ADENAUER CAME UNDER SOME CRITICISMS FROM HIS MILITARY ADVISERS, IN ACCEPTING RESTRICTIONS ON GERMAN REARMAMENT, AS A PRICE FOR JOINING THE EDC (EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY). WHAT WOULD YOU SAY ABOUT THAT CRITICISM?

Generally, I would say any government, not only the German, had to accept restriction on their old-fashioned nationalistic freedom to construct and to structure, and so on, the armed forces. In some way, the German problems were even easier to handle, because we were totally defeated, and were rather eager to get some protection. But in the end, I would say, the alliance failed, as the French didn't accept the restrictions they would have for us. You know that maybe the Pleven Plan, the Pleven Plan prescribed that the German... largest unit would be the battalion in the beginning then the brigade, and then division and so on, were already integrated international units. And the French were very happy to support this for the West German military units, but didn't accept it for them; this was, I think, the last, although not, I fear, not the last, signs of the old-fashioned nationalistic thinking.

IN 1955, NATO HAD ORGANIZED AN EXERCISE CALLED "CARTE BLANCHE." IT CAUSED A CONSIDERABLE DEBATE IN GERMANY ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF JOINING NATO. DO YOU REMEMBER THE EXERCISE?

I remember precisely. Because...

(INTERRUPTION)

I remember Carte Blanche precisely. By then I was still in the Ministry of Defense developing my old concept in refuel, but of course I was an observer, and remember particularly the...(GERMAN) the great last discussion in Bremen about the exercise. You know, by then, the NATO suffered, or at least believed to suffer, under a strong conventional inferiority compared with the Warsaw Treaty of Oder–Neisse. And two years or three years ago, before Carte Blanche the Minister decided a reinforcement of the conventional forces, but never realized it. So the American took the chance and brought to Western Europe a lot of new constructed nuclear weapons of newer class, let's say battlefield weapons. And so we had hundreds of them, and during the exercise, we played in some way, nuclear war under conventional conditions and in conventional dimensions. And I think it couldn't be it otherwise that parts of the, the, large parts of the population, who heard for the first time in their life something about nuclear weapons, nuclear war, were deeply depressed that every day hundreds of these weapons were exploded on German territory; and the war went on, went on, went on. So I think Carte Blanche was not a very intelligent neither from the strategic nor from the political point of view.

IN 1955, I KNOW THAT YOU WERE PARTICULARLY, PERSONALLY CONCERNED, BUT IN 1955, THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND DID ACTUALLY START TO SEE THOSE SORTS OF EXISTING NATO PLANS FOR FIGHTING A WAR IN EUROPE. WHAT DO YOU KNOW WAS THEIR RESPONSE TO EXISTING NATO DOCTRINE?

Yeah, by then I had not, nothing to do directly with NATO papers; but of course, it was a great difference between the German concept; most of my colleagues were thinks, thinking, still thinking in the lines of a conventional move by warfare in Soviet Russia. And had never considered a modern war in an over-populated, highly vulnerable industrial society, and of course, not in, under the threat of nuclear weapons. Uh, so it was, of course, a real shock and in my view a healthy shock, maybe, for many...to learn the NATO doctrine and NATO strategy, and, of course be as we were not prepared, and not trained, to fighting an alliance. All these problems were absolutely new.

AS WELL AS BEING NEW, DID THEY COME AS A SHOCK?

I would say, yes, it was a shock but I think everybody who had considered this problem could only be shocked by details and not by the concept. But you are perfectly right; it was a real process: firstly, to learn something about a war-preventing strategy, instead of the war-fighting strategy, to learn to fight or not to fight under nuclear conditions, and in the framework of an alliance, where the integrated staffs--that means not national, not German staffs-- were the directing...authorities.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE SAID TO US THAT THERE WAS FAR TOO MUCH RELIANCE ON THE BUNDESWEHR'S EXPERIENCE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

They were perfectly right, because all the officers and even the noncommissioned officers, in the beginning of the Bundeswehr, were former soldiers of the Wehrmacht, and some of them of the Weimar Republic. And it's normal, in particular, I fear, on the military people, to think in some strange traditional way, and to be, which assume attitude, particular proud, in, on periods where you had sue-, success in your profession. And for most of the general staff officers and commanders of the Wehrmacht, of course the first two years of the So-, of the Russian war, were success after success. Against a mil-, a superiority and so on and so on, and it, it was very difficult to overcome this, and to correct it, particularly as...these campaigns in Soviet Russia were conducted by the Germans in the lines of a Moltke and other people's tradition. It was just the confirmation of the concept.

