COULD I FIRST ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS AND HOW YOU'VE BEEN INVOLVED WITH NUCLEAR ISSUES?

Well when I came back from the United States in 1956 after finishing schools in Massachusetts I was first hired by a newspaper. I was reporting for Asahi Shimbun and they sent me to cover the new installation in Tokaimura which is the site of the atomic energy research center. While I was covering Tokaimura as Asahi science reporter some people decided that this is a dangerous guy to be outside of the institutions looking inside. And they would rather like me to be working from inside working for them. So they hired me by this, there I mean a company called Japan Atomic Power Company. And since I had a background as a mathematician somehow I adopted myself into the nuclear, the engineering and technical side of the nuclear energy to the point at the end of the process I got PhD on nuclear engineering from University of Tokyo.

AND THEN YOU WENT TO WASHINGTON? JUST TO SKETCH FOR ME THE...

Oh ... In the process we had by this we I mean this Japan Atomic Power Company, had the first commercial nuclear power station in Japan. This was a reactor purchased from the United Kingdom. And this was the first, world's first commercial reactor to come under what is called the IAEA safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards was developing at the time. So since ours was the first reactor to come under the safeguards I took part in developing the safeguards technology arrangements -- whatever called -- including the legal arrangements, et cetera. And which was the major issue when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. According to Article 3 of NPT the IAEA had to develop a safeguards arrangements for the parties to the NPT. So somehow I got involved in living part of my life, a year or so in Vienna debating and arguing and trying to figure out how IAEA safeguard system would work. After that the NPT was, I was a bit instrumental in getting the NPT ratified. It was a difficult process for Japan and it took something like six years after our signature. But immediately after the ratification we had a new interpretation of NPT type of issue coming up as was the case under, President Carter's administration. And then it seems by that time I was an advisor to the foreign ministry on nuclear issues and disarmament affairs. I went to Washington to negotiate that particular aspect of the NPT understanding all, rather the US-Japanese nuclear arrangement or agreement for cooperation on atomic energy. Something like that. And after a while after that by 1980 -- that was 1977 -- After the ... INFC ... something called ... There was something called INFCE International Nuclear Field Cycle Evaluation, I think. Exercise...by 1980. Somehow I got drafted into the Foreign Ministry as an Ambassador to go to Kuwait. And since Kuwait is the oil-producing country and since my, part of my sort of expertise is in energy they drafted me to become an ambassador, Japanese Ambassador to go to oil-producing country. And then after Kuwait they sent me to, I don't know who this they is, but they sent me to Geneva as a disarmament ambassador. So there in a nutshell is my whole life.

I'M GOING TO RIGHT BACK TO THE BEGINNING THEN, ATOMS FOR PEACE. HOW DID JAPAN PARTICIPATE IN ATOMS FOR PEACE?

Well that was a great thing for everybody, not just for Japan but Atoms for Peace was a great message which was a wonderful thing. I mean instead of this terrible destruction, the same nuclear power or the energy from the nucleus of atom could be used for peaceful purposes. And everybody, nobody really didn't ask the detailed questions of how or how much it was going to cost. But it was a wonderful idea. So the -- me...the first reaction in Japan is of course Atoms for Peace is wonderful. And something that we should pursue as a peaceful country, et cetera. So I think there is nothing very different in Japanese reaction. You know that was a period everybody called anything atomic. You had the atomic laundry shop or atomic whatever it is...cheesecake. Anything was atomic. And that expressed something wonderful, great. And that was the reaction. And for Japan I think the, this was ...the, just the time -- this was back in 1953 or something... '54. Japan was coming out of the period immediately after the defeat in the fir... the Second World War and when you look at Japan at that time it was a time that Japan was Japan's economy was on the process of reconstruction mostly based on the technology that was imported from, mainly from the United States. So Atoms for Peace in that sense was no different in peoples' perception. That is a, is another technology that is wonderful, very useful and very nice that we will introduce or import from the United States and make good use of it in well, what you might call the reconstruction of Japan as a peaceful, a peace-loving country. Or...so that, if...you know.

WHAT KIND OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE DID JAPAN RECEIVE IN HER NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN THE EARLY DAYS AS A RESULT OF ATOMS FOR PEACE?

Well there was -- what was it? Three hundred and fifty thousand dollars grant I think for the research reactor which was given to the, what was called CP-5 reactor, the number two research reactors which was bought from the United States. The first reactor was bought from the US. The second research reactor was bought from the US And practically everything was bought from the United States. And that the grant went with the research reactors for the, this program. But the assistance as such was probably not very much in terms of financial arrangement but there was immediately...the opening up of the nuclear research -- now what was it called? The Research School or something was. It was either Reactor School or Atomic Energy School opened for the international students. One was at the Argonne National Laboratory outside of Chicago and another was Oak Ridge. I was a part of the Argonne student at that time. And that was something you can find out now is those who are doing useful works in atomic energy in Japan are mostly the graduates of those, that program. So most of us studied the first part of atomic energy and nuclear science or engineering in the United States. So you can call it a great assistance.

