CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE EVENTS OF THE NEUTRON BOMB DEBATE AS YOU FIRST SAW IT?

You know when I became Minister of Defense, the debate was already won. And we were quite afraid about this debate. We knew that there would be opposition within the party and at this time, the Peace Movement had already started. But after a lengthy debate within the cabinet and what we decided that we should say yes to the Americans that we would be ready to deploy. I will send to the parliamentary floor leader there of my party just to inform it. Then he was quite nervous too, but he said, "Well, okay if you think this has to be accepted, it will be accepted. And the party will support you." And then very suddenly, without any pre-warning, we got the information from Washington, "No. Just forget it." And so we were twice embarrassed. The first one, when we convinced ourselves that it's necessary, that suddenly when Mr. Carter said to us, "Just forget it." And this created problems.

WAS THIS THE START OF, I MEAN A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE SAID IN FACT RELATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT CARTER AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WERE VERY POOR. DO YOU THINK THAT WAS THE START OF THAT?

I think so, yes. So it's difficult for me to judge. But in any case, I still remember how furious management was. You just cannot start a lengthy debate about strategic and defense necessities. And then without consulting your partners in Europe saying, "It's over, forget it." This created certainly in this country an impression that you cannot calculate upon American policy that you have to take into your European mind that they might change the approach every day. That's not very good for an alliance.

WHEN IN 1977, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT MADE WHAT HAS SINCE BECOME QUITE A FAMOUS AND OFTEN CITED SPEECH IN THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES IN LONDON. I MEAN ALTHOUGH THERE WERE, HE NEVER MENTIONS DIRECTLY THE WORDS SS-20. A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE ISOLATED THIS SPEECH AS BEING THE START OF THE WHOLE DEBATE. I MEAN FROM YOUR, WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS UTMOST IN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S MIND WHEN HE MADE THAT SPEECH?

You know we got the impression and this was confirmed afterwards, that the two super powers their problems that means, to formulate and except a SALT II which might reduce the mutual threats, the nuclear field, but just forgetting Europe. So it was his aim and I was present when he tried to persuade the American administration that Europe shouldn't be forgotten. That there is a special and particular spread to Western Europe. And at this time we knew already that the Soviets would introduce and deploy a new weapon. And then we didn't ask for a strategic answer that means intermediate weapon or the western side too. Or to take it to account and to take action that SALT II should solve the problems too. This was never done by the Americans.

EVENTUALLY, THERE WAS A LONG SERIES OF MEETINGS SET UP AMONGST SOMETHING CALLED THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP. WHAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP IN THE LEADING UP TO SORT OF 1979?

Well you know, the military people thought that our strategy or flexible response might get endangered. The western systems, the medium range systems grew older. And, must be some sort of renovation, of modernization. This was one thing, and the second one is we need weapons to match the spread of SS-20. But we always tried, us Germans, to find an answer whether the system should be sea-based. We knew at this time that a land-based deployment of the Pershings and the cruise missiles, would create enormous problems. We didn't know that those problems would be so enormous, but we feared that there would be some problems. Unfortunately, the Americans never accepted our ideas, but other west European part, European partners neither. For example, the Norwegians told us, while the systems would be sea-based, we would never allow the ships to get into Norwegian ports. Therefore, you know, this debate led to nothing. At the end we had to accept or where to choose. Whether saying no, accepting the land-basing, and we accepted the land-basing. So we weren't very much happy about it.

WHAT SORT OF PROBLEMS DID YOU HAVE ACTUALLY SELLING THAT DEPLOYMENT INSIDE YOUR PARTY?

Well you know this was a double-track decision. And we told our party friends and they accepted it that this is a very progressive decision. Just deciding modernization, a new set of weapons to be deployed, but giving those people... negotiating, a chance to get rid of the SS-20 so come, so come to a zero solution. And the party accepted it. But at the end, the party knew or had to learn, to understand, that there wouldn't be any zero solution. And then they saw that we might have tried to cheat them. That is right. We really tried to get the zero solution, but we didn't get it.

BUT IF I, KEEP ON THAT QUESTION A BIT. I MEAN EVEN WHAT HE SAID, YOU HAD A PROBLEM, YOU KNOW, SELLING THE NEUTRON BOMB DECISION. I MEAN NOT NECESSARILY IN THE PARTY AS A WHOLE, BUT WITH THE PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS OF THE PARTY. YOU HAD TO NEGOTIATE. AND THEN THAT WAS VERY EMBARRASSING. AND NOW YOU HAD TO GO BACK AND SELL TO THE PARTY ANOTHER WEAPON SYSTEM. HOW DID YOU ACTUALLY FEEL ABOUT THAT?

