WHAT DID THE UNITED STATES HOPE TO ACHIEVE WITH THE ATOMS FOR PEACE PROGRAM?

The Atoms for Peace program had several objectives. Certainly the most important was its relationship to the problem which was then beginning to grow and to be understood of proliferation. We had tried since the end of war the policy of what I call secrecy and denial. In other words not sharing nuclear materials, not sharing nuclear technology with other countries, and it wasn't working. The Soviet Union had already developed nuclear weapons. The British had done so. Several other countries were experimenting independently without any control whatsoever with nuclear energy as was natural. And there was every reason to expect that these countries as well would develop nuclear weapons or at least those who wished to do so would. So that Atoms for Peace program was conceived of as a way to share our nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in a way that would help persuade the countries who received it not to go ahead independently with military nuclear programs. Now there were other reasons too. There were other objectives. For example, at that time we had a large foreign aid program as we tend to call it now.. We felt it was in our interest and maybe almost our responsibility to help other countries recover from the damages of the Second World War, to improve their economies, to meet the growing aspirations of their peoples. And it... the Atoms for Peace program was a natural part of that. It was a way to provide a important new technology that could significantly help improve the economies of the countries who received them, not only in terms of nuclear power but in many other ways. And, and nuclear medicine, nuclear agriculture. There was a lot of optimism, a lot of enthusiasm about what the atom could do and it was only right in line with our policy of foreign aid to share that with others. And finally there was the element of US leadership. We conceived then; I think it's true today that we... if we want to be world leaders we have to show them we're world leaders and we have to demonstrate that through promoting the technologies that we are that we have great skill in, expertise in, and sharing their benefits, their peaceful benefits with other countries.

THAT'S RATHER LONG. WHAT EXACTLY WAS ATOMS FOR PEACE?

The Atoms for Peace program was a pulp program, perhaps better said a policy first announced by President Eisenhower...

WHAT WAS ATOMS FOR PEACE?

Atoms for Peace was a policy and a program first announced by President Eisenhower in 1953 at the United Nations under which the United States would share its technology, its peaceful nuclear technology, peaceful nuclear materials with other countries in exchange for an undertaking by those countries not to use it for defense or military purposes.

WHAT WERE THE GOALS? WHAT DID IT SET OUT TO ACHIEVE?

Well first of all the most important one was to dissuade countries from proceeding independently with the development of nuclear energy in a way which might give them the... both the capability...

IF YOU CAN START BY SAYING THE GOALS WERE...

First we wanted to stop the process of proliferation. In other words we wanted to stop or at least to inhibit the process by which countries were proceeding independently with nuclear energy programs that would give them the capability without any controls to develop nuclear weapons. Secondly we wanted to contribute in line with our policy of foreign assistance to the development needs of both industrialized and non-industrialized countries. And third, we wanted to demonstrate US leadership in this very important technology.

HOW WOULD ATOMS FOR PEACE ACTUALLY DEAL WITH THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM?

Atoms for Peace dealt with the proliferation problem by extending to countries nuclear materials and nuclear technology in exchange for their commitment to use it only for peaceful purposes and under controls or so-called safeguards which would allow us to verify that commitment was being followed.

WHAT WAS THE IMAGE OF ATOM OF ATOMIC ENERGY? WHAT KIND OF IMAGE DID ATOMIC ENERGY HAVE?

Well certainly in the United States it had a very positive image. It the necessity for our... military nuclear program was well understood. Certainly there was there was regret and concern about the former military use of it and a very strong desire that need never be repeated but the need to have a strong military nuclear defense was widely accepted. From the standpoint of peaceful uses these were only beginning to be understood but there was great enthusiasm and a very general belief that these would contribute to our economy, to our scientific capabilities, to our medical capabilities because there are important medical uses of nuclear energy. And there was very little opposition.

CAN YOU TELL ME ANY ANECDOTES ABOUT THAT PERIOD OF THE PEACEFUL USES?

Well I don't know that I'm a great anecdotalist. But what I recall is the general acceptance of it. The, I won't say the adulation but the, but the rather good reception which people who were engaged in the, in the nuclear energy program then received wherever they went. I was a young fellow and got invited to places to give talks and always had good dinners and I had very few critical questions as I'm sure I would today. And generally the people who had worked on the, on the atom bomb and even more so people who were then working on nuclear power and peaceful uses of nuclear energy were very widely appreciated and well received.

COULD YOU DESCRIBE THE KIND OF ATMOSPHERE WHICH THE PROGRAM ITSELF ACTUALLY GENERATED?

Well there was enthusiasm. There was enthusiasm at the technical level. There was great enthusiasm at the at the public level. I can remember for example that shortly after the announcement of the Atoms for Peace program and international launching of it many countries I'm sure by some sort of international consultation decided to print Atoms for Peace stamps so that you'll see that somewhere around 1955 or 1956 probably fifty or a hundred countries, I'm only guessing printed Atoms for Peace stamps. Overseas there was great enthusiasm for it. Maybe over, maybe over expectations of what it...might do for national economies and national scientific and technical capabilities. But there was a great deal of appreciation. And finally in the United States let's say in the official in the official sector the government sector, both the Congress and the, and the administrations repeatedly were positive to the program. It was widely viewed by many observers as the most important foreign policy initiative of the Eisenhower years. The state department felt it was an important foreign policy tool to help establish US leadership, to help forge to help forge better relations with a number of countries. And one very important thing that we tend to overlook is that it did have a role in opening up our relationships with the Soviet Union.

