WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC PARITY ON EUROPEAN AND ESPECIALLY GERMAN SECURITY?

Parity or equilibrium by definition cannot make an impact, neither on the one side of the scale nor on the other. I doubt whether in the seventies we really did have equilibrium or parity in other words. At least in the late seventies the Soviets started to deploy a new type of nuclear missile which later on became known as SS-20s, mobile missiles, there warheads each, every warhead independently targetable, range I seem to remember in the order of three or four or 5,000 kms, maybe a little less. At least the range too short to reach the United States of America. Long enough to reach major cities in the People's Republic of China. Certainly long enough to reach any place in the Middle East but in the main they were targeted against Western Europe, to be more specific they were targeted against targets in my country, West Germany. So when I got the first information that a development of the SS-20 missile was complete, that they had started to produce them, that they even had started to deploy them or rather about to start deploying them I got the feeling that the equilibrium was going to be toppled and obviously it made quite an impact on my mind, in my judgment - obviously it made a much lesser impact on the mind, on the judgment of my American counterparts of that time.

BEFORE YOU MADE YOUR FAMOUS SPEECH IN '77 YOU HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH CARTER AND BRZEZINSKI...

Right.

... IN '77 ...

Right.

... LONDON, WASHINGTON. WHAT DID YOU ...

Mostly in Bonn.

... WHAT DID YOU SAY.

Well I told them that given the perspective of the future political weight of these SS-20s it was in my view indispensable, absolutely necessary to include these missiles into the SALT II talks which were under preparation and hadn't really started but which the Carter administration wanted to get going with the Brezhnev administration in Moscow, and they had the peculiar habit in Washington to think that missiles that could only hit Hamburg or Bonn or Frankfurt or London or Paris for that matter, ought to be regarded as tactical affairs and not as strategic. They had the peculiar habit of calling strategic only such weapons which could hit their own soil and their own cities and I said to them well the first one ... so-called battlefield nuclear which hits people of German soil for the German nation is a strategic event. They had great difficulty to understand this. They were academics, you know. They had never ... and couldn't image the impact and the psychological impact of a nuclear weapon exploding among soldiers or among civilian population. Anyway I failed to get Carter's agreement to include these medium-range missiles, which I called Euro-strategic missiles, to include the Euro-strategic missiles into the SALT II talks, which SALT means strategic arms limitation and after three or four fruitless attempts, I went public in that speech which you mentioned. I think it was October 7, 1977.

IN YOUR MEMOIRS YOU EXPLAIN EXACTLY WHAT IT WAS YOU WERE SAYING. WHAT WERE YOU ...?

Well, it's a long time ago and I don't by heart know the exact wording that I used. The wording was rather cautious but for all the experts sitting in the auditorium, the diplomats and other people, it was quite clear what I was talking about and I made it superfluously clear. Afterwards at dinner, there was a dinner after the meeting, a dinner of let us say 24 people and I think it was somewhat belated, and what's the word ...

(Background directions)

HERR SCHMIDT, YOU WERE SAYING THERE WAS A DINNER AFTERWARDS, COULD YOU PICK IT UP FROM THERE. THERE WAS A DINNER ...

Yeah, there was a dinner afterwards, maybe 24 people or so. Of course the subject of the conversation was my speech and I was much more clearer at that dinner, even somewhat insulting as regards the American hesitance, and from that dinner on I think a process of rethinking started in Washington but this process of rethinking seems to have taken a year or so.

NOW TWO QUESTIONS: WERE YOU ASKING FOR A COUNTER-DEPLOYMENT OR WERE YOU ASKING FOR AN ARMS CONTROL SOLUTION?

No, I was asking for an inclusion in the SALT II. I was not asking for counter-deployment. This may have been mentioned in the course of the discussion over the night, you know, don't remember exactly. Many people have spoken in that discussion, it was a free-wheeling affair but certainly, stressed the necessity well I have of equilibrium or balance, as you called it earlier. Certainly I have stressed that but my way to arrive at balance was to include them in the, in the SALT II agreement that was being sought at that time and as history showed in '78 and '79, I started publicly to talk about a zero, zero solution of the medium-range weapon problem. This obviously has been in my mind from the beginning and I quote zero-zero solution the optimal outcome of such negotiations.

I'LL TALK ABOUT THAT IN A MOMENT. WERE YOU IN YOUR SPEECH, WERE YOU QUESTIONING THE US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE TO EUROPE?

