ASKS WHAT REAGAN ASKED HIM TO DO IN 1982 WHEN HE SET UP COMMISSION?

The charge basically was to review all of our strategic forces and to try to solve the problem of the ICBM force which had become such an issue in American politics. So basically it was to try to solve the problem of the ICBM but in the context of all of the strategic forces.

WHY WAS IT A PROBLEM?

There had developed....

RESTARTS HIM.

It had become a problem because there had developed an impasse between the executive and the Congress over the need basically for a new ICBMs but basically on how to deploy it. And the Reagan administration had rejected the Carter administration for it, and had proposed various other deployments. None of those turned out to be satisfactory to the Congress. And so by the end of 1982, when the closely spaced basing recommendation of the Administration was rejected by the Congress, there was an impasse between the two branches. And the Commission was suggested really by the Congress as a way to resolve the problem.

ASKS CHARGE TO COMMISSION.

The charge really was to review US strategic forces and to find a way to, to resolve the issue of the ICBM force and its modernization.

ASKS WHY THE SERIOUS CONGRESS/ADMINISTRATION IMPASSE.

The Reagan administration came into office. They rejected the proposed deployment of the MX missile that the Carter administration had proposed. And they came up with a variety of different suggestions for deploying it, none of which were acceptable to the Congress. So by the end of 1982, when the latest recommendation, that for closely spaced basing, was rejected by the Congress, a commission seemed the only way to resolve the impasse between the two.

WAS CONGRESS OBJECTING BASING MODE OR USING THAT OBJECTION TO OBJECT TO THE MISSILE ITSELF?

There were a variety of different attitudes in the Congress. The..a number didn't want the MX at all. A number wanted to abandon it for a different kind of, of missile. And others thought we needed nothing at all. Others supported the MX very strongly. So there were a variety of attitudes on the Hill.

WHY HAD IT BECOME SO DEEP AND BITTER?

One of the problems was that we were asking a lot of a new missile. That it had to do everything for everybody. And every proposal which was made had some kind of a flaw in it, it was not perfect. Not perfect in the way that the Minuteman III when it was first deployed seemed to fit, seemed to, to resolve all of the issues. It was accurate enough, it was survivable enough, it had good command and control. All the things you would like, the Minuteman III had. We were looking for a substitute for that, something which would solve all of our problems at once and it turned out to be very, very difficult.

ASKS HIM TO ELABORATE.

Well. The basic problem was how to make it survivable, how to make it something that was not supposedly a first-strike weapon. Also, to make it big enough to carry a number of accurate warheads. To make it cheap enough that it could be deployed. All of those things.

ASKS HOW MAKING IT SURVIVABLE MADE IT NOT A FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON?

Well the theory was that if it was not survivable, if it could be destroyed by an attack on the Soviet Union, then there would be pressure in a crisis to launch it first, so that it would not be destroyed, and that that would be destabilizing.

ASKS HIS PERSONAL GOAL IN PROCESS.

My personal goal. I guess when I first, when I first agreed to do it ray notion was, was that the task was to find a decent burial for the MX because I was dubious that a solution to the problem could be found. But then gradually as we got into it, it didn't look quite so hopeless. And then the goal became how to end the impasse on ICBM force and to move ahead with a modernization program. And also to more closely-integrate weapon systems development with arms control.

WHAT LED HIM TO THAT CONCLUSION?

Well I... no. Not the best and I thought that was, that was probably the best one could do under the circumstances. That the impasse between the Congress and the President was so deep, so strong, that... no, no resolution of it was possible.

WAS THERE A TURNING POINT WHERE THERE WAS A WAY TO SAVE THE MISSILE?

No, I don't think there was any particular point at which you can say, yes we found a solution. It gradually developed in the course of our analysis of what the problem was, what the attempts had been to solve it before, and so on. It was a gradual development of a consensus of how to deal with it.

ASKS ABOUT PROCESS OF WORKING WITH CONGRESSIONAL FACTIONS AND THE ADMINISTRATION.

Well one of the first things we tried to do was to work with the Congress. The attitude on Capitol Hill after the collapse of the closely spaced bas... basing proposal was very bad. There was a feeling of rancor toward the Defense Department and so early on we sought the views of influential Congressmen and sought to give them the sense that they were participating in the process. The other thing we did, in the, in the Commission itself was inasmuch as we had people with varying backgrounds, some knew a great deal about the issue, some not so much, was not to start right out saying, Alright, what do we do? But instead to go back over to review the history of US-Soviet strategic force relationships, of arms control, of previous attempts to solve this problem, so on. Some of them very highly technical. Go through all the intelligence. So we took, we spent a lot of time simply understanding why we were where we were.

