Interviewer: MR.
Interviewer: MORI, IF I COULD ASK YOU FIRST TO DESCRIBE THE ORIGINS AND GOALS OF JAPAN'S EARLY ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM.
Mori: In December 4, 1953, President Eisenhower made a declaration for "Atoms for Peace," displaying extremely high ideals.
Mori: This impressed the Japanese people greatly.
Mori: But at that time, as far as the Japanese people were concerned, the only atomic experience that they had was from the military use of atomic energy.
Mori: The greatest fear was of course, there were doubts about safety, was whether would be drawn into the arms race of the countries possessing nuclear weapons at that time.
Mori: We wondered whether it was really possible to use nuclear energy peacefully without getting involved.
Mori: There were large meetings and big discussions over this point.
Mori: The result was for the basics of nuclear energy to be established and to introduce the development of nuclear energy.
Mori: After these principles of nuclear energy were established, we wanted the development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy to benefit all the Japanese people and not Just a small group, so we wanted by all means that the Japanese Atomic Energy Council have members from all political persuasions.
Mori: Also, in this Atomic Industrial Forum, we assemble and exchange opinions on how atomic energy can be developed rationally and safely for the benefit of the Japanese people.
Mori: So we have constructed a system fitting our ideals.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS YOUR OWN DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THESE EARLY DAYS? HOW WERE YOU INVOLVED WITH THIS PROGRAM?
Mori: I was still young and like you, a journalist at the time, discussing the problems of nuclear energy, commenting on them.
Mori: And a group of young scholars like myself, gathered from the whole country.
Mori: We discussed that if Japan had to develop nuclear energy, what conditions were necessary to place on its development? As a result of these discussions, the Japanese Three Non-Nuclear Principles were established.
Interviewer: HOW DID JAPAN BENEFIT FROM FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN THE EARLY DAYS OF ITS NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM?
Mori: This was completely the age of America.
Mori: America was central, America and England contributed nearly all of the technological information and also took in foreign students.
Mori: So that in the first ten years, the fact that peaceful nuclear energy was developed in Japan was entirely due to our reliance on the help of the progressive countries of America and England.
Interviewer: WAS THIS COOPERATION IMPORTANT FOR JAPAN?
Mori: Yes it was important.
Mori: However, this cooperation had strings attached.
Mori: There were many conditions attached, in order to prevent connections with military use.
Mori: There was great anxiety on this point.
Mori: But the help was extremely useful, and it extended to all respects.
Interviewer: HOW WAS BRITAIN IMPORTANT IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE PROGRAM?
Mori: At first it was just a bit
Interviewer: I'M SORRY TO INTERRUPT YOU, LET'S DO BRITAIN AND AMERICA, TOGETHER.
Mori: No, no, no, no...although England contributed a bit, on the whole it was nearly all due to the Americans.
Interviewer: WELL THEN, IF YOU CAN JUST TELL ME WHAT THE BRITISH COOPERATION WAS.
Mori: Well, from England there was the training of foreign students the same as the present, and concerning the nuclear production of electrical power...at most, this was very productive, and at least there were many useful discussions.
Mori: This was the kind of cooperation we had.
Interviewer: WAS THERE ANY RESISTANCE TO THE NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM IN THOSE DAYS? DO YOU REMEMBER ANY RESISTANCE AT THAT TIME?
Mori: At least during the first ten years, the Japanese people seemed to have no worries about the safety of nuclear power.
Mori: The only concern was about its military use, in particular it would be linked to foreign countries who would attempt to use it for military purposes.
Mori: In order to reaffirm that this would not happen, all sorts of legal plans were passed unanimously in the Diet, supported by the Socialist Party and the Communist Party as well.
Interviewer: IS IT POSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN THE KIND OF RESISTANCE RATHER THAN HOW YOU ACTUALLY DEALT WITH THE RESISTANCE?
Mori: Since Japan set legal conditions against being connected with the military use of nuclear power, so the Nuclear Council believed that as long as it did not violate these principles there would be no problem...there was not that much resistance to nuclear power, to nuclear generation of electricity.
