OUTSIDE READING THE PRESS, THAT THE FIRST COUPLE OF YEARS, FIRST THREE YEARS, THE SENSE OF A TEAM WITH A COMMON OBJECTIVE, ALMOST A CRUSADE IN A WAY, IS VERY STRONG WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. YOU'RE ON A ROLL, YOU'RE ON A ROAD. EVERYBODY KNOWS WHERE THEY'RE GOING. THERE'S A LOT OF UNANIMITY AND I KNOW THERE ARE BIG ARGUMENTS, I MEAN RILEY AND HAIG, I'M NOT UNAWARE OF THAT. BUT SDI IS MORE DIVISIVE. I MEAN, PEOPLE DON’T REACT. AND NOW FINALLY END OF THE ROAD, YOU HAVE CONSERVATIVES LEAVING THE ADMINISTRATION IN DROVES, MODERATE REPUBLICANS THINKING OVER AND AT LEAST A PERCEPTION THAT SOMEHOW THE PRESIDENCY HAS LOST THE REAGAN TOUCH AND NOW HE’S TALKING ARMS CONTROL AND AGREEMENT OF SOME SORT. SO I WANT TO ASK IS THAT SENSE OF TEAMWORK, FIRST IN THE BEGINNING, THEN AT SCI AND THEN MAYBE LATER WE’LL COME TO...

So, to acknowledge that we are now talking prior to the INS talks?

I DON’T SEE HOW YOU CAN AVOID THAT. YOU KNOW, I MEAN, I JUST DON’T SEE HOW WE CAN AVOID THAT BECAUSE IT HASN’T HAPPENED YET. I'M UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE FACT THAT I'M DOING THESE INTERVIEWS BEFORE THESE LAST TWO SUMMITS, BUT I DON’T HAVE AN OPTION. SO NO, IF YOU NEED TO INCLUDE THAT, DO SO.

As I look back on those Reagan years, I do see certain chapters. The first, most certainly, is that I must say in retrospect, that wonderful two years when there was a strong spirit of teamwork, a strong spirit of commitment, as we called it the Reagan revolution, was most certainly alive and a lot of energy was spent in those years and not so much divisiveness. For me, it began to change after the SDI speech. There was divisiveness in the administration, not so much on whether it was a good idea as much as how much political capital to spend on it. The President was clearly, totally committed to pursuing SDI as his number one priority. It also was unique because it was not an initiative that came out of a consensus. It was classical, top down leadership. And in that sense, the number of authors were few. And finally, in the later years of the Reagan Administration, really beginning in 1985, the focus moved more and more toward arms control. I, for one, do not believe for a second that it represented any weakening or softening on Ronald Reagan’s part, and I think history will show that. What it did show, however, was a movement towards trying to use the strength that we had acquired in the first few years, both in defense modernization and in our foreign policy, to make those arms control talks because more productive for our American interests. And I think that the President attempted to do that most successfully at Geneva, also at Reykjavik. And as he approached the INF talks with Mr. Gorbachev, I think the President saw a possibility of gaining some very real ground that in the long run could represent stabilization in terms of elevating the nuclear threshold in Europe and make some inroad towards his dream of dramatically reducing our overall reliance upon nuclear weapons of all sorts.

I WANT TO ASK ONE MORE QUESTION ABOUT THE SPEECH, THEN I'M GOING TO GET INTO SDI A LITTLE MORE. THE SPEECH COMES RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE HOUSE DEBATE ON THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT, AND IT'S OBVIOUSLY VERY TEMPTING. IN FACT, IT ALMOST WOULD SEEM OBVIOUS TO A CYNICAL JOURNALIST TO SAY THIS SPEECH WAS, IN PART, DESIGNED TO DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM THE FREEZE MOVEMENT BECAUSE REAGAN SEIZES THE HIGH GROUND. HE SAYS, “YOU GUYS WANT TO FREEZE IT, I WANT TO RENDER THEM OBSOLETE.” ANY OBSERVATION ON THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THAT SPEECH?

Well, I find it demeaning, but some people actually have speculated that the President introduced SDI as a counter, if you wish, to the nuclear freeze movement. First, I think you would find it very difficult to find comparable examples in the President’s history as a leader and as a member of state or national government. He is not that contrived an individual, if you wish, he's driven from principle. I don't think the nuclear freeze movement really caused, stimulated a great response in the White House. It was not a major topic of consideration and never moved to the, if you wish, the top of the agenda. I do think this, that in many ways, many supporters of the nuclear freeze movement, might have been quite surprised had they understood how much commonality they had with the basic ethical or moral principles of Ronald Reagan. But in that sense, I'd say one of the greatnesses of Ronald Reagan is that he was the embodiment, is the embodiment, of the American citizen.

