COULD YOU FIRST TELL US WHETHER YOU THINK THAT THERE WERE GOOD MILITARY REASONS FOR A FORCE OF SOME SEVEN THOUSAND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WESTERN EUROPE IN THE EARLY '60s?

I think the simple answer is no. But the problem was that in the mid-1950s a plan for putting 15,000 tactical weapons in Europe had been developed and steps were underway to move toward that. So we cut it back to 7,000. Uh, there was considerable controversy over that. And by the way, that 7,000 uh, goal uh, in force level existed from roughly the mid-'60s until 1979 when it was reduced by a thousand.

SO WHEN YOU CAME IN, 15,000 WAS THE GOAL. WERE YOU EVER GIVEN ANY MILITARY RATIONALE FOR THOSE KINDS OF NUMBERS?

No. And there wasn't any rationale for 7,000 and that's been cut to 6,079...

IF I COULD JUST...

...forty eight hundred. Since then there's no rationale for today's forty eight hundred,

UH.. .

Absolutely none.

LET ME TO JUST ASK YOU TO PUT THAT IN A STATEMENT IF YOU COULD SO I DON'T HAVE TO USE THE QUESTION. WHAT KIND OF EXPLANATIONS WERE BEING — DID YOU ASK WHY WE NEED ALL THESE THINGS AND IF SO, WHAT KIND OF ANSWERS DID YOU GET, WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT?

The, the uh, initial goal, something on the order of fifteen thousand was established uh, as an offset to NATO's failure to meet what were called the Lisbon Force Goals, the conventional force goals. And Secretary John Foster Dulles believed that we couldn't afford to that and therefore he... uh, proposed the strategy of a bigger bank for bucks. Substitute nuclear weapons for conventional weapons. Nobody knew exactly how many nuclear weapons were required so this set of uh, approximately fifteen thousand tactical nuclear weapons was an element of that. But there was no uh, military rationale for that. Uh, we cut it back to seven thousand. And there was no military rationale for that. It was cut back to six thousand in 1979 and to forty eight hundred a year ago. There's no military rationale for that.

SO WHAT WAS THE RATIONALE?

The expectation was that the, the threat of massive nuclear reaction would be a credible deterrent to Soviet uh, conventional force aggression. And uh, to be absolutely sure that we had a deterrent, uh, had picked a, a figure out of the air that was a very high figure. It exists to this day.

OTHER PEOPLE HAVE SAID TO ME THAT THE MAIN REASON THAT THESE WEAPONS KEPT FALLING INTO EUROPE WAS THAT THEY WERE BEING MADE.

Well that was pa... Yes. I, uh, the, the, the plan for a vast expansion of tactical nuclear forces in Europe had been drawn up in the uh, mid to late fifties. Uh, action to produce the weapons was initiated and they were flowing into Europe. We cut back the flow from what initially had been planned, but it led to great controversy. Uh, we introduced a plan to shift, make a major shift in NATO strategy from what was called massive retaliation, the strategy of the fifties uh, to what was called flexible response... uh, the, the plan that was put forward at a NATO foreign and defense ministers' conference in April of 1962. It was so controversial because it placed less reliance on nuclear weapons. It raised the nuclear threshold. Uh, it was so controversial it took five years to obtain uh, NATO's agreement to that. It was very, very difficult to uh, attack the, the belief that nuclear weapons uh, were the security of Europe. They weren't then. They aren't today.

WHAT DO YOU SAY TO DENIS HEALY'S REMARK THAT YOU WERE VERY GOOD AT CONTROLLING AND RATIONALIZING THE STRATEGIC PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES IN UNITED STATES, BUT AS FAR AS THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE CONCERNED, YOU DID NOTHING TO DO THE SAME PROCESS WITH THEM?

Denis's memory uh, faults him on that point The fact is, A, we cut the previous...

JUST START AGAIN.

