GENERAL, I'D LIKE YOU TO DESCRIBE YOUR OWN POSITION, YOUR GOAL IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT WERE YOU DOING THERE?

I was one of a six man team. There was a negotiator and five delegates, and I represented one of the agencies in Washington which was on that team. And that was the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And as such I was a member, sort of, on that team. And I was the only one of all the various people on that team who started with SALT II and ended with SALT II. Others rotated... their position rotated two, three, sometimes four times. So there's a lot of discontinuity in other fields, but I was the one that was with it from beginning to end.

AMBASSADOR, YOU WERE REPRESENTING THE JCS, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THOSE TALKS. CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THAT, HOW YOU WERE CHOSEN, WHAT YOU THOUGHT YOUR ROLE WAS IN THE NEGOTIATION.

Why I was chosen is a long story in itself. But I had had some background and studied Russian international relations, Russian history, I spoke some Russian, I studied nuclear warfare. But I happened to be on MBFR, the Mutual Balance Force Reduction team in 1970-'71. Had some experience negotiating with the Russians cause we hadn't set it up, had not begun to negotiate with them yet. But I came back to report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and at the end of SALT I it was decided that they would replace their Joint Chiefs' of Staff representative, a three star Air Force general. And I was chosen to take his place.

YOU WERE THEN NOMINATED ONCE AGAIN WHEN THE CARTER PEOPLE CAME INTO POWER. AND THEN PAUL WARNKE BECAME THE CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR SALT. HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT HIS IDEAS, HIS PHILOSOPHIES, AND HIS POSITION AT THE SALT TABLE?

Well, I was rather nervous about Warnke's position because I had read his writings and "Apes on the Treadmill," and others, knew enough about the Russians and I'd already had enough experience to know that what some of his ideas were held together as theories but they weren't very practical. So I was somewhat apprehensive about him as being the chief negotiator.

SPECIFICALLY WHAT IDEAS OF HIS, LIKE "APES ON THE TREADMILL" AND THINGS LIKE THAT?

Well, that was one of them that the Soviets will do anything that we do, and they'll only do it because we do it. And they imitate us.

AND YOU DON'T AGREE WITH THAT?

I don't agree with that, no. They have their objectives, and they do things for their reasons. We do things for our reasons. Sometimes there's a tendency to say well, if they're doing something we should do it. But there's not a slavish or aping or imitating each other. That was one of his things that I objected to.

HE ALSO HAS WRITTEN THAT UNILATERAL, IT'S BEEN CALLED UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT. HE CALLS THAT BILATERAL RESTRAINTS, THAT YOU DO SOMETHING UNILATERALLY AND THEY WILL RESTRAIN, PRACTICE THE SAME SORT OF RESTRAINTS. DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT?

No, I disagree with that. I found out first from my readings and then found out from my hard knocks and experience that the Soviets just don't follow you or don't follow your example. If you think you're doing things in good faith and that they will then repay you, you're absolutely wrong. The Soviets don't have that Judeo-Christian ethic about their negotiations. They're tough negotiators. They do what's in their interest, and they don't believe that gratitude should be repaid by gratitude. As a matter of fact, they look upon gratitude as some way of either currying favor or with disdain. They, they have an ill feeling of people that are trying to do too much for them or trying to turn the other cheek. They don't understand that, and they don't respect people that do that.

CAN YOU THINK IN TERMS OF SALT II AND AN EXAMPLE THAT WOULD SUGGEST THAT KIND OF THINKING IN THE SOVIETS WHERE THE UNITED STATES WAS WILLING TO GIVE SOMETHING UP IN EXCHANGE FOR SOMETHING FROM THE SOVIETS AND THE SOVIETS DID NOT GIVE IT UP, AS EASILY AS WAS THOUGHT?