YOU WERE INVOLVED IN SETTING UP THE BUNDESWEHR, AND YOU HAD IN A SENSE AN ABILITY TO EXAMINE AFRESH THE STRUCTURE OF AN ARMY. WHAT WERE THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS THAT YOU HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Yeah, this is...rather difficult to say, because I think my, my first conclusion was to do everything to prevent such a war. Because what I already said, um a war, a modern war, even of conventional means, fought by conventional means, means after the depressing short period, the end of civilization in this area. It's impossible to protect anything, this means to defend anything, really for weeks, not even. And the nuclear weapons, of course, reinforce the process of destruction, and made the result entirely un-restorable. So in my view, it was, became necessary to lead the war, if we had one, more according to political consideration, than to military strategic ones. And this was the very reason that I opposed, from the beginning — that means the beginning of my time in NATO — uh, the strategy of, um, what is... of massive retaliation, which was an un-political one, in the moment...the war started the politicians declared a certain kind of "our hour," they called it, and then the politician had nothing to say to advise, to lead, the war followed certain pre-established processes which were developed by the military. So, I became extremely happy when in later on, NATO developed, against the resistance, of course, of most of the governments, particularly the French and even the US, I think the flexible response. Most of the, many of the Europeans were deeply concerned that this would mean an elation of the commitment in some way of the, the Americans. It would mean that the Americans were not willing, in future, to assist the allies in Western Europe by nuclear weapons. But, on the other hand, I was extremely happy about it, and tried to develop it a bit for European conditions because, for the first time in history, I would say, the political authorities maintained their right to control the war even in tactical details, and this gave of course a possibility for a permanent crisis management, and for if the politicians felt it would be necessary or possible for a de-escalation, because in our new nuclear conditions, it's not necessary to escalate, but necessary to try to de-escalate as soon as possible.

YOU TALKED ABOUT THE PROBLEMS YOU FACED OVER THE MECHANISMS OF NUCLEAR RELEASE. COULD YOU EXPLAIN THOSE PROBLEMS? ...

You know, it was never my problem; it was a problem of a certain Minister of Defense in western Germany, that we didn't have the right to use nuclear weapons, or that, that we, not even had, possessed nuclear weapons. The political question I was very well aware, aware of...was of course who is responsible for the release, because we need not too early not too late not too strong, and not too weak release. The release problem is a highly, and I would say, the decisive problem of the alliance. And I was extremely happy that in essence the nations, or the members of NATO, I think agreed in something which is a, a proper way, and that they constituted the nuclear planning group, which is of course a podium to discuss this problem regularly and in the proper, proper way. But you know, as the release of a certain weapon has rather differing consequences for the state of the country in which it will release, that means those uh, weapons will stay for the country in which the targets are, and the consequences are rather difficult, so it is, I think, a very important, but not too easy, procedure, um, to release properly in the political sense.

ONE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT SOME PEOPLE SAY EXISTED IN THE WAY NATO IS STRUCTURED IS THE FACT THAT IN THE END THE UNITED STATES RETAINS A VETO OVER THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHAT WOULD BE YOUR VIEWS ON THOSE PROBLEMS?