Well you know first I should add some further remarks. When I was nominated minister of defense, I got a peculiar impression. In this country and in our party, that never took place a strategic debate. Security policy and this was above all policy of détente. Nobody discussed it. The other side of the policy of détente, the necessity to be able to defend one self. To have a viable NATO. So the significance from Reykjavik defends détente, was reduced to détente. The level of the party was highly embarrassed when suddenly a neutron bomb, then afterwards the INF was told that the policy of détente can only succeed if there was a real basis of defense. If NATO's able to guarantee peace. This was one problem, the second one was the following one: Mr. Reagan came to power. And the first thing they did was to discredit the policy of détente. They told us the policy of détente is dead. Russia is the reign of evil and sub-force. So the impression that remained was now we will deploy weapons. There will be arms race that will be increased danger. Less security. And without any previous debate about the conditions of peace and détente in Europe those signals got into the minds of the people and this created all sorts of reticence of resistance. And this brought us into a very difficult situation.

I JUST WANT TO GO BACK A LITTLE BIT BEFORE REAGAN CAME TO POWER. THE ORIGINS OF THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION, WHERE WAS THE MAIN PRESSURE COMING, DO YOU THINK, TO HAVE THAT DUAL-TRACK FOR DEPLOYMENT AND FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL?

Well you know I can only report those informations I got from other people. And they told me that after SALT II was a disaster for Europe, nothing was solved for European guarantees to bring atomic weapons down to reduce a level. Some people thought that now we need a new system of weapons. And Helmut Schmidt always told me that it was in Guadeloupe forced the others into the double-track. That means telling the people we still have some years of negotiations. And then only if we fail we have to deploy. On the other hand, one has to admit in '79 the Americans weren't ready. There couldn't be any deployment. They were not yet developed. So even for technical reasons, it was intelligent to have four years of negotiations.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE SAID TO US, MAINLY PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES THAT THEY CAME TO EUROPE. SOME OF THEM HAVE SAID, WELL I WARNED HELMUT SCHMIDT OF THE DANGERS, THE POLITICAL DANGERS THAT HE WAS FACING. IF HE PERSISTED WITH THIS ARGUMENT FOR DEPLOYMENT, DO YOU THINK THAT WAS TRUE?

You know, I really cannot judge. I still remember when I was in responsibility, the American pressed us. And I still remember a very peculiar situation once in Washington. I was there, I met Brzezinski. And he asked me to meet the American press and the American television and tell them if America doesn't rectify SALT II, there wouldn't be another tract being accepted by West Germany. So I did it and I came back. I got some criticism. And I told all the people here, but it's necessary. We need SALT II. This is the basis for further negotiation. So this was accepted. Then the government changed and we had to learn that SALT II wouldn't come. Wasn't accepted by the succeeding government administration. There again people felt cheated.

CAN I JUST PICK UP ONE THING HERE. CAN YOU JUST TELL US A LITTLE ABOUT THE ACTUAL MEETING ITSELF IN BRUSSELS IN DECEMBER 1979 WHERE THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION WAS TAKEN. DO YOU REMEMBER ANYTHING PARTICULARLY NEGATIVE ABOUT THAT MEETING? WAS THERE A LOT OF OPPOSITION? DID IT ALL GO THROUGH THE FAIRLY STRAIGHT FORWARDLY? WHAT WAS THE ATMOSPHERE LIKE IN THAT MEETING?

We, that means a foreign minister, Mr. Genscher We came to Brussels. And we were entitled by our government to accept the double-track. And to accept two, if necessary deployment of the Pershings and the cruise missiles. But we got a very stiff opposition from the Netherlands and from Belgium. The Italians were quite outspoken and quite clear. And we tried to convince the people. And there was a long debate going on. And all the results, in this time in any case, one got the impression that the Dutch and the Belgians wouldn't accept their burden. Fortunately the Italians accepted. Helmut Schmidt instructed us not to agree if we, the federal republic were the only continental power to accept a deployment. If Great Britain is the enemy and second partner, then we have to say no. We need a second continental partner just to for the burden sharing. Great Britain was in another situation on account of the fact that Britain has a national nuclear power. So the Italian accepted the rest of the bunch was quite critical and very reticent.