Well, there are many examples. You know, we thought that if we would constrain some of our bombers that they would constrain their missiles. We thought that if they we restrained from building heavy missiles maybe they would cut back on their heavy missiles. We thought that if we said that you didn't have to put all the forces in the agreement immediately that they would then bring others in later. No, they just took whatever they had and pocketed those and wouldn't in others. I can recall earlier in the game that I thought that we could strike a deal with the Soviets and there was six parts to a problem. And I said to my counterpart, "Look, there are six parts, and I think we can strike a deal. We'll give you three and you give us three." And so the next day I got the floor from my ambassador. I said, "On behalf of the United States, we'll give you A and B and C. On signal then they got up and left the room. I said, "What are you doing?" They said, "Well, we're finished." I said, "No, you haven't heard our side." "What side?" "Well, you haven't heard the, what we want to extract from you." And they said, "You told us what you're ready to give up, and we agree with you." And I said, "Well, what about the other half?" And they said there's no other half. So then later next week I went and said, "Look if you give us D, E, and F, I'll tell you what we're ready to give up". And they said, [speaks in Russian], "What do you think we are, idiots? You know, we don't negotiate that way." So you find out these things by negotiating with them over long periods of time.

LET ME TAKE YOU TO MARCH 17, 1977. DO YOU RECALL THAT PROPOSAL? YOU WENT WITH SECRETARY VANCE TO MOSCOW. WERE YOU IN AGREEMENT WITH THAT PROPOSAL?

Yes. Yes, it was a good proposal, it was a good proposal. Had we stuck to it and insisted that that proposal be carried out, it would've been a good proposal and would've served us well. We would've moved well ahead of where we were later.

CAN YOU TELL ME, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE MARCH 17 PROPOSAL. DID YOU FAVOR THE MARCH 17TH PROPOSAL THAT SECRETARY VANCE TOOK TO MOSCOW?

Yes, I was in favor of the March 17th proposal of 1977 that Secretary Vance took to Moscow. We had developed that plan early in 1977, and I was largely instrumental in getting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to adopt that plan. They were skeptical about it at first. I thought if they adopted that plan, it would serve our interests. So I supported that and got the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support that plan.

WHY WERE THEY SKEPTICAL ABOUT IT? DID THEY FAVOR ANOTHER OPTION?

Well, they felt that yes, they felt that perhaps we should do things differently or go on further in other areas. And my argument was that if we could've gotten that deal which would've reduced the Soviet heavy missiles by one half, which was the big element of that deal, that this would've been a good proposal, one which we could live with.

DID YOU CONSULT RICHARD PERLE OR SCOOP JACKSON ON THIS?

No, I didn't consult. I did not consult Richard Perle or Scoop Jackson on any of these deals. I do remember coming back from negotiations and briefing Senator Jackson. We did, each of us briefed different senators, and we'd tell them and bring them up to date on what was happening after the fact. But we never asked them their opinions on deals before we presented them.

BUT HE, SENATOR JACKSON, WAS IN FAVOR OF THE PROPOSAL?

I think that later that he also agreed that as I recall, had we gotten that proposal through it would've been a good proposal.

WERE YOU DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIETS DIDN'T BUY IT?

Well yes, I was disappointed in the Soviets but I was also very much disappointed in ourselves because we made several big mistakes. One big mistake was we put down our proposal and before the Soviets could respond, we gave them our fall-back proposal. And so now the Soviets naturally said what else do you have. So they were not too anxious to reach a deal with us feeling that if in the opening rounds in the negotiations we not only said here's our proposal but here's our fall-back proposal, they'd want to see what else we had. And we're not that willing to enter into an agreement. Another thing happened before we left Moscow after we got into negotiations. And that was that there was a press conference was given by either a press conference or a press statements by Zbig Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor, which didn't sit well with the Soviets, in particular with Gromyko, and they were incensed about that. So that, that helped dampen what happened at March '77.

WHAT DID BRZEZINSKI SAY?

I don't recall exactly, but it was something that he said which was not to the Soviets liking. I'd have to go back and research this exactly. What he said was in some derogatory vein.

