DO YOU SUPPORT ALONG WITH DAVID AARON AND SECRETARY BROWN THAT PROPOSAL THAT SECRETARY VANCE TOOK TO MOSCOW IN MARCH OF '77, THAT CALLED FOR DEEP CUTS AND REDUCTIONS IN THE SOVIET MISSILES?

Because that would have been a giant step towards genuine disarmament that truly reduces the threat to both sides inherent in nuclear weaponry.

WAS IT REALISTIC? DID YOU THINK THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT IT?

We hoped they would consider it...they would think about it. It was not designed to be disadvantageous to them. It was designed to enhance mutual stability.

MARSHALL SHULMAN SAYS THAT THERE'S NO WAY, THAT IT WAS DISADVANTAGEOUS. GADDIS SMITH WROTE THAT THERE WASN'T ANYTHING IN THEM. IT WAS ALL THERE; WE COULD DO WHAT WE WANTED WITH CRUISE MISSILES AND THEY HAD TO COUNT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER AS A STRATEGIC WEAPON.

Well they're always people on our side who do the negotiating for the Soviets for them, but we have to make independent judgment in terms of our own interest, and our best judgment of what is possible with them. Several years later, in fact, the Soviets have moved towards acceptance of what was proposed by us in March '77. In fact, at Reykjavik in the Gorbachev-Reagan encounter, the Soviets moved close to the figures that we proposed in 1977. So it was not disadvantageous to the Soviets. And the people who say so, put themselves in the position of being essentially apologists for the Soviet position.

WHAT DID YOU HOPE SALT WOULD ACCOMPLISH? WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF SALT IN THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP? THE BROAD RELATIONSHIP.

We hoped it would stabilize the strategic competition, thereby making it perhaps more possible to deal with the some pol... with some of the political conflicts.

SECRETARY VANCE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE THE CENTERPIECE OF THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, THAT IT WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR FURTHER ACCOMMODATION. HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT?

Well I was always a little dubious about the notion that it was going to be the centerpiece. Eh, I felt that by emphasizing so much it would be the centerpiece, we were making a fetish out of arms control and forgetting the fact that American-Soviet relationship is a competitive one, because of ideological and regional conflicts. The arms competition is a symptom of that antagonism...of that competition. Not necessarily its cause. And by focusing so heavily on arms control, in my judgment, we were slighting some of the important issues that in fact were shaping in this particular historical era, adversely, the nature of the American-Soviet relationship.

WHEN YOU THINK OF THE GEO-POLITICAL MOVES, THE MOVES IN AFRICA AND SO ON AT THAT TIME, AND SALT, IF YOU HAD TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWEEN A SALT AGREEMENT AND NOT COUNTERING THE SOVIETS ON THE GEO-POLITICAL CHESS BOARD, OR COUNTERING THEM AND PERHAPS JEOPARDIZING A SALT AGREEMENT, ON WHICH SIDE WOULD YOU ERR?

Oh, absolutely and very clearly on the side of countering them. It seemed to me absolute counterproductive to the long range stability of the American-Soviet relationship to ignore regional conflicts while single mindedly pursuing SALT.

SO IF YOU HAD TO MAKE A CHOICE –

I've already answered that. I said it's very clear. I would have gone for countering the Soviet regional advances.

WHAT DO YOU THINK THE SOVIETS' INTEREST WAS IN 1978 OR IN THE LATE SEVENTIES IN ANGOLA AND ZAIRE AND ETHIOPIA?

I personally feel it is futile to speculate about their interests or motives. Where it's important is to react to what they do. Actions have consequences as of themselves, irrespective of motives. I couldn't care less whether the Soviets went in to Angola in order to be expansive or whether they went into Angola because of some suddenly surfaced affection for the Angolan people. The fact that they're there has certain geostrategic consequences that we have to be concerned about. And it is to that that we have to respond and not do some speculative judgments regarding their motives.

YOU DON'T NECESSARY SIDE WITH PEOPLE WHO ADVOCATE THE GRAND DESIGN PHILOSOPHY OF SOVIET INTENTIONS OR THOSE WHO SAY THEY'RE SIMPLY STRATEGIC OPPORTUNISTS.