CAN YOU TELL ME MORE ABOUT THAT?

Well this was first of all it was a very important part of the Eisenhower speech that the cooperation in Atoms for Peace, although I don't recall him using that term, cooperation in the peaceful uses of the atom would provide specifically through the establishment of a forum which came to be the International Atomic Energy Agency located in Vienna, through the establishment of that forum a place where east and west and the US and the Soviet Union in particular could meet and discuss important issues including in the long run nuclear disarmament. One of the first major events of the Atoms for Peace program was the 1955 Geneva Conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. And that was a major thing. That was the first really large scale international scientific conference since the end of the war. And certainly the first to be attended by both east and west. And the Soviet Union and the Soviet block as we called them those days turned out in force and they presented papers on subject matters that were then even more secret for them than for us. And it did have a lot to do with the thaw, with the thaw that to some extent brought the Cold War to if not an end at least diminished its intensity.

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THAT THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION HOPED THAT THROUGH ATOMS FOR PEACE THE US WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION?

The control of proliferation through the Atoms for Peace program was intended to occur through providing countries with what they needed in terms of technology, in terms of nuclear materials for legitimate peaceful uses under controls that would ensure that they would...

IF YOU CAN START BY SAYING ATOMS FOR PEACE SET OUT...

The Eisenhower administration hoped that the Atoms for Peace program would control proliferation by providing countries with the requirements for technology, for nuclear materials for legitimate peaceful purposes so that they would not have to engage in independent programs which would then give them an uncontrolled capability to develop nuclear weapons.

I'M INTERESTED IN THIS ISSUE OF LEADERSHIP; THE US WANTED TO MAINTAIN SOME KIND OF CONTROL. IF YOU CAN JUST GO OVER THAT POINT.

One of the objectives of the Atoms for Peace program was to demonstrate US leadership in this advanced area of nuclear technology... in a way that would help persuade people that the United States was the technological leader in the world, that it's therefore its defense capabilities were credible, that its economic cape-cre-capabilities were credible. This is a common theme of US foreign policy that we must demonstrate our leadership in as many fields as we possibly can. And the Atoms for Peace program fit into this very nicely because we were the leaders in both defense and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

AND AM. I RIGHT IN THINKING THAT BY RETAINING THAT LEADERSHIP YOU'D HAVE SOME CONTROL OVER PROLIFERATION?

Well leadership and control are not synonymous. Leadership is let's say part of the environment in which foreign policy is conducted. If you don't have leadership then your commitments are not viewed as being as serious. Your ability to carry them out is not given the same credibility. Control is let's say the operative part of it. You, to control you have to engage in you have to enter into agreements which give you some right to say what other countries are doing. And we did that in the Atoms for Peace program.

HOW WAS ATOMS FOR PEACE ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED?

Well it was implemented the Atoms for Peace program was implemented in several ways. First of all through the supply of nuclear technology. We entered into agreements for cooperation with many countries and with groups of countries such as the European community, then called EurAtom, European Atom Energy Community, to provide technology. Another important element of it was the provision of nuclear materials; not at no cost but at reasonable prices that would minimize any incentive to produce them independently. We int... we engaged in trading and for countries in the foreign aid category; in other words for foreign aid recipient countries such as the under developing countries of South Asia and Latin America we provided modest financial and economic grants to build nuclear research reactors and to buy nuclear equipment and nuclear materials. By and large the program however was not a what I will call a give-away program. But people paid for what they got and were expected to conduct their programs largely with their own funds.

THAT WAS THE ONLY EXCHANGE WAS IT? HOW DID THIS SYSTEM WORK?

The Atoms for Peace program was implemented in... I would say three major ways. First of all by sharing with other countries our peaceful nuclear technology. This had been developed in the United States at taxpayer expense. It was quite unique in the world and by sharing it with other countries we were able to allow them to proceed with their own development and use of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Secondly by the provision of nuclear materials. These were provided at cost. They were not given away but they were provided at cost and on reasonable terms. And again these were unique materials in the world that other countries did not have. And by providing these we reduced their incentives if not entirely, eliminate their incentives, to produce them independently. And then finally for a category of countries that were recipients of our foreign aid we did provide modest development grants for the purchase of small scale research reactors and other nuclear energy equipment and materials.

LET ME ASK YOU WHICH COUNTRIES BENEFITTED MOST FROM THE ATOMS FOR PEACE.

The Atoms por... for Peace program was deliberately...

START AGAIN.

The Atoms for Peace program was very carefully planned to be attractive and to and therefore capable of let's say influencing almost all countries. Both the industrialized countries of that period and the less developed or less industrialized countries. For the developing countries, for the developed countries, the industrialized countries of western Europe and Japan the emphasis was on nuclear power and we did provide nuclear power technology and nuclear power materials, specifically nuclear fuel to those countries so that they could initiate a nuclear power program. For the developing countries and which these were of course much more numerous the major emphasis was on nuclear medicine, nuclear agriculture and very importantly the development of a nuclear research capability. You have to remember that many of these countries were not engaging at all in anything that could be referred to as scientific research. And it was a very welcomed feature of the program to many of them; that here for the first time someone was helping them perform maybe not world shaking research but important research at the forefront of technology with modern tools such as nuclear reactors and nuclear equipment. And, and there were many countries in the middle of this broad spectrum who had both some industrial capabilities but not advanced ones. And I can remember a remark by a friend from Spain. He said, "You know, this is the first research work that's been performed in Spain with government sponsorship since the voyages of exploration." I don't know whether it was a true statement but it was what, it was how he viewed the Atoms for Peace program. It allowed his government for the first time in decades to if not centuries to sponsor and engage in nuclear, in research efforts.