BUT ISN'T IT TRUE, SOME PEOPLE HAVE SUGGESTED, THAT REGARDLESS OF HOW THE PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE REJECTED IT BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T WANT TO GIVE UP THEIR HEAVY MISSILES. DO YOU THINK THAT'S TRUE?

Well no, I think that had they seen what we were ready to give up and seen the overall context, had we stayed with that original proposal, I think the Soviets would have been willing to reduce their heavy missiles by one half. And in the context of the rest of that agreement, I think that we could've convinced them that it was in their interest and in our interest. And I think we could've dealt with it.

WAS THE PURPOSE OF HAVING SOVIETS REDUCE THEIR HEAVY MISSILES TO CLOSE THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL? WAS THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PROPOSAL?

This, the object was to help to close the window of vulnerability because the Soviets had gone ahead and were building heavy missiles and were up to 308 with ten warheads on each missile, and we had none of that category. As a matter of fact, they had we had light missiles which were Minutemen. They had medium missiles which were three times as powerful as the Minuteman, the SS-17s and -19s. Then they had the heavy missile, which was twice again as heavy which was six times as heavy as the Minuteman. And had they cut back those largest missiles in half, cut those by one half, we would then have had a significant reduction in the Soviet capability to knock out our fixed, land-based targets.

IT WAS ALSO BEING INTERPRETED AS PRESIDENT CARTER'S OWN ATTEMPT TO REDUCE ARMS OR STRATEGIC WEAPONS DRASTICALLY EARLY IN HIS ADMINISTRATION. WERE THESE TWO OBJECTIVES COINCIDING IN THIS PROPOSAL, PRESIDENT CARTER'S AND YOURS?

Yes, I think that the this was the first time that a proposal as radical or as drastic as that had been put together. And I say over the time it took several months to develop it because it was right after President Carter came into office. It was put together as a good proposal, and yes it would have called for significant reductions in missiles.

THAT WAS TURNED DOWN, THEN WE WENT BACK TO GENEVA. THEN THE NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED. YOU AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JCS. WHAT WERE THEIR MAIN CONCERNS ONCE THIS PROPOSAL WAS REJECTED. WHAT THEN DID THEY THINK THEY COULD ACHIEVE THROUGH ARMS CONTROL?

Well, the Joint Chiefs' were concerned first over the unilateral right that the Soviets would have to these three hundred and eight super heavy missiles, and we did not have that right. Second they were concerned that the Backfire which was listed as an intercontinental bomber which was not being taken seriously by the Soviets and they were pushing it aside. And third they were very much concerned with many aspects of the verification problem which was a big stumbling block because we felt that, the Joint Chiefs felt that no treaty should be entered into which could not be verified. And there were many loopholes being inserted into the verification provisions by the Soviets even as late as December, 1978. They, they pushed through one large loophole on the encryption of telemetry, the so-called Article 15.3, the big loophole they drove into the verification provisions. These were some of the main concerns that they had.

WERE THEIR INTERESTS ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED BY THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION, BY WARNKE AND THE REST OF THE DELEGATION AT GENEVA, THE JOINT CHIEFS' INTEREST? DID YOU FEEL THE...

Well the I had my say and the chiefs had their say when they were back here at the various meetings but the fact that the secretary of state was supposed to be in charge of negotiations and he was very closely in tune with President Carter's ideas meant that very often the chiefs' views were downplayed. The question always came up not as would this be a good treaty but is this a treaty you could live with. This proposal one that would safeguard your interests, and they were always evaluating that kind of a question to see whether it was something we could live with.

WERE SOME OF THESE SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS, THE NEGOTIATION PROBLEMS SATISFACTORY TO THE CHIEFS?

To repeat the March '77 proposal; had the Soviets accepted the proposal that we put forth, had we insisted that this was a good deal from their point of view and ours, which it was, and had we stuck with that was a good proposal and we could've lived with it. It was the last one then throughout the period of negotiations until the final deal was struck. And along the way the Chiefs made repeated statements that the negotiation then being conducted would not adequately represent the security interests of the United States.