ASKS ROLE OF CONGRESSMEN?

In meeting with people like Congressmen Aspin and Dicks, and a number of senators and so on, what we sought was to see what the limits of acceptability may be on Capitol Hill, what sort of ideas they had—and a number of them are very knowledgeable in this area. And how we might be able to craft a solution which both met the strategic needs as we saw them of the United States and also the political requirements of acceptability on Capitol Hill. So they played a very important role.

ASKS LIMITS THEY SET?

Well I don't know that they set limits but what, what gradually developed was what we ended up with and that was a kind of a three-part solution to the whole problem, designed to appeal to a variety of interests, not all of them, most of them overlapping but not all of them similar. The first to deploy an MX for those who felt it essential that we have that sort of thing. To recommend the development of a small single warhead missile for those who felt that the MX was, was a mistake, that instead our strategic forces ought to move clearly in the direction of clear survivable systems. And lastly as I said to integrate arms control with, with the modernization of our strategic forces, so that we got in a political sense people who supported the MX, would accept the small missile as a way to get the MX, people who didn't like the MX but liked the small missile, but would accept the MX because of the small missile. And people who perhaps didn't feel any modernization was necessary but in order to get the Reagan administration active in arms control would support a strategic modernization. So that from a purely political sense it was that kind of a combination which got a variety of different coalitions together.

WHO DID YOU INTERACT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION AND HOW DID IT GO?

With, with Judge Clark and with Bud MacFarlane and Secretary Weinberger. Basically.

SO...

As we got along we also had, had a couple of good meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

WHAT EMERGED FROM WORKING WITH THEM?

Well it depended. Judge Clark was, was very supportive, very helpful and didn't try to steer the boat. Secretary Weinberger had, had some very strong feelings, and we didn't always, we didn't always see eye to eye about them. But he and I met frequently and they were always amicable meetings but he had his own views and we had our own sense of the imperatives, if we, if we were to solve the problem.

WHAT DID HE WANT TO SEE?

Well he was a strong...

RESTARTS HIM

Secretary Weinberger was a strong supporter of closely spaced basing and of a full-MX deployment, and that's the way he saw the problem.

HE WASN'T HAPPY WITH MINUTEMAN TALK?

Not particularly.

[DIRECTS]

No. He was not enthusiastic about the small missile. He was worried about the development of two missiles rather than one, the expenses and he felt that it was not the best way to go.

REFERS TO REMARKS ON SURVIVABILITY AS PRECLUDING FIRST-STRIKE. WHY IN 1983 WAS IT OK IN THE REPORT TO HAVE MX?

What we did is divide the problem into two parts and, and rather than try to find one missile which solved the whole problem, we divided the problem up and part of the requirements we gave to the MX and part to the small missile. For the short term we felt it was very important to deploy a moderate number of highly accurate ICBM warheads. That for perhaps the period of, of a decade or so that those missiles in silos would be sufficiently survivable because while the Soviets with their test missiles could conclude they had enough accuracy to destroy them, that was far different from actually mounting an attack with operational missiles with all the problems and soon. And we felt that perhaps for another decade they were adequately survivable. Then if we for a long-term survivability went to a mobile single warhead missile that was fully survivable, that when that was developed that also would lend survivability to the MX in silos because the Soviets would have less incentive to attack the MX in the silos if they knew that there was a large number of missiles they could not successfully attack. So that was the rationale behind it.

ASKS ABOUT WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY.

Well that window of vulnerability was a slogan and it really developed for very different reasons. We didn't deny it. Nor did we accept it. We said, one can calculate what the technical as well as the strategic vulnerability of silo-based weapons is. Whatever it is, it's going to get greater as time goes on and Soviet missiles get more accurate. Therefore the problem has to be solved. We felt that our solution which took advantage of time and got us a deployment at the earliest possible moment as well, best aided stability.

WAS HE HAPPY WITH REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO THE REPORT?

Yes I think so. They accepted the response completely, so it would be difficult not to be happy with it.

WAS WEINBERGER HAPPY WITH REPORT?

Oh I wouldn't want to characterize his reaction to it. He accepted it. He announced publicly that he supported it. There was a lack of enthusiasm which has remained to this day in part of the Defense Department about the development of the small missile. There's no question about that. But I think in fact what we did is allow the strategic modernization program to go forward and that was important to everybody, the Congress and the President. And therefore I think yes, they were happy with it.