COULD WE GO A LITTLE BIT OVER THAT SO WE HAVE IT A LITTLE BRIEFER? IN A SENSE YOU WERE A RECIPIENT THEN OF THE ATOMS FOR PEACE SCHEME. IN A SENSE. IS THAT TRUE?

Right. That's -- it was ...

JUST GO OVER...DESCRIBE THAT AGAIN.

Well I don't know really very much about it. Something I recall as the assistance is this grant for research reactors and we received one of these grants which was three hundred and fifty thousand dollars a piece. Went with this second CP-5 reactor. And then under then such direct assistance we had the agreement for cooperation initial phase of it on which a number of programs were attached including the arrangement for the Japanese students to go study the initial phase of reactor engineering or nuclear science at the time. And Argonne National Laboratory was, were international institute, I forgot the full name for such students from all over the world, but I think there was a very large number of Japanese students.

WHAT WAS THE KEY WAY IN WHICH ATOMS FOR PEACE WAS HELPFUL TO JAPAN?

Well that's very difficult. Now it depends on whether you talk to anti-nuclear somebody or somebody within the nuclear community.

WHAT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO THE INDUSTRY?

It's always difficult to describe because the first phase of Atoms for Peace including the research reactors are...were all US made. And the first phase of people who were engaged in the works were educated in the United States for the nuclear engineering. The...enriched uranium, the nuclear fuel of course came from the United States and it's really difficult to say what did not come from the United States. I mean, it would be easier to ask that question. So the entirety of the start of the nuclear engineering nuclear-energy research was dependent so much on the US. And the question you're asking virtually becomes whether the start of nuclear-engineering works in Japan was useful. I think looking at the fact that we have quite a few power reactors and nuclear power stations in operation which is contributing something like thirty percent of electric energy now obviously that has been very useful.

YOU MENTIONED THE ANTI-NUCLEAR. WAS THERE MUCH RESISTANCE AT THIS POINT IN THE EARLY DAYS TO THE START UP OF THE NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM BEARING IN MIND THE BOMBINGS?

Yes. And the anti-nuclear feeling at the outset back in the 1950s was very different from the organized anti-nuclear movements of today.

JUST TALK ABOUT THE FIFTIES.

Okay. This was a controversy over whether the time was right for Japan to be engaged in nuclear research work immediately. And --

I'M SORRY. CONTINUE. HOW DID THE JAPANESE PUBLIC RESPOND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EARLY CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM FOLLOWING THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS?

I think there was less association in people's mind except to think that it is wonderful that nuclear energy is now for peaceful purposes. And ,the association of nuclear energy with nuclear weapons came much later, worldwide by the way. And therefore the first reaction I still remember. This was the time I was working for Asahi Shimbun as a journalist. I remember writing articles about what a wonderful thing that we have nuclear power and that was the first reactor, research reactor that went critical. And I wrote the report on that and as a young journalist first year in work was great to see my article appearing on the top front page...big article. And that was the reaction. I mean, the, there was a banner headline saying for the first time the, what was it called? The atomic fire atomic energy is put on fire. Something. You know. Said the initial critical article. So and then this was in Tokaimura and that was another article I remember and I still can look at it. It was, it was the pride of our place, the [mito] that we have the first nuclear reactor. That's, that's the, was the reaction. I honestly think there was not anything very much else. And it was after that we came into the controversial or discussion as to the wisdom of introducing or getting the power reactors. Do we need to do more research, scientific research rather than go into the direct and immediate use of nuclear power for practical purposes which could involve according to some argument, which could involve the use of energy for non-peaceful purposes if you, if things went wrong. I mean that was much later.

WHEN WAS THAT TURNING POINT? WAS THERE A PARTICULAR EVENT THAT MADE THAT A TURNING POINT?

I think the discussion or argument was whether we should buy and build the Calder Hall reactor from the UK was, when this debate started and the discussion was between the Calder Hall reactor and other type of reactors from the United States. But mostly whether it was wise to move into the power-generating field at that time. And many people thought that because of the blank of a number of years during the war time and immediately after the war Japan needed to accumulate more of the research type of activities and research type of personnel before getting into the commercial application of the thing.

YOU WERE JUST SAYING THAT PEOPLE DIDN'T TALK ABOUT THE ACTUAL BOMBINGS IN JAPAN. COULD YOU ...

Well one of the things a-about the atomic bomb which I think would be of use and interest is that for quite some time after the bombing people did not talk about the incident as something direct related to the new technology as such. And if you remember there is a memorial dedicated to those who perished in Hiroshima bombing which said, "Please rest in peace because the mistake will not be repeated." Now and we argued very much, this was very early in the period, and we argued very much what did people mean by the mistake. Did it refer to anybody's special act or just the general sort of, lack of wisdom on the human knowledge or human behavior of having turned this new energy into destruction rather than peaceful purposes. And that was a general understanding which means that the way some people talk about Hiroshima as, I mean obviously, as the first incident of actual, the destruction did not become the central focus of our discussion of atomic power in Japan till probably ten years after the bombing itself, or something like that. I think we were more conscious, I mean obviously we were conscious of what happened in Hiroshima but we were separately very much conscious of the benefit from the peaceful uses for atomic energy.