I think it's really irrelevant. The same argument has arisen, for example, over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And there are those pitiful souls who claim that this was purely defensive move by the Soviet Union. I say pitiful souls because anybody who argues that is arguing in effect that the primitive country of sixteen million people were somehow a major threat to the number two superpower in the world. But let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the Soviets moved into Afghanistan for these allegedly defensive reasons. The fact that they have moved in has consequences for the stability of the region, for the viability of Pakistan and Iran, potentially for Soviet access to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and that is what we have to be concerned about. And not essentially an answerable speculation as to why they did something.

IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, WHAT WAS YOUR CONCERN, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR MOTIVES, WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF THEIR PRESENCE?

In the Horn of Africa, the effect of the presence was to put pressure on the Arabian peninsula, to put them in a position to in effect, generate a strategic squeeze on an area in which we continue to have vital interests.

YOU'RE WORRIED ABOUT OIL.

Yes.

YOU SAY IT. I CAN'T USE A YES ANSWER.

I worried about oil and its implications for the future viability of Western Europe and the Far East. It seems to me that this is almost self-evident.

HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOU AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF THE SOVIETS?

I would say that the State Department, by and large, was overly preoccupied with the arms control negotiations. I shared Secretary Vance's hopes for a comprehensive arms reduction arrangement, which he very strongly favored and advocated prior to his mission to Moscow in March of 1977. Though I was skeptical in fact, that the Soviets would then accept. My feeling was that we, nonetheless, ought to persist in that approach in the hope that we could get them eventually to accept. But beyond that, I felt that there were wider geostrategic concerns that we could not afford to ignore and in which in my judgment the State Department was slighting. Namely, Soviet expansion to the Horn of Africa, the Soviet strategic buildup, the kind of pressure they were putting on us in various parts of the world, in part exploiting our post-Vietnam malaise. In my judgment, this course of action on the part of the Soviets was not really compatible with what, in my judgment, ought to be a reciprocal and a comprehensive détente and not a one-sided and one dimensional détente.

DIDN'T SECRETARY VANCE SEE THE PROBLEM AS LOCAL?

Probably. And I don't think it was.

YOU WROTE IN YOUR BOOK THAT DISAGREEMENTS ON THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM DICTATED DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE SOLUTION. DO YOU CARE TO EXPAND ON THAT?

Well I don't remember exactly what you're referring to, but certainly if one views a problem as local, and if someone else views it as broader geopolitical, then the solutions tend to be different. If one views the Soviet move in Ethiopia, as having only local significance focused primarily on the border dispute between Ethiopia and Somali...land or between Ethiopia and the Eritreans in their struggles, then obviously one's reaction to it is different than the one sees this as having consequences for adjoining regions, notably the Arabian Gulf.

WHAT WAS THE SOLUTION? FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW.

The solution was to make an issue of it. To make an issue of it so as to convince the Soviets that this matter was affecting the totality of the relationship including the strategic relationship so that the Soviets could not assume that in effect, they could have their cake and eat it too. On the one hand, seemingly promote détente with this impact particular in our public opinion, and on the other hand, continue fairly aggressive moves in the Third World designed to expand their sphere of influence by reliance on proxy military forces, logistically and politically supported by the Soviet Union.

DIDN'T YOU ADVOCATE A CARRIER TASK FORCE?

Yes.

LET ME PUT THE QUESTION THIS WAY. DID YOU THINK THAT PART OF OUR SOLUTION A MILITARY SOLUTION, A THREAT OF USE OF FORCE?

Yes. Of course. There are situations in which threat of military force carries with it a message. There are situations in which even the deployment of military forces conveys a message. It conveys an interest. It conveys a sense of involvement. It compels the other side to think about it without one having necessarily to cross the t's and dot the i's. In other words, without necessarily deciding that one has to use that military force in military operations.

WHAT IF THE MILITARY SHOW OF FORCE DIDN'T WORK? WHAT IF THE ETHIOPIANS CROSSED THE BORDER INTO SOMALIA? WHAT WOULD WE DO?

We had, of course, the option of supporting the Somalis with arms and our presence in the area would still be a complicating factor compelling the other side to assess the consequences of that presence, to assess the implications that this has for the US-Soviet relationship. In other words, it would maximize the complexity of the environment that they were confronting. Again, one cannot be simpleminded about it. One h... doesn't have to decide that the presence of military forces automatically means that you will use them in military operations. But the presence introduces a new factor into the calculus. And you cannot conduct diplomacy in an age in which power is still an important aspect of international affairs without occasional reliance on power...and the projection of power.