TELL ME ABOUT INDIA.

Well India was a very interesting country to many people. India was to many Americans and I think to people in other parts of the world as well, the testing ground for democracy in the developing world. Here was India, the second most populous country in the world following the democratic path. We had the example of China following the Communist path, the authoritarian path. And there was a tremendous desire on the part of many who... Americans to help India succeed in, economically technically, in any way we could. There was almost a love affair with India among let's say US intellectuals. And it was shared by I think the public in general. And the Atoms for Peace program again was a was a welcomed new tool in our way of in our arsenal, let's say, for assisting India to achieve its goals of better eco... economic life for its people more security higher level of education. And it fit in with all those goals. And it was very natural for us to want to assist India particularly since it had a major it had an educated highly competent scientific elite... some of whom had distinguished themselves in the area of nuclear physics already.

I'D LIKE YOU TO TELL ME A LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT THE EARLY ATOMIC PROGRAM IN INDIA AND HOW THE US ATOMS FOR PEACE SET OUT TO ASSIST THAT PROGRAM.

India was a very special and a very interesting case. India was the world's largest democracy. It was pretty much the testing ground as we saw it for democracy in the developing world. We, it was constantly compared with China which had chosen the Communist path, the authoritarian path and there was a tremendous desire on the part of the United States; both the intellectual community and the government itself to help India succeed... to improve the economy of the country, to improve the law to the people who were one of the poorest countries in the world. And it was felt that the Atoms for Peace program fit in very much with these with these goals. It would provide India with technology that could help improve their industrial production, their industrial tech... capabilities. Uhf there was in India, as in many other countries even though it on the average is a very poor country, there was in India a very competent elite of individuals who had great scientific competence in the nuclear physics who had already begun on their own a small nuclear energy program in India. And by assisting that program/ by working closely with that elite it was felt that we could help India obtain its attain its goals of improved improvement for its people.

YOU SAID BEFORE EVERYONE WAS IN LOVE WITH INDIA. I'D LIKE TO...

Indi... Everyone was in love with India.

JUST A SECOND.

Everyone was in love with India. It was the largest recipient of US aid of many different kinds and there was a tremendous desire to see India succeed in improving its economy and improving its technology, its living conditions. And the Atoms for Peace program fit in as we saw it ideally with those goals.

WHAT WAS YOUR OWN ACTUAL ROLE IN ATOMS FOR PEACE?

I worked my way up the bureaucratic ladder in the Atoms for Peace program. I began as a I think something called a... Deputy Assistant Director for something or other in the division that had responsibility for administering the Atoms for Peace program and I after some time became the head of that program in the Atomic Energy Commission which had the major responsibility for its implementation. And at a later date I became the I'm sorry for these titles. A Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Energy Affairs which had the major responsibility for the day to day foreign policy aspects of the Atoms for Peace program.

GO BACK A LITTLE. THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE ATOM. CAN YOU TELL ME SOMETHING ABOUT THAT ATMOSPHERE THAT ATOMS FOR PEACE GENERATED IN TERMS OF THE PEACEFUL USES.

Okay? There really are three classes.

START AGAIN.

Okay. There really are three classes of uses peaceful uses of atomic energy. The first and the one that people generally think of when they think of nuclear energy is a generation of electric power. The Atoms... the fission process...

IS IT POSSIBLE TO PUT IT IN A NUTSHELL?

There are three classes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, all of which figured in the at-Atoms for Peace program. First the generation of electric power. Second the uses of nuclear energy for non-power purposes such as medicine agriculture and the like. And finally and very importantly its use as a research tool.

FOR WHAT PURPOSE WAS IAEA SET UP?

The International Atomic Energy Agency was specifically proposed in President Eisenhower's 1953 speech as the organization which would channel nuclear assistance from the countries that possessed nuclear capabilities to those who needed it and which would apply appropriate controls to make sure that the materials were not misused. And it evolved in pretty much that way. It it both provides assistance and a forum for cooperation to many, man... to it's member countries and it also applies the controls which we call safeguards.

AS PART OF ATOMS FOR THE PEACE, THE INFORMATION THAT WAS DECLASSIFIED AT THAT TIME... WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF THE...OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION AT THIS EARLY PERIOD?

The declassification process; in other words, the process of removing the classification stamp or designation from nuclear information which up until the Atoms for Peace program was almost complete was a stepwise one although a fairly rapid one. The first big step was taken in 1955 at the Geneva Conference. And at that point I would say most of the information relative to the generation of electric power the design operation of nuclear reactors for generating electric power was declassified. Even before that most of the information dealing with non-power uses in medicine and agriculture and the like had been declassified. What remained classified after the Geneva Conference of 1955 was certain information the nuclear fuel cycle, in other words on the separation of plutonium and on the isotopic separation of enriched uranium. At the 1958 Geneva Conference information on re... so-called reprocessing which means the separation of plutonium from reactor fuel was declassified. To this day information on enrichment, most information on enrichment remains classified. So that is the extent of declassification. Almost everything except uranium enrichment.