Firstly, I am not a great friend of the battlefield weapons and the short-range ones, because I think it's a strange idea to support a conventional defense by using smaller nuclear weapons. The, these weapons open a new dimension of warfare, and I think, are not very helpful for the, the defense, so in my view, NATO should have some of these systems, but only to deter the Warsaw Pact organization to use similar systems too early; and secondly, to demonstrate in a crisis that they feel that's a very serious one, and that they are contemplating seriously the use of nuclear weapons. Uh, so my...attitude towards the small, short-range weapons is quite different, I think, to many of my former colleagues. And in the framework of my concept, the quick release is not the problem. You know, the quick release problem...had one awful-- only theoretically, of course-- uh, consequence that NATO released some hundred of these weapon, of these weapons for the next 24 hours. And this means nothing but a depolization, ... politicization of these weapons. And in my view, we need weapon per weapons release, and not the exchange kind (?). So, my interest in this problem is a bit differing, um, to what you mentioned.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS YOU DON'T SEE THE DELAY AS A PROBLEM.

Uh, the problem, then, you see, lies in a differing area. It is the problem whether we feel it necessary to, to repeat it, to use nuclear weapons for the support of our conventional defense. And this is, in my view, in, in every respect...nonsense, from the political starting from the political to the technical one, in some way.

BUT ISN'T THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SUPPORT OF A CONVENTIONAL WAR, ISN'T THAT ONE OF THE VERY IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE?

Yeah, it is in some way, but I think we should use them only as a warning signal to the other side, demonstrating either you...de-escalate with us, or we will escalate into the hardest forms of nuclear war. We are sorry, but we are not willing to accept your total victory, let's say...with conventional instruments only, so we have to do, and this is our offer, let us de-escalate instead of escalate.

YOU SAID EARLIER THAT YOU ACTUALLY DIFFERED QUITE A LOT FROM YOUR COLLEAGUES, YOUR PAST COLLEAGUES. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THEIR ATTITUDES?

Yeah, in which respect, do you think?

THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS FLEXIBLE RESPONSE...

Yeah, uh-huh you know, the first reaction, I think, the...Dutch had it already a bit; it was that...the flexible response meant nothing, but this goal of the strategic American systems from...any mission in Western Europe. And, it was of course also difficult to accept the flexible response for all of us who didn't see the political dimension of every war...and who had the feeling that the only responsible people for warfare are the military. And the political people were incompetent, were willing, or tempted, to give in firstly in details and later in principle, and so it would be better for our security to leave it in the hands of the military. This was one, and you know, this was in some way what I like to call a pre-nuclear thinking. Because already in the, in the pre-nuclear era, warfare was a political problem but by then, as in the Germany, Bismarck, and Moltke, the military had the feeling that the politicians are of course responsible for opening, and may even for closing the war, but everything which happened between the beginning and the end was the problem of the military. And this is, I think, something which is still in many minds, and they are not willing to accept the defect for them (?) that the political leadership, the political evaluation, is the most important one, because we have not the intention, we shouldn't have the intention, or even the possibility, of a victory. Because a victory is something which threatens the other side, and destroys any possibility of de-escalation. Because the other side, what we had discussed, just, the moment, the other side has in view of this threatening victory of the other side to escalate.

WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE MAJORITY OF YOUR COLLEAGUES WERE FAR MORE PREPARED TO SUPPORT AND ARGUE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF MASSIVE RETALIATION AS A DOCTRINE?

Yes, in these first years, of course, and strongly supported by the politicians.

COULD YOU REPHRASE THAT?

Because, you know, for many, many reasons...firstly, they were accustomed, they were trained to it, they knew exactly what to do.