Denis Healy's memory faults him on this point. The fact is we cut back the plan for tact... nuclear weapons here very substantially from the levels planned in the raid to late fifties down to a level of seven thousand. Secondly, we introduced into those weapons what are known as permissive action links. These were uh, devices that were in the warheads to ensure that nobody in the field had physical capability to, to arm those warheads... without an input from the President of the United States. Europeans criticized that. They said we were locking up the weapons. Uh, thirdly, we introduced in 1962 the major change in strategy which was designed to defer any possible use of these tactical warheads, make a nuclear war less likely. That was so controversial it took five years to uh, to convince NATO the merit of it and five years to approve it. And by the way, uh, that strategy and essentially the number of warheads we put there in uh, the mid-'60s uh, is existent today.

CAN I JUST PASS ON TO THAT FEROCIOUS FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DEBATE? LOOKING BACK ON THOSE YEARS AND INDEED STILL NOW, A LOT OF THE EUROPEANS THAT WERE INVOLVED HAVE SAID TO ME, "LOOK. BY ASKING THESE QUESTIONS, WHAT HAPPENS IF DETERRENCE FAILS, BY WORRYING OUT LOUD ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS WHEN DETERRENCE FAILS... ROBERT McNAMARA MADE IT MORE LIKELY THAT IT WOULD FAIL. OUR POINT WAS IT MUSTN'T FAIL. LET'S KEEP THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE. THAT'S THE REAL DETERRENT." WHAT DO YOU SAY TO THAT?

There's a certain uh, logic to that... certain merit to that. Uh, don't say, has no clothes even if he doesn't have clothes. Uh... The other side of the argument however is one that they fail to recognize. If deterrence fails and your only plan is one of committing suicide, what happens then? One of destroying yourself? Quite frankly, that was the plan in the mid-'60s. It is the plan today. Now to address specifically the criticism that by talking about that and by implying that in the event of uh, failure of deterrence we should not initiate the use of nuclear weapons, one reduces the credibility of deterrent. One has to accept that. And the, the offset to that is that one can strengthen the credibility of our conventional forces as a deterrent, uh, materially and do it within realistic political and financial constraints. That's what we should do.

ONE GERMAN SAID TO ME, ALWAYS TALKED ABOUT IT BUT UP TO NOW NOT ONE SINGLE EXTRA AMERICAN, GERMAN, BRITISH, FRENCH SOLDIER HAS BEEN PUT INTO EUROPE AND THEY NEVER WILL BE. IT'S A DREAM.

Well that's not true. The uh, conventional forces of uh, NATO have...

LET'S START THAT AGAIN.

It's not true to say that the conventional forces of NATO have not been strengthened in the last uh, uh, twenty years. They have been. Uh, both in terms of uh, military equipment and in terms of uh, personnel and in terms of training and uh, combat capability. They have, moreover, there have been two recent studies. One by the European security group which included the German, uh, British, American uh, military and civilian officials, including the former Supreme Allied Commander, General Goodpaster which said that one could greatly strengthen the NATO conventional capability without substantial additions of personnel and of the cost. For the total of the fourteen nations over a period of five years cumulatively were twenty billion dollars. Now quite frankly I think they underestimated the cost. But suppose it's two or three times that? We're, we alone are spending three hundred billion a year. It's absurd to say that we should let 20 or 40 or 60 billion for fourteen nations over five years stand in the way of possibly reducing the risk of nuclear war. I'm not willing to do that.

AND POSSIBLY INCREASING THE RISK OF ANOTHER KIND OF WAR?

No, no, no. My, my point is that we can, we can buy, strengthening conventional uh, forces. We can uh, avoid reducing the deterrent to conventional uh, force development. To be absolutely frank with you, our threat to initiate the use of nuclear weapons is becoming less and less credible. Uh, six of the eight uh, retired British Chiefs of the Defense Staff have said that under no circumstances would they ever recommend that we initiate the use of nuclear weapons. How are the Soviets to view the alleged threat of first use? It's becoming less and less credible to them with every passing day.

WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE TO THOSE WHO SAY, "LOOK, WE CAN'T ENVISION WHAT THE FUTURE'S GOING TO HOLD. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE PRESSURES MIGHT BE ON THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FUTURE. WE DO KNOW THAT FOR 40 YEARS JUST THE MERE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR HAS DETERRED WAR...