WHEN YOU WERE AT ARGONNE AND THROUGHOUT THIS EARLY PERIOD WHEN THERE WAS A FEELING OF NUCLEAR EUPHORIA, DID IT EVER OCCUR TO YOU THAT THERE WAS A PROLIFERATION RISK? YOU WERE MIXING WITH PAKISTANIS AND INDIANS AND SO ON. DID IT SEEM LIKE PROLIFERATION MIGHT BE A PROBLEM?

Not very many people talked about the proliferation issue. I do not think very many people were aware of that. I think there was some who were talking about this new concept of [inner] country program that is it is not limited to four or five. It could be any number and depending on the type of industry you have and depending on the scientific research you carry out, any country would be able to achieve the nuclear status and that was that was not very popular idea or popular concern in Japan. I think we were too busy trying to say that we are not, we were not going to become, go nuclear. And please don't anybody misunderstand us. I mean, we were in trying to explain ourselves; that we are going into nuclear industry but not for nuclear weapons.

HOW --

No. I just wanted to add this was the period that Japan was not very confident of herself. And Japanese were not very confident of ourselves. It may be difficult for you to think of it now but in the, in the late 1950s people were not very confident about our own country. And people did not talk very much about what we're worried about other countries. So that may have had something to do with the lack of perception about the proliferation issue as such.

WHAT IMPACT DID THE LUCKY DRAGON INCIDENT HAVE ON JAPANESE POLICY?

Well I do not know about the Japanese policy that had a very large and very important impact on the public.

SORRY, I'M SORRY. COULD YOU JUST...IT'S IMPORTANT JUST TO KEEP A LITTLE STILL, THANK YOU.

No it had a very important impact on the Japanese society and social psychology of people's reaction to anything nuclear. And this was you know, the...it was named the ashes of death, the fallout. And ashes of death was a very sort of neat description of what it was and it had landed the bomb itself and associated it with death immediately. And Lucky Dragon was the first incident in which Japanese were, or the you might say second incident, were directly involved in the fallout or the nuclear explosion. And that had, almost became a national concern. And that was very sternly expressed throughout the country and presented all over the academic field over the world that the atmospheric contamination of the atmospheric testing are coming to, is coming to such a point that it is endangering the future of mankind maybe. And that was how the subject of test ban was brought up in Geneva -- I mean, not the only cause obviously because there has been the negotiation on disarm...nuclear disarmament going on between East and West before that. But the impact of Bikini or Lucky Dragon was that it has demonstrated that the atmospheric contamination by radioactivity can be if you continue the testing in such, in the, in the, in that way the testing was continuing with something like what was the biggest, largest bomb was fifty eight megaton by the Soviet Union I believe. Something like that. And that was a very large destructive power and very large spreading of the fallout.

WHY DID JAPAN DECIDE TO SIGN PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY?

Well obviously because it is, I mean by that time, by 1963 the nuclear disarmament became a very important subject throughout the world, not just the nuclear weapons countries but --

WAIT. SO WHY DID JAPAN DECIDE TO SIGN THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY?

Well part of the reason could be that with Bikini or Lucky Dragon incident we had emphasized the importance of stopping a test to avoid further contamination of atmosphere by the radioactivity. But I think it is much more due to the fact that by 1963 when the test the test ban treaty was signed the subject of nuclear disarmament has become a universal issue all over the world including...involving not only the nuclear weapons states but everybody. And by that time already the memory of Hiroshima has become a different thing from it was some time ago, a decade ago and became a symbol in Japan also of what could happen with nuclear weapons or nuclear war as the case may be. And then it was inconceivable at that time, by that time already I might say that Japan would not sign the Test Ban Treaty. I mean, it was very natural for Japan to accept the treaty and celebrate and rejoice in the fact that even partial test ban has been achieved. And since then we keep talking about the comprehensive test ban.

AT THAT TIME THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE US AND BRITAIN STARTED WORKING ON THE NPT BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERNS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. DID JAPAN SHARE THEIR CONCERNS IN THE EARLY SIXTIES? AND WHICH COUNTRIES JAPAN CONCERNED ABOUT?

Well the Non-Proliferation Treaty work as was being carried out in Geneva did not come to the public attention in Japan for some time, until the NPT draft was ready. And the issue concentrated on Article 3, the special status given to [new nation] safeguards and whether the IAEA safeguards would come into effect in total and so forth. So in a sense the Japanese nuclear community as such their concern and interest about NPT went through the gate of IAEA safeguards. But this is very different obviously from the political concern that some other community in Japan were having about the proliferation issue or you might call about the wisdom of nuclear arming for anybody. And I think that was a subject of concern in the early sixties. I think it was in the early sixties that President Kennedy had talked about the possibility of so many or a dozen countries with nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. And that was the subject that people were very much concerned and were aware of. And I would not exclude Japan from the list of the countries who thought about the subject.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION, YOUR PERSONAL REACTION TO THE NEWS OF THE CHINESE TEST?

