...IN A HISTORICAL SEQUENCE, AND MAKE IT FARTHER, PEOPLE TEND TO ADDRESS THE FUTURE THROUGH THE PAST, AND WE WANT TO DO IT STAGE BY STAGE.

I will make my answers shorter than your questions, OK?

I HOPE YOU MAKE THEM LONGER. NO, I DIDN'T ASK YOU TO BE SHORT... I ASK YOU NOT TO BRING IT FORWARD, NOT TO BRING CONTINUOUSLY TO THE PRESENT, BUT ESSENTIALLY STAY WITHIN THE PERIOD.

If my answer has an iron logic, then I will follow this iron logic.

OKAY... TELL ME, THERE IS THE IMPRESSION AMONG SOME, THAT IN THE TRANSITION BETWEEN CHAIRMAN BREZHNEV AND GORBACHEV THERE WAS A RETHINKING OF THE SOVIET UNION BOTH NUCLEAR POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT THIS RETHINK ENTAILED?

In a nutshell, we understood more clearly than ever that we live in an interdependent world, that we are in the same boat, and we must find the solution to our own security together with all opponents. We thought they are enemies, but actually they are partners in survival. So this is the idea of common security, which was actually in the air. This was the title of report published by Palme Commission.

WITH THIS KIND OF SPIRIT, HOW DID YOU PERSONALLY, I THINK YOU WERE AT THE TIME...RECEIVE OR UNDERSTAND THE STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN WHEN HE CAME TO POWER ON THE NATURE OF SOVIET STATE AND SOVIET PEOPLE?

When he came to power we had other leadership. And of course these kind of statements, as this "evil empire" or that we belong to the "dustbin of history," they did not help. They fueled our negative attitude. It was the question of negative feedback loop. They say something very negative, we react accordingly. And now we want to have positive feedback loop. We are doing something good, they are doing something good.

BEFORE YOU MOVE THERE... CAN YOU TELL ME PERSONALLY, YOU KNOW, NOT AS AN OFFICIAL, NOT AS A... HOW DID YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT IT WAS TRYING TO DO AND WHAT DID IT DO TO YOU, IN TERMS OF BEING A SOVIET PERSON? THE STATEMENTS BY REAGAN?

They annoyed us psychologically, me also, and...they just... we had this reaction, maybe overreaction, because he was so hostile to us. We thought that maybe we must build up our military power a little bit more. It was an impetus for us to build more weapons, which now we see maybe was the wrong answer... who knows?

I WONDER, WHETHER THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR EXAMPLE, WAS WARNED BY THE SOVIET MILITARY THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20s MIGHT EVOKE SUCH A SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL RESPONSE BOTH IN THE STATES AND IN EUROPE?

I was not here at that time, but I think, that this was not thought through in the sense of the possible reaction, our modernization. Actually, we had our missiles there. It's a complicated subject, you cannot answer in several words. We had our missiles there, in Europe. And there was no big fuss, they were accepted. But now when we began to modernize them, there was the fuss. But as to the American answer, Pershings... These Pershings were on drawing boards in the States long before we began to change our old missiles to new ones. So from both sides there was technical momentum, technical. So, they had new weapons, and they tried to find function for this new weapons. So the military thought, technical competition went first, political thought was a little bit behind.

HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN -- I SUSPECT THAT YOU ANSWERED THIS QUESTION MANY TIMES, BUT I NEED IT AGAIN -- HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE SOVIET TOTAL REJECTION OF THE ZERO OPTION WHEN REAGAN PROPOSED IT IN '81 AND SORT OF THE ROUTE THE SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN IN TERMS OF ACCEPTING IT?

OK, THE QUESTION IS ESSENTIALLY, THE KIND OF CHANGE OF ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ZERO OPTION BETWEEN THE TIME IT WAS OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN '81 AND NOW?

Well, in '81, when he was talking tough, we didn't want the zero. And also we thought that it will contribute to military balance in Europe, our new missiles. In time we became wiser, and also the Americans became wiser, and we thought that maybe it's a good place to start nuclear disarmament. In January 15, 1986, our leader Gorbachev proposed a plan of nuclear disarmament by the year 2000, which many thought is just a pipe-dream, impossible to achieve and so on. But then at Reykjavik they discussed it, and now in Washington we have this breakthrough in a sense that we got this agreement to begin nuclear disarmament. In itself, from the military point of view it's not a big deal, because it affects only three to four percent of nuclear arsenals, but as a beginning it is very important. We crossed the nuclear Rubicon, so we can go forward.