THESE ISSUES, I GATHER, WERE DEBATED IN AN NSC MEETING IN OCTOBER 6, 1978, WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. WHAT HAPPENED? DID YOUR VIEW PREVAIL?

October what?

I THINK IT WAS OCTOBER 6TH. I KNOW THERE WAS AN NSC...

What year?

1978.

Well, you're talking about the October or November meeting 1978, I believe my view prevailed because it was roughly around that time that the President approved two very important recommendations that I was pushing. One, was to seek facilities in the area so that we would have access for our force projection into the area on a rapid basis. And secondly, the President approved the idea that I had been promoting for quite some time. Namely, the formation of the rapid deployment force...in order to give the United States the needed flexibility to enhance air and sea lift and through the availability of light forces for the deployment of American forces into areas where we're not permanently stationed.

PERHAPS THIS IS EARLIER. BUT HE DIDN'T APPROVE THE SHOW OF FORCE - THE CARRIER TASK FORCE.

I think that was earlier. I think that was either in late '76 or very early in '77.

NO. NO.

That was either in 1977 or early '78. But more likely, I would guess, in late '77. But I'm not precisely sure of the dates.

WHEN YOU RECOMMENDED THAT, TELL ME WHAT CARTER'S REACTION WAS AND HOW YOU FELT ABOUT IT.

Well, his reaction was not to approve it. It's simple as that.

HOW DID YOU FEEL?

I felt normally. When you're in that position in the White House, if your batting average is let's say two thirds positive, then you expect occasional negative decisions.

DID YOU THINK THAT THE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFRICA, THE EXPANDING INFLUENCE IN AFRICA, AS WE WERE NEGOTIATING THE SALT TREATIES, WOULD OR SHOULD AFFECT OUR INTEREST IN THE SALT TALKS?

Of course. I've already indicated that in my judgment you cannot entirely separate geopolitical issues from strategic issues and you cannot subordinate geopolitical to strategic issues. In fact, in my judgment, the Soviet behavior in the Third World, particularly in the African horn, contributed to the eventual demise of our efforts to obtain a significant and constructive arms control agreement. This is why I have used the phrase which have been oft sited that SALT lies buried in the Sands of Ogedan. That is to say, it lies buried in the sands of the region which is being contested by the Ethiopians and the Somalis with the Ethiopians lo... heavily assisted by the Soviets.

WHY DO YOU SAY THAT? WHY DO YOU THINK THAT?

Because these Soviet actions, not only pose, as I have suggested, a geopolitical challenge to the United States, but also they contributed to a greater public disillusionment with détente. Public confidence in détente was undermined by a pattern of Soviet behavior which seemed to indicate that the Soviets were taking advantage of détente on one of its levels, namely the geopolitical, while at the same time seeking to arrive perhaps at an arms control agreement at another level. And the public increasingly became suspicious. The standards the public was using then to assess any agreement with the Soviets became higher. Political skepticism became more intense and of course the Republican party out of power, was capitalizing on all of this to claim that the US was being soft, not responsive enough to Soviet pressure, etcetera.

THIS IS SAYING, "I LIKE SALT, BUT UNLESS WE TAKE SOME MEASURES TO COUNTER THE SOVIET GEOPOLITICAL MOVES, SALT'S GOING TO DIE." THAT'S DIFFERENT FROM SAYING, "IF WE TAKE MEASURES TO COUNTER THE SOVIET GEOPOLITICAL MOVES AND IT JEOPARDIZES SALT, IT DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE."

It is different. But it doesn't mean that one proposition validates the other. Eh, first of all, it is a fact of life in a democracy that public attitudes affect the totality of the relationship and then becomes very difficult to compartmentalize the issue. Therefore, it is an acknowledgement of fact to say that Soviet misconduct is going to prejudice the public against any agreements with the Soviets. Secondly, that does not invalidate the proposition that some geopolitical issues may be important enough to press on them even if it jeopardizes Salt. My judgment was that if we did not press, Salt would be jeopardized anyway. Because we cannot fool the public into believing that the Soviets are good guys with whom an arms control agreement must be sought almost at any cost, while ignoring their geopolitical expansion. My view was that it would surface anyway. And that therefore both of the merits of the case as well as in terms of political logic, we would be wise to respond.