WERE WE ALLOWED TO BUILD A HEAVY MISSILE UNDER SALT, THE PROVISIONS OF SALT?

No, no, we were never allowed to, and the Soviets insisted that they have a unilateral advantage in this field. Subsequently we did say that we wanted to have a new missile system. And they said yes they would agree to one which would be as large as their medium missile, the SS-17 or -19 which they insisted calling a light. We called it a medium and they called it a light. And we were given authority to build a system up to that range or up to that limit but not one as big as their heavy missile.

I'D LIKE YOU TO TELL ME THE STORY OF THE BACKFIRE BOMBER AND TO ILLUSTRATE THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PROBLEMS WITH...

Well the Backfire bomber; there are several stories I could tell. One is that I sat down with my counterpart, General Trusov (?) one time and showed him a bunch of pictures, and an analysis that had been done in an international monthly magazine and took him step by step and showed him that the Backfire bomber could be of international range was of international range. He didn't disagree at any of the steps along the line. Finally he said, "Well, we just don't have any intention of using it that way." And I said, "Well, we don't deal in intentions ... we deal in capabilities." He said, "Well, we might have the capability but we don't have any intention of ever using it in that way." And I said, "Well, intentions can change." Later on, and it happened during that March of '77 period I got talking to Marshal Ogarkov who was then Marshal, charge of many of the forces in the Soviet Union. I guess he was chief of staff of the forces of the Soviet Union. And he said "Look, Backfire bomber can't reach United States. I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll put you in a Backfire bomber and head you towards the United States, and then I will you say you could bomb the United States and then land in Cuba. I'll have your widow waiting for you with flowers at Cuba because you'll never get to Cuba." And I said, "Well Marshal, if you will follow. Get in that plane with me the people will be sure to give it a full load of fuel and the terms, the demands, and I think we'll both get there. And my wife can give us both a bouquet of flowers in Cuba after we arrive. Having flown over the United States and come into Cuba." So there's one little leitmotif in the otherwise very often pretty mundane or dull and intense negotiations.

SO YOU WERE CONVINCED THAT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER WAS A STRATEGIC BOMBER?

Yes, we had "proof" -- proof as much as we could. I remember on one occasion Secretary Schlesinger had a bunch of experts come in and had them study the Backfire bomber over a period of 60 days. And we came in for a one hour briefing to determine whether or not whether this was an intercontinental bomber. That meeting lasted seven hours, and Schlesinger tried in every way to discredit and to trip up and show the assumption was faulty from all these experts. And he couldn't do it. So after that he became convinced that the Backfire was a heavy bomber, and I then was more convinced. I had intuitively felt so, and I had seen from other studies, had enough information. But after that seven hour session with a room full of experts who had studied for 60 days, I was then convinced that the intercont... Backfire did have these intercontinental capabilities.

SO WHY DIDN'T WE COUNT IT UP? WHY DIDN'T WE ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO HAVE THE COUNTER...

We, we, well, we wanted a deal. We wanted a deal, and we felt that we could exclude these and still get a deal and it wouldn't be that big a threat against the United States. But the missiles were the bigger threat because they were the fast-flying systems and therefore, the bombers didn't figure into the equation that much. The fallacy in that was, of course, that we don't have any air defenses, and the Soviets' do. Those days something like 40 times as much in the way of air defenses as we did. So we were quite vulnerable to an attack from bombers so, therefore, the chiefs felt and I supported them in their belief that the Backfire should be counted. But they were overruled, and there was a political decision, administrative, the administration made that well they'll try to limit the Backfire to a production rate of two and a half a month but not count them into the aggregate.

DID THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WANT A DEAL TOO BADLY, AND WAS THAT SORT OF EVIDENT TO THE SOVIETS AT THE TABLE?