CAN YOU SUMMARIZE THAT?

Well before 1954 when the Atomic Energy Act was amended to permit Atoms for Peace, to permit international cooperation and the transfer of nuclear materials and technology, almost all nuclear information and nuclear technology except the very most basic information on the structure of the atom and so on was classified. The design of nuclear reactors was classified. The design of nuclear fuel and how to produce it was classified. Under Atoms for Peace almost all of this has been declassified in several steps with the result that today the only thing in the peaceful area that remains classified is the enrichment of uranium. Now it goes without saying I think that uhf the design of atomic weapons and special equipment for producing weapons components and the like remain classified.

[QUESTION INAUDIBLE]

I'm not certain when I first became aware of China's interest in nuclear energy whether for peaceful or military purposes. I assume that others in the United States government were better informed than I, but I do not recall having any specific understanding or expectation that they were moving in this direction, until perhaps the time of their first nuclear test which I think was in 1964.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT?

My reaction to the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964 was one of considerable surprise particularly since the French, who had been trying for so long had I guess the French test preceded the Chinese test but not by very long.

HOW MUCH CONCERN WAS THERE IN THE US IN 1968 WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT ISRAEL WAS POSSIBLY BUILDING A, THEY SAID IT WAS A TEXTILE PLANT...

Well there was a great deal of concern in the United States that Israel, even though a friendly country and one with whom we had very close relations, was proceeding on an independent nuclear program which based on the knowledge we had at the time could very well lead to the development of nuclear weapons. Our attitude was very much the same as it was during the earlier days of the Atoms for Peace program. This is what shouldn't happen and we should do what we can to bring that program within the controls that it'll be used only for peaceful purposes. Bear in mind that although the existence of the Dimona program, the Dimona reactor did become known the Israeli statements at the time were that it was only for peaceful purposes, And we wanted to make that true. And to ensure that was so and to help... and to verify that was so.

WAS THERE MUCH INTERACTION BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE CANADIANS AND THE BRITISH ... BEARING IN MIND THAT DIMONA HAD BEEN A FRENCH PURCHASE?

There was a great deal of cooperation among the so-called western suppliers; the few countries of the west; the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and France from the very beginning of the Atoms for Peace program in the direction of trying to follow more or less common policies that would ensure that their nuclear cooperation, their nuclear exports would not contribute to military programs. Now the level of that cooperation and let's say the results of that cooperation varied from country to country. With Canada and the United Kingdom it was very close and I think really very successful. France tended to be although generally following the policy of non-proliferation, even in those early days, tended to take a much more independent view and to be less uh/ insistent than we would have been in ensuring that its nuclear exports were clearly committed to peaceful purposes and safeguarded to verify that commitment was kept.

HOW WAS IT HOPED THAT US WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION THROUGH ATOMS FOR PEACE?

The US hoped to be able to control proliferation through Atoms for Peace by meeting the legitimate needs of other countries for... nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, for nuclear materials for peaceful purposes under controls which ensured that they would not use those for anything other than peaceful purposes, under safeguards to verify that was being done, that commitment was being kept. By meeting those legitimate needs we hoped that we could then steer countries away from these independent programs that could lead to the development of nuclear weapons.

IF YOU CAN TELL ME AGAIN IN ORDER OF PRIORITY WHAT ATOMS FOR PEACE SET OUT TO DO...

The Atoms for Peace program,

OKAY.

The Atoms for Peace program had, I would say, three major objectives. The first was to stop or at least inhibit this process of proliferation. The inder... independent nuclear programs by countries could lead to the development of nuclear weapons by them, by meeting their legitimate needs for nuclear materials, nuclear technology under controls. Second, it was part of our general program of contributing to the economic development of countries, particularly those whose economies had suffered during the war by providing them with information and material and technology that would contribute to their economic development. And thirdly we wanted to demonstrate US leadership in the in this very advanced very prominent area of technology namely nuclear technology as a way of making sure the people viewed the United States as technological leaders whose commitments would be kept and whose capability to perform its worldwide responsibilities was real and credible...The Atoms for Peace program had several objectives. For example it was intended to... inhibit, if not absolutely stop, the process of proliferation. It was intended to contribute to the economic and technical development of our friends around the world. And finally to demonstrate US leadership in this very important field of technology.

1963, JOHN KENNEDY'S PREDICTION THAT BY THE '70s THERE MIGHT BE AS MANY 25 NATIONS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOW REALISTIC WERE THE FEARS AT THAT TIME?

The... prediction of the extent of proliferation, in other words, how many countries would acquire nuclear weapons has always been much worse than the reality. The most prominent of those predictions, the one most often sited is that of President Kennedy that there would be something like 25 countries by I think the end of the '70s. Oh, those predictions were not incorrect in let's say technical capability terms. It could have happened. The fact that it didn't happen is no accident. The fact that it didn't happen is a result of policies deliberately pursued by the United States and other countries to inhibit proliferation such as the Atoms for Peace program.

FROM A TECHNOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW, HOW MUCH INFORMATION WAS ACTUALLY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS REGARDS TO THE TECHNOLOGY OF... IF SOMEONE HAD THE TECHNOLOGY FOR NUCLEAR POWER, DID THEY HAVE THE SAME TECHNOLOGY FOR MAKING A BOMB?