Mori: The entire country welcomed nuclear power, the nuclear generation of electricity.
Mori: The Diet passed the laws and the budget unanimously, in the first decade.
Mori: There was not that much resistance.
Mori: There was some concern, but it was just on that one point.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS YOUR VISION FOR THE FUTURE AT THIS TIME, HOW DID YOU SEE THE FUTURE OF THE JAPANESE NUCLEAR PROGRAM?
Mori: At that time, we were a bit too optimistic.
Mori: This was because Eisenhower's proclamation was very rosy-colored.
Mori: The nuclear production of electricity would soon be economical, so that it could be used by everyone, if America would just help out a bit, just like with other forms of technology, if America would just help out a bit, we could easily start producing it domestically and it would become economical.
Mori: I think that we were a bit too optimistic.
Interviewer: WE ARE NOW GOING TO TALK ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.
Interviewer: THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEBATE OVER THE NPT IN JAPAN, YOUR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT?
Mori: This policy was positively advanced by former President Carter.
Mori: Then the IAA was organized, the guarantee ability and government contents were gradually clarified.
Mori: There came to be a concern that it would become a great handicap to a country like Japan, which was only using atomic energy peacefully.
Mori: I think that it was at this time that an inspector from the IAA came to the nuclear power plant at three o'clock in the morning, pounded on the door and said in a loud voice, "Open up for inspection." There were incidents like this as well.
Mori: We wondered why there had to be so much trouble for our country that was only using nuclear power for peaceful purposes.
Mori: At this time with regard to proliferation itself , the IAA was extremely strong, so we requested and advised that these incidents should not occur.
Mori: This was the first.
Mori: This was extremely important.
Mori: From Japan's point of view...
Interviewer: JUST A SECOND.
Mori: From Japan's point of view, the most important aim was the banning of nuclear weapons.
Mori: This was the initial condition of nuclear power in Japan, held by the government, the masses and we working for the peaceful use of nuclear power.
Mori: But on the whole, even though NPT was born as a step toward this aim...
Mori: we felt a strong resistance.
Mori: This was because we began to worry that it would be a great blow to countries using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Interviewer: WHAT WERE THE CONCERNS OF THE JAPANESE INDUSTRY, THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY, AT THE TIME OF THE DEBATE?
Mori: In general, the concern was whether or not it would injure countries using nuclear power peacefully.
Mori: Whether it would handicap countries only using nuclear power peacefully.
Mori: This one point.
Interviewer: DID THE JAPANESE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE NPT AND WHAT KIND OF RESERVATIONS WERE THOSE?
Mori: Clearly, this was based on the premises of completely prohibiting atmospheric nuclear testing, and the production of nuclear weapons, and as long as it did not harm countries using nuclear power peacefully, with this one condition, the Japanese government, and the Japanese people were more or less in agreement.
Mori: Of course the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were established to ban the production of nuclear weapons we were not opposed to an organizing of this on an international level.
Mori: But if the NPT was ratified, it would give special rights only to countries possessing nuclear weapons, which would be a handicap for countries using nuclear power peacefully.
Mori: Concretely speaking, there was the problem of safeguards, IAA's safeguards, and as I said before, one day, I think that it was in the 1960s, one day, this was before the NPT, in the middle of the night, three o'clock in the morning, an inspector suddenly knocked on the door and said that there was an inspection.
Mori: This was a very upsetting incident.
Mori: Japan itself has absolutely no intention of producing nuclear weapons.
Mori: And it intends to cooperate as much as possible with the comprehensive banning of nuclear weapons.
Mori: Why must Japan have these special burdens? This produced a strong feeling of resistance not only among producers but in the Japanese people as well.
Interviewer: CAN YOU EXPLAIN TO ME WHY...I'M SORRY...
Interviewer: WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE 1970s NOW, WE'VE MOVED TO THE 1970s.
Interviewer: I'D LIKE TO KNOW WHY NUCLEAR ENERGY WAS SO CRITICAL TO JAPAN IN THE EARLY 1970s, AND WHAT EFFECT THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO HAD ON JAPAN? IF YOU COULD MAKE THIS AS BRIEF AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE I KNOW THAT IT IS A BIG AREA.