Yes I think so. I think the Carter administration telegraphed to the Soviets that we were so anxious to get a deal that we would be willing to set the example and to turn the other cheek. And the fact that first that Carter's man Vance gave the fall-back position immediately after the original position was one evidence. But there are many others. The Carter administration stopped the Minute line -- the Minuteman line, it cancelled some submarines, it cancelled the cruise missile program. Had a long number of unilateral actions that it took to cut back our forces in order to show the Soviets an example. And this was, this happened in almost every field. Yes, the, not only did our proposals and our, and our words show the Soviets that we were trying to set the example. But our deeds showed the example. For example, in every area the Carter administration cut back. They cut out the B-1 bomber. They cut back the Minuteman line. They cut off plans for new follow on land-based missiles. They stretched out the submarine ballistic missile program. They cut back on the cruise missile program. So in every area we tried to set the example and show them by unilateral strength we were of good faith. And we didn't have to do that, I think. The Soviets were looking at what we were going to do and as I mentioned earlier they respect strength and they abhor weakness. And they look at that as a as a very bad thing from, they didn't want to negotiate with anybody they didn't respect, and they didn't have any real respect. This hurt me because I liked Carter and I'd worked with him and I'd worked on those earlier proposals. And here was a man of good faith and wanted to set the example. And I think his motives were absolutely pure. What he didn't understand were the Russians, and the Russians don't deal that way. And he just could never really bring himself to that realization.

BUT HE LATER APPROVED THE MX WHICH WAS PROBABLY THE ONE, IT'S BEEN CALLED THE BIGGEST WEAPONS SYSTEM SINCE THE H-BOMB.

Yes, I think somewhere about the beginning or spring of 1978 his Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, saw that if we were going to get into a treaty and look like we were going to get into a treaty we would have to begin modernizing our forces. That we'd cut back too much. And that we needed to not only have forces for leverage, for negotiation but to take care of our own security. So he started a number of steps and the MX was one of those. And he started upgrading the Minuteman. He brought the submarines back in, as I remember, back into production rates. So that was beginning to turn around late in the SALT II.

WAS THIS PART OF AN EFFORT TO GET THE JOINT CHIEFS ON BOARD ON SALT, TO GET THE CHIEFS ENDORSEMENT ON THE SALT II AGREEMENT?

Probably in part. I think they were listening closely to the Chiefs, and they wanted the Chiefs with them. And they saw the Chiefs predictions that if the treaty was going the way it was going that they could not endorse it. And they kept telling him that from after, certainly after Vladivostok on through right onto the spring of 1979. They kept telling him that that treaty which was being negotiated would not be a satisfactory one.

BUT IT WAS, AT LEAST THEY ENDORSED IT AS...

In the end most, not all, said that yes this is a modest but useful step. And so they changed their position of saying they were against the SALT II treaty that was being negotiated to saying that it was a modest but useful step.

YOU RESIGNED YOUR POSITION ABOUT THEN, IS THAT CORRECT? JUST AFTER THE TREATY WAS BEING SIGNED.

Yes, in January of 1979 after I had seen what happened at the so called Christmas Session just before Christmas in '78, when we had given several additional concessions, I told the chiefs that I thought this would not be a satisfactory treaty. And I asked to be relieved, and they said, "No, we would like you to stay on. You know where the skeletons are. You've been here longer than anybody else. You know our demands and our, what we would like to have here. We don't think you ought to resign and embarrass the administration. Think you ought to try to get a good deal. Then if the deal is cut and you're still unhappy, then we'll understand that you should, why you've resigned." And so they said please stay on until the treaty is signed. And I stayed on then until the 14th of June, 1979 when it was signed. Then that night I sent back a message saying I cannot in good conscience subscribe to this treaty. I asked to be relieved and was put on the retired list. And cable came back and said, "Your request is approved."

WERE YOU A LONE VOICE OR WERE YOU REPRESENTING SOME OF THEIR CONCERNS THAT THEY DIDN'T FEEL THEY COULD EXPRESS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND NOT TO EMBARRASS THE ADMINISTRATION?