The relationship between the technology of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the technology of nuclear weapons really relates to the preparation of the materials. Unfortunately the same materials that are produced by or used in... nuclear reactors are those which can be used to make bombs. Now, from that point on the technologies... depart very drastically... I mean, you do not know how to make a bomb simply because you know to make a nuclear reactor or know how to make a nuclear reactor work.

START FROM THE BEGINNING.

Alright. The technology of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the technology of military uses; in other words, the technology of the, of the bomb have this in common: the materials that are produced in peaceful uses for example the nuclear reactors are to some extent used in nuclear reactors are the same materials which with certain preparation can be used to make nuclear weapons. Now from that point on the technology is very different. You do not know how to make a nuclear weapon simply because you can design or even less operate a nuclear reactor.

IS THAT INFORMATION CLASSIFIED?

The information on

AT THAT TIME. THE SIXTIES.

The information on the design of nuclear...

START AGAIN.

The information on the design of nuclear weapons, bombs has always been classified. It remains classified. Now of course certain general principles the types and the... let's say the qualitative ideas of how a bomb works have for one reason or another entered the public domain but the detailed design of atomic weapons remains classified to this day.

SO IN THE SIXTIES THOSE FEARS WERE NOT JUSTIFIED?

It's a very interesting thing that those who have been responsible for US nuclear non-proliferation policy from the very beginning, and even before there was a policy for thinking about it, the Acheson-Lilienthal report for example, have always assumed that once a country gets the materials it will be able without too much difficult to turn them into at least a crude bomb. I think that fear is somewhat overstated. I don't think it's as easy as those who have made that assumption think it is. But nevertheless, that's an underlying assumption of the whole history of non-proliferation policy development. We have always assumed that once a country gets the materials it will be able to make a bomb, even though it was rather hard to make the first ones and the evidence we have I think with countries like India and so on is that it isn't as easy as those who have learned to do it think it is.

SO THE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN NO WAY CONTRIBUTED TO PEOPLES CAPABILITY?

Well I would not say that it did not contribute to their capability. I better start that over because I didn't say with the, what the what was...

OKAY.

The dissemination of nuclear technology does have of course a relationship to the capability to make bombs, to design and make bombs. You have to start very far back teaching nuclear physics as a relationship to the design and production and testing of bombs. The teaching of chemistry per... especially nuclear chemistry has a relationship to it. The teaching of more detailed technology such as the manufacture of nuclear fuel certainly does give people experience with handling these materials that will help them make not a fuel element but a weapons component which is very different in shape and size but to some extent the experience matters. But these relationships are... I would say not crucial. In other words the information that is needed to turn nuclear material into nuclear weapon components if you know what you want to make is information that really is widely available because it's chemistry and metallurgy and the like that have been practiced many years. The materials are somewhat different but that is a learning process that would not defeat anybody for a great deal of time.

IT'S EASY OR...

I'm saying that if you know how to design a nuclear weapon making the nuclear weapon, the process of making it from nuclear materials if you have them is probably not very difficult and not a... and is not knowledge that you can reasonably keep from people because it's knowledge that is in the mainstream of... how do you deal with materials of metallurgy and chemistry and the like. That's...

WHAT'S THE DIFFICULT PART THEN?

Well... What I believe that it is difficult to design a nuclear weapon that works and that this is not...a project for a high school senior or even a university senior although there are many who have sat at the table and presumably come up with designs that might or might not work. There are a lot of... there's a lot of techniques that go into the design process. There's a lot of knowledge that goes into the design process. And then once you have the design, although what I said was that it, i... you cannot keep from... a... let's say a reasonably developed country the capability to turn the materials into a working... maybe a crudely working but still a working bomb. It isn't those techniques are not are not ones which... everyone on the street possesses and I'm really referring now to the terrorist scenario. I don't think that as... a single individual or even a small group is very likely to have all of these capabilities, to be able to integrate, put together all these capabilities design, materials handling and so on and turn nuclear material that he might have got a hold of illicitly into a bomb. Now there are other people who disagree with that but I question whether that can be done by a very small group.

CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE TARAPUR CONTRACT AND HOW THAT EVOLVED?

India had...

YES.

India had developed had begun developing a nuclear energy program largely on its own, largely through the capabilities and the strong personality of a, an individual named Homi Bhabha who was the... a nuclear scientist of some note and was the first chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. He made it very clear, Dr. Bhabha made it very clear that he thought that India should have nuclear power, that it would be beneficial to the Indian economy and to the development of Indian technology. And interested US officials, the chairman, then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in that in that proposition. And it was agreed I think around 1960 that the first step would be a survey mission by the US Atomic Energy Commission to India to assess their capabilities to undertake a nuclear power program. In other words to see whether they had the technical infrastructure, the trained people in general the capacity to carry it out. And I headed a small group of about four or five people who went over to India for that purpose. That was the beginning of my involvement in the... what became the Tarapur project.

WHAT DID YOU FIND?

Well the results of the mission as I recall them from the technical point of view were positive that while India as we all know is a very poor country and had enormous needs in technology and so on at its best, at its highest level. India was already engaged in many high technology activities. It was producing aircraft and electronic instruments and so on more or less up to date for that period of time. And that with proper training of individuals it could successfully undertake a nuclear energy program meaning it could it could acquire a nuclear reactor largely designed and built abroad and safely operated, safely produced fuel for it and integrated with the electric grid and that has turned out to be the case.

