DR. BRZEZINSKI, CAN I BEGIN BY ASKING YOU TO DESCRIBE FOR US THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE MEETINGS BETWEEN JIMMY CARTER AND HELMUT SCHMIDT IN 1977. I'M TALKING ABOUT THE LONDON MEETING, AND PARTICULARLY THE ONE IN WASHINGTON IN JULY OF THAT YEAR.

Well, as far as I remember, it was perfectly cordial and normal. Uh, the relationship got somewhat worse later on, but I think initially the relationship was quite normal.

I REFERRED TO THAT BECAUSE CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAS SAID MANY TIMES THAT THE REASON HE MADE HIS SPEECH IN OCTOBER '77 WAS THAT HE HAD SAID THE SAME THINGS IN PRIVATE BEFOREHAND, AND HAD HIS ARGUMENTS BEEN IGNORED. IS THAT YOUR RECOLLECTION OF THE EVENT?

Well, I don't know what he said in private, so to speak, if he was meeting with the President all by himself. I don't recall that in '77 the Chancellor in the meetings that were attended by the respective advisers put a great deal of emphasis on what subsequently came to be called the INF, namely the SS-20s. He might have mentioned it, but I certainly do not recall him putting enormous stress on it. And therefore the speech that he gave at the IISS was to some extent, at least, a departure in the sense that it highlighted his anxieties much more sharply, and they were spelled out much more fully.

I THINK HIS VERSION OF EVENTS IS THAT HE HAD WORRIES OVER SALT II, AND ALSO OVER CRUISE MISSILES, AND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION FELT THAT IF THEY WERE TO TAKE EUROPEAN WORRIES INTO ACCOUNT THEY NEVER WOULD GET THE SALT II AGREEMENT, I THINK THAT'S HIS VERSION OF THAT.

Well, you know, I can't argue with his version, I haven't read his book –

BUT YOUR RECOLLECTION IS THAT HE DIDN'T PUT THESE PARTICULAR ARGUMENTS IN THE CONVERSATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN WASHINGTON, IN JULY 1977?

I do not recall these issues being raised as major obstacles to the ongoing SALT negotiations. There may have been some expression of concern, but not as a major issue. The major issue surfaced, as best as I can recall, with his speech in London. Where he articulated his position much more fully, and made a strong case for the kinds of concerns he's expressing.

CAN I MOVE ON NOW, DR. BRZEZINSKI, AND JUST ASK YOU QUICKLY ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ENHANCED RADIATION OR NEUTRON BOMB EPISODE. WHAT WAS THE REACTION INSIDE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WHEN THE STORY FIRST BROKE IN JUNE '77 IN THE WASHINGTON POST? WERE YOU PREPARED FOR THIS?

Well, we certainly didn't expect the kind of furor that developed in the press. And obviously we weren't terribly happy about the spin that the Washington Post was giving to the issue. It seemed to me then, it seems to me now, that the Washington Post was rather hysterical on the subject. Uh, it was sloganeering. It wasn't really addressing the problem that the weapon was supposed to address, but was rather presenting it as some terribly anti-human device in tones which I thought were overly dramatic.

OK, NOW YOU WENT, LATER ON IN '77, YOU WENT AND TALKED TO THE EUROPEANS ABOUT THIS QUESTIONS, I'M SIMPLIFYING SLIGHTLY, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH CONSENSUS OF SOME KIND. WHAT DID YOU FIND WHEN YOU WENT AND TALKED TO THE EUROPEANS ABOUT THIS ISSUE?

Now which issue are you talking about?

THE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON.

Well, the question then was, where would this weapon be deployed? And what kind of a decision should the United States make regarding production, in relationship to the question of deployment. Our position was that there was no point producing this weapon, if it couldn't be deployed. Because this is the kind of weapon which, if it were ever to be used, it would have to be used in the very early stages of hostilities. If the weapon was stored in the United States, you couldn't exactly use it in the early stages of hostilities, unless you had a lot of warning, there was a protracted crisis, you could then move it to Europe, although moving it then would then itself escalate the crisis. So our view was it had to be deployed. Now, since it is primarily an anti-tank weapon, it didn't make much sense deploying it in Portugal, or in Great Britain. The place where it had to be deployed was on the central front. Now the central front means Germany. So the real question was, would the Germans permit us to deploy it. And Chancellor Schmidt felt that it was too much of a political burden for him to assume responsibility for deployment. He would have preferred us to proceed with a production decision, while eschewing the deployment decision. Or as a fall back, although I'm not quite sure where that emerged exactly in the course of my trip, but I believe that it did. He took the position that if some other European power would permit deployment, than Germany could also permit deployment. Now that in turn begs the question who that other European power could be, and it would have to be in that case Benelux, because it would have to be some power close to the theater, close to the front line.

DO YOU THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT THIS ISSUE, THE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE AMBIGUITIES AND TENSIONS WHICH EXISTED IN THE ALLIANCE, WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, OVER WHETHER OR NOT A LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR WAS FIGHTABLE?