HAVE YOU BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH THEIR LACK OF ENTHUSIASM ABOUT THE SMALL MISSILE?

Oh of course. I think well, there are several things that are unfortunate. I think the small missile, while it, while there's no question it's very expensive, I think it is still a very important direction for the United States. I think it's also unfortunate that, that our recommendations came when they did, on the eve of an election year because the coalition that was put together in support of our recommendations really didn't survive the elections of 1984. It, it broke apart and the Congress failed to... failed to approve 100 MXs and the administration at least made noises about backing away from the small missile, each accusing the other of bad faith.

AS IF IT WERE A BARGAINING CHIP FOR MIDGETMAN?

Well for the Congress that's true. As a matter of fact, the administration looked at the Midget-man as a way to get its MX by and large, not the Air Force but the Defense Department as a whole. And the Congress by and large viewed the MX as the price one had to pay to get the Midgetman.

BUT IF WE CAN'T GET BOTH...

Well we already have or will have 50 MXs. They have, that much has been approved. The question is whether or not we will eventually get the Midgetman and the other 50 MXs which the administration wants.

DOES HE WANT THE OTHER 50 MXS?

Oh yes, yes. I think they are important.

ASKS IF COMMISSION MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET RID OF MX AND SUBSTITUTE MIDGETMAN. WHY WASN'T THAT DONE?

It wasn't done for a variety of reasons. I think the basic one is the strategic reason that we felt that we did, that there was a strategic imbalance. A strategic imbalance in fast, fast flying, accurate warheads. And that that imbalance could be important in a crisis situation where the Soviets could make miscalculations based on their superiority in those quick, quick reaction warheads. Therefore we felt that we had to take steps early to rectify at least in part that imbalance. The Midget-man was a long ways away in development and therefore we felt that a limited deployment of the MX was a very important move.

WAS MORE MXS NOT A BARRIER TO BUILDING MORE MIDGETMAN?

Yes, that always was a possibility that, as I said before, the... developing two missiles was expensive. And that there could be an argument that when we had the MX we really didn't need the Midgetman. But we felt that risk was, was worth trying, was worth running in order to get all of our strategic problems dealt with the way we felt that the two missiles did.

ASKS ABOUT ASPIN AND DICKS AND HOW THEY REACTED TO THE REPORT.

Well I think he... I think he and others, Democrats, who supported our recommendations came under fire basically for supporting the Administration. And it was less the specifics of it than it was the general idea of supporting the administration. So I think it was partisan political heat, not, not grounded fundamentally in, in strategic differences.

PERHAPS BECAUSE CONGRESS HAD BEEN PUSHING FOR SURVIVABLE BASING MODES FOR TEN YEARS?

Yes in part. One of the real problems of course with, with the survivable basing mode was that the administration, the Reagan administration, rejected the multiple protective shelter of the Carter administration. And while that was not a grand solution to the problem, it did, it was a reasonable approach. So with that gone it made it very, very difficult without going to very esoteric kinds of deployments to get reasonable survivability.

WAS REAGAN WRONG TO CANCEL MPS, AND DID THEY REGRET IT?

First, yes, I think it was a mistake.

(DIRECTS)

I think it was a mistake for the Reagan administration to turn away from the multiple protective shelters. It did have some flaws but it was a program which had been accepted on the Hill. I think the Reagan administration could have said, well it isn't what we would have chosen, had we been starting afresh, but the program is already underway, a lot of work has been done, we will go ahead with it. Whether or not they subsequently regretted not going ahead, I doubt. Because they have maintained an opposition to anything resembling an MPS deployment down to nearly the end of the administration.

WAS HE ASKED TO BE ON FIRST TOWNES PANEL?

Yes I was.

RECALLS HISTORY LEADING TO CREATION OF TOWNES PANEL. WHAT WAS THE MISSION OF THAT PANEL?

The mission of the Townes Panel was to find the best technical deployment for the MX. Not, not to deal... it was a much narrower charter than the later Commission had.

WAS THE TOWNES PANEL TOLD MPS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION?

No, not directly.

WAS IT DISTURBING TO BE ON IT?

No, it wasn't a disturbing experience. We were widely, widely split and we had majority and minority reports, but no, it was, it was an interesting experience. And what the basic, the basic recommendation of the first Townes Panel was for a modified MPS deployment which was rejected by the administration.

WAS THAT THE MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION?

The majority. The majority recommended the deployment of MX in silos but in such a configuration that if we did not get arms control, for example with the Soviet Union, it could be expanded into an MPS system.