No. I'm not prepared to say that the deterrence of war for forty years, and thank god it has been deterred. I'm not prepared to say that was a function of, of the existence of the nuclear weapons. It was I think a function of the conventional balance that existed. It is a misperception that the conventional balance is so much in the favor of the Soviets that it is only the threat of the first use of nuclear weapons that stands in the way of nuclear war. I don't believe that's the case. A, an attacker seeking to achieve a high degree of confidence in his ability to attack successfully needs a very large uh, superiority. Something on the order of three to one. Uh, it's not at all clear that exists today. The Soviets do not wish large scale war with the West. They will probe for weakness, take advantage of it at low cost if they can find it. They don't wish large scale war for the West, with the West. They remember they lost 20 million dead in World War II. We must develop a conventional deterrent that is sufficient to deter their conventional action. We're close to having it today. We can get it either by increasing our conventional forces within realistic political and financial constraints or by negotiating a shift in the force balance. And Gorbachev has given indications he would be willing to seriously consider that.

LET ME ASK YOU ONE MORE QUESTION ABOUT THE SIXTIES BACK THEN. AND IF YOU COULD KEEP IT TO THAT PERIOD. DO YOU THINK THAT AROUND THAT TIME — OR THIS GOES PERHAPS SINCE AS WELL, THERE WAS THIS KIND OF FEELING GROWING UP IN EUROPE THAT IT'S BETTER NOT TO BE TOO CONTROLLED. IT'S BETTER NOT TO HAVE ALL THIS CENTRAL CONTROL McNAMARA KEEPS TALKING ABOUT BECAUSE THE POINT IS TO MAKE THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT EVEN IF IT'S IRRATIONAL IT MIGHT HAPPEN. WE MIGHT LOSE CONTROL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT...

At times the Europeans have felt the best form of deterrence... is... the conception in the Soviet mind that they're facing madmen. I think that is extremely dangerous. Why? Because in a crisis it creates what we call crisis instability. It creates in the Soviet's mind a fear that they really are facing madmen. And the madmen may launch those nuclear weapons as they've been threatening to do for years and years and years. And therefore... say the Soviets to themselves, the way to deal with those madmen is to strike first, to preempt. My God I, that's the most dangerous possible situation. Surely we want to prevent that.

LET ME GO THE BRITISH AND FRENCH DETERRENCE AND IF YOU COULD PUT YOUR MIND BACK INTO THE EARLY SIXTIES AND NOT NECESSARILY FAR OFF INTO THE MODERN TIMES AT THE MOMENT. SIMPLY, WHY DID YOU FEEL IT NECESSARY TO CANCEL SKYBOLT?

We cancelled Skybolt because it was a pile of junk. It was a weapon which had a specific objective, a designed objective. And as it went through test and development it became very clear it couldn't achieve that objective. It would have no military utility. We cancelled it. Thank God.

AND WHAT WAS THE BRITISH REACTION WHEN YOU SUGGESTED IT...

The political crisis...

START AGAIN.

There was a, When we cancelled the weapon it led to a political crisis in Britain. And the reason was that the British had established their independent nuclear deterrent. They wanted to maintain it. They had no way to maintain it, to modernize it other than by using Skybolt. Uh, now obviously they didn't uh, wish the weapon was as I have said, a pile of junk. But so long as nobody knew it was a pile of junk uh, they were willing to proceed with it.

SO EFFECTIVELY YOU'RE SAYING THAT WHETHER IT WORKED OR NOT WAS NOT AS IMPORTANT AS...

There was a political objective that they were uh, pointing to, uh, much more than a military objective.

WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT OFFERING THEM POLARIS INSTEAD?

We were very reluctant. Uh, I say we, the President, the Secretary of State and I were very reluctant to uh, to uh... uh, transfer Polaris to the British. We were certain it would lead to French-British problems. We eventually did uh, authorize the, the procurement of Polaris by the British. And it did uh, I think contribute uh, to the French-British uh, uh, problem.