1974. WHEN THEY UNDERWENT THEIR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION DID YOU FEEL IN SOME WAY THAT ATOMS FOR PEACE HAD FAILED?

The Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 was, needless to say a great disappointment. I did not think then and I certainly don't think now that it invalidated the principles or the policies of Atoms for Peace in any way. First of all because it was a direct result of some very early agreements which were admittedly defective, which were contained provisions, or maybe more accurately lacked provisions which were in all of our subsequent agreements. And it was these provisions which India, well, let's say took advantage of to develop a nuclear weapon in a way which allowed them to say that did not constitute any violation of the agreements.

LET'S JUST TALK ABOUT THAT. THAT'S THE HEAVY WATER.

The heavy water and the Canadian Cirus agreement.

WHAT WERE THE PROBLEMS WITH THOSE AGREEMENTS?

The basic problems with the two agreements which allowed India to produce plutonium which in turn was used to make a nuclear bomb were that they did not clearly define what was meant by peaceful purposes. And they had no safeguards to ensure that the commitment to peaceful purposes was being carried out.

WHAT WAS THE PROBLEM WITH THOSE TWO AGREEMENTS?

The heavy water supply agreement and I...

STOP THERE. OKAY.

The heavy water supply agreement and I believe that the agreement the Canadian agreement for the supply of the reactor, the Tarap... of the Cirusreactor was probably very...

LET'S GO OVER THAT.

The heavy water supply agreement, and by that I mean the agreement for the supply of heavy water for the Cirus reactor which was a US-Indian agreement, and the Canadian agreement... which was an agreement for the supply of the Cirus reactor itself had similar provisions. These provisions were that the material —

START AGAIN.

The two agreements shared the same problem. Although they did require that the heavy water and the reactor be used only for peaceful purposes. They did not specify in enough detail what was meant by peaceful purposes and they did not have safeguards which allowed anyone; us or the Canadians or the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that the commitment was being kept. And this allowed the Indians to say that by developing a... and testing a nuclear explosive which they said was for peaceful purposes they were living within the terms of the agreement.

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE LATE SIXTIES, EARLY SEVENTIES IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY AND THE HOPES THAT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY HAD AT THAT TIME?

The atmosphere in the nuclear during the late sixties was very affirmative. There were, orders were being taken for nuclear power plants in large numbers. There was every expectation that the plants would be built on schedule would operate well and would produce economic electric power. This began to change into the seventies. I can't remember if there was a... exact turning point but the atmosphere became more difficult in terms of nuclear regulation for example. Plant construction was slowed down. Uh,...began to be experienced and by 1973 or 1974 it was clear that the industry was facing some serious problems.

BUT THINGS WERE LOOKING GOOD IN THOSE THREE YEARS.

Well I would say that the period of affirmative attitudes toward nuclear power lasted longer than three years. I would say that from probably 1964 onward... until 1971 was a period of optimism in the nuclear industry. This industry has always suffered from ups and downs off of... attitudes, pessimism alternating with optimism. And that was the optimistic period; from the Geneva Conference of '64 to the Geneva Conference of '71 which was the last Geneva Conference was a period of optimism.

ANY OTHER THOUGHTS ABOUT THAT PERIOD OF OPTIMISM? ANY OTHER RECOLLECTIONS ABOUT WHAT...

I... The expectation during those, during that period was that in the industrialized countries most of the additions to the electric power generating system would be nuclear. And that sometime in this century most of the industrialized countries would have half or more of their electric power generated by nuclear energy. And, and that has come to pass in a number of rather important countries; not here unfortunately but it has come to pass in a number of important countries.

HOW ABOUT THE USE OF PLUTONIUM?

Plutonium was always viewed as being a necessary part of the nuclear fuel cycle. It... From the very beginning the expectations were that plutonium produced in light water nuclear reactors, the kind that have come to dominate the nuclear power industry would be extracted in reprocessing plants, fabricated into fuel and returned to those reactors so that the, what some people call the plutonium economy is not a new an unanticipated possibility but something that was seen from the very beginning.

WAS THERE ACTUALLY A DRIVE FOR THE PLUTONIUM?

The plutonium economy again, this is a new term but the b... what I would say the recycle of plutonium was anticipated. It was planned on. There were active efforts made by the atomic energy commission and by similar organizations in other countries to establish the facilities and especially the reprocessing plants. Uh, that would make the recycle of plutonium possible. And again, in several countries those plants have been built and they're operating and plutonium is recycled. The United States tends to be an exception.

HOW DID THE NUCLEAR MARKETPLACE CHANGE BETWEEN THE SIXTIES AND THE SEVENTIES?

Well the marketplace change drastically in that a constant stream of orders for new nuclear power plants, essentially dried up by around 1973, if my memory is correct. Many people say, and I assume many people believe, that the oil embargo of 1973 stimulated the nuclear power industry. My recollection is just the opposite; the oil embargo by depressing economies in the industrialized world reducing the demand for power in energy and power in general was one of the major influences in drying up the market for new nuclear reactors. Now on top of that in other words, the market had been saturated, not just the market for nuclear plants but for electric power in general, had already been saturated by plants that were ordered and were already under construction by 1973. Now on top of that the regulatory problems; in other words the problems encountered in building plants under the regulatory... regimes of the various countries and especially the United States led to great delays, great cost overruns in the building of plants. Again, primarily in the United States. This is not a worldwide phenomenon. And that further has set back the industry.