WHAT THAT CONCLUSION REPRESSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION?

No it was...I wouldn't say it was repressed. It was ignored pretty much.

THE CONCLUSION WAS IGNORED?

Yes. And the administration then proposed I think to put 40 in the, in the Titan silos temporarily. They looked at an airborne system which the Townes panel also suggested looking into. And then they finally came up with closely spaced basing.

WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THAT?

Closely spaced basing is a highly technical solution to the problem of survivable, technical and probably unprovable as to whether or not it would actually work. Because it depended on theories of fratricide, that is of one incoming warhead destroying others for its success. And one really had to come to judgments based on experts' analyses which differed greatly as to whether or not that would work. And so it was, it was...too technical, too difficult a deployment to try to explain and to get accepted. Because it was really beyond the ability of a layman to satisfy himself that it would work.

WHAT DID THAT SAY TO YOU WHEN THEY CAME UP AGAIN AND AGAIN WITH SAME MPS SOLUTION--AND THAT WAS REJECTED?

Well, that made it quite clear that the administration was for a variety of reasons not going to accept an MPS kind of solution.

WHY WERE THEY AGAINST IT?

I think a, because it was a recommendation of the Carter administration.

(DIRECTS)

The... the MPS solution I think was rejected by the Reagan administration both because it did have some flaws. If there were no arms control, the Soviets could just build enough warheads to overcome it. And also because it looked like an arms control gimmick. It looked it was being devised by arms controllers. And the Reagan administration came in with a kind of an antipathy to arms control interfering with weapons development and I think they developed this attitude toward MPS which remained as long as Secretary Weinberger was in office.

NOTES THAT THE REPORT WANTED ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS? WAS HE HAPPY WITH STEPS ADMINISTRATION TOOK TO MEET THAT?

It was a, it was a hard fight but yes, yes, and by October of, of 83, the administration had significantly modified its proposals for strategic arms control. And made a real negotiation possible, I think. So yes, the administration didn't do everything that perhaps some of us would have wanted yes, but they fundamentally changed their approach.

WHAT DID THEY REALLY GIVE UP?

What did the administration give in on? Well initially they gave in on the Midgetman, on building the Midgetman. And they also agreed to be more forthcoming on arms control, and also to look at arms control more closely integrated with our strategic programs rather as something one does off to the side.

WHAT IS HIS BIGGEST ACHIEVEMENT?

Well I was very pleased with the outcome of the report. The fact that it was a unanimous report of the Commission. And that was about five years ago now, four and a half years ago. And I'm still very comfortable with the conclusions, despite the changes in the strategic environment. In the interim, I'm, I still think the recommendations are very sound. It's hard, it's hard to beat that in this field.

IS CONSENSUS STILL THERE?

It's in, it's in a state of disarray if it, if it hasn't broken down. The Russians seem to be moving much more along the recommendations of our Commission than does the United States. The... In the Defense Department, not in the Air Force but in the office of the Secretary, there is only lukewarm support for the Midgetman, especially under the budg... budget pressures which are coming now. And it is quite possible that could be, funding could be withdrawn for that. On the Hill, of course the MX program has been cut from 100 to 50 and I think that getting the other 50 funded is going to be a very, very difficult job. So yes. There has been, it's only been a... well it hasn't been a success so far.

ASKS ABOUT SOVIETS TAKING RECOMMENDATIONS UP MORE STRONGLY. WHAT DOES HE MEAN?

Well. The Soviets, since the, since the Commission report, have come out with, with two new ICBMs, both of them are going to be mobile. And I think that, you know, that the heart of our recommendation was to move toward mobility as the best assurance for survivability.

BUT MOBILITY OF SMALL ICBM MAY BE VERY EXPENSIVE PART OF IT. IT'S THE LEAD BALLOON TIED AROUND IT. SHOULD IT BE MOBILE? WOULD IT WORK IN A LESS EXPENSIVE BASING MODE?

It would, it would work but it would not be survivable and while it would be relatively more expensive to destroy it than the value you'd get from destroying it, it still doesn't accomplish what we felt which was to make an attack on it not remunerative. And as long as the Soviets have ample warheads, and right now they do, they can afford to attack each silo with a Midgetman in it. If arms control got down, reduced the numbers to the point that each warhead was very valuable, then putting them in silos would be very, would be fine. And if each side only had single warhead missiles, and a relatively equal number, then there's no need for mobility. But we're a long ways from that now.