SDI NOW. I SEE TWO BIG POINTS WHERE IT’S UNDER ATTACK AND I WANTED TO ASK YOU ABOUT BOTH. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT I'M GOING TO BE INTERVIEWING GENERAL ABRAHAMSON. SO IF THERE ARE THINGS THAT YOU CAN GIVE SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE TO THAT HE CAN'T, THAT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO GIVE US HERE BECAUSE HE CAN GIVE THE OTHER STUFF. I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE’S GOING TO SAY YET. BUT FIRST ONE, THE FIRST BIG CRITIQUE COMES FROM THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. I THINK I'M RIGHT ABOUT THIS, ANYWAY. FIRST MAJOR CRITIQUE BY A “RESPONSIBLE” ACADEMIC SOURCE, ASH CARTER, I GUESS, DOES THAT WITH SOME HELP, I DON'T KNOW. WHAT WAS THE REACTION WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION TO THE OTA REPORT, AND ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU WANT TO MAKE ON THAT?

If I look back and look at the sequences of criticism that occurred against SDI. I think the number one reaction that we had in the White House was astonishment at exactly what was being criticized. Because the concept of a perfect defense achieved much of the focus. It never was our objective, and we never even envisioned that that debate would take place. And perhaps that is a result of inadequate strategizing. But I would argue that the immediate move to perfect defense was more a ploy, a propaganda ploy, of defense opponents in America, actually. Initially, our objective was to simply deny that concept of a first strike to the Soviets. It was to remove the difference between counterforce and counter value weapons. It was, in other words, to remove any possible incentive on the part of the Soviet Union to believe that they could structure or plan a first strike against the United States that could achieve their military goals. It was as simple as that. And in that sense, what we sought was what we refer to as a boost phase defense. Some means by which we could significantly destroy a significant fraction of Soviet missiles without getting into the game of decoys and countermeasure and counter-countermeasure. And it was the new technologies that made that possible, that really spurred SDI. What SDI certainly was not, in the President’s mind, was a return to the days of attempting to defend missile silos or military targets. It most certainly was not that. Now, as SDI emerged and people began to criticize it and initially the Office of Technology Assessment, later my own scientific community quite widely, what they were criticizing was not the SDI that either Ronald Reagan had envisioned or the SDI that General Abrahamson was attempting to build. It was some form of a perfect shield, which we never envisioned.

NOT TO BE ARGUMENTATIVE, BUT THAT FIRST SPEECH OF THE PRESIDENT’S AND A LOT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE LATER, YOU CERTAINLY I THINK AS A CASUAL LISTENER, GET THE FEELING THAT HE’S TALKING ABOUT AN UMBRELLA THAT'S GOING TO, WE'RE GOING TO SIT IN OUR BACK YARD SIPPING COKES AND WATCH THIS THING GO ON UP THERE LIKE WE DO IN THE VIDEO ARCADE?

You know, I do wish that people would go back carefully and look at the President’s own terms and recognizing the significance, particularly of the terms obsolete and impotent, because to anyone in charge of maintaining a nuclear balance, the words impotent and obsolete, apply to a condition of a weapon that will not and is not likely to be ever used. Not to, I think, that ridiculous extreme of one that is somehow magically neutralized. And the words impotent and obsolete were discussed in detail in the final development of that speech. And they were, let's say, included at the President’s insistence. I will even confess that I most certainly encouraged the same because effective impotence and obsolescence could be achieved by the kind of meaningful, but imperfect, defenses that we thought technology could lead to in a fairly short period of time.

TERRIFIC ANSWERS, BY THE WAY. I REALLY APPRECIATE THIS A LOT. LET ME PUSH YOU A LITTLE BIT. AM I WRONG IN SAYING THAT ONE OF THE REASONS WHY WE, THAT IS THE COUNTRY, ABANDONED AN ABM SYSTEM IN THE EARLY ‘70S WAS BECAUSE, IN PART, WE DIDN’T REALLY THINK IT WAS GOING TO WORK THAT WELL. BUT ALSO BECAUSE PEOPLE DIDN’T REALLY LIKE THE IDEA OF HAVING A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM THAT WAS SIMPLY GOING TO DEFEND MISSILE SITES. AND ONE OF THE APPEALS OF THE PRESIDENT’S SPEECH WHICH IS VERY POPULAR AS SOON AS IT’S MADE, THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT EVAPORATES A YEAR AND A HALF LATER AND POLLS SHOW A GREAT SUPPORT FOR THE, WAS THE SENSE THAT WE WERE ALL GOING TO BE PROTECTED HERE?