No, not, no, I don't think so. No. I was questioning the wisdom of the Carter administration, in rather polite and diplomatic terms as it were.

BUT YOU WERE NOT ASKING WHETHER AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT WOULD PUT AT RISK CHICAGO FOR ...

No, no, no, no. I, I certainly said I hate the idea that you think the destruction of Chicago as strategic affair, the destruction of Hamburg as a tactical one. Certainly may have said something of that kind.

BUT YOU WERE NOT PUTTING THE CLASSIC GAULIST FORMULATION?

No, no. I've, I've never been a classic Gaulist! Not a Gaulist at all.

HERR SCHMIDT, LET'S TALK ABOUT GUADELOUPE ...

Yeah.

... WERE YOU SURPRISED BY THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, BY THE SPECIFIC HARDWARE PROPOSALS WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER MADE AT GUADELOUPE?

I was. Yes. I was not prepared to hear that. I don't know whether my friend Callaghan was prepared to hear it but my feeling is that at least Marie Giscard was not prepared for that proposal, as I wasn't, I myself, and because it was a surprise I let the others talk first in order to gain some time for thinking about it.

HERR SCHMIDT, AS YOU SAY THESE ARE MATTERS OF SOME CONTROVERSY. SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT HAVING, HAVING WILLED THIS SITUATION YOU WEREN'T...

Having?

... HAVING WILLED THE SITUATION, HAVING VOICED THIS CONCERN YOU WERE THEN NOT REALLY PREPARED TO ADDRESS HOW IT COULD BE SOLVED. YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH THIS ... ?

I'm not familiar with that criticism but I think anybody can from the files, whether the files of the American administration or the German Government, easily find out that I've always asked for inclusion in SALT II and for equilibrium not only in long-range nuclear weapons but also in medium-range nuclear weapons and this equilibrium could be found be eliminating these weapons. I didn't really believe that I could totally... I thought privately that there might be arrest on either side, a small number and therefore I quote the zero-zero solution to be the optimum outcome. I didn't really believe that we would reach that optimum. We might reach let us say some ... on either side, let us say 1,000 on either side or 2,000 or so. This I thought was the probable outcome but not the optimum.

PART OF GUADALOUPE WAS AN ARMS CONTROL INGREDIENT WHICH LATER BECAME INCLUDED IN THE DUAL TRACK, DID YOU SERIOUSLY EXPECT THAT TO WORK?

Expect what?

THE ARMS CONTROL INGREDIENT IN, IN THE GUADALOUPE ... ?

Well the Guadaloupe meeting started rather, in a rather peculiar way. Jimmy Carter invited the President of France and the Prime Minister of Britain and myself to Washington. I would have, easily would have gone. I have no prestige inhibitions but the President of France resented the idea of being summoned to Washington and he called me on the telephone. We talked via the telephone as we consult about everything, and asked my view and I said well, why don't you invite Jimmy Carter to your place but not to Paris but to some France island close to Washington. So this was the reason why the whole meeting started in Guadaloupe and it was the original invitation by Jimmy Carter had to been to discuss a matter of common interest, matters of common interest, not just arms control. Many subjects to ... all over the world I think and the Guadaloupe meeting really was a... meeting ... but the arms control ingredient ... became the by far most important part of it and this, this joint decision on how to deal with the SS-20 threat was formalized ten months later in the North Atlantic Council meeting in early December of the same year.

HERR SCHMIDT, IN OCTOBER '78 YOU MET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV OR SECRETARY BREZHNEV AND I BELIEVE YOU ASKED HIM TO STOP THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20.

Well I've told him every time when I saw him, yes. I told him that this would not, this wouldn't, couldn't, could not be accepted by the Germans and that I would raise hell with the Allies on the Western side in order to stop them from going on and I think in the beginning he didn't really understand how important this was for me. He has understood it in 1980 and in '81; we talked again on these matters in 1980 and in '81. In '81 we, the two of us and the four eyes (?) had large military charts on our table. My charts showing him where his SS-20s were targeted on, showing him, I was showing him the German cities that his generals were about to destroy with their SS-20s, and he showed me the Russian military charts, how far the American ground launch cruise missiles and how far the Pershing IIs and their evaluation would reach into Russian territory and it became obvious that the military on either side had a rather precise perception of what their own weapons and the enemy, and the enemy's weapons would do, or what they could destroy, and Brezhnev got rather angry when he saw that anything that I'd been telling was correct. He might not have studied the Russian charts in advance but I showed him on his own charts that what I had been telling him over years was correct and he became very angry and poor Alexander had to gather his charts from, from the floor after Brezhnev had brushed them aside in anger. But at that time ... especially in this specific conversation in '81 in a little chateau near Bonn, he certainly was quite aware that this from my point of view, or better to say from the German point of national interest was an unacceptable situation, which was building up. But in those years,'80 was the, at the turn of '79/'80 you had the invasion of Afghanistan. It was the period in which the Americans attempt to liberate, to, to liberate the hostages in Iran and all these, all these things, the atmosphere was freezing - boycott of the Olympic Games and all that, so the chances for negotiations were, were decreasing rather quickly and partially also due to the, to the obviously-growing disability of the old man in Moscow.