WAS THERE MORE TO IT THAN THAT? WAS IT JUST THE FRENCH PROBLEM THAT WAS ON YOUR MIND?

Well that was a major problem. Uh, we felt that uh, it was likely to, to lead to additional uh, uh, concern on the part of the Soviets about uh, crisis instability and, and that was a matter of importance to us.

SO WHY IN THE END DID YOU DO IT?

We did it because uh, I believed then and I believe now that the foundation of the alliance's unity and it was very clear that unless we took some steps to help the British modernize their independent nuclear deterrent, there was going to be a disruption in the relationships between uh, US and Britain. We didn't want that.

SO IN THE END THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE STRATEGIC ANALYSIS. COULD YOU PERHAPS SAY THAT?

Uh... At that time uh, we felt that we could best achieve uh, our uh, strategic objectives uh, if you will by uh, putting primary emphasis on the political action rather than the uh, military hardware.

DID YOU BELIEVE DURING THOSE EARLY YEARS OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION THAT IT WAS GOING TO BE POSSIBLE TO STOP THE FRENCH FROM DEVELOPING A FORCE DE FRAPPE?

No, no. We, we did not think uh, it would be possible to uh, stop the French from developing an independent nuclear deterrent any more than we thought it'd be possible to stop the British. We didn't believe that uh, independent nuclear deterrents were stabilizing. But they were sovereign powers. Uh, they had the technical uh, and financial capability to move ahead toward it. And we didn't think we could stop.

BUT YOU DID MAKE SOME FAIRLY RUDE REMARKS ABOUT IT. FOR EXAMPLE AT ANN ARBOR, WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THAT?

The Ann Arbor speech wasn't rude. Uh, it uh... appeared to uh, the French to be very critical of their action. I'm sorry they uh, they placed that interpretation on it. But uh, we didn't believe then and I don't believe now that uh, independent nuclear deterrence uh, in the hands of either the French or the British, or for that matter other NATO powers are desirable.

THAT WAS SEEN BY DE GAULLE, POSSIBLY BY THE BRITISH BUT THEY WOULDN'T HAVE SAID SO, AS A CERTAIN AMERICAN ARROGANCE AND AS AN ASSERTION BY THE UNITED STATES, NOT ONLY THAT IT WAS THE LEADER OF THE ALLIANCE BUT THAT IT SHOULD HAVE SOLE CONTROL OVER THE ONLY WEAPON THAT REALLY MATTERED. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT ARGUMENT?

Well I, I think there was, there was merit to it. Uh, I don't think that uh, the US should uh, have sole control over the use of, of nuclear weapons. Uh, we tried very hard in the, in the 1960s to, to convey uh, to our allies certainly to the French, to the British, to the Germans, the other NATO members that uh, we did not wish to exercise sole control. We wished to exercise sole veto control, but we wished to ensure that we had uh, participation by the other members of NATO in development of, of uh, strategies and plans involving use of nuclear weapons. It took, took such absurd uh, uh, forms as the, what was known as the multi-lateral force. This was to be a naval force uh, with uh, nuclear warheads stationed on surface ships. The surface ships to be manned by...

SO YOU WERE JUST TELLING US ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE MLF I THINK.

The MLF uh, was a uh... a hardware solution to a political problem. It was absurd. It was a serious problem. The problem was that the Europeans uh, believed, correctly so, that we had not taken them into uh, our confidence in our plans for uh, procedures for the use of nuclear weapons. And it's true we had not. We didn't tell them how many weapons we had. We didn't tell what their characteristics were. We didn't tell where they, where they were located in Europe. We didn't tell them uh, what warplans we had for their use. We didn't tell the procedures for control of their use in case of war. Uh... The, particularly the state department uh, was very concerned about this and the justification. And it was conceived then that uh, we would develop a, what was called the multi-lateral force. It was to be a, a force of, of uh, surface ships on board which would uh, be stationed nuclear weapons and the ships would be manned by multi-national crews, French, German, Norwegians, the Dutch, British, etcetera. And we tried to think of a common language and common food that, it, the, the fin... the thing finally broke down of its own... weight. It was a perfectly absurd military solution to a political problem. Finally we came up with uh, what I persuaded President Johnson to approve of, which was a political solution to a political problem. The formation of what's known as the nuclear planning group. It exists to this day. We had it, we obtained approval of it in about 1967. It was designed to expose to the Defense Ministers and their Chiefs of Staff the uh, foundations of our nuclear planning.