PAUL WARNKE SAYS THAT SALT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT YOU DEAL WITH THAT IN ITS OWN RIGHT, AND ITS GOOD FOR US, ITS GOOD FOR THEM, AS LONG AS ITS A GOOD TREATY, AND YOU FIGHT THE GEOPOLITICAL BATTLES ON THEIR OWN TERMS.

Well, first of all, the people who say that, are never prepared to fight the geopolitical battles on their own terms. They're in favor of ignoring them. Not responding. Because they're so preoccupied with SALT. So first of all, I don't believe that this is really a true statement of policy. Second, it simply doesn't work in real life. The public is not blind. The public sees the geopolitical conflicts and we fail to respond. It's not going to support SALT because then it'll suspect that SALT was negotiated out of weakness. And we were dealing with the facts of the situation and the facts are by and large the way I described them. There was a rising crescendo of resentment and opposition to SALT. Not so much on the merits of the SALT agreement itself, but in reaction to Soviet misconduct. To which we were seeing -- to which we are perceived as not responding effectively or adequately.

YOU APPEARED ON MEET THE PRESS IN THE SPRING OF 1978 AND ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF SOVIET EXPANSION AND SAID IT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE SALT. SECRETARY VANCE WROTE IN HIS BOOK THAT YOUR MESSAGE WAS THAT WE WOULD SLOW DOWN SALT. WAS THAT WHAT YOU WERE THINKING?

No. That was not the message that I was sending. I was merely registering the proposition which to me seems to be almost a truism that American public opinion will not disregard Soviet misconduct. And if it doesn't misregard it, and I don't think it would, it'll then not support SALT. And therefore, if we are really serious about getting arms control agreement with the Soviets, we better be responsive to the Soviet challenges on other fronts. Because otherwise, we're going to be perceived essentially as accommodationist and weak and public suspicions will then crystallize into visible and political effective opposition even to SALT.

DID YOU FEEL THAT IT WAS WORTH MAKING A CHALLENGE TO THE SOVIETS EVEN IF IT JEOPARDIZED THAT?

Well, you've already asked me that. And I said that the issue's important. Of course. Because I don't make a fetish out of SALT. I don't think SALT is the most important thing in the world.

BUT WAS THAT ISSUE IMPORTANT ENOUGH?

Yes. I think Third World expansionism and geopolitically sensitive areas is important. My argument, however, is that if we responded to it, we would be in a better position to negotiate an arms control agreement with the Soviets. And therefore, I did not feel that we would have to sacrifice SALT. I felt if we didn't respond, we would probably end up losing geopolitically and losing SALT as well.

PAUL WARNKE ABOUT THIS TIME WHEN YOU AND PRESIDENT CARTER WERE SPEAKING OUT ABOUT THE LINKAGE ISSUE, THAT SOME OF THE CLEARANCES FROM WASHINGTON SLOWED DOWN AND THAT IT DID HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE SALT TALKS IN GENEVA.

Clearances?

WELL, CLEARANCES FOR THE NEGOTIATING POSITION WHEN THEY WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK TO WASHINGTON TO GET CLEARANCES FOR THE NEGOTIATING POSITION. DO YOU THINK THAT YOUR SPEAKING AT MEET THE PRESS, PRESIDENT CARTER SPEAKING OUT IN PRESS CONFERENCES AND VARIOUS SPEECHES, TALKING ABOUT THE EFFECT ON THE RATIFICATION PROCESS, THAT THIS INDEED SLOWED DOWN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA?

I fail to see the logic of that argument. The President of the United States was expressing the position of the United States. Am I to infer that the President of the United States should defer to the views of his negotiator in Geneva?

NO. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS AN ACTUAL SLOWING DOWN OR A DELIBERATE –

Of what?

OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

But that's not up to us. It's up to the Soviets.

BUT ON OUR PART THERE WASN'T A SLOWING DOWN?

No.

LETS TALK ABOUT CHINA. WHAT WAS YOUR PRIMARY INTEREST IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH CHINA? WAS IT FOR THE...WERE YOU INTERESTED IN SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OR NORMALIZATION FOR ITS OWN SAKE?