THANK YOU ...

HERR SCHMIDT, I FORGOT TO ASK YOU ONE VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION: WHAT WAS YOUR IMPRESSION OF PRESIDENT CARTER AS THE LEADER OF THE ALLIANCE, AS THE MAN IN CHARGE OF NATO?

Well he wasn't really the leader of the Alliance... and certainly never is an American President in charge of NATO. The Alliance and NATO is two different things. France is a member of the Alliance. NATO is an organization not mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty, has been built up in the course of history, in the course of history France has left that organization. Normally the Alliance has been lead by consent, building up consensus on important issues of questions, in many instances over the last 30 years that I have followed events closely. In many, many cases was being done under the spiritual guidance of the American President, that is true, but sometimes also at the guidance of others. Sometimes under the guidance not of American president but of other Americans, sometimes under the guidance of the Europeans. I would like to mention Pieremel (?), the Amer Report of 1967 was of the greatest importance for the Europeans. I would like to mention McNamara who wanted to get away from the so called massive retaliation, military strategy over five years until he convinced his colleagues within NATO, not necessarily within the Alliance. He didn't convince the French at the time. It was not his President, Johnson. Now coming back to your question was Jimmy Carter a leader of the Alliance? No, he was not a leader.

NOW, LET ME JUST ASK YOU ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EPISODE WHICH CAUSED THE BIGGEST PROBLEM BETWEEN YOU AND CARTER, NAMELY THE NEUTRON. WHY DID YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAD TO DEPLOY IT?

Well, I was opposed to the weapon in the beginning and they, the American/France, wanted to deploy it. I was opposed to it. They had the idée fixe to deploy more and more and more nuclear weapons in Europe. Some of the American military obviously were thinking in terms of fighting a nuclear war. I was opposed to that. After some time of discussion I was willing to give in for what reasons? For the reasons that I didn't wish to fight two or three fights at one time with my most important ally - the United States of America. That was the prevailing reason in mind. Well, when I had decided to give in to Carter, he changed his mind and no longer wanted to deploy the neutron weapons. Now this was one of the rather unhappy episodes in the co-operation between the two governments. Well, I was happy that he didn't insist any longer on deploying these weapons but of course not only had he lost his face with a lot of people, also had he made me lose my face, which I have not forgotten.

YOU HAD MADE YOUR DEPLOYMENT CONDITIONAL ON THE BENELUX COUNTRIES DEPLOYING AS WELL?

I can't remember this exactly. I will have to look into the files to be precise here. I had made it a precondition in the, in the Pershing II and GLCM (Ground Launched Cruise Missile) range. I'm not so sure whether I had made it a condition also as regards neutron bombs or neutron weapons. Now please cut this out there. My memory fails me. I would have to look into the file. It was thinkable but I'm not sure.

HERR SCHMIDT, LET US, LET US TALK NOW A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE PERIOD AFTER 1980, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. WHEN THE REAGAN GOVERNMENT CAME IN, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IT WAS, AS YOU SAID, VERY DIVIDED BY STATUTE AND ALL SORTS OF THINGS. THERE WAS A LONG PERIOD OF INFIGHTING. DO YOU THINK THAT THAT ADMINISTRATION WAS SERIOUS ABOUT NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS?

In that generalized full of a question you can not expect any answer. The administration as such didn't have one attitude. There were people who were serious, for instance Paul Nitze. There were other who were not serious and it took a long time, at least we in Europe could find out what really was the prevailing attitude within the administration and it took a long time until the administration themselves found out what their general line of operation was to be, in the beginning, and after having been elected but before having been sworn in, President Reagan told me he would negotiate and negotiate and negotiate with the Soviets, and I believed him. Well, a little later on it didn't seem quite so clear whether the attempt to negotiate was that forceful as he had been telling me in advance. I never doubted that the will for negotiations as regards Ponitie but I wasn't so sure about Mrs. Kirkpatrick or Mr. Perle or others, or Mr. Weinberger, and I felt quite relieved when by July or so '82 George Shultz was appointed Foreign Secretary because this man was reliable, steady and that you could believe a word that was coming from him.