Let me try to explain what, to me, is the difference between SDI and the previous 20 years or so of ballistic missile defense. And I must speak from two perspectives. As a citizen, the mere concept of being able to protect society from nuclear weapons, especially missiles, is one that we can all support. And I think we have and we have seen that. As a scientist, I find it very, a different conclusion. In the late ‘60s and early ‘70s when we were asked and I was a scientist at Los Alamos in those days, when we were asked to look at tools, if you wish, to intercept ballistic missiles at just moments before they would strike a minuteman site, for example, we confronted a task we simply did not know how to solve. It was extremely difficult to do. In fact, I would say that today, it is far easier to intercept, effectively, to intercept a ballistic missile in its boost phase, or develop the tools to do so, than it is to develop a clear and effective terminal defense. And it was, the major change that made SDI possible, was the availability of technology, particularly directed energy technologies, that would allow those two criteria that Paul Nitze made famous to be achieved. And one of them is to be effective on the margin, meaning if the Soviets build more missiles, it was far easier for us to build more defenses. And secondly, was to be survivable against a first strike. We couldn’t do that. We couldn’t even envision how in the ‘60s and ‘70s. But when 1983 came around, we could.

LET’S TACKLE THE APS REPORT, THE DUBIOUS TIME TABLE, OR WHATEVER.

Sure. When the American Physical Society report came out and said that it would take ten years or more to develop a kind of boost phase defenses that are achievable with directed energy weapons, I was chagrined and I read it carefully. In fact, the report was not that negative about the feasibility. But I must admit to you that I read it and I said to myself, “Am I or am I not proud to be a scientist?” And I am. But I am not proud of the way we make these, too often make these sort of blasé assumptions and I'll tell you what I told Jim Abrahamson. I said, “Abe, if we scientists or we humans, had been born with seven fingers instead of ten, then their estimate would have been seven years, not ten years.” But the fact is we were born with ten fingers. I think they, by saying ten years, meant “not this year, not next year, about ten years.” But the fact is when we have a key priority and something that the public wants to support, as we're doing today and attempting to deal with AIDS, for example, it’s amazing what we can do in one, two, three years. I think we know how to, we know the basic way, basic means and the basic technologies of how to develop boost phase defenses. There's no question that it would take us five to ten years to develop an optimized system. But I think we could begin and we could begin to make deployment decisions, even, in the early ‘90s.

LET’S GO THROUGH THESE PHASES A BIT. LET’S TAKE THE BOOST PHASE FIRST. HOW DO WE TACKLE THAT PHASE FROM SPACE BASED ASSETS OR FROM LAND BASED ASSETS?

First, there are basically three key regions, if you wish, of a ballistic missiles travel. The boost phase, when it looks like a shuttle that just took off from Canaveral, you'll see an enormous amount of thrust and flame behind the missile and that's important to remember because that's what we're looking at. Now, that is considered the most important and efficient point of interception, mainly because you can't decoy it. You cannot make the other side, you cannot deceive the other side with such a clear cut, visible signal, a Roman candle if you wish. The second reason is that there are many warheads on board in this day of MIRVed warheads, and so you can, with a single target, you can destroy quite a large package. The success of phases, the 20 minute or so midcourse phase where it coasts through the upper atmosphere and finally the reentry phase, are much more difficult phases for an effective interception. And the reason is because of the enemy’s capability to decoy, to deceive you and the need to discriminate with great detail wheat from chaff, if you wish, or decoys from warheads. And this, by the way, is why we frequently hear about 50 million or more lines of computer code. The great complexities that have been introduced in a lot of the SDI scenarios are because of a heavy reliance upon midcourse or terminal interception. The fact of the matter is the SDI, as we initially discussed and as the President proposed, was one that would have succeeded only if we had effective boost phase defenses. And that is where we intended to target the program.

ARE YOU UNIQUE IN YOUR EMPHASIS ON BOOST PHASE OR WAS THAT CHARACTERISTIC OF...?