SUGGESTS REAGAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF DEFENSE WAS SO DIFFERENT FROM SCOWCROFT'S, IT IS SURPRISING THAT HE WAS CHOSEN TO HEAD COMMISSION?

We weren't working on the Soviet force structure in a sense, but we did feel that the overall efforts, both in strategic weapons programs and in arms control should be to improve the stability of the balance, so that the character of the weapons systems themselves should not be an incentive to turn a crisis into a conflict. In other words you should not have vulnerable systems and those that you had to worry about if you didn't use them first they would be destroyed. And we felt that was useful on both sides. It would not... it would not end the chances of having a conflict, but it would reduce the chances of having a conflict neither side wanted. Now the administration was not on that same wavelength at least in the beginning although I think, I think it is more generally accepted now than, that it was at the time.

WHAT WAS DIFFERENT ABOUT THEIR APPROACH?

I think they still...

DIRECTS

The Administration's approach

(RESTARTS HIM).

The Administration's approach was not focused nearly so much on arms control as it was on developing a force structure which either matched that of the Soviets or was adequate for the missions that the administration felt. Now we did the same thing but our focus was to do it and accomplish other things as well. I think that's the principle difference between the two.

ASKS HIM TO BE MORE EXPLICIT.

Well. I think that the administration was less interested in integrating strategic systems and arms control and trying and focusing on if you will the issue of stability as a goal for both, and instead they were focused on the asymmetry, if you will, between the forces of the two sides and focused on reducing that asymmetry by the development and deployment of the MX missile.

ASKS ABOUT VULNERABILITY, SILOS. ASKS IF RUSSIANS WOULD FEEL THAT IF AMERICANS PUT MISSILES IN SILOS THEY MEAN THEM AS FIRST STRIKE FORCE?

No, I don't think so, I don't think so. Because I think the rationale that we used to do it and, and we deliberately recommended a number which was not adequate to represent, to give us a capability for a full first strike against Soviet ICBM force. And therefore, you know, what we wanted to do was worry the Soviets but not to scare them so that in effect they thought we did have a first strike force and were going for it. One would have to take compensatory measures. That would have defeated what we were trying to do. So we wanted to worry them. We wanted them to know that we had a force capable of use, first if we had to, but not one designed to destroy their offensive capability.

WHAT DID HE THINK OF RAIL GARRISON PROPOSAL?

Rail garrison is, is a useful proposal as long as we understand what it is and what it is not. It is not a survivable basing mode in the sense that the Midgetman mobility is, for example, because it depends on strategic warning. As long as the missiles are in their garrison they are highly vulnerable. Much more so than in silos, in the Minuteman silos where the MX is now. If one has ample warning and acts on the basis of the warning and gets the missiles out on the rail system, then they are highly survivable. So that as long as one recognizes that in any kind of a surprise attack or in an attack where we have not already reacted by putting them out, they are very vulnerable.

ASKS WHICH HE WOULD SELECT IF HE HAD ONLY ONE—RAIL GARRISON, MORE MXS, MIDGETMAN?

Well I don't think they are substitutes for each other. I'd like to have both. I support the other 50 MXs in a rail garrison mode and I would have no problem moving the current 50 out of silos into, into rail garrison. But I think it's important if we do that to have the Midgetman, because we definitely need an ICBM force that does not depend on warning for survivability.

DOES IT DEPEND ON SOVIET COOPERATION TO HAVE THIS VISION OF STABILITY?

No, no. To have stability on both sides, of course, we think it's in the Soviet's self-interest to do the same thing. I mean neither side ought to want to have its ICBM forces vulnerable. And therefore in self interest each side ought to move toward survivability. And the Soviets are in fact are doing that. So it's not a cooperative effort even though we think that the results are beneficial to the strategic balance.

DID THE SOVIETS HAVE HIDING ADVANTAGES?

Yes they do. Their principle advantage is that there isn't a problem...

(INTERRUPTS).

The Soviets do have an advantage over, in mobility as compared to the United States in that they do not have to worry about the public interface. It would be absolutely impossible in the United States to put missiles out on roads, on the railroads, whatever, in peacetime. It simply could not be done. The Soviets do not have that kind of a problem. On the other hand much of the Soviet territory is unsuited for big missiles overland. Their rail net is much thinner than that of the United States. So it's not completely one sided. But by and large the Soviets have an easier time with mobility than does the United States. It's very difficult for us to deploy mobile systems, very difficult.

WOULD HE HAVE OPTED 10 YEARS AGO FOR A MISSILE WITH FEWER WARHEADS, BUT EASIER TO MOVE AROUND?