HERR SCHMIDT, CAN YOU TELL US HOW YOU PERSUADED THE AMERICANS TO TAKE UP THE ZERO OPTION?

This was not difficult. I didn't try with the Carter administration because after the Double Track decision, immediately thereafter you've got Afghanistan, I have already talked about the deterioration of the atmosphere between Washington and Moscow. It was quite clear that in the year 1980, which at the same time was an election year in America, these negotiations would not go very far, but immediately after the start of the Reagan administration we in Bonn started to try influencing them on the medium-range nuclear weapons negotiations, and we told them that in our view the best outcome would be zero-zero, zero on either side, and it was not difficult at all to convince the White House of this concept and President Reagan made a, made his own in a public declaration or public speech - I don't remember exactly, I think in October 1981. I was quite happy with that statement.

YOU SAID IN A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTERWARDS WITH MRS THATCHER, YOU SAID THIS SHOWS THAT RONALD REAGAN REALLY IS A MAN OF PEACE. LOOKING BACK ON THAT CAN YOU PERHAPS THROW SOME LIGHT ON THE APPARENT CHANGE WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN PRESIDENT REAGAN?

Well, there have to, there seems to have been more than just one change. After this statement of '81 and other statements, which created the impression of a clear, well-thought ... Obviously, other people got the upper hand in the Reagan administration who at least thought that it was necessary to increase American nuclear capabilities and multiply them and he himself, as regards SDI for instance, has made great efforts to enhance their nuclear capabilities, whether in the defense field or in the attack field and many people in Europe during that period, including myself but I was out of office then, started to have grave doubts about his ... negotiations. In the end of his administration, I don't know under whose influence, maybe under the influence of my friend George Shultz, maybe under the influence of others, certainly not under the influence of Kasper Weinberger, he again turned his thinking towards arms limitation and even an arms reduction now, which I think is a, is a happy turn back to his original ideas. President Reagan never has tried to become an expert on military matters. He never has endeavored to learn the most important details in that field, which lead to a situation in which his aides played a much greater roles than aides would have played under President Ford or let us say in the whole Nixon-Ford-Kissinger era. Reagan seems to be a man of some basic convictions and on the other hand willing to let others do the ground homework, the detailed work. Well, he might go down to history as a man who in the end of this administration brought about the first nuclear arms reduction treaty, the first arms reduction treaty at all in the modern world, and this is quite something.

LET'S GO BACK TO ZERO OPTION. DID YOU SERIOUSLY EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO IT?

I seriously not only thought but I was convinced that under the compelling threat of seeing Pershings and other medium-range weapons coming up over the horizon, threatening a great number of Russian subjects, they would negotiate. I was absolutely convinced. Whether it would come under Brezhnev or under his successor I did not expect three successors to, to come to the fore within a couple of years only, but I was quite convinced that they would negotiate. I was not convinced of the zero-zero reason but I, I was convinced of their necessity and their own national existence interest to negotiate and to come to limitations and hopefully to reductions.

YOU'VE SPOKEN SEVERAL TIMES WITH NITZE, PAUL NITZE WAS ACCUSED BY SOME PEOPLE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OF BEING TOO CONSIDERATE OF YOUR INTERESTS. DID YOU KNOW ABOUT THE WALK IN THE WOODS BEFORE IT HAPPENED?

The walk in the woods happened in July '82, which was the period in which my administration in Bonn had started to falter. I did not know about the walk in the woods. It might have been, and I am inclined to believe so, it might have been this mistake or the failure of the Americans to inform us, but it also may have something to do with the, with the beginning of the faltering of my own government. I have had and still do have every confidence in Paul Nitze, a man whom I have known for decades, one of the wisest servants of the American nation but always willing and capable of taking into account the interests of their allies, whoever: the British, or the French or the Germans or others.

THANK YOU. LET ME NOW TURN IN MY FINAL CLUTCH OF QUESTIONS TO THE CURRENT DEAL, HERR SCHMIDT. YOU, YOU'RE PUBLICLY A SUPPORTER OF THE DEAL, IF I UNDERSTAND YOU CORRECTLY, BUT IF YOU WERE WORRIED IN 1977 SHOULDN'T YOU BE MORE WORRIED NOW?