HOW ABOUT THE EUROPEANS THEN?

Well the situation in other industrialized countries is different from that in the United States in several ways. Overall there has been a great reduction let's say in the expectations, below the eg... below the earlier expectations in the, in the ordering and installation of nuclear power plants. And that's true in India and that's true in, I'm sorry. That's true in Europe but it's true in Japan as in the United States but by and large in those countries, plants that have been ordered and built have not been delayed to the extent that they have been in the United States. The cost overruns have not been as great and there's now, I would not say a resurgence in nuclear power but at least a beginning a slow a slow revival . At least there was until the recent accident at Chernobyl and it remains to be seen what the long term impact of that might be.

GETTING BACK TO '75 WHEN THESE CONTRACTS WERE SIGNED BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AND ALSO FRENCH AND PAKISTAN, ETC. WHAT WAS THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY'S REACTION TO THOSE CONTRACTS?

Well, the American nuclear industry reacted of course adversely to the contracts under which both France and Germany sold nuclear power plants and other facilities in South American and in Asia. Not because they were unwilling to accept competition but because they thought that the rules of the game were different for... the French suppliers and the German suppliers and for themselves because the French and the Germans were able to offer other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle which they were unable to offer. So there was quite an adverse reaction. No not, as I say not against competition per se but against what was perceived as unfair competition in that respect. But the main reaction, the main negative reaction really was in the United States government.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE LONDON NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP, ITS FORMATION...

Well I returned to the United States from an overseas assignment just as the London Suppliers Group was... getting underway. And I did attend all of the meetings that were held during the Ford administration. I did not attend any meetings after the Ford administration because I did not continue in the government after the Ford administration. It was a very... a very useful and I think largely successful effort to increase foreign allied participation in and implementation of sound non-proliferation policies.

WAS THERE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATED?

Yes. The London Suppliers Group during the Ford administration did reach agreement on some very useful and important measures that would substantially restrain what we set out to restrain which was the supply of so-called sensitive technologies; enrichment and reprocessing to countries which had no apparent need for that technology and which might misuse it.

HOW DID YOU VIEW PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION WHEN HE CAME INTO OFFICE TO DEFER REPROCESSING AND...CONSTRUCTION; IN OTHER WORDS, HIS INITIAL NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION?

Well the Carter policy was set back to what I believe are sound non-proliferation efforts, not because the goals weren't laudable but because it was unrealistic because it wasn't directed to the real problems which were not nuclear fuel cycle and the use of plutonium in general but the problem of specific countries who had, who might d... misuse that technology. Proliferation is a problem of countries, not of fuel cycle policies.

THE CARTER PEOPLE REGARDED ATOMS FOR PEACE AS OVERSOLD AND THEY SAID POORLY THOUGHT OUT. DID YOU FEEL THEIR CRITICISM WAS WARRANTED?

Well there certainly has been a point of view that was held at least initially by some of the officials of the Carter administration that the Atoms for Peace program was oversold. I think that was unfair criticism. I can't speak for them but I think that they backed off from that. I think if you look at the results, the results are that instead of President Kennedy's 25 nuclear weapon states we have... depending on how you like to count them, perhaps six. And I don't think that's a policy failure. That's a policy success.

ANY OTHER COMMENTS ABOUT THE CARTER POLICIES GENERALLY?

The Carter policies I perhaps tongue in cheek were I think ill thought out which was a criticism that they made of the original atoms for peace policies because what they did was to diminish the willingness of our allies whose cooperation is essential to effective non-proliferation policies, diminish their willingness to cooperate at the very time that their cooperation as alternate suppliers was so important.

COULD YOU REPEAT THAT?

The essence of the Carter policy was the attempt to defer the use of plutonium, whether in the breeder or whether in recycle in present day light 'water reactors. Now that was far too broad of a... and too much of a shotgun approach. The problem is to defer the acquisition of plutonium by countries that might misuse, by generalizing this policy, by going to war against plutonium in general. The Carter policy reduced the willingness of other countries to rely on the United States as a supplier. It reduced their willingness to cooperate with the United States in the application of sound non-proliferation policies and in my opinion it was a setback and not a gain for non-proliferation policy.

THE NON-NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ACT IN '78. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE NNPA?

The NNPA of course in some respects was the statutory embodiment of the Carter policy but it went even further. And even the Carter administration officials to their credit were dismayed by certain aspects of it. The... In addition to putting in statutory form the attempt of the Carter policy to prevent the use of plutonium the real vice of the non-proliferation act, or the nuclear non-proliferation act was its requirement that the United States in effect, not honor some of its commitments long standing commitments made many years earlier as a nuclear supplier. That was a very serious defect. And to their credit, as I said, the Carter administration people spoke against that but it's in there.

SO YOUR REACTION, IF YOU COULD JUST SUM UP...

Well the non-proliferation act like the Carter policy but to a greater degree was on balance not in the best interest of good non-proliferation policy. It did undermine the credibility of the United States as a supplier and by doing so it stimulated the independent development of nuc... nuclear capabilities around the world.

WHAT WAS YOUR STAND WHEN IT CAME TO THE TARAPUR AGREEMENT?...