(INTERRUPTION)(QUESTION REPEATED)

I would say the massive retaliation was a doctrine accepted as a so-called nuclear strategy in the first decade of NATO, both by the politicians and the military. And it had, strangely, its charm, because it demonstrated, or at least it promised, the total defeat of the other side. And it gave the military the freedom, the authority, to lead the war according to their concepts and so on; the politician had nothing to say. After they had declared the so-called "our hour," the politicians could dine and sleep. And this had, of course, some charm, for some of my colleagues. The politicians were against the flexible response---I think we mentioned it already shortly—and, they were deeply concerned that this is nothing but a limitation of the American commitment. It is the easiest, and in some way legitimizing way, to say...in a crisis, this is your problem. Fight it by conventional means. Which of course would be in the real interest of the Americans: there's no doubt at all. We have particular, at least of the, at least in Western Germany, many people who are deeply concerned about the...American intention to use nuclear weapons as early and as much as possible in the next war. I think this is absolutely stupid, because the American and...this was the same extent the Soviet interest is it, to have a war at a conventional level, because this kind of war could be limited in some way, geographically. But the nuclear war, I think, is not too limited in any respect. And so I would say in all consideration and all exercises, I led in...SHAPE, the American players were always rather reluctant to release nuclear weapons too early. And they were absolutely right, not only from the American point of view, but, I think, also from the well-understood European point of view.

DID YOU EVER HAVE ANY PROBLEMS, BECAUSE YOUR VIEWS WERE DIFFERENT?

Yeah, on, in one respect it was, of course, easier to talk with Germans, not only from the linguistic point of view, but also from the organizational point of view, because I had no German--what is it, contrary to subordinate--superiors. I had no German superiors; I was an integrated member of the staffs. But, of course, my superiors, like General Lemnitzer of course, had to listen to my advices, and I had to follow their decision. And in practice, you know, it's much easier to find compromises than in theory. And very often it's good, and a very fruitful discussion between, in principle a bit opposing partners.

IF YOU LOOK AT THE BATTLE PLANS FOR THE BRITISH ARMY, THE LAND BATTLE DOCTRINE WHICH THEY FORMULATED IN 1960, IT'S THE PREAMBLE; IT STARTS OUT, "IN THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE USED FREQUENTLY. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WILL BE USED CONSTANTLY." DO YOU THINK THE DEBATE ABOUT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WAS EVER A REAL ONE, GIVEN THE WAY THAT VARIOUS NATIONAL FORCES WERE STRUCTURED?

No. I think the discussions about the flexible response was mainly influenced by so-called national interests, and national concepts. And the main concern I tried already to mention was the lessening commitment of the Americans. It, you know, it is extremely difficult to develop common tactical rules and regulations. There are so many national prejudices, so-called military traditions, and so on, and I was never concerned about these differences, because in the moment start, the war starts, integrated, we have an integrated operational authorities. Not national ones-- the British have not the opportunity to fight under British operational command, but on the integrated NATO one, so these tactical differences are, I think, not as important as it looks.

SIR ARTHUR HOCKADAY HAS SAID TO US THAT WHEN NATO DOCUMENT MC14/3 WAS ADOPTED, HE DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER THE DOCTRINE WAS FLEXIBLE, BUT THE DOCUMENT CERTAINLY WAS. DO YOU THINK THAT THAT'S A FAIR POINT TO MAKE, THAT NATO DOCTRINE HAS NO COHERENCE UNDER FLEXIBLE RESPONSE BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION IN EUROPE?

Yes, of course without the opposition, we had maybe a clearer document, but it's not my concern, because under the conditions of a crisis, our NATO authorities have to decide, and are maybe not too anxious to follow just the text of the, a treaty or something of this kind. But of course, my friend Hockaday for many years, is right; from the, let's see, language, or the lawyer's point of view, the text could be more exact, which is normal in diplomatic documents: you try to get the consents of all of them, and it makes normally the treaty not easier to understand.

AFTER MCNAMARA'S SPEECH IN ATHENS, THE FRENCH USED THEIR VETO IN NATO TO PREVENT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. WHAT PROBLEMS DID THAT CAUSE YOU, AS A NATO OFFICER?

One very personal that excellent French officers had to leave our staff; excellent both as experts in some way, but also in the political and human respect. And, of course, it was the first step to a very strange and dangerous process of, let's say, re-nationalization. And, um, I was deeply impressed by them, as most of the French officers were extremely unhappy that they had to leave, and some of them did ask me, "You have some experience with resistance. Is this a case where we should resist?" It was, for many French officers a very difficult situation, and I sympathized deeply with them, but you know, we couldn't change it, and in some way, we can solve problems easier without, than with France.