Mori: Well, in terms of energy sources, since Japan itself has almost no sources of oil or coal, in all respects, the problem of oil and foreign sources of energy is extremely important.
Mori: So that after the we had been through the unfortunate experience of the atom bomb, if the immense power of the atom could be harnessed for peaceful purposes, how wonderful it would be.
Mori: We were drawn by this dream.
Mori: We had great hopes that if this could be used peacefully we would have a stable source of energy in the future, and if technology was handled properly, a clean source of energy as well.
Mori: We had great expectations.
Mori: Of course the results were somewhat different.
Mori: Of course there was a great influence...1973 was the start.
Interviewer: WHAT IMPACT DID THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO HAVE ON JAPAN?
Mori: Well, this is difficult to say, but first the price jumped up more than tenfold, then there were supply problems which resulted in great disorder.
Mori: But after that, with Japan's effort, with the increase in nuclear energy, reduction in use of oil, and various technical means and changes by the Japanese people...
Mori: they say that we were the first to get over it.
Mori: But the stimulus was probably the strongest for the Japanese.
Interviewer: IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES, THE NUCLEAR MARKETPLACE CHANGED.
Interviewer: THE AMERICAN EXPORT POLICY DECLINED, EXPORTS DECLINED OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT, AS I UNDERSTAND.
Interviewer: AND THE FRENCH BECAME MORE IMPORTANT AS NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS.
Interviewer: CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT HOW THE FRENCH GOT INVOLVED IN THE JAPANESE PROGRAM OF REPROCESSING FROM SGN, CAN YOU JUST EXPLAIN THE KIND OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND HOW IT CHANGED IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES?
Mori: Well, by the beginning of the Seventies, Japan's nuclear production had been working for fifteen years and had reached a state where it could produce nuclear energy on its own.
Mori: At the same time that the demand for nuclear energy increased as a result of the increase in the price of petroleum, concern greatly increased about the safety of nuclear energy and environmental problems.
Mori: In some ways this came from the United States, the arguments came from the United States, but in any case, opposition to nuclear energy grew stronger.
Mori: Then, like now, in America itself there were problems developing with the nuclear production of electricity.
Mori: So at the same time, pluses and minuses of nuclear energy appeared, in this period from 1973 to about 1980.
Mori: So the nuclear energy from America had its accounts blocked and dropped to under 50 percent.
Mori: But nuclear energy was still very important.
Mori: It was a very troubling state.
Mori: There was a movement that said that it was bad to depend entirely on nuclear technology imported from America, and that Japan had to become self-reliant.
Mori: At the same time, there was concern about the supply of nuclear fuel and its handling, and positive policies of cooperation with foreign countries beginning with France began.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF ALL THIS?
Mori: We realized that it was bad to depend completely on America for nuclear technology and that it was necessary for Japan to solve its own technical problems of nuclear energy.
Mori: We completely reexamined the problem and worked to replace the nuclear energy technology with Japanese produced technology, working to raise its capability and operation.
Mori: But at the same time, we had to begin thinking about the problem of the supply of atomic fuel.
Mori: In this regard, France made an offer to cooperate positively in this regard.
Mori: I myself was very involved in this problem individually.
Mori: Of course at the time, to some extent, public opinion questioned the necessity of cooperation with France.
Mori: America said that with regard to atomic fuel, if you were going to work you should quit and work directly for the French.
Mori: I received such an order.
Interviewer: HOW MUCH TAPE HAVE WE GOT? AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME, JAPAN WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN THE ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY AND THERE WAS A LOT OF CONCERN IN AMERICA BECAUSE OF PLUTONIUM, THERE WAS AN ANTI-PLUTONIUM LOBBY, WHAT WAS YOUR POINT OF VIEW ABOUT THIS AT THE TIME, WHY DID JAPAN NEED ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING?
Mori: Since, in general, nuclear energy is energy produced by equipment, it is natural for Japan to have all the technology connected with it produced in Japan.
