IN YOUR OPINION, WAS SALT I IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES?

Well, I think at the time SALT I was written it was the best deal we could get, and it was a way of getting started so at that time, had the Soviets come through with what we thought they would do, it would have been a good deal. To refresh your memory, the Soviets wanted a deal on ABMs, on anti-ballistic missiles, and we gave them that deal, and we wanted a deal on strategic offensive arms, because they had already gone 50 percent ahead of us, in ICBMs as land-based systems, and in submarines and submarine systems. And we felt that if we gave them the IBM Treaty, then -- and negotiated on strategic offensive arms -- we could get a deal within five years whereby we could get an agreement at lower, equal levels, and that this would be a good deal for both of us. We gave them the ABM Treaty -- matter of fact, we showed even more restraint by not employing the one hundred systems we were allowed under the ABM Treaty. But, in the strategic offensive area, where we showed a great deal of restraints, restraint, the Soviets built, and they continued to build up through the five-year program and even beyond, so that at the end Harold Brown testified, stated that as Secretary of Defense, that when we showed restraints restraint, the Soviets built; when we built, they even built, even more. So they had it both ways: even when we did something in modernization, they did us one better; when we showed restraint, they continued to build.

DID YOU THINK IT WAS A GOOD IDEA TO SIGN THE ABM TREATY?

Yes... Yes, I thought it was a good idea to sign the ABM Treaty, under those circumstances, where we would reduce the number of strategic offensive arms. But if we were not to reduce the strategic offensive arms, then it made no sense to have an ABM treaty; in other words, if you throw away your shield, you should also throw away your swords, or even, or reduce the size of the swords, to daggers, or something. But if you're going to throw away your shield and allow another side to build an ever-larger, heavier sword, then you're defenseless without a shield.

AND THAT'S WHAT HAPPENED.

That's what happened in the end.

YOU JOINED THE SALT DELEGATION IN 1973. WHAT WERE YOUR OBJECTIVES?

Well, I joined the SALT delegation in '73 first because I was ordered to and I was a military man, and they said that I had certain things to bring to the negotiating table, such as my knowledge of the Soviets, as my Russian language, such as my knowledge of nuclear weapons and the fact that I'd worked on the NBFR, the other negotiating forum that was being set up. The objectives were to try to reduce the number of weapons in a way which preserved or even enhanced, stability, and then preserve stability; in other words if the Soviets had more, we didn't feel that our only option would be to match them, we feel that, felt that if we could get them to reduce down to lower levels and we would stay within those lower levels that we would both be better off, and it would be a more stable world and a saner world.

DO YOU THINK THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIETS IN 1973 AND '74 WERE GOOD FOR STABILITY?

I think he felt that they were good at the time, and I think he had a an exaggerated opinion of our own technological prowess and the fact that I think he believed the Soviets could not match us in accuracy of weapons. It turned out to be wrong; many people in the intelligence community said that, "Look, the Soviets put such a high priority on weaponry in general and strategic weapons in particular, that the Soviets are going to match the United States in the number in number of missiles," which they did, but on the accuracy of the warheads on those missiles, and that's what they eventually did: they matched us in the, in the accuracy, which made all the difference in the world. Up to that time, we could allow the Soviets to have more power, more throw-weight. We could even allow them to have more weapons, so long as we believed that we had an advantage in accuracy. That accuracy advantage of ours dwindled from '73 through '74, '75; finally, in spring of '78 the Carter Administration was convinced that the Soviets had caught up to us in accuracy, may even go ahead; then the name of the game changed.

DO YOU THINK THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME POLITICAL MOTIVATION TO DR. KISSINGER'S PROPOSAL?

Well, I think all of these have political motivations; I think this was a, an era of détente; I think this was a, an idea of the idea was that, you know, we'll try to get along; we'll show good faith; we'll negotiate and show the example; I think it was some of that; although he was much more realistic militarily and strategically, than other members of the Carter Administration later on, but still I think he felt that there were certain, that we had advantages and we could keep those advantages. I think that proved to be wrong.

DID YOU AGREE WITH SENATOR JACKSON'S PROPOSALS ABOUT EQUIVALENCY?

Yes. No, I thought that Jackson was more far-seeing and was, had a more, much more realistic appraisal of what happened, and I was always amazed, I marveled at Jackson's grasp for what Soviets were up to, and he worked at this, he knew this, and he understood that, and I very often learned much more about the Soviets by sitting at various briefings given to Jackson, than I did in some of our own sessions, were we talked about the Soviets. He was a he was an expert in this field, and he had a group of people that came and talked to him, including some British experts, who would follow the Soviet Union closely, and he understood where they were going, and what the trend was much better, I think, than a lot of other people who were professionally in the business.

WHAT ABOUT HIS IDEA OF EQUIVALENCY? THAT SOVIETS AND UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE EQUAL NUMBERS IN EACH CATEGORY? DID YOU AGREE WITH THAT IDEA?

Well, it was not the equal numbers in each category so much; it was that we should have an equal number of warheads, and equal power, or throw-weight, in those warheads. Now, other people were saving that we need not have an equal number, and we'd not, and we certainly don't need the equal power, because the Soviets are crude, and their technology is crude, and they don't can't do what we can do, we have more accuracy. He saw that throw-weight could be transformed into greater accuracy, as it was, down the line. so he was more farseeing as to where these would lead us, than were a lot of the people who were willing to say that we had a technological advantage, and that technological advantage would always be in our favor.

IS THAT WHERE DR. KISSINGER WAS REALLY WRONG?

Well yes, I think and at the time, he was correct. In other words, we had more accuracy, and on the on a snapshot picture of where the Soviets were, and what they could do with their number of missiles and warheads, and snapshot picture of where we were, our accuracy advantages was, were, so great, that we didn't have to worry about them having more warheads or greater power. What he might have believed, I don't, is that maybe we would reduce these missiles and then not have that problem face us in the future, but in the absence of any reduction, if you calculated the trends and put them forward, he was clearly wrong, and a very few people saw that at the time, one of whom was Scoop Jackson.

WHAT WAS WRONG WITH KISSINGER'S PROPOSAL OF TRADING UNEQUAL AGGREGATES FOR AN EQUAL NUMBER OF MIRVS?

It's the same question; the question is that he was taking a snapshot of a situation which existed at that time, and he either believed that future a future situation would keep that same relative position, that either the Soviets couldn't improve, or if they improved, that we would continue to stay ahead of them. And that the real experts, a few people in the CIA, a few people in DIA, and Scoop Jackson were saying, "No, that's not going to happen; the Soviets are concentrating on this field, and they're gonna overtake us. And they're going to use this greater throw-weight and greater numbers to an advantage: when they have the greater accuracy, then they're gonna have everything and then we will not, any longer, be able to deter a first, a disarming first strike."

AND IS THAT IN EFFECT WHAT HAPPENED IN THE LATE 1970S?

That's what happened in the late... And I say that to Harold Brown's credit when he was Secretary of Defense in '78, he recognized that as coming, and he started to build our own systems and improve our own systems, so that in the face of the Soviets, improving their system, we couldn't stop that -- we had better improve our own. And that trend was started even before Carter left office.