AND THAT DID THE JOB.

And it did the job, yes. Quite correctly.

BUT THE PROBLEM THAT THE MLF WAS REALLY SUPPOSED TO ADDRESS WAS THE FEELING THAT THE GERMANS, WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH HAVING GOT THEIR OWN NUCLEAR FORCES, THE GERMANS MIGHT WANT TO BUILD THEIRS BECAUSE THE GERMANS WOULDN'T BELIEVE THAT UNITED STATES —

The MLF was designed partially, to, to uh, to take care of what's known as the German problem, the fact that they don't have an independent nuclear force, but more importantly to deal with the, the general uneasiness among our European NATO partners, that they knew nothing about nuclear weapons and nuclear plans or nuclear strategy, or who's finger was on the trigger or when the trigger might be pulled. And they were quite correct. It was a bona fide uh, concern. We sought to deal with it with a nuclear planning group. I think we have.

LET ME JUST ASK YOU TO COMMENT IN GENERAL, AND NOW WE'RE TALKING STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS AS WELL AS TACTICAL. WE'RE TALKING GLOBAL AS WELL AS EUROPEAN. WHAT LESSONS DID YOU LEARN ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ABOUT THE NUCLEAR BALANCE FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF CUBA?

I think the most important uh, lesson we learned from uh, Cuba was uh... the risk that we, NATO, and in that case in particular the US, even when we have what most people uh, believed then and some people believe today is nuclear superiority. At that point we had roughly five thousand strategic offensive nuclear warheads. The Soviets had on the order of three hundred. I believed and President Kennedy believed there was no way we could launch our five thousand against their three hundred, and destroy so many that uh, a sufficient number of Soviet weapons would not survive to inflict unacceptable damage on us. And therefore we were in a, in a very real sense uh, disarmed as far as the nuclear weapons were concerned. Except, that ours of course uh, deterred them from using theirs. But the great danger was that while we couldn't uh, use them according to any plan, the great danger was that in the event of conflict uh, as nearly came about... on the soil in Cuba, that there would be unauthorized use of such weapons which could, could literally uh, inflict unacceptable damage on this country. That's what we faced uh, during the uh, final days of Cuba. And it was that lesson that I think uh, stimulated the interest we already had in reducing the risk of nuclear war.

WHAT YOU SEEM TO BE SAYING, AND IF SO, I WONDER IF YOU COULD SAY IT — IS THAT EVEN THOUGH UNITED STATES HAD WHAT? TWENTY TO ONE?

Seventeen.

ALL RIGHT. SEVENTEEN TO ONE SUPERIORITY AT THAT STAGE, THAT YOU WERE NOT ONLY DEFERRED FROM ANY CONSIDERATION OF USING YOUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. YOU WERE EVEN DETERRED FROM A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN YOUR OWN BACK YARD.

No. I, I, that's...

YOU WEREN'T SAYING THAT. OKAY.

We were deterred from a conventional war by the risk of, of uh, conventional war elsewhere in the world and, and of the...

NO. BUT YOU WERE SAYING THAT THERE WAS A GRAVE RISK. HAD YOU GONE FOR THE CONVENTIONAL OPTION OF TAKING OUT THOSE MISSILES

Oh, oh. Yes. If that's what you're saying Yes.

YEAH.

You're absolutely right.

YEAH,

You're absolutely right

IS THERE ANY WAY THAT YOU COULD SAY THAT, AT LEAST IF YOU COULD SAY THAT EVEN AT THAT TIME...

There were, there were other reasons. I had...