Mori: There is not too much point in saying whether this is good or bad.
Mori: Japan had great pride in being the purest country with respect to nuclear weapons.
Mori: Whenever America says such a thing, there is a public debate about why America is interfering with Japan.
Mori: Why, when this country has gone to such efforts to make sure that it will not produce nuclear weapons, why with regard to such vital energy is America interfering? They come to have a strong feeling of resistance.
Mori: This is a very important point that I would like you to understand.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS JAPAN'S VIEW ABOUT LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP AND ITS AIMS?
Mori: As a means toward advancing non-proliferation, and advancing nuclear production, and as a responsibility of the countries possessing nuclear technology, Japan believes that in this regard that to hold these standards together is very important, and that Japan must follow this as well.
Interviewer: WHAT DID YOU THINK THE INFCE ACCOMPLISHED?
Mori: Well, since an international consensus was reached on the quantities of nuclear fuel in the nuclear fuel cycle necessary for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, this was a great achievement.
Mori: It's too much, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is just one step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, it goes a bit too far, however.
Mori: The countries that participate in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, prepare an international foundation for the rationalization of nuclear energy.
Mori: This is what I think it is.
Interviewer: WAS THERE A CONCERN IN JAPAN AT THIS POINT ABOUT THE STOCKPILING OF PLUTONIUM? DID JAPAN SHARE THE US'S CONCERN ABOUT PROLIFERATION AT THIS POINT?
Mori: There was reason for the United States to be concerned, but for Japan...
Mori: well, since Japan has absolutely no intention of using nuclear energy for military purposes...The Japanese people themselves did not worry too much.
Mori: But whether Japan's common feeling that it is a uniquely pure country will be understood elsewhere in the world is something that I worry about.
Mori: If one speaks about the common feeling within Japan, I don't think that there was that much concern.
Mori: But since the United States was worried, other countries were worried, so Japan began to institute protections in order to ease their concern.
Mori: Of course we intend to carry them out adequately.
Interviewer: IS IT TRUE TO SAY THAT AT THIS TIME — THIS IS IN THE MID-SEVENTIES — THAT JAPAN, LIKE A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, HAD THE CAPABILITY TO MANUFACTURE A BOMB?
Mori: Perhaps...
Mori: It may be so...
Mori: It might be, I think...
Interviewer: IF YOU CAN AGAIN JUST REITERATE THAT JAPAN WASN'T INTERESTED IN MAKING A ...
Mori: Not at all.
Mori: So, I think that there was no relationship to whether Japan had the capability or not.
Interviewer: LET'S JUST START AGAIN.
Mori: So I think that they are probably capable, any number of countries, of producing a bomb if they want to.
Mori: Japan has absolutely no intention of making atomic bombs, however.
Interviewer: IN 1974 THE INDIANS EXPLODED A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVICE.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT NEWS AND WERE YOU CONCERNED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD FOLLOW SUIT?
Mori: Well, for Japan, India is a very distant country in a number of ways, so that I don't think that there was any particular influence.
Mori: In terms of international diplomacy there was some effect, but I don't think that the effect was that great.
Interviewer: THE CIA PUBLISHED A REPORT IN 1974 AND SAID THAT JAPAN WAS AMONG SOME OF THE COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT GO AHEAD WITH A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.
Interviewer: THIS WAS IN '74.
Interviewer: ONE MORE TIME, IF YOU COULD PUT IT INTO THE CONTEXT OF THE 1970s, DID THIS SEEM A POSSIBILITY AT THE TIME?
Mori: Not at all.
Mori: This is a complete misinterpretation.
Mori: I've already said this, but why is there such a great misunderstanding when there is such a close relationship between our countries? I don't understand this at all.
Interviewer: WOULD YOU LIKE TO START? WE WERE DISCUSSING THE CIA REPORT.
Mori: Yes, I finished the answer.
Interviewer: THE CIA REPORT SAID THAT JAPAN MAY GO AHEAD, HAD THE CAPABILITY, MAY GO AHEAD WITH THE PROGRAM.