WHY WAS THAT?

Well, any, let's say, any decision, ...about arms control, or release...there were some problems which were very difficult to discuss with the French authority, not with the French colleagues. And you know, the, the structure, the decision-making structure in NATO, is of course rather sensitive against any kind of opposition, so in some way, life became a bit easier, but in principle, I think it was a very grave moment, or a very serious moment in NATO.

THEY MAINTAINED THEIR OPPOSITION FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME. THAT MUST HAVE BEEN A PERIOD OF PARTICULAR FRUSTRATION FOR YOU?

Yeah. At, at least in certain areas, it was rather frustrating: you are perfectly right.

WHEN YOU WERE AT SHAPE...THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE BUILDUP OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT BUILDUP?

They are firstly the bad conscience most of the West European government had, after not fulfilling the promises of a lesser bomb, to reinforce their conventional components. Uh, secondly, the feeling is, maybe it's not too bad; it's better to have the weapons here than not. And thirdly, I think, the Americans expected some increase of influence, stationing these weapons here. But those people you mentioned are absolutely right in my view, that they have too many of them. But you know, by then it was very strange; on one hand, what I already said, the west Europeans were not willing to reinforce the conventional, and on the other hand, the Americans were extremely proud to have developed such new systems of nuclear weapons, absolutely new ones, and it was also some kind of propaganda to show what they are able to do but I entirely agree, they had much too many, and particular, following my concept, that we shouldn't have only some to demonstrate...our crisis feeling and our determination to escalate in the nuclear area.

WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DECIDING HOW MANY WEAPONS WERE REQUIRED?

Well, in some way, I think the Pentagon, and SACEUR.

COULD YOU REPHRASE THAT?

This kind of augmentation, of course, could only happen, could only be done by the Pentagon; that means the American war office; and with the agreement of the Supreme Commander of NATO in Europe...SACEUR.

ONE CRITICISM OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY NOT OBEY THE SAME RULES.

My response to this argument: firstly, I think at least in the last years, you can observe a deep change in the Soviet think- strategic, and particularly in the security policy that I mentioned. And I doubt whether this is something the Soviets can, at least practically, not accept. Because I cannot imagine that they are deeply interested in a sudden and automatic escalation of nuclear weapons, which we had in ...the massive retaliation. I think, particularly if you start a war, you must have some objectives. And any nuclear weapon used in such a war is certainly not, it, it's the advantage in the sense of your goals, so I would say this argument, the Soviets are you know that the Soviets, I am quite sure, particularly as they have some sort of a conventional superiority, are not very eager to use nuclear weapons at all, and particularly none on their territory, and this means on the West European too.

ANOTHER CRITICISM IS THAT IT ACTUALLY WOULD PUT YOU ON A RATCHET, THAT IF THERE'S A SLIGHT INCURSION INTO NATO TERRITORY, THE DOCTRINE ACTUALLY LEAVES YOU WITH NO POSITION TO RECOVER FROM THAT. DO YOU ACCEPT THAT?

No, I think, of course, recovery is impossible during the war, and even after the war, it's extremely difficult. But it should be easier, after a war in which we didn't use our military forces in a traditional way, trying to destroy as much as possible. So I would say the ...uh, (German), the attitude not to use as much power as you have, but only as much as it's necessary for a certain limited political goal. This is the question we face, and I think this is one of the many advantages of the flexible response; it gives the political authorities the possibility to control the politi-, the military, even in detailed (?). The release of a nuclear tactical weapon is the best example.