I think normalization for its own sake was the most important factor. Here is a terribly important country occupying a major portion of the Eurasian continent potentially playing a major role in the world scene. It would be clearly in the American interest to have a good relationship, both with Japan and China at the same time. It would greatly improve our position in the Far East. And in that respect, represent a very major step forward in creating more stable international system.

WASN'T THIS A GEOPOLITICAL MOVE ON OUR PART THAT WE COULD MAKE TO COUNTER THE SOVIET MOVES IN AFRICA?

No. I think countering the Soviet moves in Africa was desirable in its own sake, but normalization of relations with China was desirable in its sake as well. We were seeking some progress in that direction since 1972. Eh, some initial progress under Nixon was badly slowed down under President Ford and partly because of domestic difficulties in the United States. And some resumption of progress in that direction was postulated as one of the key objectives of the Carter administration... in the very first weeks after we took office. We had a series of planning sessions and we outlined a number of objectives for the Carter administration. And the sixth objective, but not sixth in ranking, but simply the sixth objective on our list, was to normalize relations with China if possible by the end of 1978. That was the deadline we set for ourselves in the first three or four weeks of the Carter administration. So, we moved in that direction and I certainly tried to contribute if I could to the attainment of that objective and I'm glad that we did.

WHAT ADVICE DID YOU GIVE THE PRESIDENT ABOUT SELLING CHINA DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY?

That was later on. That was after normalization in the course of 1979. I favored it. I thought that to expand the relationship with China we need not discriminate against China in this area. That China was not posing a major security problem or threat to the United States. And therefore the sale of dual-use technology to China was justified.

DID WE SELL DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIETS?

No. For reasons which I think would be apparent even to the most stupid person watching this program.

WHAT ADVICE DID YOU GIVE THE PRESIDENT ABOUT ARMS SALES TO CHINA BY OUR ALLIES?

Oh. I didn't object to them at all. I thought that this was desirable because a strong and secure China was clearly a contributing factor to international stability and was in our interest.

SO, IN ADDITION TO NORMALIZATION THERE WAS A SECURITY ASPECT TO THIS NEW RELATIONSHIP.

Well, of course. There is a security aspect to every major relationship. We're interested in security of Pakistan, we're interested in security of India. To the extent that China could be secure and stable that contributed to greater stability in the Eurasian continent. And it clearly was in our interest. It was in interest of international peace as well.

WERE YOU TRYING TO SEND A MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS?

No message had to be sent. They clearly knew that an improvement in American-Chinese relations was good for the United States. I did not view my position as entailing the responsibility of worrying about Soviet security.

WERE YOU INVOLVED IN THE TIMING OF DENG XIAOPING'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES?

Yes. Very much so.

WHAT HAPPENED?

When we decided to normalize relations we extended an invitation to him to visit the United States and there was some preliminary bantering about a possibility when I paid my visit to China and in a course of secret negotiations with him, set the timetable for normalization. But once we moved closer to normalization, the President decided that's one very good way of sealing that important event, would be to have Deng Xiaoping visit Washington. And therefore, we extended an invitation to Deng Xiaoping which he immediately accepted, and as we all know, he came and visited Washington roughly a month or so after normalization was announced.

WASN'T THAT A SLAP IN THE FACE TO BREZHNEV? WEREN'T CARTER AND BREZHNEV PLANNING A MEETING AT ABOUT THAT TIME?

Well it's sort of news to me that the United States should not be able to meet with leaders of other important countries because that would not be liked by the Soviets. I had never assumed that American foreign policy ought to be dictated by prestige considerations of other leaderships. But should be rather guided by American interests. It was good for the United States to have a good relationship with China and that's why Deng Xiaoping came to Washington. Are you suggesting that United States should not have visits by the Chinese unless the ...Soviets approved or unless the Soviets came to Washington first?

I THINK YOU WROTE THAT YOU WANTED TO SOLIDIFY THE RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA BEFORE SALT WAS SIGNED.

No. I did no...I didn't write that. I thought it was important to solidify the relationship with the Chinese. Period. And that was desirable. We were not going to let SALT delay that. After all, you know, the Soviet position was that nothing should be linked to SALT. Eh, and some people in the State Department were arguing that nothing should be linked to SALT. And now, all of a sudden, suggestions were made that we should link how we conduct our relationship with China to SALT in order to satisfy the Soviets. That's a rather curious argument. That on the American side, nothing should be linked to SALT, even if our interests are involved, but conversely, Soviet concerns outside of Salt should be respected because of SALT. That's a kind of a reverse linkage to the unilateral advantage of the Soviet Union. Again, I fail to see the reasoning in support of that proposition.