Why?

SHOULDN'T YOU BE MORE WORRIED THAT EUROPE IS DECOUPLED, IS BEING DECOUPLED ...

I wasn't ...

... I HATE TO USE THAT HORRIBLE WORD BUT IT'S A SHORT-HAND ...

I never was worried about it, never. My analysis of the American interests in the long term has always convinced me of there being no danger of decoupling. This is an invention of shortsighted people and some other people use that phrase or that, that so-called danger in order to, to, to assist their short-term interests in other fields and getting more weapons or whatever. No, I have never thought that there was a danger of decoupling and as regards the results of the dismantling of the Pershings, the GLCMs and the SS-20s there'd be a military situation thereafter, it will be very similar to the military situation which, with which we have rather comfortably lived until 1977. No, no principal change. So of these people who know they say well, since the Pershings have gone we have to undertake such and such effort and such and such forceful steps to redo all our defense efforts. They haven't said that in 1976, they haven't said that in 1977. This is just psychologically you can understand it. On the other hand you don't need to take it too serious.

DOES THIS MARK ... ?

Admirals and Generals always want more ships and more weapons and they take the arguments where they can find them. I have full understanding for them but it doesn't necessarily mean to agree to what they are asked to.

HERR SCHMIDT, ARE YOU SAYING THAT PERSHING AND THE PERSHING AND THE GLCMS WERE NOT NECESSARY?

I say they were absolutely necessary in order to bring the Russians to the negotiation table and I was willing to deploy them in order to bring the Russians to the negotiation table and I had the open the intent and even the conviction that these negotiations would lead to results, not necessarily to the zero-zero result but to a result of limitation of numbers on either side and to the result of equilibrium in Euro strategic missiles, equilibrium is the catch word.

HERR SCHMIDT, FINAL QUESTION. YOU CAN'T, SUMMED UP ON THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE 1970S ...

No, no, no. Be precise. I have passed some doubt on the leadership of, during the Carter administration. I have not cast any doubt about the first six years of the '70s. You might have a discussion of Vietnam or other subjects and we might talk about that but as regards the defense of Europe and the strategy, the diplomatic, military and grand strategy of defending Europe, I have no doubts about what the, what was being done under Nixon and Ford and Kissinger. Minor, minor disputes but no grave doubts.

I, I'M SORRY TO BE INACCURATE. NOW, BUT ARE YOU NOW SAYING THAT THE, THE PRESENT SET OF ARRANGEMENTS CAN CONTINUE INDEFINITELY OR DO YOU, LIKE SOME PEOPLE, SEE IN THIS TREATY AND IN REYKJAVIK AND IN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS A STEP TOWARDS, WE DON'T QUITE KNOW WHAT BUT TOWARDS A NEW KIND OF SET OF ARRANGEMENTS?

Not necessarily. What I do see, for instance, is that the French are not very happy with the ... I am happy but they are not and I understand why they are not happy. They still believe in some nuclear strategic formulas which they have inherited from General De Gaulle and they have started the process of rethinking, they haven't gone very far ... and that they are unhappy because, also because of their having not been present at the negotiation table as regards INF. One has to know that their weapons are INF weapons of course. I think that the solution of the question of numerical superiority of Russian conventional forces has to be solved. In my view the numerical superiority isn't that big but it does exist and it can be easily matched with the French and the German and Benelux forces are combined in the, in approaching that solution, which has been tried twice after World War II: once ...

You know, I have always thought in terms of equilibrium, doesn't necessarily mean 100 on one side and 100 on the other. It could also mean 110 on the one side and 90 on the other but by and large equilibrium. I have always thought in equilibrium and the so-called strategic nuclear field long-range nuclear weapons, and the Euro strategic field I have always thought of equilibrium, in the field of conventional arms. Obviously most of the people in the West think that in the conventional field you have numerical superiority on the Soviet side but if that is so the easiest thing to make up for it is to combine France with Benelux and German forces and the central fear there. No Soviet marshal would ever take on the combined forces of two classical European military nations, and France and with Germany and among the two, they could after mobilization, within a week, field two million soldiers due to the fact that France and Germany and Holland and Benelux never have given up the ... and that all the young people served are mobilized and are trained soldiers. Now there have been two attempts so far to combine the French and German forces: one in the early '50s, so-called Mount LeBlanc (?) which was defeated in the French Chamber in '54; the second attempt was under President De Gaulle's leadership by the Elysee Treaty but the idea of combining forces was being defeated and the Germans want to start this time in '63. I think it will come to a third and successful attempt in the course of the 1980s in that fie1d and I'm rather happy to see some French political leaders, for instance the Gaullist Chirac and the Socialist Francois Mitterrand who start thinking aloud in, along ways and allies which might, alleys which might lead to that, to that goal. The catch word is equilibrium again, informed the field what are conventional weapons or nuclear weapons of different qualities. You cannot make up for a actual or perceived disequilibrium in the conventional field by having more nuclear weapons.