SOME PEOPLE SAY THE REAL PROBLEM WITH FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IS THAT IT LEADS PEOPLE TO BELIEVE YOU ACTUALLY CAN FIGHT A WAR, A LIMITED WAR WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

This is, of course an intelligent argument, but on the, because I think it is the decision to start the war, in the days of a massive retaliation, was a bit more difficult. Maybe. But if the other side have to expect a controlled response, controlled by governments who are not willing to accept any kind of defeat, but by governments who are willing to de-escalate in the moment the aggressor does the same, I think it, it's wiser. You know...one of the many problems we face is in our disputes that some of us are not able to accept that could prevent war. They are already arguing our strategy and many other... concepts, from the platform that we have already war. But, I, the real, the concrete, the realistic concept is, I think, that we are most likely able to prevent a war, and it's much more interesting to consider ways...instruments...strategies, which would make war even more unlikely. This is our problem, and not whether we should fight in this or in this way.

WHEN YOU WERE SETTING UP THE BUNDESWEHR, THERE WERE LOTS OF PROBLEMS. FIRST OF ALL, THERE WAS AN ANTI-MILITARIST FEELING IN WEST GERMANY. THERE WAS ALSO A GREAT DEAL OF OPPOSITION TO THE CREATION OF A GERMAN ARMY FROM THE FRENCH AND FROM OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

Thank you very much. Firstly I have to mention, maybe, that I joined the German forces; uh, I was already a member of a commission in 1950, when Adenauer was looking for expert advice how to structure and so on and so on...possible German forces. My main concern was not whether we need German forces; my real concern was that we shouldn't have a rearmament in the real sense; that we had to have new military forces, new concepts, both in the strategy and in the, solving the internal problems and so on. And I was never astonished that large of the German public felt deeply concerned that in our world, we would have again German military forces. The very conservative part said no, no German army again, unless...our honor -- that means, the, yeah, the Third Reich would be better, called better than it was, has been restored, and no change at all, even in, in, in, in stupid small rules and so on. This was the conservative, or better, the restorative part of the population. The other was the Left, who had the right to say, in the former days, the military forces was always used as an education factor against the Left. Something we wouldn't like to have. That means militarization of the society, and we had, let's call, a pacifist group, who said, "After all these awful things which happened, under German responsibility, we should be cautious and should give up any..."--they called it also militarization. And I was in the very strange situation that the critical part of the population supported myself and my concept, because this was against any repetition of .... And the other, who felt, “Yes, of course, we are a nation, as all other ones are,” and that it's necessary to have armed forces and so on and so on, they were not always very happy about it.

WHY WAS IT THAT YOU WERE IN FAVOR OF THE DOCTRINE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE?

For a very simple reason. Negatively speaking: because I thought the 'massive retaliation' which occurred then, was a completely un-political military strategy, and because I was convinced that this would not be acceptable for the allies of the United States. The 'massive retaliation' was based on the almost commercial point of view, that one should spend as little money as possible for defense purposes; and since conventional forces are always more expensive than nuclear ones, which have much lower personnel costs.

(INTERRUPTION).

And for these economical reasons 'massive retaliation' was developed. People believed it made no sense to prepare for a limited conventional war, and wanted immediately "to shoot from all barrels", and to totally destroy the other side. This was then still a combination of classical thinking--war must lead to the destruction of the other side--as well as of the old concept that to wage war is really only an affair for soldiers. The concept of 'flexible response' fascinated me because of the appointment of the political, the main authority which had to decide not only on the beginning of the war but also on the type of warfare. That has even led to the fact that — thinking of the Athens guidelines — each nuclear weapon has to be released by the politicians. This...because of this political control we now have the possibility of crisis management, i.e. of preventive crisis management before even the first shot is fired, and in a war, the possibility to offer again and again, if possible, de-escalation to the other side.

YOU WERE AN OFFICER IN SHAPE, AND YOU SERVED UNDER LEMNITZER. CAN YOU TELL US WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE IN NATO FOR THE MASSIVE BUILDUP OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE '50S AND EARLY '60S?

Well, negatively speaking, the refusal of the West European nations to continue building up their conventional forces, so that an effective defense became here conceivable. On the other hand, the United States had developed these short short-range systems as the most modern weapon on the nuclear battlefield. For a number of reasons, probably also economical ones, these had been brought to Western Europe and were now simply here [in Europe].