It certainly was characteristic of, let us say, the White House thinking and White House policy apparatus and the technology that made it feasible was certainly key in the overall decision to proceed with that speech. Certainly, there were establishments and camps, if you wish, especially within the military and the defense contractor arena, that had other ideas and ideas they had thought about for years and thought that the time had come when they would be accepted. And this is the way we make decisions in America, and it’s right. But the fact is the vision, if you wish, that drove the President’s SDI was one where we would be able, and could achieve, the effectiveness of boost phased defense.

HAS THE INTENTION, HAS THE PURPOSE, THE MANDATE FOR SDI CHANGED RECENTLY?

I don’t see that the mandate for SDI as far as it has come from Ronald Reagan has been altered one single iota. You can go back and look at a speech that he gave before at the National Space Club, I think, in 1984 in which he very explicitly stated, in kind of an awkward way for a President, that it was boost phased defenses that he was talking about; that it was not a perfect shield. Now, granted, many others inside and outside the administration have expressed it in their own way. But if we want accuracy, we go back to the author, the President was consistent from the beginning to the end.

I WANT TO GET A LITTLE TECHNICAL HERE, BUT NOT TOO TECHNICAL, JUST-- DESCRIBE FOR US WHAT AN SDI BOOST PHASED DEFENSE MIGHT CONSIST OF, KEEPING IN MIND THAT IF YOU HAVE A WHOLE BUNCH OF THINGS ORBITING UP THERE, THEY'RE PRETTY EASY TO KNOCK DOWN.

Let me confess that in the ‘70s and even in the very early ‘80s, I myself was a serious skeptic about the technical feasibility of SDI and in particular because of the difficulty of boost phased defenses. What changed that picture for me was the realization that we could develop, and had the knowledge to develop, a laser on the ground, an intense light source, on the Earth’s surface on the ground, that could transmit the Earth’s atmosphere and maintain the perfect optical quality that characterizes a laser. We refer to this as atmospheric compensation. And let me refer to it another way, the twinkling that we see a star, in a star, on a clear night is caused by distortions in the atmosphere. The star itself is not twinkling, it only appears to be. And we wanted to take the twinkle out of that star, but in reverse, and we learned how to do it in 1982 and have been refining it ever since. That meant the weapon, the expensive component for boost phased defense, could be placed underground. Secondly, the technology of placing relatively low cost mirrors in space in low Earth orbit to be able to precisely direct that laser beam coming up from the Earth to intercept a Soviet ballistic missile was an advance in optics that we felt was entirely feasible and thought we knew basically how to get there. We hadn’t done it.

I'M SORRY. I THINK YOU SAID, “SECONDLY,” AS I RECALL. “SECONDLY, THE RELATIVE“ YOU WANT TO TRY IT?

Okay. Secondly, the availability of relatively low cost, and let me just say clever techniques, for putting mirrors in space in large number, a sufficiently large number that the Soviets would never be confident they had destroyed them all, and that would give us survivability security. Putting them in space with sufficient aiming accuracy to be able to direct a laser beam from the ground to intercept a ballistic missile as much as 10,000 miles or more away, we thought was in hand, or in the foreseeable, projectable future. Those were the two key technologies that to me made boost phased defense look real. And I think as time evolves, they will be the technologies that we will come to rely upon most heavily.

NOW, ISN'T IT TRUE THAT ANYTHING THAT WE CAN DO EVENTUALLY, IF NOT BEFORE, THE SOVIETS CAN DO? AND AREN'T WE, IF WE GO DOWN THIS DEFENSIVE ROUTE, AREN'T WE SIMPLY THEN PROPELLING THE WORLD INTO A NEW ARMS RACE WHERE THERE'S SIMPLY A NEW GENERATION OF TECHNOLOGIES THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE TO SPEND ENORMOUS SUMS OF USEFUL MONEY TO BUILD?

I've heard so many times the concerns that people say about driving an arms race, and I see several fallacies. One, let’s not fool ourselves. We have been in an arms race with the Soviets, an intense arms race, for 20 years. And I would much rather be in an arms race for defenses than I would be for offenses. But let’s remember something else. The Soviet Union has invested very heavily in their own strategic defense program for decades. And I am not talking about a simple system to defend Moscow, nor a simple system to defend military targets. I am talking about directed energy technologies the same kind of ground-based lasers, for example, that we are choosing to emphasize, have received considerable emphasis for the Soviet Union. And I wish I were at liberty to share with the American people every bit of knowledge and information that I have been privileged to hold because I think it would make the entire issue of SDI far clearer.