Up to a point, yes, although those issues were never really fully debated, directly. I think the issue was, to some extent, dealt with in political terms, much more in terms of how to handle their position, and the anti-nuclear wave that was surfacing, so there really wasn't a debate in strategic terms. I think it was rather a political sparring that was taking place, because President Carter didn't want to assume total responsibility for the production decision, outside of deployment, and Mr. Schmidt wasn't prepared to assume responsibility for a deployment decision. He would have preferred Mr. Carter to make the production decision or alternately share the deployment decision with someone else. And the reason throughout had nothing to do with war fighting, flexible response, it had a lot to do with the domestic political situation of the respective leaders.

RIGHT, THANK YOU. NOW CAN I ASK YOU BRIEFLY TO DESCRIBE THE MEETINGS YOU HAD WITH PRESIDENT CARTER IN MARCH OF 1978, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH IT BECAME CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD CHANGED HIS MIND. CAN YOU GIVE US SOME SENSE OF HOW THIS PROCESS WORKED.

Well, I've described it very fully in my memoirs actually, so there isn't really much point in repeating that.

ALAS, I CANNOT PUT YOUR MEMOIRS ON THE SCREEN DR. BRZEZINSKI.

Well, the President I think was rather surprised when he learned that in the view of his advisers, myself included, but also the secretary of defense, and the secretary of state, the moment was ripe now for decision, in that the Europeans had made at least a provisional commitment to deployment. Somewhat fuzzed, but provisional. And therefore a production decision was right. It then surfaced, at least to me, in my own mind, that the President really didn't want that weapon, period. And that he had hoped it would go away. He had hoped, it all of a sudden became clear to me, that basically the Europeans would not bite the bullet on deployment, and therefore he wouldn't have to produce. And he was rather disturbed when we told him that now the setting is ripe for a production decision. He then wanted to review the deployment decision. And I think as a refuge, so to speak, he then insisted that the European production decision be much tighter than it had been contrived, I believe by Warren Christopher, if my memory serves me right, who went to Europe to work out some sort of an arrangement that would span the deployment decisions and the production decisions, and give everyone some flexibility while permitting the process to go forward.

IN YOUR BOOK YOU DEFEND PRESIDENT CARTER. YOU SAY THAT THE PERCEPTION THAT HE FUMBLED IS UNFAIR. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY YOU SAID THAT?

Yes, I think it is unfair, because Mr. Schmidt has assiduously cultivated the impression that he courageously bit the bullet, and the President defaulted. Whereas in fact, Mr. Schmidt was hiding behind Luxembourg, or Holland, or Belgium, using them as a shield, and then when the President decided not to go ahead with the production decision by itself, which in all fairness I have to say I would have favored, then Mr. Schmidt took advantage of that to blame Mr. Carter in toto, for the failure of the process to go forward. Whereas in my judgment, quite frankly, I think both Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Carter are responsible. I felt at the time, and it leaked to the press because I said it privately to Cy Vance, and his press attaché was there, and that subsequently became a matter of public record, that if the President does not go ahead with the decision, it will be the worst decision he will have taken in the first 17 months of his presidency. So I felt strongly the President should go ahead. But I also felt very strongly that Schmidt was being, in my judgment, at the best evasive, and fundamentally disingenuous on the subject. And what he subsequently said on the subject is even more appalling, because he has been unwilling to shoulder at least some of the responsibility for the setback that was a by-product both of Carter's and Schmidt's unwillingness to bite the bullet.

DO YOU THINK THAT THERE IS IN THIS A PROBLEM WHICH HAS BEEN INHERENT IN THE ALLIANCE, WHICH IS THAT THE EUROPEANS ARE RATHER LIKE ADOLESCENT CHILDREN. THEY WANT TO REVOLT BUT THEN THEY WANT ULTIMATELY TO BE HIT OVER THE HEAD AND TOLD WHAT TO DO BY THE AMERICANS. AND PRESIDENT CARTER WAS BEING MORE DEMOCRATIC AND WAS NOT PREPARED TO DO THAT.

There is something to that, but I didn't say that.

LET ME JUST MOVE ON NOW. YOU WERE SKEPTICAL OF THE MILITARY CASE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW THEATER WEAPONS IN EUROPE. IS THAT THE CASE? THAT YOU WERE SKEPTICAL.

Yes.

WHY DID YOU CHANGE YOUR MIND?

Because I became convinced that the political aspects required some response.

CAN YOU SPELL THAT OUT A FOR US A BIT? WHAT DO YOU MEAN?

Well, basically that unless we responded there would be such a sense of anxiety in Europe about the possibility of an American non-response, which I excluded, given the fact that we had 300,000 troops in Europe, that the effect would be in effect what has come to be called decoupling. And that the decoupling would be a psychological, political fact rather than a military fact, but in so being, would be highly destructive. And therefore we had to give some tangible token of our willingness to respond in kind to what the Soviets were doing.

BUT IT WAS YOUR VIEW THAT IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS, THE SS-20'S DIDN'T POSE A THREAT WHICH REQUIRED COUNTER DEPLOYMENTS?

That they posed a threat to which we could respond adequately with existing forces.

LET ME NOW ASK YOU ABOUT GUADALOUPE, CAN YOU TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS THERE, AND HOW CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT COMPORTED HIMSELF THERE.