SOME SAY THAT IT DELAYED THE SIGNING OF THE SALT TREATY BY SIX MONTHS. INSTEAD OF BEING JANUARY IT WAS JUNE.

Oh no. If anything, it accelerated it. Eh, by December of 1978, a large number of issues were unresolved and the Soviets were unyielding on them. After normalization with China, in fact, Soviet concessions were forthcoming in the Spring of 1979. And in all probability though you could never prove it, it was Soviet concern about the thrust and momentum of the new American-Chinese relationship that may have propelled the Soviets into making these concessions.

LET'S TALK ABOUT THE ICBM VULNERABILITY AND THE MX. DID YOU SEE A SO-CALLED WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY IN 1977?

I thought that there was the growing danger that the Soviets would have a one-sided advantage in what might be called counter-force systems. And that the United States was both vulnerable to such systems and had no adequate force of its own capable of certain counterforce missions.

ONE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DEVELOP A FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY. SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT'S LUDICROUS BECAUSE WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER TWO LEGS OF THE TRIAD?

Well that is true as long as the other two legs of the triad aren't vulnerable. One of those legs may not be all that invulnerable. In any case. Eh, the other leg, the SLBM leg, is still invulnerable. We don't know for how long, but that doesn't really get at the guts of the issue. Because the guts of the issue is not that Soviets would some day launch suddenly a preemptive first strike out of the blue and engage in a total nuclear war. The question arises in different ways. First of all, the asymmetry of vulnerability creates political and psychological conditions which can be destabilizing, can also be inhibiting in ones own response and can be employed in a manner short of an all-out attack to exact a military or political advantage. It is this asymmetry that has always bothered strategic planners who felt that therefore there ought to be some stra... [stake in] to reduce that vulnerability; to make the relationship more symmetrical in terms of degree of vulnerability or security.

YOU MEAN PERCEPTIONS OF NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY PAID POLITICAL DIVIDENDS?

That's one aspect of it. But it's more than perceptions. It's also the impact that such vulnerability has. On your ability to respond in a variety of situations short of a total nuclear exchange.

DID YOU AGREE WITH THE CONCERNS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER ON THIS?

Well you will have to be a little more spec...uh, precise. I had concerns of my own. I didn't need the committee of present danger... They had a variety of concerns. They had a lot of concerns. So you'd have to be a little more specific as to what you ask –

THEY TALKED ABOUT, NITZE WROTE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF COERCION, ABOUT GETTING DIPLOMATIC ADVANTAGE BECAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION –

Well the way you summarize it, it sounds to me not unreasonable. I think these problems did arise and they did concern a number of people in the administration -- Secretary Brown was concerned about it, the JCS were concerned about. The President was sufficiently concerned to approve the deployment of the MX. On a scale which was quite significant we were planning 200 launchers each with ten warheads. So that the concern was there.

THE PRESIDENT SAYS THAT YOU RAMMED THE MX DOWN HIS THROAT IN A JUNE 4TH, 1979 MEETING. DID YOU?

Well I'm very flattered to that's what he says. That's...is that what he says?

HE WROTE IT.

Well, if that's...if that's what he wrote, in fact, I'm very flattered. That's a rather unique definition of the relationship between the President of the United States and his National Security Advisor. But, if that is the case, I certainly have no r... regrets about it.

WAS HE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT IT? ONE HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT WHEN HE FIRST CAME INTO OFFICE, HE WANTED TO FREEZE ON WEAPON SYSTEMS. THE LAST THING HE WANTED WAS A NEW WEAPON SYSTEM.

Well that's perhaps true. But you know, we live in a real world. And in a real world, you're faced with real life threats. And then you have to make real life responses to them.

WHEN DID HE BECOME CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD DEVELOPED A POTENTIAL HARD-KILL CAPABILITY?

You will have to ask him that.