Well, I was the only one to resign. There was one other chief who spoke out very much against the treaty. And that was the chief that represented the Marine Corps, and he testified against the treaty. Said it was not in our interest. But the other chiefs for one reason or another believed that somehow this could be a modest but useful step. They saw it as a stepping stone to a further agreement. I saw it as a chasm. I didn't think you could take two successive steps across this wide chasm, you'd fall through. You would codify and endorse a lot of the things you couldn't undo if you bought that particular treaty, the counting rules, and the verification provisions, and the unilateral rights, and so forth. So I saw it as a detriment. And I was in favor, and I've always been in favor of arms control, getting arms control agreement. I saw it not as a stepping stone to an agreement but an impediment, or as I said falling into a chasm, falling in between. So I retired on those grounds.

THIS WAS IN YOUR VIEWS, YOU TESTIFIED CLEARLY THAT THIS WAS AN UNFAVORABLE AGREEMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES. CAN YOU TELL US WHY IT WAS AN UNFAVORABLE AGREEMENT?

Yes, well the SALT II was an unfavorable agreement for a number of reasons but I can just mention the big three. And that is, first, it gave the Soviets a unilateral right to heavy missiles and did not allow us to get into that arena. Second, that it did not count the Backfire which had intercontinental capabilities. And third that it had the loose verification provisions. Now there were other reasons behind that which the experts knew about but which were not prominent in testimony, such as SALT II was counting the wrong thing. It was counting launchers, and it should have counted missiles or even more specifically warheads on missiles. A launcher is like a rifle tube or a shotgun tube it'll shoot out a bullet or shotgun pellets but you can reload that rifle just as you can reload the missiles silos or you could put more warheads on missiles in those launchers without counting more launchers. And that's what the Soviets did. They produced a missile with four, and then six, and then ten warheads. And we stopped having half of our missiles with one warhead and half with three. So they have a tremendous advantage in warheads. And this was another big reason that subsequently had to be turned around in our later, in our START negotiations.

DO YOU FEEL THAT THE MX WAS A GOOD SYSTEM? DID IT DO SOMETHING TO REPRESS THE SO CALLED WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY?

Oh yes, yes. The MX was a well-conceived system for two reasons. One maybe three reasons. One it would have had more warheads on a missile. Second the warheads would have accuracy which could not be built into the Minuteman system any longer. And third it was given a way to move around and not become vulnerable. So from all three counts of having more accurate systems and more warheads on the missiles themselves and being relatively invulnerable by being moveable, it was a good system.

WERE THE JOINT CHIEFS IN FAVOR OF THE MX?

Yes, yes, the joint chiefs were in favor of the MX.

AGAIN I'M GOING TO GO BACK TO WHY THE JOINT CHIEFS ENDORSED SALT. THAT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN A VERY BIG VICTORY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ONE WAY IN WHICH THEY COULD HAVE AT SOME POINT HAD TO THE TREATY RATIFIED. THEY GOT SOME CONCESSIONS ON ACCOUNT OF THAT, DID THEY NOT? IN TERMS OF THE MILITARY BUDGET AND IN TERMS OF SOME OF THE WEAPONS SYSTEM THAT CAME ON LINE.

Well I think that there was that as the undertone or the background. I can't point to any specific lists but they'd seen at Secretary Brown had recognized the growing vulnerability of our own systems and was trying to redress those and that this trend was in motion. They felt that we could continue that trend. We would eventually come back to a point where we could say that it was a good treaty. And there were a number of reasons of that type which must've gone through their minds as to why they finally said that this was a modest but useful step. They were not overjoyed with it but they testified they could live with it.

SPECIFICALLY WHAT CONCESSIONS, YOU MENTIONED THAT IN DECEMBER, THE CHRISTMAS NEGOTIATIONS OF 1978 WERE KIND OF THE FINAL POINT FOR YOU TO DECIDE TO RESIGN. WHAT CONCESSIONS IN PARTICULAR DO YOU THINK...