That was a big surprise and I think it was a surprise for practically everybody. And that marked an era that one might say anybody can make nuclear weapons. I mean, I'm sorry to put it that way but that was the assessment about the technology there were, or industrial capabilities of Peoples' Republic that people had, we had at that time. And in that context people were not really surprised when the Soviet Union made the bomb. That was back in '49 or something. When UK made the bomb or when France announced that it would make the Force de Frappe there. But when it came to China that was unexpected. I mean if you had a list of countries whom you did not expect to have nuclear weapons by that time, probably China was one of them at that time.

CAN YOU SPECULATE WHAT MOTIVATED THEM?

You mean the Chinese?

HMM.

Well it's obvious that Chinese had thought about building the nuclear weapons very early in the period and they had asked for the Soviet assistance and the Soviet had provided assistance for a year or two until they broke up. And that was what made the Chinese bomb possible. I'm quite sure the Chinese have a different explanation of the story but that's how we understand it. And that was the period I think as I was trying to describe, in the sixties that was a time that people had thought about, well many countries talking about or some other countries were talking about many other countries having nuclear weapons. And I think the first book that came out was a Rand Corporation work about the subject. I think. I forgot the subtitle but I remember the book very...I remember very vividly too now the surprise and interest of having read the book, at that time. I think it was called Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or something.

DID THE CHINESE TEST AND THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE PROGRAM PRESENT A SECURITY PROBLEM FOR JAPAN?

Well that's difficult. National security issue in Japan was seen under very different light in the sixties in particular. That, remember we just had come out of the occupation and had finished the post-war period and everybody was talking about peace and had not really paid very much attention to another possibility of ourselves getting involved in another war. And that was when the anti-nuclear in the sense of anti-nuclear weapons sensation became rather strong. And as I was trying to say earlier that Hiroshima incident was sort of a re...I don't know what it is. You know. So the concept, and of course we had the security treaty with the United States and we knew that we were under what people started talking about the nuclear umbrella of the United States, the extent to which people depended on the US for our security either consciously or unconsciously. It was very large and very much, I think if we still continue to do the same maybe it's not the right thing.

HOW MUCH IMPACT DID THE PEACE MOVEMENT HAVE IN THESE EARLY DAYS?

Well, when you refer to the peace movement with regard to the nuclear weapons I think that was sort of what you might call inevitable or necessary ingredient for the Hiroshima day because by that time already we had a seed of split in that movement as between Communists and the Socialists. And we had a very strange argument at that time. Why is the fallout from the United States so bad whereas the fallout from the Soviet bombs were okay. I mean. In other words, a very strange question but that question was seriously asked. Nobody answered it by the way.

WHY DID JAPAN DECIDE TO SIGN NPT AND YET NOT RATIFY THE TREATY FOR SIX YEARS?

That is very, I shouldn't keep saying that it's very difficult but the immediate cause, the reply is I don't know. The point is when we signed NPT there was not much public debate about the subject and it was the continuation or extension of general anti-nuclear weapon policy that when something came up we signed it. But at the same time we were smart enough to negotiate that we should join the Geneva disarmament conference for the fact of signing NPT. So we did join the Geneva conference on disarmament or CCD at that time at the time of signing NPT. Okay. Then we had another problem when it came to ratification and that's that it took six years. And the first part of the problem was the argument which the industry presented about the impact of safeguards, that it would put Japanese nuclear industry at disadvantage in the world market. And in that we found very interestingly enough the Federal Republic having the same argument. I don't know. For the, probably for different reasons but for, at least we had the very same argument about the impact of safeguards and the need of somehow establishing a rational structure for the international safeguard system. So that was one argument. The other argument obviously was that there were a number of people who said that we should, we should maintain the option of nuclear arming ourselves. It was, there was not very many people who said that we should go to, go nuclear immediately. I remember because at that time I was rather much involved in trying to persuade the opponents of NPT including many members of parliament or Diet that we should immediately go ahead and ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty on two grounds. One that I did not think we will have effective nuclear forces capabilities in Japan no matter what, how much we wanted if we, even if we wanted it. And the argument was, I remember that argument because I presented, I was a witness at the Diet Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of the Liberal Democratic Party saying that we should ratify it. And saying, well, in my calculation we should buy license from the United States to build nuclear weapons and build nuclear submarines. But it will take ten years to build meaningful nuclear arsenal and it will be ten years old by the way. And it didn't make any technical or military sense to build that forces. That was one argument. The second argument was the NPT obviously was becoming a condition for expanding the peaceful uses according to its Article 4. And if you didn't sign, if we didn't join become a party to the treaty we may have difficulty. We probably will have difficulties in obtaining the field material or imported technology or exercising rights of, to peaceful uses. And then the third argument was that I could assure the members of the Diet that we had established a safeguard system which would be fair objective and non-interfering. Something like that.

AT THIS TIME YOU WERE IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY. CAN I ASK YOU TO GO OVER THAT A LITTLE BIT AND RELATE IT TO YOUR OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCE? I REALIZE YOU DID IT BUT YOU BROKE IT DOWN INTO THREE.