WAS THERE A---

All I can tell you is when he decided to approve the MX, which was in the Spring of 1979, prior to the SALT II agreements signing in Vienna, and we had fairly extensive sessions on this...very extensive, in fact, not only meetings of the special coordination committee which I chaired, but also of the National Security Council itself which the President chaired. And we had very extensive discussion, both of the desirability of the MX and if we were to move that way, what kind of an MX, large one or the small one, of the basing mode for it with Secretary Brown coming up, with a very effective scheme for insuring its survivability. And it was after this exercise, which was very comprehensive and thorough in nature, and in which the issue was fully vented that the President approved the decision to go with the MX with no one at the NSC formally dissenting from that decision.

HOW MUCH OF IT WAS BASED UPON A REAL CONCERN FOR THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR ICBM FORCE AND HOW MUCH OF IT WAS A POLITICAL DECISION TO GET THE CHIEFS ON BOARD SO THAT SALT COULD BE RATIFIED?

You're asking me to speculate about the President's motives? I have no idea. It's hard for me to say. It may have been a combination of both. Eh, it's very hard to judge these things. The Vice President, incidentally, was also involved in that decision, and it's quite conceivable that for each participant in that decision, the mix of motives may have been very different. Some there ha...may have been more concerned about the problem of external security, some may have been more concerned about getting JCS on board, as you have said. Eh, some may have been concerned over senatorial response. Some may have been concerned over the possibilities of ongoing, past SALT II, negotiations with the Soviets and the kind of leveraging that this would have on future Soviet positions. It could have been any mix of these motives.

WHAT WAS YOUR DESIRE TO SEE THE MX BILL?

To stabilize the strategic situation in the American-Soviet relationship. In my view, the MX would enhance American strategic options and reduce some of the emerging potential instabilities in the strategic equilibrium.

ENHANCE STRATEGIC OPTIONS. YOU'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT SOLVING A VULNERABILITY PROBLEM, YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT IN CASE OF WAR.

That's right. That's right. Because you have weapons in order to deter war, but in order to deter war, you have to have weapons that you can use in a war. And if you're going to lose most of your weapons in a war, then you may be less effective in deterring war. Also, there may be wars at levels lower than the total. And you don't want to be faced with a situation in which your only option is responding with everything you have or not responding at all. And the MX would have helped to fill that gap. Giving the President, giving the United States greater versatility in a war-fighting situation.

What's the relationship between MX and PD59? Was MX the hardware that made a new counterforce strategy possible?

The Presidential Directive Number 59, which did significantly alter the US doctrine of deterrence but also of potential war-fighting was strongly reinforced by the decision to move towards MX deployment. Because it would be very difficult to implement PD59 in the absence of a system such as the MX.

PEOPLE TALK ABOUT THIS AS A WAR-FIGHTING STRATEGY. IS THAT ACCURATE?

No. I think the accurate way of describing it is a war-deterring strategy, but to deter war you have to be able to deter your opponent in all of the different manifestations of war fighting of which he's capable. Because you can only deter him in one respect, but not in several others. Then you are failing to deter him in those other respects. And given the nature of Soviet strategic deployment over the years, it is clear that the Soviets are not thinking only of one spasmic apocalyptic total exchange. But they're also thinking of some variety short of that. And if we want to deter them, we have to be able to indicate to them that they will not be able to confront us with a choice of either committing suicide or capitulating.

DETERRENCE AND USE OPTIONS ARE THE SAME THING.

Variety of options to respond matching the other side's capability enhances deterrence.

DOES A CHOICE BETWEEN A BIGGER VERSION OF THE MX OR A SMALLER VERSION -- WHAT DID YOU FAVOR AND WHY?

I favored the larger one because it had a larger number of warheads, and could g... therefore give us in a shorter period of time the larger capability that we felt was needed.

DID YOU SUPPORT THE SALT TREATY THAT WAS FINALLY SIGNED IN VIENNA?

Yes. Of course I did. I think I was one of the principal briefers in the White House on the subject. Eh, and in fact, the fact that I was doing quite a bit of briefing on SALT was due to the argument that was made by those who organized these briefings, that I was somewhat more persuasive than some of my colleagues –

WHAT WAS IMPORTANT –

-- in propounding SALT.

WHAT WAS IMPORTANT ABOUT IT? WHAT DO YOU THINK IT GAVE US? WHAT WAS GOOD ABOUT IT?