Although somewhat am... amused by the irony of Mr. Carter opting for the continued shipment of nuclear fuel to Tarapur, I felt very strongly that it was the correct thing because it did tend to reemphasize the importance of keeping supply commitments, of being a reliable supplier.

DIDN'T IT PROVE THE CASE THEREFORE THAT THEN HIS POLICY HAD BACKFIRED ALMOST...

Yes. I think there was a great deal of irony in it that here was the administration and the most senior official of the administration who said that we can restrict our nuclear cooperation, our nuclear exports having to support the export of nuclear fuel to a country that had exploded a nuclear device and probably the only country that has done so in a way that at least raises a question of having not lived up to its commitments.

HOW DID YOU REGARD INFCE?

Well INFCE was a... well meaning effort to raise the consciousness of other countries, to the proliferation problems. I think it had that effect. Now INFCE was all things to all people. To those who originally proposed it of course in the United States, INFCE was an opportunity to sell obviously unpopular unattractive policies of non-proliferation, tight export controls to the rest of the world. To others, including many in the United States, INFCE was an opportunity to demonstrate that those policies were not saleable and to get back to normalcy. And it did the latter by and large. It demonstrated that the policies weren't acceptable. They weren't accepted... and it tended to clear the air with the exception that the United States having seen that the policies were unsalable largely retained them anyway.

HOW DID PRESIDENT CARTER'S POLICIES OVERALL AFFECT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY?

Well the policy, the Carter policies had a v... very serious adverse effect on the attractiveness of US nuclear supplies to other countries. And I prefer not to talk in terms of the nuclear industry because it's not just the interests of the nuclear industry that are at stake. It's the national interest that's at stake. And I think everyone, including the officials of the Carter administration, agreed that participation in nuclear commerce was, is vital to maintaining our influence. And by reducing the attractiveness of doing business with United States it was it had an adverse influence... it had an adverse effect. We lost business without any doubt. We lost nuclear fuel business and I'm... believe that we lost reactor business because of those policies.

TO WHAT DO YOU ATTRIBUTE THE ANTI-PLUTONIUM FERVOR IN THE US IN THE '70S AND DO YOU THINK IT WAS JUSTIFIED?

I think that campaign or movement was a product of several things, first of all there was a general disenchantment with government activities, secondly there was a growing environmental movement, and it was clearly part of that, you find pretty much the same faces, the same organizations in the environmental movement an in the anti-plutonium movement, the anti-nuclear movement. And I think in addition, there is a certain amount of misunderstanding about the issues, they are not simple, so it is not surprising that people would say well this is the stuff you make bombs out of so we will not have it being around the world in commerce, so putting all these together, and with the leadership of some very competent and capable intellectuals in the universities, you had the anti-plutonium movement of the seventies.

DESCRIBE THE KIND OF ATMOSPHERE WHICH IT GENERATED?

At the beginning, you mean. Well there was great enthusiasm for both the peaceful uses of atomic energy, there potential contribution to our economies, to our scientific research, to our scientific efforts, and there was enthusiasm for the proposition that we could cooperate in this previously denied field, that it was part of the mainstream of our efforts, assist other countries in their economic development and their scientific development, it was a very positive, almost a heady, atmosphere. I think the usual cliché was that it captured the enthusiasm of the world.

IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT YOU'D LIKE TO COMMENT ON AS REGARDS ATOMS OR PEACE?

Let me think a little bit about that, I mean we talked about the objectives a number of times hm. Now another objective of the program, I wouldn't put it as a very major one or high one, was to somewhat improve lets say the attitude in other countries, the public in other countries, toward the necessary maintenance of our nuclear weapons program, our military program by sharing this up-to-date peaceful uses technology with other countries, the feeling was that they would be less critical of our military program, which there was to some extent a growing criticism around the world in those days.

ANYTHING ELSE ABOUT THE CARTER'S?

I'm, on the record, no. No, I'm not

FINALLY, JUST THE PRESENT DAY, WAYS YOU SEE THE PROBLEM TODAY.

I believe that proliferation problem today is what I would call one of stability, I see no wholesale movement such as has often been predicted by the hand-wringers, toward the acquisition of atomic weapons by other countries there is, there are what are commonly called problem countries who, for one reason or another, usually because they feel that they're in a very unsatisfactory security situation feel that they need atomic weapons. And we have to work with those countries, work on those countries, if you want to put it that way, with country-specific policies that are designed to steer them away from that, but a general movement toward proliferation, I don't see that happening. The abuse of the nuclear fuel cycle, I definitely don't see that happening.

ONE OTHER POINT THAT, AT THE TIME OF THE INDIAN TEST, WAS IT NOT FELT THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD GO AHEAD AND DO SOMETHING TO STOP THE INDIANS FROM GOING AHEAD WITH THAT TEST? THERE WAS A FEELING AT THAT TIME THAT WOULD CAUSE THE PAKISTANIS TO BE INTERESTED, AND IT WOULD GO FURTHER.

I was out of the country on assignment when the Indian test took place, and I can't speak to whether there was a...how much prior knowledge or suspicion that there was of the test or what might be done to avoid it. I do believe that the reaction after the test was disappointing, that probably more could have been done and should have been done by way of making it clear that we viewed the test as inconsistent with our commitments, with the Indians commitments to us and to Canada and to impose some rather substantial penalties of cost for having proceeded with that test.