No. I would still go with the single warhead missile because I think that multiple warheads provide an incentive for attack. And while it's cheaper, the more warheads you can put on one delivery vehicle, the cheaper you can make it. It is conducive to instability and therefore I think one of the major directions of both sides ought to go in arm control is to reduce the MIRVed forces on each side.

WOULD HE OPT TO CUT MIRVED, USING MIDGETMAN?

I certainly would although we'll never do that because the non-MIRVed... I certainly support cutting the MIRVed forces in any arms control between the US and the Soviet Union. We won't start by cutting out the MIRVed forces because by and large they are the new modern forces. And the single warhead missiles, except for the Soviets' SS-25 are, are old missiles. But I think that in conjunction with arms control and modernization, we ought to encourage modernization by developing non-MIRVed missiles and then in arms control to reduce, to reduce MIRVed weapons.

BUT ARMS CONTROL HAS CREATED A PROBLEM: IT GIVES INCENTIVE TO GROUP WARHEADS ON MISSILES BECAUSE THEY COUNT LAUNCHERS. THEN MPS SYSTEM WAS MADE EXPENSIVE BECAUSE OF VERIFICATION CONCERNS. THEN CARTER OPTING FOR THIS MISSILE TO TRADE OFF. WHAT DOES THAT SAY ABOUT...

What all of this says about arms control and strategic forces is that for too long they were handled and looked at by different parts of the executive branch. And the arms control people were over here and the weapons development people were over here. And one of the things we recommend strongly is to bring them all together so that we looked at arms control and weapons developments as part of an overall strategic policy, and one could not ignore the consequences of decisions and arms control. Like for example, counting silos and therefore ending up forcing the weapons developers to put as many warheads as they could on the only thing that counted which was, which was a silo. Those were the kinds of things that we argued really ought to push us in the direction of integrating arms control and strategic force development.

IS THEIR HOPE FOR CONSENSUS IN A UNIFIED PROGRAM OF THAT TYPE?

Yes it is. We have made some progress but there's been an additional new element introduced and that is the Strategic Defense Initiative, and that brings up all different kinds of calculations as to whether or not you need an ICBM force, whether you can defend it with the Strategic Defense Initiative rather than go to mobility or anything like this. So that we have not by any means solved our strategic problems.

WASN'T HIS COMMISSION WORKING ON THIS WHEN SDI WAS ANNOUNCED IN 1983?

Yes we were.

WERE ANY OF YOU INFORMED? WERE YOU STARTLED? HOW DID IT FIT INTO THE REVIEW OF ALL STRATEGIC FORCES?

We were startled. We knew about it I think the day before the speech. Yes, we decided that the only way we could do it, at least for our initial report, was to ignore, to ignore it. Because it was only a speech. It had nothing behind it. We didn't understand the rationale or anything. So we did ignore it in our first report and dealt with it in a minor way in our last report.

WITH THAT AND ICELAND CONFERENCE, WAS IT POSSIBLE TO TRUST ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON DETERRENCE AND MODERNIZING FORCES?

It's not at all clear to me that, that the administration at the present time does have an overall strategic concept that relates offensive forces to defensive forces to SDI to arms control. That's not at all clear to me.

SOME FEEL SDI CAME FROM DEBATES OVER MX...THERE WAS NO WAY TO BASE IT SURVIVABLY WHICH MEANT THEY HAD TO BUILD A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM.

I think SDI did have its roots, insofar as those roots come out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the frustration over this decade-long attempt to find a survivable basing for our offensive forces. And I think part of the conclusion was that we simply could not continue to compete with the Soviets in the area of, of ballistic missiles and instead we had to go in a different direction which was strategic defense.

WHY WERE DEFENSE SYSTEMS TURNED DOWN AS SOLUTION TO VULNERABILITY PROBLEM?

Well they hadn't... They had been turned down before because tech... technically they simply were not far enough advanced that they could not be defeated by a much cheaper offensive force. They were too easy to overwhelm. So that they simply didn't make sense to, to use rather than mobility to protect ICBM forces. But we, in our Commission, we did recommend research into, into defensive systems to protect ICBM force, because especially with something like an MPS, a mobile deployment, you get a lot of leverage out of your defensive forces. All they have to do is defend the areas where the missiles are and since the Soviets don't know where they are they have to fire at, at a lot of empty, empty holes. So that you can use defense in a way which makes, gives you a lot of leverage.

HOW IMPORTANT WAS CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S ROLE?