I think, yes, the biggest concession that we gave the Soviets in December of '78 was the provision which allowed them to encrypt the telemetry of their missiles, in other words scramble the signals of their tests for missiles. Up to that time, we'd insisted that since we didn't encrypt telemetry, they shouldn't encrypt telemetry and that this should not be done. We then, as a compromise move put together by Mr. Vance and then the head of the arms control agency, said that well we would buy the Soviet formula that they will be permitted encryption but not that encryption which would impede the provisions of the treaty. And this to me was a non sequitur. It was saying that that which is in a sealed envelope doesn't matter and they didn't know what was in the sealed envelope. And if it could be in the sealed envelope it would have to matter or why were the Soviets trying to hide it. They had nothing to hide. They should not want to hide messages in this sealed envelope. So why did they want to encrypt telemetry except to circumvent the treaty and to get around it. And that to me was the, was the straw that broke the camel's back.

AMBASSADOR, I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU A QUESTION ABOUT THE OPENING OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND DID THE SOVIETS, DID THAT AFFECT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN GENEVA?

Yes. I think it definitely affected them because I remember when the announcement was made the Soviets seemed stunned and while they didn't talk about it, it was certainly on their minds. And the very next morning the Soviets reopened problems which had been agreed between us before and even introduced new problems which had never been introduced in negotiations before and we were scrambling to try to deal with new situations right at the spur of the moment while Gromyko and Vance were there in Geneva there in late December. So all this I'm, had a definite effect on the on the slow down of negotiations and either the Soviets decided that they wanted to wait and see how this would all come out, or to try to see if they could get further concessions from us, and of course they did get the concessions on the encryptions on telemetry. This is where they finally got official word that we would not count the Backfire bomber. That was agreed to at that time. They were told officially that we would not insist on having a missile on our side. So these things all happened in the wake of the China announcement.

WAS THERE IN EFFECT ANY LINKAGE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES, BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET IN ETHIOPIA AND THEIR PRESENCE IN AFRICA, ETC. WERE THE NEGOTIATIONS SLOWED DOWN AT ALL?

Officially there was no linkage. Officially the statement was that these are separate negotiations, that they're unrelated to anything else. In reality I always felt there was linkage. I'm a realist about these things. I don't think you can divorce things completely, of, in one arena from another. So I think that there's always a question of linkage to some degree or other. And I've seen, certainly since that time, that it's continued to be so. I saw the breakdown of a meeting between Haig and Gromyko over the Solidarnosc meeting when the Poles went the Polish trade union was hurt. Of course again you saw the, Carter withdrawing the agreement from consideration after Afghanistan. So to me linkage always exists and might have been more stark in those two examples that I've given. But I think that they're always in the background and they'll always color your views of what are happening because arms control is a part of a larger process. In that you can't have arms control in the absence of an improved East-West relationship. You have to have improved East-West relationship and then arms control has a way of succeeding. But if you got an arms-control agreement, did not improve East-West relationship the arms-control agreement would come apart.

IN 1978, THE SPRING OF '78, RELATIONS WERE GETTING WORSE, ESSENTIALLY BECAUSE OF ETHIOPIA, THE HORN OF AFRICA, ETC. AT THAT TIME WERE THE TALKS AFFECTED?

Well, this is a it has to be, you have to, I have to give you a subjective answer. I couldn't go back and document whether any particular thing was directly involved because there were no instructions or orders given. I had the feeling that they were affected and I've always had the feeling that arms-control negotiations did not occur in a vacuum. They occur between real live people who are representative of real live and existing governments and they have their policies. And they certainly have to be affected and brought into the balance.

AMBASSADOR WARNKE HAS TOLD US THAT SOME OF HIS CLEARANCES WERE SLOWED DOWN SO THAT THERE WAS SOME SORT OF OFFICIAL ATTEMPT AT LINKING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO SOVIET BEHAVIOR. DO YOU SENSE ANY OF THIS?