Well, as I said I think it was 1958 I quit Asahi and joined Japan Atomic Power Company and 1960 I went to Argonne to study nuclear engineering and by the end of the decade, 1960s I was general manager for nuclear field or something like that in the Atomic Power Company. And because of our relationship with the IAEA safeguards on account of the first commercial nuclear power station I was very much involved in the safeguards issue. And the Foreign Ministry at the time was having obviously difficulties in finding a proper "expert" who can deal with matters of nuclear disarmament and in particular IAEA safeguards and subjects like that. And then I was retained by the foreign ministry as unpaid advisor whose advice they did not take except when they liked it. But I worked for the foreign ministry. I was working for the foreign ministry at that time already concurrently as being a general manager to the Japan Power Company. And that was how I got involved in spending part of a year in 1970 in writing what was called the model agreement for IAEA safeguards for the parties to the of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So...

I SEE...

I was doing both works. And that was, it was because of that involvement somehow I felt the obligation of promoting the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Japan. And that was how, as I was saying earlier, I was topped as the government parties witness to testify in favor of the treaty.

CAN YOU TELL WHAT THE CONCERNS OF THE JAPANESE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY WERE VIS-A-VIS THE NPT?

There are two concerns contradictory to each other. One was that the safeguard provisions and the international inspection would put Japanese industry at disadvantage in the commercial market, worldwide commercial market. That was one. And the other, on the other hand was if we did not join NPT the Japanese industry may have difficulties in exercising sort of free access to the world market.

THIS ISSUE OF SECURITY GUARANTEES I UNDERSTAND WAS IMPORTANT TO JAPAN. AND I KNOW EARLIER YOU DESCRIBED THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. COULD YOU EXPLAIN TO ME WHY SECURITY GUARANTEES WERE SO CRITICAL TO JAPAN AT THIS TIME?

Well more because the argument was brought up because of the NPT. I mean I do not know if people would have been arguing about the possibilities of Japan's own nuclear armament or option thereof, et cetera, if NPT did not come up as a subject and if the matter of ratification of NPT became an issue between the government party and the opposition party. In particular the Socialist party. And well as I said it's very difficult to tell but it became a subject. And, and became an issue. And a matter of I do not think people, anybody expressed serious doubt about the extended deterrence as the US nuclear umbrella was called except for the fact that for the opposition party it would be logical and reasonable and even fashionable to say that you could not trust the extended deterrence by the United States as against other nuclear weapon states such as the Soviet Union and China. And that Japan has to manage her own security. As you might know and you might recall that socialist party's position is that Japan should arm itself and should remain neutral all the time whereas the fact of the matter was obviously that we were under the US-Japanese mutual security treaty which was the basic instrument of as-- assuring or ensuring security for Japan.

HOW IMPORTANT WERE THE THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES?

Well that's a hard one because that was primarily a political issue. And not very much a legal subject. Anyway at the time when it was proposed. And it was a political quid pro quo in a way of maintaining or remaining with the mutual security treaty with the United States as vis-a-vis the opposition. And in that sense it was very important, politically.

WHAT DID THE THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES SET OUT TO ACHIEVE?

Well achieve the political balance or political bargain for that matter but it would be imprudent for me to say anything more about the subject because it's a very lively subject in international dialogue at that time, at this moment even.

COULD YOU EXPLAIN TO ME WHY NUCLEAR ENERGY WAS SO CRITICAL TO JAPAN IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES? THIS IS THE TIME OF THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO AND JUST BEFORE WE GET TO THE CARTER PERIOD?

Well Japan's dependence on oil was very high, seventy percent or whatever. The oil as such it, the, Japan depends 99 percent of oil on import and about 75 percent of that came from the Middle East and it was the Middle East OPEC countries or OPEC countries who declared the embargo and started the oil crisis of 1973, end of '73. And there was a major panic probably out of proportion to the actual shortage of energy but the major panic was all over the world including United States, Europe. And certainly including Japan. And then you have to talk about alternative energy if you can not depend very much on oil and you have to find people did not think of less than twelve percent growth rate at that time. And people were counting making calculations based on that sort of growth rate. And then your need for energy continues to be very large and if you cannot supply it from oil, and since we'd not have viable coal industry or resources, you have to go nuclear.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE NEWS OF THE INDIAN TEST, THE 1974 TEST? HOW WAS THAT...WHAT WAS THE RESPONSE IN JAPAN TO THAT?

Nobody seemed to take very much interest in the subject as far as I could recall. And I think even in the Geneva CD we were the only country who made a speech deploring the test. I don't think anybody around the world issued or uttered very much, very many words about the subject. And I think that was the reason why President Carter got very much concerned about , I think it was only in the Carter period, started, that in the significance of Indian test which is based on the Atoms for Peace technology transfer became a major concern and very much of an issue.

WAS JAPAN CONCERNED AND SKEPTICAL OF THE SO CALLED PEACEFUL MOTIVATION OF THE EXPLOSION?