WELL LEAVING THAT ASIDE THEN, IF YOU COULD JUST GO BACK TO THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. IF YOU COULD JUST SIMPLY SAY FOR US THAT THE MESSAGE WAS THAT EVEN WITH THAT TREMENDOUS SUPERIORITY YOU FELT YOURSELVES DETERRED BECAUSE OF THE DAMAGE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED.

We were deterred from initiating use of nuclear weapons,

COULD YOU JUST GIVE US A STATEMENT?

Even with the tremendous superiority that we had in nuclear weapons at the time of Cuba, the ratio some 17-to-1 in superiority in strategic offensive nuclear weapons, we were deterred from initiating their use by the recognition that there was a great danger with the, we would uh, lose uh, several million Americans. No President, no Secretary of Defense that I wish to respect uh, would expose their nation to that. And neither Kennedy nor I were willing to do so.

AND WHAT GENERAL CONCLUSION WOULD YOU DRAW FROM THAT SITUATION?

The conclusion I draw is that uh, nuclear weapons in the nuclear age when uh, one's opponent has several thousand are absolutely necessary to deter one's opponents from their use. But beyond that they have very, very little uh, nu... military utility.

AND YOU DON'T BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE OF THE TREMENDOUS SUPERIORITY THAT YOU HAD AT THAT TIME, THAT'S WHAT FINALLY MADE KHRUSHCHEV BACK OFF, AND HE MIGHT NOT TODAY.

I am almost certain that it was not our nuclear superiority that uh, led him to back off.

WHAT WAS IT?

It was the fact that we had uh... a conventional superiority in that region. We did have the capability to uh, quarantine or blockade uh, Cuba indefinitely.

YOU WERE AFTER THE LATTER OF WHAT? FOUR OR FIVE YEARS AT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT. UNITED STATES WAS GETTING EMBROILED IN THIS MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WAR, EASILY THE MOST POWERFUL NUCLEAR POWER IN THE WORLD. AND YET IN THE END IT WAS TO LOSE THAT WAR. DID THAT TEACH YOU ANYTHING? DO YOU DRAW ANY LESSONS AT ALL ABOUT NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE?

Vietnam had, Vietnam was a tragedy, but it had uh, very little to do with the evolution of our thinking with respect to nuclear weapons. At no time did we think uh, there was any possible uh, use for nuclear weapons in connection with Vietnam.

BUT DIDN'T THAT IN ITSELF, PERHAPS EVEN IF IT DIDN'T CHANGE YOUR THINKING, DID IT NOT PROVE SOMETHING ABOUT...

No. I, I think that uh, Vietnam was, was uh, so unusual a case in relation to the uh... the cases for which the nuclear weapons have been procured. That is to say East-West confrontation in areas such as Western Europe, that it had no effect on the evolution of doctrine relating to the use of nuclear weapons.

BUT IS IT NOT THE CASE THAT BACK IN THE EARLY FIFTIES WHEN JOHN FOSTER DULLES WAS DENUNCIATED, THE MASSIVE RETALIATION IDEAS, I MEAN IT WAS SPECIFICALLY TO STOP SOVIET AGGRESSION IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD.

I think that... at times US Presidents or US Secretaries faced uh, in mid-fifties, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had threatened or implied that nuclear weapons would be used in peripheral areas, areas outside of uh, Europe. Uh, I'm not at all sure that uh, the words were ever backed up by specific plans for such use. I hope not. I would not wish to see that done. Then, I wouldn't have wanted to see it done in the fifties. I don't want to see it done today.

WAS THERE ANY SENSE IN WHICH THE GROWING INVOLVEMENT OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IN VIETNAM MEANT THAT YOU JUST DIDN'T HAVE TIME OR ABILITY TO FOLLOW THROUGH IN OTHER AREAS?

No. It, the Vietnam conflict as I've suggested uh, was a serious tragedy but it did not prevent us from uh, fulfilling our security obligations elsewhere in the world or for taking count of the uh, security needs and strategic uh, needs in those situations.

LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE. SOME PEOPLE SUGGESTED THAT YOUR EFFORTS IN THE SIXTIES WERE TO ESTABLISH A SECURE, INVULNERABLE SECOND STRIKE FORCE FOR THE UNITED STATES, ONE THAT WAS STABLE AND ONE THAT COULD ALWAYS STRIKE BACK AGAINST ANY ATTACK ON UNITED STATES. TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE TRIDENT MISSILE SYSTEM AND TO WHAT EXTENT IS IT NOT SIMPLY AN EXTENSION OF THAT EFFORT?

One can't deal with one system and say it's good or bad. One has to examine the system in the context of the total strategic plan. In the sixties we sought to uh, develop a, an invulnerable uh, retaliatory force and make very clear to the Soviets that it was both invulnerable and a retaliatory force. The opposite to that would have been a vulnerable first strike force, or to give the appearance that we were developing that. Today, uh, they, they...say that they uh...

I'M SORRY. I'M GOING TO HAVE TO STOP YOU. IF YOU COULD JUST PICK UP WHERE YOU STARTED.

One can't uh, look at a particular system such as the Trident and say in isolation from all other systems, the strategy that it is to support, it is either good or bad. One has to look at the strategy. One has to look at the uh, uh, appearance that one is conveying to one's potential opponent. And the appearance we wanted to convey in the sixties and...the appearance I think we should convey today is that we have an invulnerable retaliatory force. It is not a vulnerable first strike force. Because if the Soviets feel we have a vulnerable first-strike force that creates what I call crisis instability. In the event of a military confrontation they will be fearful that since our force is vulnerable, uh, we will plan to use it before they hit us. And since it gives the appearance of being a first-strike force, the capability of destroying their force, that we also plan to use it before they strike us. The incentive to them therefore is to preempt, to strike us before we launch. That creates the danger.

BUT...

The... In the sixties because we had such a tremendous numerical superiority and because there had been talk among senior US military or civilian officials of first-strike capabilities, the Soviets feared it. To a considerable degree they fear it today. And they look upon the combination of the MX uh, ten warheaded launcher placed in vulnerable holes, holes that we consider vulnerable, have said are vulnerable; plus the Trident which is a very accurate invulnerable weapon; plus the strategic defense initiative which they look upon as a leaky defense, of value to us only in association with a first-strike capability. They look upon all this as possibly conveying the decision to develop a first-strike. That is very dangerous... very dangerous. It creates crisis instability.

BUT SPEAKING SPECIFICALLY OF TRIDENT, WHAT IS IT THAT UPSETS YOU ABOUT TRIDENT?

I, I, I'm not upset by Trident. Uh, the Soviet's are upset by it in combination with the other actions.

BUT WHAT I'M TRYING TO GET AT IS IF YOU COULD SAY THOSE TWO ELEMENTS TO A SYSTEM —

No. I don't want to... At this point,

NO.

It isn't Trident as a weapon, as a...

BUT I MEAN WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRIDENT AND ITS PREDECESSORS? IS THERE ONE?

It's in the combination of the MX, the SDI, the other things all...

SURELY THE TRIDENT IS MORE ACCURATE.

Yeah, but if you had just Trident alone and you didn't have the MX and didn't have these, they wouldn't care about it. Anyhow there's an easy way out of the Trident thing. Uh, we're concerned about their SS-18. We're... They're concerned about the Trident. We... We're not concerned about the SS-18 by itself. We're concerned about it in relation to other actions that could convey a first-strike capability. Uh...

LET'S JUST STOP IT HERE BECAUSE...

...want to do is, uh, uh, in the, in the case of Reykjavik what we really want is, what we should want and I think do want is a first phase of a fifty percent cut. But more important than the fifty percent cut is a restructuring of force, the so-called sublimits that will cut back their S-18, SS-18s. Therefore reduce the vulnerability of our minutemen and the price we pay is to give up the Trident or a portion of it, which is what they look upon, not the Trident per se but the Trident in relation to the MXs and these other things as part of what they fear as our first-strike capability. So I don't want to focus on one weapon per se. That's not the way to...