I'm not privy to any documentation or any specific instance where because of some event, something was slowed down. My sensing is that it was slowed down because of this feeling the feelings that were running at the time.

ONE MORE QUESTION... YOU'RE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THEY BUY THE TREATY, YOU DON'T. IT SORT OF SEEMS...

Well, you see, they I don't, let me, let me, let me try...

Wait a minute...wait, wait, stop... That statement is incorrect. Because it was at least the commandant of the Marine Corps who was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and clearly didn't, so you can't say the chiefs bought it. Some of the chiefs bought it.

BUT GENERAL JONES TESTIFIED IN FAVOR OF IT...

Okay, but I mean you know there was still...

LET'S ASK HIM THAT ... GENERAL JONES WAS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ACCEPTED THE TREATY AND TESTIFIED IN FAVOR OF IT. YOU HAD BEEN THE REPRESENTATIVE TO SALT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND YOU TESTIFIED AGAINST IT. IS THERE AN INCONGRUITY IN THIS? COULD YOU EXPLAIN YOUR POSITION?

The position my position was that I told the chiefs what was happening and they agreed with me as we were going along that the treaty was not in our interests. And as late as January '79, when I said I could not see my way clear to endorsing this treaty, they said, "We agree with you and we see your point of view." Later on when the treaty was signed at the official level I decided that this was not a stepping stone and was not a way to another agreement. And the chiefs as I remember individually testified they were not wild about the treaty and were not enthusiastic about it, but they said that they felt under the circumstances it could be a modest but useful step. One of the chiefs did not. The commandant of Marine Corps was outspoken and did not change his mind that had been expressed earlier that this would be a bad treaty to enter into. The others were willing to agree that this could be a modest but useful step. I was ready to resign. They had their own reasons for going along with it and maybe they weren't ready to resign and maybe they had other reasons.

IN SOME WAY THIS PROGRAM WE'RE DOING RAISES A BIG QUESTION, HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS? I MEAN, VANCE HAD HIS VIEWS, BRZEZINSKI HAD HIS VIEWS, AND NIXON HAD VIEWS. FROM YOUR EXPERIENCES IN THE '70S, HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS?

CAN YOU NEGOTIATE WITH THEM EFFECTIVELY AND WHAT IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM?

Yes. You can negotiate effectively with the Soviets but you need first of all a lot of continuity in your own position. Cause we were under certain very great disadvantages vis-a-vis a closed society. In an open society people know counter arguments and they know a lot about our intelligence picture and the closed society doesn't have to reveal these secrets and don't. And they don't have a constituency with the people the way our, ours does. And they don't have a legislature which they have to deal with. So you're under a certain very great disadvantages. With those disadvantages though, if you have a coherent proposal and you can demonstrate to the Soviets over a long period of time that something will be in their interest as well as yours, and you stick to and you're patient, and you deal from a position of strength, then you can get a deal. You cannot deal from a position of weakness. You cannot set the example and believe that by setting the example, they're going to follow. You have to have something to give up in other words. And many times the Soviets would say, "Well, look. We're ready to give up things. What are you ready to give up?" And my answer was, "You want me to build up to your level only to have to come down?" But it was a very realistic question to ask and it was only after the Reagan administration started to redress the great imbalance, started to modernize his forces, not in a destabilizing way. They didn't try to match the Soviets in heavy missiles and a number of missiles they built but began building submarines, reintroduced the B-1 bomber, began bringing more accuracy into the missiles they had, very importantly began developing cruise missiles in large numbers and began developing stealth technology, things like that. You now had things to trade with the Soviets. And the Soviets understand that. So the object of the exercise is to be patient and to continue to show them that they have something to gain as well as you do. But also be able to offer something and in the process of having to offer them something, not doing those things which they're doing, so that you don't... further destabilize the situation. So we had to try to, and did develop systems which would assure us deterrence without being threatening to them. And this was difficult. But I think it by and large proved out to be the way to deal with the Soviets in the last six and a half years.