Well you're asking a political or diplomatic question to a diplomat. And my answer is that well, I mean, of course it is possible that the Indian claim for peaceful uses for nuclear power was the case. But we could not at least conceive of any technical ways that could distinguish the peaceful from the weapons purposes. And we could not find any way of assurance that technology will be used for peaceful purposes only.

UNDERSTANDABLY JAPAN WAS AGAINST PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

Well, as you can see from the fact that peaceful nuclear explosion was written into NPT as its Article 5. It was very much in fashion in the late 1960s. And the United States was very much promoting the idea. I remember attending a seminar, held by the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States somewhere in the Western state where the actual peaceful nuclear explosion was carried out. And the seminar was called to preach the gospel of the PNEs as you call it in stimulating recovery of natural resources including, I think that was a natural gas, the particular incident I went was called Gas Baggy. And everybody, not everybody, but quite a few people from all over the world was attending the seminar to hear that the nuclear, not only the nuclear power as such, could be used for peaceful purposes but now the nuclear weapons could be used for peaceful purposes. So it was not unnatural in that period that people would call the name of peaceful nuclear energy or peaceful nuclear explosion because nobody was against it but everybody was promoting it. The Soviet Union was very much promoting the concept. And I remember seeing the movies advertising the effects of peaceful nuclear explosions, et cetera. So I mean that was not something sort of unfavorably looked at the time.

IN 1974 AFTER THE TEST, THE CIA RELEASED A REPORT VOICING ITS CONCERNS ABOUT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND EVEN NAMED JAPAN AMONG THE COUNTRIES THAT IT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT. WAS IT TRUE TO SAY AT THIS POINT THAT JAPAN DID HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO MANUFACTURE THE BOMB?

Oh, I think we did. And I think we do. I mean as far as technical capabilities and industrial capabilities was concerned Japan the Federal Republic and Japan were always at the top of the list of the possible nuclear weapons country. It was the political judgement of both the Federal Republic in their case and Japan in our case of not to go nuclear arm...to the direction of nuclear armament. Because it, for us, it did not make sense to have nuclear weapons or to nuclear arm ourselves. It did not contribute to our security as far as we could judge it.

COULD WE JUST GO TO THAT BUT LEAVING OUT GERMANY. DO YOU MIND JUST EXPLAINING AGAIN THAT POINT WITHOUT TALKING ABOUT GERMANY. JUST THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE.

Okay. It was very clear technically that we could make, manufacture atomic bomb, probably not the hydrogen bomb immediately but the crude atomic bomb was within the reach of our technology at the time already. The argument was that to do so and to go nuclear would not help us, would not help our security for two very clear reasons. One was that if we did we would disrupt the basic structure of our security which is the security treaty with the United States and the fact that we are already at that time a part of the Western group in maintaining and the security, et cetera. So that was the first point.

THE CIA REPORT VOICED A CONCERN ABOUT JAPAN. COULD YOU COMMENT ON WHETHER JAPAN HAD THAT CAPABILITY?

Well there was no question that we had the capability to build crude atomic bomb at the time. We did not think it was useful to do so because for one thing to do so would disrupt our basic structure of security which was the US-Japanese mutual security treaty and everything that went with it. And at the same time, if we wanted to have nuclear forces capabilities that would be meaningful as nuclear arms, the extent to which we had to go would be as I at one time argued in front of our national Diet that we will have to purchase licenses from the United States to...

COULD YOU MAKE IT BRIEFER. JUST THE SECURITY POINT. THAT YOU HAD THE CAPABILITY BUT YOU DIDN'T NEED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PROGRAM AND WHY NOT. CIA REPORT SUGGESTED JAPAN HAD THE CAPABILITY COULD YOU COMMENT?

Well there's no question that we had the capabilities but we did not have the need for that capability to materialize.

CIA REPORT VOICED ITS CONCERNS ABOUT JAPAN, COULD YOU COMMENT ON THAT?

Well there's no question but that by the early 1970s Japan had the capability to build her own nuclear bombs. On the other hand there was no point of our doing so at the time because that would go against our basic policy on national security which was US-Japanese na...the mutual security treaty worth more in the world of early 1970s. To have a bomb or two did not mean very much in the security or mutual significance. You have to have a good-sized armed forces of your own, including capabilities to deliver such nuclear weapons which we were not capable of doing. And we knew that.

COULD YOU TELL ME YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TOKAIMURA REPROCESSING NEGOTIATIONS AND WHAT KIND OF DIFFICULTIES YOU HAD? THIS WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE CARTER PERIOD.