Interviewer: WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT?
Mori: At that time, I saw that report, but why, when Japan and America are so closely related was there so great a misunderstanding? I couldn't understand that at all.
Interviewer: MARK THAT ONE TWO, BOTH OF THESE, OK? OVERALL, DID YOU SUPPORT PRESIDENT CARTER'S NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES? YOU MENTIONED, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT, DID YOU SUPPORT THESE POLICIES?
Mori: I think that President Carter had the ideal of working toward abolishing nuclear weapons.
Mori: I fundamentally agreed with using NPT as a step toward that goal.
Mori: But what he did, his method was completely wrong.
Mori: This includes his policy toward Japan, totally wrong.
Mori: So that I don't necessarily believe that this was the best policy.
Interviewer: WHAT EFFECT DID THE CARTER NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT HAVE ON THE JAPANESE NUCLEAR PROGRAM?
Mori: This had some rather ironic results.
Mori: We came to believe that we had to handle nuclear energy ourselves, and that it was wrong to depend on a foreign country, foreign technology for this very important source of energy.
Mori: For Japan this is the most important source of energy, and in order to carry on in the future, it is necessary for us to do it ourselves.
Mori: That this was the feeling that resulted was a very ironic result.
Mori: For thirty years, Japan had already determined itself that it would not produce nuclear weapons, and that will not change in the future.
Mori: It is totally unrelated to that.
Mori: I think that this is a rather ironic result.
Mori: Maybe the Americans cannot understand this human psychology of wanting to do something when it is forbidden.
Mori: It is like a poor person wanting to work, but being told that he doesn't need to work because he will have money in the future, coming to want to work.
Interviewer: ALSO DID YOU FEEL THAT JAPAN HAD ALREADY SIGNED NPT, SO WHY WAS IT NECESSARY TO SIGN NPA AS WELL? WAS THERE SOME RESISTANCE ALSO BECAUSE NPT WAS ENOUGH?
Mori: It took extremely long from the time it was signed until the time it was ratified.
Mori: As I said before, there are all kinds of people in Japan, and there are politicians who questioned whether we should discard the option of possessing nuclear weapons or not.
Mori: Of course, they are extremely few, not even one percent, but they aren't totally absent.
Mori: But the cause of the delay was really this questioning of why a pure country like Japan had to be restrained by NPT.
Mori: It took time to calm the feelings of the Japanese people.
Interviewer: HOW DID JAPAN RESPOND TO THIS NNPA BEARING IN MIND THAT SHE WAS ALREADY A SIGNATORY TO NPT?
Mori: NNPA was just inside America, a law that America insisted on itself.
Mori: But from the standpoint of the cooperative relationship between Japan and America, there were all sorts of influences on Japan.
Mori: Japan may have been a bit too indulgent toward America.
Mori: But NNPA was not necessarily created by America to include Japan, and it was presented in such a way as to minimize the damage to Japan, the leaders of the American government understood the Japanese position on this point fairly well, and probably tried to ease the situation as much as possible within the limits of the law itself.
Interviewer: DID YOU SHARE THE EUROPEAN CONCERNS THAT YOU HAD ALREADY SIGNED NPT THEREFORE WHY NECESSARY TO ALSO HAVE NNPA? DID YOU SHARE THEIR CONCERNS?
Mori: Of course we shared the exact same concerns, however, since this was something that was pushed by America alone, to speak harshly, this was a problem that even reduced the number of countries cooperating with the United States.
Mori: I don't think that it was good for America.
Interviewer: WE'LL DO TWO QUESTIONS NOW, AND I'LL JUST GO STRAIGHT ON.
Interviewer: DO YOU THINK THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SUCCEEDED IN CONTROLLING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION? IN OTHER WORDS DID YOU AGREE WITH HIS VIEW THAT YOU COULD STOP A COUNTRY DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF YOU STOP THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.
Mori: Well, it was about a fifty percent success.
Mori: But as for the remaining fifty percent, since Carter insisted on being too restrictive, many countries that originally were not interested in nuclear weapons or the technology being forbidden started to be interested.