HERR SCHMIDT, LET ME JUST RETURN TO ONE OR TWO LITTLE QUESTIONS. FIRSTLY, YOU'VE GIVEN US A TANTALISING GLIMPSE OF MR BREZHNEV. NOW YOU PROBABLY OF THE WESTERN LEADERS KNEW HIM BETTER THAN ANYONE, CAN YOU TELL US WHY HE THEN DEPLOYED THE SS-20 IN THE FIRST PLACE?

I am not quite clear whether he deployed. Certainly was a decision of the Politburo but it could have been a decision in the long list of issues to be dealt with on one and the same day, so to speak a routine decision without understanding what they really were doing to other people. Certainly they have they taken a number of routine decisions in setting aside money for new military developments or research or production or deploying. It is thinkable for me that the Politburo or at least that Mr. Brezhnev did not understand the enormous political importance of the decision to produce and afterwards deploy the SS-20s. As I said earlier he was an old man already at this time and despite his own military experience in World War II, he on the other hand was not very close to the military. He liked Marshal Ustinov who was the Defense Secretary, the Defense Minister whom he considered to be a friend but he wasn't so close to the professional military whom he did not consider to be his friends or at least not his close friends. This I know from the horse's mouth and anything which Ustinov said was good for him and it was Ustinov - this is just guesswork, let's assume that Ustinov had, had in a Politburo mention that these new missiles are necessary to replace other older ones they might have decided to do it without any great discussion ...

MY FINAL QUESTION, HERR SCHMIDT. LET'S JUST GO BACK TO THE PERIOD AFTER YOUR SPEECH. IN YOUR SPEECH YOU SAY THAT YOU WERE NOT ASKING FOR NEW WEAPONS AND YOU SAY THAT YOU WERE, YOU WERE SUMMONED AT GUADALOUPE WHEN THERE WERE THESE PROPOSALS ...

Yeah.

WHY DID THAT HAPPEN? HOW DID THAT COME ABOUT?

As I said earlier there was a process of rethinking of the situation in the United States all over '78. The invitation of the three Europeans to meet Carter in Washington came I think in late November or maybe December '78. I did not say in that invitation that I wanted to come up with such a proposal. Well, from an American point of view it was one of the answers which one might have expected. If somewhere is a deficiency the normal American answer would have been well then, let's spend some more money, build some more weapons and deploy them. That's the normal way of thinking of the military, in America not only but also all over the place, but America or Russia or other countries. So it was not so, so much out of the world of thinking, I wasn't very happy about it in the first place, but in the second place Jim Callaghan said well this might in the end be necessary but let us negotiate with the Russians first in order to remove the SS-20s and Giscard said well, this is a good idea but if they are, do not know from the beginning up that in the end we would deploy missiles on our side as well, then the negotiations will fail. So let us give to them a defined period of time after which we would deploy. It's not in between and we have come to an agreement, and I bought this solution so you might say that there were three fathers of the double track, number, number one James Callaghan, number two Valerie Giscard, number three myself and you could also have said there were four fathers because in the end Jimmy Carter bought this concept.

VERY GOOD ANSWER. MY, I, SORT OF ONE MORE QUESTION IF I COULD ASK YOU, HERR SCHMIDT. THIS, YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR OWN PARTY AFTER THE DUAL TRACK, YOU FOUND YOURSELF IN A SLIGHTLY DIFFICULT POSITION, PARTICULARLY AFTER PRESIDENT REAGAN CAME IN. HOW DID, HOW, HOW EASY WAS IT FOR YOU TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT IN YOUR PARTY FOR THE DUAL TRACK?

It was not easy at all and the word slightly difficult is an under, under-estimation of the situation. It was not very easy but I managed and they deviated from the double track only after we had left office.

HOW DID YOU MANAGE ... ?

Well by methods and by which political leaders normally act by making convincing speeches.