Yes, but things started already in 1976 during the campaign period with Mr. Ford's statement about the difficulty of approving different countries plutonium production and plutonium usage. And then we did not believe that could be really the case but we had a forewarning that it might become much more of an issue if Mr. Carter was to be in office. And it did become the reality. And obvious reason was that because of the oil shock, everybody was talking of building nuclear power stations all over the world, very large number. And therefore the uranium resources then known was not enough to supply fuel. And the clear alternative was to go to the use of plutonium. So the picture was that plutonium will be all over the world and everybody will have access to plutonium usage. The unfortunate part of the story was the first subject the United States has taken up as the immediate likelihood of plutonium usage happened to be Tokaimura reprocessing plant which was under construction for many years but came to the final testing period in Spring of 1977. And the United States has notified us that they would invoke the provision in the US-Japanese mutual cooperation agreement that the safeguardability of any facility, particularly reprocessing plant has to be determined and agreed upon and that the US was not in a position to approve the safeguardability of that facility. Obviously we got very mad. I mean, for heaven sake we had been spending our good money and we have been receiving encouragement from the US that we should go to the use of plutonium and fast breeder period and so forth and so on. And now that the...are we were saying the United States are you telling us that what you have been telling us have been wrong? And they said yes we have been in error in encouraging the plutonium usage. And now that we have figured out the truth and the truth is that you should not use plutonium and therefore should not start operation of Tokaimura reactor. The foreign ministry at that time was very much disturbed, obviously, about the situation and the Diet members were of course very much concerned and some of them were very furious about the thing. And we did not know how we could approach to the subject, undo the problem. And then somebody in the foreign ministry thought, "Oh well, why not draft this Imai and send him to Washington. He seems to be good old friend of somebody called Joe Nigh who was doing all the policy works under the Carter state department." So I was sent to Washington. I saw Joe and started discussion. And I found out much to the envy of nuclear industry of the United States because they said, "Gee, what a good thing that you could talk to Joe Nigh because we have been trying to talk to him and we couldn't figure him out and we couldn't talk to him. He would refuse to discuss the subject with anybody from the nuclear industry of the United States. And just because we were Japanese and good old friend of him that you can talk to him, please do your best and convert him to accept the truth or better truth about the plutonium usage." I was very lucky in, at that time that Joe was very receptive to my approach and my argument. He shared a good deal of his time and we went into a serious discussion. And at that time the current, the Deputy Secretary of State, Mike Armacost was in NSC, heading Japanese affairs. And Mike happened to be an old friend as well. So I had two old friends to whom to talk to who were directly involved in this subject and have direct access to the President. And I think we were successful in reminding, shall we say, the Carter administration that, not that we disregard the points that have been made, but please remember that you are creating a major international crisis, bilateral crisis in the bilateral relationship between US and Japan. And it is not the current administration who favored the policy maybe the past administration before but we regard the US administration, we believe in a continuity of the US policy in any matter. And that is the basis on which we have the security arrangement and everything else. And well that was a long negotiation.

DID YOU EXPECT PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT THEN?

That's in fact what I argued for. That the United States did not have to admit publicly but it could give preferential treatment to its allies, to the states which have good reasons not to use plutonium for nuclear weapons and with whom the United States have had an earlier commitment. And I think it's very difficult to say how it worked but, and I was not praised for the argument I made and agreements I had worked out but somehow things have been resolved.

Now I remember in this argument the, I tried to tell Joe that it is no problem in approving the operation at Tokaimura because I know the way the construction work had been carried out and I knew that the plant would not be operating a day after it will be breaking down. And Joe Nigh said he couldn't believe it. But about a year later when we met again he said, "Ry, you have been right." Because that's exactly what happened to the Tokai plant. But I say that without pride for the, in the plant itself.

AT THE TIME, THE LATE SEVENTIES, DO YOU THINK THAT THESE CARTER MEASURES ACTUALLY DID ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS OF PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? AT THE TIME.

I think so and I have to say that it took my four years in Geneva to look at the military use side of the nuclear power in the late 1970s which I did not know then. I did not know the fact that the Carter administration was engaged in the secret negotiations with the Soviet Union about the test ban. I did not realize the sum of the secret informations that the US government had about the possible activities of some of the Third World countries. And as I -- at that time I was more involved in the Japanese energy situation. I was more absorbed with the need of getting Tokaimura started so that the credibility of nuclear power in Japan will remain undisturbed. But as I say now, after four years of Geneva, I can see the points that have been made to me, some of the points that have been made to me, which then I did not really understand. So my conclusion is that it was clumsy way probably of having dealt with the program but it was a very important program and it was dealt with very well.

AT THE TIME DID YOU SEE PROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AS A POLITICAL OR TECHNICAL ISSUE? HOW DID YOU SEE IT AT THE TIME?

I saw its importance. I appreciated the programs that w...it would create and so forth and so on. But what I'm saying is I did not understand it well enough as I should have.

WHAT EFFECT, WHAT IMPACT DID THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT, THE CARTER ACT HAVE ON THE JAPANESE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY?

Well it had increased, aggravated and then all kind of bad things that you can think about with regard to the trust that you can place with the US nuclear policy. The...if you think about it was an act of national legislation to change an international treaty. And only the United States does it and get away with it, by the way.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT? YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, RIGHT?

That's right. The, the Nonproliferation Act of 1978 was a national legislation which changed the requirements or worked fur...added further on to the requirements of the Nonproliferation Treaty itself. And in that context it was an amendment to the treaty legislated nationally. And I said, only the United States does it and get away with it. And that is the feeling we had very strongly about the NP... PA.

NNPA. IT'S EASY TO MIX THEM UP. DO YOU THINK THAT NPT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL?