Oh I think it was extremely important. I think Congressman Aspin's role was, was extremely important. There were others who also played a vital role but he was, he was instrumental in, in working with us, in giving us a sense of, of what would work and what wouldn't work. And also in, in carrying through on the Hill with his colleagues to try to support the recommendations of the Commission. And he still continues to do that.

ASKS IF HE DRAWS ANY LESSONS?

In designing the MX I think we made a mistake at the outset and the Air Force in arguing for a more modern missile thought that the simple and most persuasive way to get it was to say we needed a more survivable missile, that the Soviet missiles were getting more accurate. In fact, what they should have said was the Minuteman is getting old and we need to modernize it. But by talking the vulnerability and so then they had to solve the problem. And it's a problem that turned out to be virtually insoluble. At least with any single weapon system. That's, that's where they went wrong at the outset.

WHY DID THEY FEEL THEY HAD TO PRESENT IT THAT WAY, AS A VULNERABILITY ISSUE?

I think because the argument for modernization simply for modernization sake would be less persuasive to the Congress than if we were really taking a step forward and making the next missile an invulnerable missile and therefore they thought that was the way, the way to go. And, and, they had not you know, really looked seriously enough into the problems of, of survivability and a number of the basing modes that first looked to be attractive on closer examination turned out to have serious flaws.

IS NOT ALSO A DIFFERENT PURPOSE FOR THE MISSILE. THE AIR FORCE KNEW THE CONGRESS DIDN'T WANT TO HEAR ABOUT ACCURATE WARHEADS...

Oh that's part of it, yes, yes. There was a problem with a number in Congress about developing accuracy, yes, that was really a mistake, that accuracy was important only for first strike forces and we should not have a first-strike force. Yes, that was part of it.

ASKS ABOUT SURVIVABILITY AND VULNERABILITY ARGUMENTS?

The Carter administration inherited the problem of survivability. When the Ford administration left office the notion had been to deploy it in what was called a buried trench and the missile would go along this trench and break up through the soil and fire whenever it needed to be. And then they found out that if a warhead, a Soviet warhead, hit anywhere in the trench, that the trench actually magnified the force of the explosion. And since we have found out ways to deal with that but that, that deployment mode had to be abandoned and therefore the Carter administration was seized with the problem finding a new basing mode early on.

DID HIS COMMISSION CONNECT A MISSILE OF THIS TYPE WITH DEFENSE OF EUROPE?

Yes.

WHAT WAS THE CONNECTION?

Well what we argued was that our strategy for the defense of Europe envisioned in some circumstances using nuclear weapons first. Now if we had no nuclear weapons which were adequate for attacking Soviet forces as opposed to cities and command and control and leadership, then it made a mockery out of our strategy to use nuclear weapons first in the defense of Europe if that was necessary.

WHAT DEFENSE OF EUROPE?

Whatever. To use them against a military target system that is what you would want to do if you had to use nuclear forces in the defense of Europe. What we were talking about though is really basically developing it so that the Soviets would be aware we did have this force which could be used for that purpose and therefore it would reinforce deterrence in Europe.

WHAT'S DIFFERENT ABOUT USING AN ICBM RATHER THAN NATO MISSILE OR WEAPONS?

Oh the MX was not, was not a substitute for having European systems, not at all. But if the Soviets insisted on escalation, then we felt we had to have systems which made sense in firing at Soviet military targets and therefore something less than an all-out exchange which would destroy both societies, because that would not make sense.

ASKS FOR SCENARIO FOR THAT.

It's very difficult to develop scenarios. Remember what we're trying to do is deter the Soviets from acting, and the best way to do that is to try to prevent them from looking at any aspect, where there may be a loophole that they could move through to successfully attack. And therefore we felt that having forces, having strategic forces which were militarily useful and that is against military targets, not simply to destroy Soviet society, would be an adequate, an added deterrent. If all we had were big inaccurate weapons the Soviets would calculate we would never use them and risk the destruction of the whole United States to save Europe.

IS THAT THE CASE BEFORE MX?

Minuteman was moderately accurate but not accurate enough, no.

IF SOVIETS INVADED WE MIGHT NOT RESPOND BECAUSE WE COULDN'T MILITARILY?

That's the theory, yes.

WHAT TARGETS WOULD PREVENT ESCALATION?

Well theoretically, theoretically and nobody knows what would prevent escalation, but theoretically they would be purely military targets like missile silos... that could be attacked without a lot of collateral damage, without attacking population centers. Really to demonstrate the purpose nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe would be to demonstrate to the Soviets how serious we were and that we would not allow a European aggression to succeed.