I GUESS THIS IS THE CONUNDRUM, ISN'T IT? IF THEY HAD A CREDIBLE DEFENSE AGAINST ICBMS, WE WOULD BE VERY, VERY CONCERNED. IF WE HAVE A CREDIBLE DEFENSE AGAINST ICBMS, WON'T THEY BE VERY, VERY CONCERNED? IN OTHER WORDS, HOW DO WE...?

I must speculate here, but I believe that one of the reasons why President Reagan has been in his later years more inclined toward the arms control table has been because of the realization that with SDI as a supported initiative in America, it is more advantageous to the western world, to the free world, to be able to negotiate a balanced offense, defense, military capabilities that is in both sides’ interests. In other words, if the Soviets fear, as Mr. Gorbachev actually did express to President Reagan at one point, that we might do that which they have been trying to do, I might add, which is to have both offense and defensive superiority, we know that that is not our objective. We also know that our citizens would never support that. And we had no intention to do so. We are willing to negotiate that right now to assure the Soviets that that is not our objective.

I WANT TO GET TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT I WANT TO ASK ONE REALLY BIG QUESTION FIRST. TWENTY YEARS FROM NOW, FIFTY YEARS FROM NOW, WRITING A HISTORY BOOK OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCIES, POST-WAR PRESIDENCIES, THERE'S A CHAPTER ON REAGAN. THERE'S A PARAGRAPH ON HIS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND THOUGHT. WHAT ARE THEY GOING TO SAY HAS BEEN HIS BIG CONTRIBUTION TO, OR IF THERE IS ONE, TO THE WHOLE NOTION OF OUR THERMONUCLEAR STRATEGY?

I think the Reagan years will appear as very important years in the history of the nuclear age as, let's say, look back on from the middle of the 21st century. And I think it will be seen as the turnaround in a 20 year long period of eroding stability that began with the introduction of highly accurate MIRVed missiles, first by the United States, but placed in large quantity in Soviet heavy missiles. That erosion of stability, that threat if you wish, was turned around by Ronald Reagan by a combination of offensive forces and arms control, but most importantly by the introduction of SDI. So as we look back in that history, I think we will see that he stemmed the tide that ultimately would have, could have, wound up in nuclear blackmail or even conceivably in a nuclear war.

(SIDE COMMENTS)

I think as we look back, what we will see is that Ronald Reagan stemmed the erosion of stability that began with the introduction and emphasis upon Soviet heavy ballistic missiles and we will see that he stemmed a tide that could very likely have wound up in either nuclear blackmail, or worse yet, even conceivably in nuclear war.

LET ME PUSH YOU ON A FEW THINGS THAT YOU ASKED, NOT PUSH YOU, BUT GO BACK AND GO OVER A FEW THINGS I THINK YOU'VE SAID A LITTLE BIT BEFORE. NOW WE'RE AT THE END OF THE REAGAN YEARS AND WHAT WE SEE IS WE SEE A MAN WHO HAS REFERRED TO THESE FOLKS AS THE EVIL EMPIRE, THE SOURCE OF ALL EVIL IN THE WORLD. WE ALL KNOW THAT STUFF, THE RHETORIC THAT HE USED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. BUT NOW HE’S SITTING DOWN AT THE TABLE TALKING VERY ENTHUSIASTICALLY ABOUT MAKING A DEAL WITH THEM. HAS THE SOVIET UNION CHANGED, HAS THE PRESIDENT CHANGED? WHAT'S CHANGED?

I think there's a, if you wish, a complication that somehow in many ways has been very well by Freeman Dyson in his book Weapons and Hope. And it is this; that we find it so difficult to imagine that a President could negotiate with an enemy, and yet we have done it throughout history. The President once referred to the Soviet Union as an evil empire. Let me not put words in his mouth because that would be presumptuous. But I, for one, endorse the President’s efforts on arms control in ’85 and later. And yet, I believe it strongly today as I did ten years ago, that the Soviet Union is an evil empire and that the system that they have embraced is thoroughly evil. What we want is to exist in peace and hopefully to work toward a situation where they come to recognize the, let me say, the more ethical and moral standards of freedom. We want that, and it would be blind not to be willing to negotiate with them. I think the fact that the President was willing to go to the arms control table was because he saw a possibility of being able to meet the needs of free people; not because he was acquiescing to the Soviet Union, nor because he believed that Mr. Gorbachev was a fundamentally more west-leaning leader of the Soviet Union.