Mori: This was a minus.
Interviewer: HOW HAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POLICY BEEN DIFFERENT? HAS IT AFFECTED JAPAN IN A DIFFERENT WAY?
Mori: I don't think that the policy has fundamentally changed.
Mori: Just the way of managing it has changed, but it hasn't changed fundamentally.
Mori: But basically, it is much easier to discuss things.
Mori: Reagan starts discussing with the assumption that nuclear energy is necessary.
Mori: For Carter, nuclear energy was a last resort, our last choice.
Mori: He started talking with the assumption that nuclear energy was not all that necessary.
Mori: It is very easy to discuss these things with President Reagan.
Interviewer: ARE YOU CONCERNED TODAY ABOUT THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THAT HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND WHICH OF THOSE COUNTRIES MOST CONCERN YOU?
Mori: Of course I am concerned, but Japan doesn't collect much information on this directly.
Mori: We get America's judgments on these things, "we are worried about such-and-such a country" or "it looks like an atomic bomb is being made in a certain country," through things like CIA reports.
Mori: This is the only way we know.
Mori: However, since Japan itself is concerned about fallout from nuclear weapons, we are worried about the existence of such countries.
Mori: I think that we should be a bit more concerned about this situation.
Interviewer: WHY DO YOU THINK THAT IT IS NOT A MAJOR CONCERN?
Mori: This is a very important characteristic of Japan that I would like you to understand.
Mori: If one is going to be concerned about this problem, some sort of counter-measures are necessary.
Mori: But Japan doesn't have military forces itself and is living as a peaceful nation only.
Mori: So since the influence will be indirect, the concern is indirect as well.
Interviewer: TO WHAT EXTENT IS JAPAN DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TODAY WITH HER NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND IS THIS LIKELY TO CHANGE? AS I UNDERSTAND IT, JAPAN HAS BECOME MORE SELF-RELIANT AND I WONDERED IF YOU COULD EXPLAIN THAT?
Mori: We have become self reliant to some degree, but nuclear energy is essentially something that goes beyond national boundaries, and is a technology that is related to the world.
Mori: It would not be good for Japan to try to get along just on its own.
Mori: Especially in case of nuclear accident, Chernobyl is the biggest example of this.
Mori: Instead, we must be aware of the impact on the countries around Japan, work cooperatively, and cooperate over technology.
Mori: Recently we have started to try to have a large conference to set guidelines for this.
Interviewer: WHICH COUNTRIES ARE COOPERATING IN THE CURRENT PROGRAM AND HOW?
Mori: The countries cooperating are the countries of Europe and America.
Mori: Then the countries working with Japan include China, Indonesia...
Mori: some countries like that, the so-called LDC.
Interviewer: THIS QUESTION ABOUT JAPAN HAVING THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, WHAT DOES IT MEAN, WHAT DOES NUCLEAR CAPABILITY MEAN? DOES IT MEAN THAT A COUNTRY CAN BUILD A BOMB?
Mori: Japan's capabilities are only in terms of peaceful use, there is no relationship to military use.
Mori: In other words, the way that the people of different countries of the world think is different.
Mori: So if one thinks that if one, if America sets a condition against building bombs, Japan won't build bombs, this is an American way of thinking, Japan does not build bombs.
Mori: But if Japan's nuclear energy program had the faintest hint of military use about it, in the next day or two it would be completely stopped by mass demonstrations.
Mori: This is absolutely clear.
Mori: There is no chance of military use occurring.
Interviewer: PEOPLE ARE ALWAYS SPECULATING ABOUT HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE JAPAN TO BUILD A BOMB.
Interviewer: POLITICS ASIDE, SCIENTIFICALLY, WHAT IS THE ANSWER TO THAT?
Mori: What is that question? How long it would take?...
Mori: I've never thought about it,...
Mori: never investigated it...
Mori: I know that it is important, but if one has never been robbed, then if one is asked how much time it would take a robber to take your money is unanswerable.