NOW YOU'VE MENTIONED ALREADY THE PROBLEMS OF THE COLLAPSE OF SALT II, BUT THERE WAS ANOTHER PROBLEM THAT WAS ASSOCIATED TO SOME EXTENT WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, OR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. YOU REFERRED TO IT WHEN WE SAW YOU LAST. AND THAT WAS THE RHETORIC. I MEAN THIS VERY, VERY ANTAGONISTIC RHETORIC. I MEAN HOW MUCH OF A PROBLEM DID THAT BECOME FOR YOU?

A very great one. I think probably the greatest one. Here the peace movement, and the party and the trade union, and the public opinion existed already the impression after Carter and the neutron bomb. That American decisions are taken only from the basis of American interest. That European interest plays a minor role. Then we've got the rhetoric. Then we've got the decision of the government. Not a ratified SALT II. Not to accept SALT II. We are to learn from the Russians that they were no longer ready to negotiate. So we really got the impression or perhaps better to say the popular opinion got the impression, that a new area will come. An area of tension, in the areas of increased dangers. And in this area, it's difficult to bring, to tell people that primo negotiations will go on. They might even succeed. And, secondly, we have not yet decided about the deployment. That, Helmut Schmidt tried to bring the two super powers together. He went to Washington. He went to Moscow. There was success. The negotiations went on. And even then, the majority of the people didn't have the impression that these were real negotiations conducted with the aim to get a result.

WHAT DOES THAT SAY THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN? WAS HE BEST RECRUITING AGENT THE PEACE MOVEMENT HAD?

To a certain extent, yes. When you met the people they always used quotations, quotes, positions of Reagan to fight you. And for me it was very difficult. On the one hand, I knew what I know that we depend upon the United States. And I knew that those were positions taken for home consumption, above all. But people cannot distinguish to that extent a politician, prove he really can.

OKAY, NOW LEADING INTO THE EARLIER 1980S. THE POSITION OF YOUR PARTY.

RIGHT, YEAH THERE'S TWO THINGS REALLY THAT I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU AGAIN; THE FIRST ONE IS I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU SEPARATELY ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND THE RHETORIC OF RONALD REAGAN AND I, I KNOW YOU'VE SAID IT ONCE BEFORE, I'D JUST LIKE TO HAVE IT AS A SEPARATE ANSWER BECAUSE IT WOULD BE EASIER TO EDIT. SO IF I JUST ASK YOU, YOU KNOW, WHAT WERE THE PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW REAGAN ADMINISTRATION?

The Reagan administration declared publicly that one would never ratify SALT II, there was a new rhetoric towards the Soviet Union, reign of evil for example, and Mr. Reagan declared publicly that the policy of détente has come to an end. That means those elements of our mutual policy of security which are so important for us, policy of détente is part of the policy of security was declared officially as out and it's practically impossible to convince a country and a party that one should go on with an arms race, that's what remained, at least in the eyes of the public opinion.

FINE, AND NOW THE LAST ONE...MY LAST ONE RATHER IS TO GET BACK TO THIS QUESTION OF, OF LEADERSHIP BECAUSE I REMEMBER AND IN, IN YOUR LAST ANSWER, I MEAN AT THE END OF THE TAPE YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT YOUR, THE LESSONS OF YOUR FOUR AND A HALF YEARS AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND REQUIRING FIRM LEADERSHIP FROM THE UNITED STATES. I REMEMBER YOU TELLING ME WHEN WE WERE HERE LAST THAT THERE WERE THE PROBLEMS THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD WAS THAT HE WAS ALWAYS ASKING FOR FIRM LEADERSHIP AND WHEN HE GOT IT HE DIDN'T LIKE IT AND IN FACT, WHAT WAS YOUR, WHAT WOULD YOU SAY, WOULD YOU SAY THAT WAS THE TRUTH AND THAT WAS...?

You know this is certainly right. Helmut Schmidt is a very strong personality and in principle he wants to lead. But on the other hand he knew that West Germany is only a medium-sized power but he is a man with high discipline and a very intelligent one, therefore if you get him orientation, that means leadership, and if you are ready, that means the American Preside is ready to discuss with leadership and to formulate leadership after debate with its European partners, then neither Helmut Schmidt nor we would have any problems but there, there weren't any debates, there wasn't any leadership. There were things that changed quite often and this created the problems.