WOULD WE ATTACK FORCES THEY WERE MASSING?

Yes there would... initially one would presume we would use, we would use shorter-range systems, not intercontinental systems. That was the last kind of...of backup. But yes we'd use smaller systems against Soviet military forces. Probably in Europe.

AND HOLD THE MX IN RESERVE?

Yes.

WHEN WOULD YOU WANT TO USE ICBMS?

Hopefully never. It is the existence of that missile, with its capability that we would hope the Soviets would take into consideration before they would attack and therefore would be deterred from doing it. That's the whole principle of it.

WHAT'S THE POINT OF SURVIVABLY BASING A MISSILE TO ABSORB THE RESULTS OF AN ATTACK OF WEAPONS WHO SHOULD BE ITS TARGETS?

Well surely one has to do either one, you know, the scenario that, that we were just discussing was one of Soviet conventional aggression in Europe where we would initiate the use of nuclear weapons. There are many other kinds of scenarios. Most other ones would involve probably a Soviet attack on the United States first. So the one needs both the accuracy for military purpose and also survivability to guard against the Soviet attack.

COULDN'T THEY DO THE SAME THING?

Of course. But remember what we're trying to do is prevent a conflict. The Soviets would not attack in Europe if they didn't have some particular objective. What the introduction of nuclear weapons does, doesn't necessarily favor the defense, the offense, we don't know. What it does is to throw any calculations of rational objective right out the window. The uncertainties are so great that it's not possible to calculate the consequences of an attack. And therefore they would be less likely to attack. That, that is the th... and the more robust the systems arrayed in support of Europe the less the Soviets could calculate that there's any way that they could launch a successful attack. That's the heart of deterrent strategy.

DID HE FEEL THE MX COULD HELP ELSEWHERE TO HOLD SOVIETS IN CHECK?

Basically, basically what we felt was that the MX would be very useful in stabilizing crisis situations, that in some crises, there's sort of a game of chicken. And if the Soviets knew that they had an advantage in these kinds of weapons and they knew that we knew it, then they would feel they could take one step farther and we would have to back down eventually because we could not usefully attack them. That we felt was a serious instability which could in fact turn a crisis into a war. That if, that if the Soviets knew we had this capability which the MX gave us, they would be less willing to go into crises and less willing to dare us because, because we had this capability.

ARE WE THEN IN A CONTINUING ESCALATION, EACH SIDE TRYING TO FORCE THE OTHER TO BLINK?

Possibly. One cannot omit that aspect from some crisis situations. Depends how a cri... what the crisis is. And how it develops and what each side wants to get out of it. But there's not question that in, in some crises, one side or both sides are seeking to gain some advantage. And one of the issue is who, who will blink first. And what we said is we should not have a force structure which forced us militarily to blink first.

ASKS HOW MIDGETMAN FITS IN?

Well the Midgetman is less for that scene immediately and directly as a follow on for survivability. In other words it would do, it could do the same thing that the MX did. But the reason you need the Midgetman in addition to the MX is for long-term survivability.

WOULD HE GIVE UP MX FOR STABILITY OF A SINGLE WARHEAD SYSTEM?

I think you need both. But the Midgetman could in fact play that role as well. In other words it would be a highly accurate warhead as well. What happened though in '83 when we made these recommendations, the Midgetman was a decade away from, from deployment. And we felt that was too long to wait.

ASKS ABOUT LAUNCH UNDER ATTACK. DOES IT MAKE HIM NERVOUS?

Yes, very. I think launch under attack, while we certainly ought to convey to the Soviets that we had that option and we might do it if they attacked, I think to rely on it, to have to rely on it as a measure of survivability is very, very dangerous, because it puts a, puts a terrible stress on a, on a president in terms of how does he know an attack's coming, and so on and so forth. It's...I think it's a very dangerous way to go...as policy.

WAS WEINBERGER MIFFED AT BEING PASSED OVER TO THIS BIPARTISAN GROUP?

Probably, probably. I wouldn't be surprised if, after all that's his job and he was comfortable with the recommendation. There is no reason he should have been happy about a Commission moving in to do it. In fact however it wasn't doing his job for him. It was a recognition of an impasse between the executive and the legislature. And what our job was to try to find points of congruence between these two who had lost the capacity usefully to have a dialogue. That was really what we, what we did.

ASKS IF PRESIDENT THANKED HIM?

Well surely. Well he thanked me very warmly, for the work of the commission.