Well it certainly corrected some of the asymmetries in the American-Soviet strategic relationship, that were sanctioned by SALT I. As you remember, SALT I in effect, formalized major inequities in the relationship of strategic power between United States and the Soviet Union. With the Soviets having a larger number of launchers, submarines etcetera. So SALT II, first of all, was a significant step in the direction of more genuine strategic equality. Secondly, SALT II involved the first modest step towards some reductions in strategic forces. So we were beginning to reverse the trend of a kind of spiraling race; there was more and more systems. Now I say it was a modest step, because it was a partial step. We were able to reduce in that agreement a number of launchers. We were not able to reach agreement which would have had the effect of reducing the number of warheads. But that might have been a follow on accomplishment in the later agreement. Beyond that, SALT II involved some partially effective obstacles to the introduction of new systems. And therefore was also an impediment to an important aspect of the arms race. So I would say in these three elements, SALT II was a useful, important, contribution and therefore, I supported it.

HOW DID YOU PERCEIVE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN? WAS IT A PROBLEM?

At what time?

DURING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. OR DURING THE REVOLUTION.

The Soviet involvement was marginal and external -- clearly the Soviets were abetting and encouraging the Iranians to be as anti-American as was possible. But they were not directly involved as far as I know.

CARTER SAID HE LEARNED MORE ABOUT THE SOVIETS IN A FEW DAYS THAN HE HAD IN PREVIOUS YEARS. WHAT DID HE LEARN AND HAD HE CHANGED HIS VIEWS, DO YOU THINK?

Well I assume he must have changed his views if he...uh, since he said that. Uh, it wasn't much of a surprise to me.

DID YOU CHANGE YOUR VIEWS OVER THE FOUR YEARS, OF THE SOVIETS?

Not really. I think they confirmed some of my suspicions.

I DON'T KNOW IF YOU'VE READ GADDIS SMITH'S BOOK. HE SAID THAT PD-59 WAS A CAPSTONE OF A POLICY THAT YOU'VE BEEN URGING ON THE PRESIDENT FOR FOUR YEARS. DOES THAT MAKE ANY SENSE, AND IF SO CAN YOU TELL US WHAT THAT POLICY WAS?

Well essentially it was a policy of enhanced deterrence...designed to the give the United States a capacity for maintaining a stable strategic relationship with the Soviets in spite of the massive Soviet buildup which appears to have been designed to give the Soviets at least some initial first-strike capability. And also a greater war-fighting flexibility. It was essentially an attempt to renovate a strategic doctrine, to give it greater flexibility, to make it more effective in the likely conditions. Of the remaining years of the '80s and into the decade beyond.

WERE YOU DISAPPOINTED THAT SALT WASN'T RATIFIED?

Yes. I was disappointed. But not crushed.

WHAT KIND OF THING DID YOU TRY TO IMPRESS UPON THE PRESIDENT IN TERMS OF THE SOVIET UNION, ITS BEHAVIOR IN THE FOUR YEARS THAT YOU WERE A NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR...

I'm sorry; I don't understand the question.

WHAT KINDS OF OPTIONS, IDEAS ETC. DID YOU TRY TO EDUCATE THE PRESIDENT ON, IN TERMS OF THE SOVIET UNION, THEIR INTENTIONS, THEIR BEHAVIOR, WHEN YOU WERE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR AT THE WHITE HOUSE?

It's very hard to summarize, or to reduce this to a few words, but I tried to impress the President with the proposition that the Soviets were a serious competitor, and that they were constant in the pursuit of their strategy, and that the only way that was effective in dealing with them was to be firm and constant oneself, to see the large picture and the interrelationship between the different aspects of the American-Soviet competition. The strategic, the geopolitical, the ideological, that only then could we maintain and sustain an effective strategy that would do two very important things: establish a reasonably stable, through not particularly cooperative relationship with the Soviets; and convince the American people that we were managing that relationship responsibly, and therefore deserved public opinion, support, without the public opinion shifting from euphoria about détente to hysteria about cold war, which are unfortunately the very destructive swings in American public attitudes regarding the Soviet Union.

DO YOU THINK THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN WORLD DOMINATION?

You can't answer a question like that, because that's one of those questions which frankly is so simplistic that either a no or a yes answer is a partial distortion. The Soviet Union wishes to be the number one global power. Now whether that is the same thing as Communist domination or not is a very complicated historical, philosophical question. But it certainly wishes to be the number one global power. I for one don't wish it to be.