FINE, GREAT. BEN. HERR APEL, I'D JUST LIKE TO TAKE YOU BACK TO SOMETHING THAT YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT A LITTLE BIT BEFORE WHICH IS THE PROBLEMS YOU'VE HAD IN YOUR OWN PARTY IN THE 19-- EARLY 1980s. WHAT I WANT TO ASK YOU IS WHETHER THE RISE OF THE P2 (?) AND SPECIFICALLY THE RISE OF THE GREEN PARTY WHAT PROBLEMS THAT GAVE YOU, THE SPD, IN HANGING ONTO THE, THE ...AND HANGING ON TO DEPLOYMENT?

You know this party decides, is political guidelines on party congresses. We had one in '79, one in '81 and at those party conferences the double-track decision played an important role and twice we got a majority in favor, but I have to admit the party never believed that there might be deployment. The party hoped that there could be a result, a successful negotiations. When we had to learn that both super powers weren't interested in real solution at least not a zero solution and then the party got much more reticent, much more against it. I do not think that the Green Party played an important role at this time. She, it was, she wasn't able to come into the parliament in the '80 elections, that means they didn't play a role in parliament but the peace movement played an important role and the churches played an important role and the American rhetoric played an important role and the other problems the party was confronted with: unemployment, social unrest added to this opposition and I think to a certain extent the opposition against the zero solution was the crystallization point where the party fought against, against the Government the means Helmut Schmidt on account of being unsatisfied with the whole set of politics in this country.

THANK YOU. ONE FINAL QUESTION...YOU WERE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AS YOU SAID FOR FOUR YEARS DURING WHICH TIME THIS COMPLICATED SERIES OF MODERNIZATION WERE GOING FORWARD. YOU MENTIONED THAT THE MILITARY HAD AS IT WERE ONE REASON FOR WANTING A PARTICULAR WEAPON TO BE DEPLOYED BUT THE PARTY HAD ANOTHER. I'D LIKE FINALLY TO ASK YOU A GENERAL QUESTION. FROM YOUR, YOUR EXPERIENCE DO MINISTERS OF DEFENSE UNDERSTAND NUCLEAR DOCTRINE OR DO THEY SIMPLY THINK THAT THE FUNCTION OF NUCLEAR DOCTRINE IS RATIONALIZED DECISIONS TO JUSTIFY THE THINGS ARRIVED AT BY THE POLITICIANS? WAS THE FUNCTION OF NUCLEAR DOCTRINE IN YOUR EXPERIENCE?

Well you know I really think that politicians, that means Ministers of Defense understand the NATO strategy but one thing is absolutely sure it is for a politician extremely different, difficult, extremely difficult to explain the rationale of nuclear deterrence to its own political customers. How can you explain a strategy, nuclear deterrence; once it fails it will destruct and destroy mankind. How can you explain to people that you defend peace and freedom with weapons which if they, once they are used will destroy mankind? This is the, is a moral question and it's very difficult to transport, to convince people. Was this the right answer?

YES, BUT JUST...LET ME JUST ASK YOU...

It's better perhaps, yeah.

... I WAS GETTING A REALLY FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND WHETHER YOU, YOU AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE TOOK A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE SERIOUSLY AND WHETHER, FOR EXAMPLE, YOU WERE WORRIED ABOUT THE FACT THAT THERE ARE THINGS NOW WHICH IN 1979 THE MILITARY THOUGHT WASN'T IMPORTANT IN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. DID YOU AS THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE TAKE THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE SERIOUSLY OR DID YOU SIMPLY THINK THE IMPORTANT THING WAS NOT TO CLARIFY TOO MUCH WHAT IT WAS AND KEEP EVERYTHING AS VAGUE AS POSSIBLE?

Everybody took it seriously and we still take it seriously. We do not have another NATO strategy and as long as we don't have any other we have to stick to the actual one but one thing is absolutely sure, you defend a strategy that if it fails will destroy Europe, and I always have problems to believe that you can organize the nuclear part of the flexible response in a way that politicians still have a chance to stop the nuclear exchange. Now this is part of the strategy difficult to believe and to transmit that there is nuclear exchange then there is an interval, a pause where politicians debate, even though the NATO maneuvers never got into further details and it is very difficult to explain, to train and to believe that once we have passed the nuclear threshold we still live in our world where rational calculation is possible.