Interviewer: HOW DO YOU ENVISAGE THE NEXT TEN YEARS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, WHAT DO YOU THINK IS GOING TO HAPPEN, PARTICULARLY FOR JAPAN?
Mori: Now nuclear generated electricity is the largest part of Japan's electrical supply.
Mori: For over ten years now, about forty percent of Japan's electrical supply is nuclear generated.
Mori: So in the future, as America has been concerned, the amount of plutonium enrichment is likely to increase.
Mori: But, after all, America has its own sources of energy while Japan has none.
Mori: There is a difference of about a hundred years in existing supplies.
Mori: The human race will not be able to go on for millions of years.
Mori: There is probably only a hundred year difference in supply in terms of which country will run out of energy first....if nuclear energy is not used peacefully, the human race will have no future.
Interviewer: ARE YOU CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORISTS HAVING ACCESSIBILITY TO...
Mori: Japan is an extremely peaceful nation and this danger is much less than in other countries.
Mori: But one must be careful, nonetheless.
Interviewer: FINALLY, PEOPLE CRITICIZE FAST BREEDERS BECAUSE OF THEIR PROLIFERATION RISK.
Interviewer: DO YOU THINK THAT THEIR WORRIES ARE JUSTIFIED?
Mori: Where people?
Interviewer: I'M SORRY, IN AMERICA PRIMARILY, AND IN BRITAIN.
Interviewer: DO YOU THINK THAT THEIR FEARS ARE JUSTIFIED, JAPAN IS EMBARKING ON A FAST BREEDER PROGRAM? COULD YOU EXPLAIN?
Mori: Fast breeders are a technology that increases the capacity by a hundredfold, and so historical circumstances make it absolutely necessary to use them.
Mori: So it is important not to use them in such a way as to influence proliferation.
Mori: But it is almost unthinkable not to use them.
Mori: It is bad to have nuclear weapons not fast breeders.
Interviewer: DO YOU AGREE THAT IF A COUNTRY WANTS TO BUILD A BOMB IT WILL DO SO REGARDLESS?
Mori: If a country has a certain level of technology that may be so...
Mori: but they need the motivation.
Mori: The motivation is the important thing.
Mori: I suppose that they could build some sort of bomb...
Interviewer: IN OTHER WORDS IT IS A POLITICAL ISSUE AND NOT A TECHNICAL ISSUE, WOULD YOU COMMENT ON THAT?
Mori: The problem of proliferation is a political one and not a technical one.
Mori: So one cannot use the issue of non-proliferation in order to stop technical progress and one shouldn't do it.
Interviewer: THIS IS OUR LAST QUESTION, AND UNFORTUNATELY IT IS THE EARLIEST THING I ASKED YOU, SO NOW WE HAVE TO FOCUS ON 1958 AGAIN.
Interviewer: IF YOU COULD TRY NOT TO SAY, "AS I SAID BEFORE" SINCE WE MAY NOT USE THE EARLIER TAPE...THIS IS A RETAKE...
Interviewer: IF YOU CAN TELL ME ABOUT THE EARLY DAYS, THE GENEVA CONFERENCES, ATOMS FOR PEACE, AND HOW JAPAN BENEFITED.
Interviewer: HOW WERE YOU INVOLVED?
Mori: I, myself, participated in the second conference.
Mori: The atmosphere of international cooperation was wonderful, today it still seems like a dream.
Mori: It seemed quite beneficial for Japan to start to be using nuclear power for peace, to the extent that I miss that time today.
Mori: It was a time of dreams, a very good period.
Mori: I hope that an age when that kind of international cooperation is possible will return again soon.
Mori: If nuclear weapons are eliminated, I think that such an age may return.
Interviewer: IS IT TRUE TO SAY THAT IT WAS AN PERIOD OF NUCLEAR EUPHORIA, EVEN FOR JAPAN WHO HAD BEEN THROUGH THE ATOMIC BOMB?
Mori: For Japan, who knew the terror of nuclear weapons the terror of nuclear power the best, if this energy could be used for only peaceful purposes, how wonderful it would be.
Mori: Perhaps we had the biggest dreams.