OKAY. IF YOU COULD STOP THE TAPE A SECOND.

It's a combination of that Trident with all these other things; MIRVs uh, MXs uh, etcetera that causes the problem.

LET ME ASK YOU A DIFFERENT QUESTION THAT MIGHT GET AT THE SAME THING. WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE VIRTUES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE TREMENDOUS IMPROVEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN ATTAINED IN THE ACCURACY OF INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES OVER THE LAST TWENTY YEARS?

Well I find it very difficult to conceive uh, military uses for, for uh, highly accurate weapons against what are called counterforce targets. Uh, there is a school of thought that believes we should have the Trident or some other missile of that kind in order to be able to destroy uh, the hardened uh, Soviet missile sites. Oh, I can't conceive of that. Uh, we're not going to launch first. I'm positive of that. No, no President, no Secretary of Defense in the last uh, 35 years has supported a first-strike strategy. Therefore presumably uh, this highly accurate missile to be launched against uh, Soviet missile sites uh, would be launched after the missiles have left those sites. I find it very difficult to conceive of why we need it for that purpose. Alternatively some would say, "Well, uh, perhaps the Soviets would have launched only half of their weapons and half would be left in their holes. And we need it for that purpose." I can't conceive of fighting in a, a war under those circumstances. It's beyond the human ability uh, to, to control uh, nuclear operations in that situation. My God! We saw what happened in Chernobyl. That was a, just a... a minor uh, uh, explosion of a civilian reactor. Imagine what we would be facing if we had uh, a thousand, say half of uh, of their uh, highly accurate uh, warheads detonating on our soil, what it would do to our communications, what it would do to life in this, in this nation and uh, why under that circumstances we would think it made any difference, uh, whether we had a weapon that would destroy a thousand of their uh, remaining missiles or not.

BUT YOU DID YOURSELF IN THE INITIAL YEARS AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ARGUE STRONGLY THAT IF DETERRENCE FAILS IT'S BETTER FOR US TO HAVE ACCURATE WEAPONS GOING FOR MILITARY TARGETS THAN FOR US TO HIT CITIES...

I did indeed, but that was at a time when they had a hundred or two hundred uh, warheads compared to our uh, uh, four or five thousand. What we were seeking to do was in that rather limited period of years before they caught up with us, or came anywhere close to catching up with us to ensure that if uh, nuclear operations were ever to start when we had that tremendous numerical advantage that neither one of us would launch all of our force. And the way to, to uh... to uh, try to increase the likelihood that that would be the, the way in which those warheads would be used, we said, "Let's... s-suggest that we target these forces on military forces only."

BUT...

But that was what was known as the uh, the limited counterforce.

BUT YOU COULDN'T REALLY ACHIEVE THAT WITH THE WEAPONS THAT WERE AVAILABLE THEN. YOU COULD ACHIEVE IT MUCH BETTER WITH WEAPONS THAT ARE AVAILABLE NOW.

We could achieve it to a considerable degree then. We could target on uh, bomber airfields for example. They had very, very few missiles at that time. And the missiles they had were what were known as soft and highly vulnerable so we didn't need uh, the accurate uh, accuracy that we need today to attack their hardened missile sights.

I JUST WANT TO ASK YOU ONCE MORE VERY BRIEFLY WHAT IS WRONG WITH HAVING A FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY? WHAT IS WRONG WITH BEING ABLE IF YOU THINK WAR IS INEVITABLE FROM DRASTICALLY LIMITING THE DAMAGE TO YOUR OWN PEOPLE BY GOING FIRST...

There's no significant difference in the damage that would accrue to us from launching our strategic offensive nuclear force of some uh, eleven thousand warheads in a first-strike or absorbing the first-strike and launching those that survive in a second strike. The damage to this country would be the same. Uh, approximately the same of these set of circumstances. What one needs to do is avoid ever launching either one of those. And when you launch first you are for certain going to have a retaliatory strike. If you don't launch first you may have no strike. That's what we should seek to achieve.