WHEN WEST GERMANY JOINED NATO, THE GERMAN ARMY STARTED TO BECOME AWARE OF NATO PLANS. THE DOCTRINE MC 14/2, WHAT WAS THE GERMAN ARMY'S REACTION TO THAT DOCTRINE?

Well, we must not forget, that the new German forces, the Bundeswehr, were comprised of members of the old Wehrmacht [German army until end of WWII]. And the strategic concepts of these people were very strongly influenced by the successful years of the Russian campaign. What we call 'mobile warfare'--which had really always been the pride of the Prussian, and therefore the German General Staff-had been applied there with great success. So that, of course, in the first years -- but that didn't only happen in Germany, but particularly here,-- people were still very strongly impressed by old concepts of warfare, with visions of victory. And of course, it took a relatively long time until it became clear, first of all, that nowadays modern forces should and can legitimately only prevent war, or that they are responsible for making a de-escalation occur. And that ...meant a big change in thinking. Of course, another change of thinking had to occur, because we now suddenly had no longer a German hierarchy, but in decisive questions we had to address ourselves to the all...had to accommodate ourselves to the allies.

DESCRIBE WHAT THE CARTE BLANCHE EXERCISE DID, AND DESCRIBE WHAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE ARMY THOUGHT OF IT?

Well, this exercise was based on the premises that Western Europe, here the German Federal Republic, could only be defended in the case of defeat in a conventional...with a massive use of short-range nuclear weapons. And since the papers printed much on, about that, large parts of the public, and I'd say rightfully so, were shocked about what a future war, in the alliance, would bring for them. I am personally, and many others, were shocked that what we had here was nuclear war under conventional conditions. It was made to look as if now the conventional grenade, hitting Bremen, was not less important, or that the present nuclear weapon was simply something totally different. And this was certainly for us--those of us who were first of all for the alliance, and who discovered here simply that this was suicide, political suicide, for the alliance; and who, secondly, also thought that prevention of war should be the uppermost aim-- this was for us a quite considerable nuisance.

WHAT TASKS CONFRONTED YOU IN 1955, WHEN YOU WERE HAVING TO SET UP THE BUNDESWEHR?

Yes. Since 1950 I took part in the deliberations of the government, and later of parliament, on how future German forces might be structured, and what might become the content of my special area in the case of a possible participation in a West European, Atlantic defense community. Therefore, I was in the defense ministry from 1951 to 1958, before i.e. earlier it had a different name, was called 'Department Blank', and had the task to think about this concept of 'internal leadership' [innere Führung], i.e. about the concept of leadership, and therefore also about the relationship to democracy, to modern war, and to teach about this. From there, in '58, I was transferred and had one of the large brigades for three years, and then went into NATO.

IN A SENSE, THE PROBLEM FACING THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES, ONCE THEY HAD JOINED NATO, WAS ACTUALLY TO ARGUE FOR A STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENSE, WHICH HADN'T EXISTED BEFORE. HOW DIFFICULT WAS THAT FOR YOU, OR FOR THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES? DID YOU HAVE TO ARGUE FOR A MORE AGGRESSIVE WAR-FIGHTING DOCTRINE?

Yes, no, I understand perfectly. I was never really interested in a forward strategy, i.e. in having the alliance carry war further into Eastern Europe. My reasons against that are firstly, that this is the most primitive means of binding the Eastern European satellite states to the Soviet Union. And secondly, that without doubt hardly any of the allies will be willing to take such risks. They are, thank God, willing to defend our NATO territory in a multinational structure, in a forward...a frontal defense, but not in a forward defense. And I believe, and have always understood it that way, that this 'not-forward' defense lies in the interests of the alliance, as well as in the interests of the Federal Republic, and if I may continue, even in the interests of the other Germans. Politically seen, it is also the only possibility to hope for a timely de-escalation. Because, once we have gained ground over there, and especially, to a large degree, then Eastern Europe will feel so threatened and attacked by us that all concerns about a so-called 'revenge' are actually directly supported.