Well, he sulked most of the time, so that the really constructive discussions were between Giscard and, uh, well, the British prime minister, Callaghan and Carter. Now on the subject on what came to be known as INF, it wasn't called that at the time, the four, who were having all of their discussions in private, called me in to give them a briefing on what the US was planning to propose to the alliance. And I did that. And I outlined that our plan was to have a mixture of forces, some ground launch cruise missiles, some Pershing II's. I do not remember now whether I gave them precise numbers, my guess is probably not, because my vague impression is that we fixed the numbers somewhat later. But at, I may have given them the general ballpark numbers, and I tried to explain what was the reason for the mixture. Why the two systems were mutually complimentary, and why we favored a certain kind of disposition of these forces. And I previewed the fact, the proposition that this kind of deployment either military would nullify whatever potential military benefits the Soviets would obtain from their SS-20 deployment, or it would offer negotiating counter in the event there should be negotiations. In effect, a two-track approach.

WHY DO YOU THINK CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WAS SULKING?

I have no idea. It may have something to do with his political, personal life. I have no idea.

WITHOUT BEING TOO PERSONAL ABOUT IT, YOUR OBJECTION IS THAT THE GERMANS, HAVING RAISED THIS PROBLEM, WERE NOT PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE PRECISE PROBLEMS ABOUT HOW YOU COPE WITH IT. THE PRECISE SOLUTIONS.

Well, subsequently they did, particularly when Chancellor Kohl took over. And you know, the INF problem has worked out extremely well.

DID YOU REALIZE AT THE TIME THAT THE PERSHING II WOULD BE A SLIGHTLY TRICKY THING AS FAR AS THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED, OR WAS THAT THE IDEA?

Well, you realize that it was a useful system.

CAN I ASK YOU TO EXPAND ON THAT.

It is a very accurate system. It doesn't take time, a long time to reach its targets. It certainly gave the Soviets food for thought.

LET ME ASK YOU A GENERAL QUESTION NOW. DO YOU THINK THAT THE 1979 DUAL-TRACK DECISION, LOOKING BACK ON ALL THE PAIN AND WHATEVER, THAT IT HAS BROUGHT WITH IT, HAS BEEN WORTHWHILE? DO YOU THINK IT WAS WORTHWHILE?

I think it was really an astounding success. I mean, the result is that the Soviets have now, in effect, agreed to an accommodation which is dismantling systems at a rate of four to one, which is a very major accommodation by them, which negates everything they did in this respect. In the meantime, I think the alliance has demonstrated something very important: that if pressed, it can stand together and respond together. Both in terms of an affirmative and assertive response through deployment, and through negotiations.

YES, I ACCEPT THAT'S PERFECTLY TRUE. BUT AS A STUDENT OF HISTORY, WOULD YOU CLAIM THAT THIS IS WHAT PEOPLE INTENDED AT THE TIME, IN 1979?

Well, I don't know what the Soviets intended. But I know that whatever the Soviets intended, they didn't get.

LET ME ASK YOU KNOW A GENERAL QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THIS PERIOD THAT I'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT WITH YOU, FROM '75 TO '87, WHETHER YOU THINK THAT MARKS SOME KIND OF MAJOR WATERSHED, IN THE HISTORY OF NATO, IN THE HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE EUROPEANS. OR WHETHER YOU THINK THE RELATIONSHIPS THAT FUNDAMENTALLY STARTED IN THE '40S AND '50S ARE GOING TO CONTINUE?

Well, first of all, I have a little bit of an antipathy towards the whole idea of watersheds. You know, every year one hears about historic watersheds, because there was a summit, because there's some agreement, or because there's some events. So, there are so many watersheds that I hardly find any landfill between them any more. Obviously, the kind of an arrangement that was contrived between America and Europe in the late 40's and 50's has had a lot of staying power. And that's all to the good. But an arrangement that has a lot of staying power is not the same thing as an arrangement that continues to exist indefinitely. The contrast that I would draw between the latter and the former would be that historically, for example, there are some nations that, barring some total catastrophe are likely to endure for a long, long time, and have endured for a long, long time. They're organic, they reflect a certain enduring historical reality. There are also international arrangements which are long-lasting, but are inevitably subject to change because of the fluidity inherent in international politics. I consider NATO to be in that category, rather than like an organic, historic, something which is something that is part of our scene for a thousand or two thousand years. I think the era that was ushered in by Yalta and Potsdam is beginning to come to an end. Is beginning to come to an end. Which means it's a process. But I think we can begin to see the outlines on that process in the mist, becoming a little more defined. And obviously, NATO is to some extent also a reflection of the division of Europe, between two super, extra-European powers. Both powers now have increasingly non-European preoccupations. And I think that is going to affect NATO. My guess is NATO will continue to exist for quite some time. But it's inner substance will begin to alter. Its centrality in world affairs, and even in the Atlantic connection may somewhat diminish. And other issues may become increasingly important. And I don't, I don't shed too many tears over that. I accept is as inevitable, provided we can manage it responsibly, and don't precipitate consequences which would be destabilizing.