WE CERTAINLY HAVE SEEN A LOT OF HARD LINERS HAVE LEFT THE ADMINISTRATION TO BE REPLACED BY MODERATES OR LESS HARD LINE. I MEAN, GEORGE SCHULTZ IS NOT ALEXANDER HAIG AND BAKER IS NOT REGAN, AND DOWN THE LINE. AND KEN EDELMAN’S GONE AND JEANE KIRKPATRICK IS GONE. I MEAN, HAS THERE NOT BEEN A CHANGE IN THIS ADMINISTRATION IN TERMS OF— [side comments] I'M WONDERING, AND LET ME JUST ADD ONE THING TO THIS. BECAUSE I'M WONDERING, LIKE THIS PROGRAM IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE A SHELF LIFE OF 15 YEARS. THEY'RE GOING TO PULL US OUT IN 15, THEY'RE GOING TO SAY, “CONCH, YOU'RE REALLY AN IDIOT. CAN'T YOU SEE? EVERYBODY’S NOW MENTIONING THE FACT THAT THIS GUY, AND YOU HAVEN'T GOTTEN THAT IN YOUR SHOW.” I MEAN, THERE'S SOMETHING TO THAT, ISN'T THERE?

There's no question that in the last two years of the Reagan Administration that a lot of the so-called hard liners, or most committed people, left. And I think that's hardly surprising. Government is not filled with people who are driven by a commitment. Let's face it; government is, in large measure, a bureaucracy. And a bureaucracy seeks largely the preservation of the institution, that individual bureaucratic institution whether it be NASA or the Department of Defense or State or whatever. Those who come in with a purpose, with a cause, with a deep commitment for which they will sacrifice anything, are anomalies. And as time went on, those anomalies left, no question. And yes, it is natural that Howard Baker, who was much more a member of traditional government, would replace others who joined the President, such as Ed Meese, in the early days, no question. And I don't think that's a surprise. I also don’t think that it represented that significant a change in the President’s objectives in that game because, believe me, if there's one thing that anyone who worked for Ronald Reagan knew, it was who was in charge and who set the priorities. It was not unusual for the President to be confronted with a, say, 10-2 recommendation and for him to simply take the two. He often had a line, he said, “I'll take the high road,” and he did it whether the hard liners were around him or not.

HAS CONCERN ON THE PART OF, I THINK WE ASKED THAT QUESTION, I DON’T WANT IT SAID AGAIN. I DO HAVE A COUPLE MORE QUESTIONS, BUT WE'RE ALMOST DONE. FUNDING FOR SDI HAS NOT GONE ON AT THE LEVEL THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REQUESTED. IS THERE A LEVEL OF FUNDING THAT THE PROGRAM WILL ESSENTIALLY BE EFFECTIVELY KILLED AS A PROGRAM, SIMPLY KIND OF PERCOLATE FORWARD THE WAY, I MEAN, ALL THESE THINGS WERE PERCOLATING FORWARD PRIOR TO SDI, AS I UNDERSTAND IT. SCIENTISTS WERE WORKING ON LOS ALAMOS AND LIVERMORE AND OTHER PLACES ON THESE. SDI BROUGHT MORE MONEY TO THEM, BUT IS THERE A FINANCIAL--

People have often wondered because there's a critical amount of money that represent go or no go in the SDI program, and I'm afraid I'm going to, I can't quite go along with that. It's public support, not the amount of money, that determines whether a program will continue or not. There are inefficiencies and grave inefficiencies, in the way money is spent on SDI just as there are in virtually every other area of defense, just as there are on the way we spend our funds at home for that matter. We are not perfectly efficient creatures, and I would say that government is less than most. What matters is public support. Again, I emphasize that. If the public wants SDI, then the Congress will do their best to keep money from being wasted. If the public does not want SDI, then we will not have SDI.

OKAY, THAT LEADS ME TO MY LAST QUESTION, WHICH IS IF A DEMOCRAT GETS IN OFFICE, MOST OF THEM HAVE COME OUT AGAINST STAR WARS, SDI, CALL IT STAR WARS, WILL IT SURVIVE?

I have few doubts that SDI will survive a Democratic administration or even a much more moderate Republican administration. I'm just not worried. I have spoken and talked with people throughout the United States, as well as in Europe, and I find that the base of public support is profound and deep and I think enduring. What threatens SDI is the confusion of what it is, whether it can work, how big it will be and what it will do. I think that confusion is diminishing year after year after year and I think that can only provide enduring support behind SDI. Whether a Democrat, for example, an opponent, a political opponent of Ronald Reagan chooses to terminate the program, I think it’s very unlikely, very unlikely.