Yes. We have agreed at the Third Review Conference in 1985 that NPT has been a useful contribution to the security of the world. You could have, we could have wanted, asked for more and have probably done something to include India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and those important countries who are outside of the NPT. And if there could have been an regime including all these states it would have been a much more effective instruments for the international security. Well it did not happen but the ones, those we have and the regime we have is working well. And what is marvelous and wonderful is that we have not had the increase in the number of nuclear weapon states during the past two generations. Something like that.

WHAT ARE JAPAN'S PRESENT DAY SECURITY CONCERNS AND TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THESE MET BY THE US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP? ONE OF THE THINGS THAT PEOPLE WORRY ABOUT IN AMERICA IS THE FACT THAT THERE IS STILL PLUTONIUM ALL AROUND THE WORLD AND PEOPLE THINK ABOUT JAPAN AS BEING A VERY ADVANCED COUNTRY WITH THIS CAPABILITY. DO YOU THINK IT'S CONCEIVABLE THAT JAPAN WILL EVER EMBARK ON A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM?

No. I do not think it is possible. One because she has to first approve the budget for the nuclear weapons production which will not be approved. And two, you have to recruit enough number of scientists and engineers to do the work which you could not recruit and when you do not have many in people, you can build it. It's just as simple as that. I don't think it is possible.

HOW DO YOU ENVISAGE THE NEXT TEN YEARS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE?

I have been thinking that by the end of the 20th century the nuclear energy will be supplying something like ten percent of the total energy consumptions of the world. That is something like forty percent of electricity of the world until Chernobyl. Now Chernobyl has changed the picture very much. People have become more concerned about the nuclear energy and less optimistic about the future of nuclear energy. So that the, this ten percent by the end of the century to me even now seems less likely. In other words we have to get into the forecasting of oil price by the 1990s. And my favorite subject is by early 1990s oil price will start shooting up again. And that would revive the interest in nuclear energy again but until then the nuclear energy will not be a very strong force anywhere in the world except in Japan. And I don't, I cannot explain why Japan is continuing with a nuclear energy program as strongly as we do. And we are the only exception I think throughout the world and I ask the indust...the people in the industry why it is, but that is the case. And I think by the 1990s when the oil price will start shooting up again and producing another oil crisis the fact that we are continuing on the nuclear power will prove to have been the right decision, not that we know the reasons why at this moment.

AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS? HOW DO YOU SEE THAT?

That will be entirely different program. The, I think people have learned enough to separate the nuclear power usage or power plant production, operation and weapons-grade material and weapons assembling program. So unfortunately the possibilities of further proliferation of nuclear weapons will remain. In spite of the fact there will be less emphasis on nuclear power as such.

DO YOU SEE MORE COUNTRIES ACQUIRING CAPABILITY? HOW DO YOU SEE THAT?

Well I think there are many countries who are capable now of producing crude nuclear bombs and it will be a matter for their judgment as to whether the acquisition of crude bombs would help them in their security. And if somebody, some country thinks it does they will go ahead and do it. And that will be just too bad. And you cannot change some government judgement if they are so very strongly convinced of that. I hope that the world public opinion or world current of opinions of you know, the governments and people are such as to convince them about the inadvisability of doing it. But you cannot control everybody's mind.

WITH A SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND IS IT POSSIBLE TO SAY THAT THE TECHNOLOGY IS THE SAME REGARDLESS? IS THERE ANY SECRET TO MAKING A NUCLEAR, A BOMB, A CRUDE BOMB?

Well I don't think there are very much secrets left with regard to the crude bombs because you could read Chicago Herald Tribune about ten years ago and read the specifications for building a bomb which was apparently a very good specification because judging from the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission then went to the court to put injunction on it didn't work. But I mean the extent of the spread of knowledge about the bomb design are such that anybody can sort of, I mean even MIT student or somebody, a Columbia student had a good design of the bomb. But the difference is to have a conceptual drawing or a conceptual design and production design. It's a very different thing. And it is a hurdle that you have to go over into making the actual bomb. But when there is a national effort by countries with more than a certain level of technology they can do it, I think. But that will be very different from the nuclear weapons, the sort of nuclear weapons, that are in the arsenal of the two superpowers today. That's very different stuff.

OK, LET'S STOP THERE.

Well I think, as far as the technical capabilities are concerned, we, Japan would be able to come out with a bomb or two within, I don't know three weeks, four weeks, that sort of timeframe. But I don't think having a bomb or two, a crude bomb or two, would be of our interest at all. I don't think...It's just, it's just...I mean...outside our interest. We don't think about that as a possibility or anything that is feasible.

WHY NOT?

I can't say "As I said before"

IF YOU CAN PUT IT IN A NUTSHELL.

Well in our view, or at least in my view, to nuclear arm ourselves in the world today, it has to contribute to our national security. And to contribute to our national security we have to have a good size capability, including delivery capabilities. To have a bomb or two, would run against our security. Because it would threaten other people and would not achieve, would not be backed up with sufficient capability to materialize that threat. That is something you should not do in your national security policy.