BEFORE WE GET THERE... CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT WHAT YOU ANTICIPATED GOING TO REYKJAVIK, THAT WAS FOR YOU THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THIS KIND? PERSONALLY.

I was at Geneva too, only at Geneva I was a correspondent.

NO, NO, I AM TALKING ABOUT REYKJAVIK. WHAT KIND OF...I AM TRYING TO INJECT A PERSONAL, OBSERVATIONAL...OF SENSE TO YOUR OBSERVATION OF REYKJAVIK. CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT YOU ANTICIPATED GOING THERE?

Well, we had a plan of nuclear disarmament there and we almost succeeded, but unfortunately we could not solve our differences about weapons in space. At Geneva both leaders agreed to stop the arms race on Earth and to prevent the arms race in space. But when in Reykjavik General Secretary Gorbachev tried to persuade President Reagan to be as good as his word and to prevent the arms race in space, he said no because he likes so much "Star Wars" program. That was the reason, when...went down...But still, the original reaction was, that Reykjavik was a failure. But pretty soon both sides agreed, that it was a success, because this was where it all started.

TO WHAT...EXACTLY. CAN YOU RETELL THE STORY OF THE CRITICAL PART OF REYKJAVIK THAT IN YOU MIND STARTED THE PROCESS?

We proposed to the President, it was actually our idea to go to Reykjavik, and we came there with proposals. The Americans didn't have any proposals. So we discussed our proposals. And we suggested that we will work for nuclear disarmament, and Reagan agreed. This was a real achievement, because, for instance, if you talk to Prime Minister of Britain Thatcher, she is against nuclear disarmament, because she thinks that nuclear weapons as deterrent, they insure peace. But we think, that they are too dangerous, that there are no fail-safe systems and it's better to get rid of them. And President Reagan happens to think likewise. So it was a big meeting of the minds in this sense.

PLEASE, THE CONVERSATION IN FRONT OF THE CAR BEFORE, I THINK REAGAN GETS IN, WHICH WAS REPORTED ON TELEVISION, WAS SORT OF A VERY BRIEF EXCHANGE, WHICH I ALWAYS THOUGHT VERY DRAMATIC. CAN YOU, SORT OF, GIVE YOUR INTERPRETATION OF WHAT...

What did they say? They just parted disappointed, both sides were disappointed. But then pretty soon, as I've said, they understood, that something was really achieved. This "something" was the understanding that we must work together for nuclear disarmament. This was the understanding, and then we made concessions. We came from Reykjavik with our "package” but then we decided that maybe we'll go step by step and step number one was this intermediate missiles.

SO WOULD YOU SAY THAT AS A RESULT OF REYKJAVIK THERE WAS A SEPARATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INF VERSUS...

No, not at, after Reykjavik.

WOULD YOU EXPLAIN TO ME?

At Reykjavik and immediately after Reykjavik we had the position that we must move on several fronts simultaneously: strategic forces, ABM treaty and intermediate missiles. But then we saw, that it is next to impossible, because America is not ready. So we decided to unpack our package and we have result number one. Now we are expecting result number two: cutting by half strategic offensive forces and staying with ABM treaty.

TELL ME BOTH THE OFFICIAL POSITION AND HOW YOU SEE IT PERSONALLY THE SORT OF THE AMERICAN INTERNAL DISCUSSION ABOUT THE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY?

It is not our problem. In the joint statement which was adopted at Washington both sides are saying that ABM treaty must be observed as signed. So the question of interpretation never arised from 1972 up till 1985, maybe or 1986. Why? Because it was there. It is normal interpretation. But the "Star Wars" program, if continued, inevitably is going to clash with the ABM treaty. And actually, the Reagan Administration never liked this treaty. I remember a book by Strobe Talbott, Time correspondent, "Deadly Gambits" about Reagan's Administration's policies in arms control field. And in this book he says, it was book published five years ago, something. He says that the first thing Reagan's Administration wanted to do is to get rid of the ABM treaty. But they are still agreed with the ABM treaty. Then our saying officially that we were going to stay with the ABM treaty, for a certain period of time. As to interpretation, this interpretation, the so-called broad interpretation, was simply invented, because they hired a lawyer inexperienced in the field to find loopholes, and he tried to find loopholes and now this broad interpretation appeared, interpretation which even the American Congress is not going to buy.

STROBE TALBOTT ALSO TELLS THE STORY OF THE "WALK IN THE WOODS". I WONDER WHETHER THERE IS A SOVIET VERSION OF THAT... EVENT?

Oh, that I do not remember. It's...you must ask Kvitsinsky... go to Bonn...where he is, or Nitze, for that matter. It was a kind of an attempt to reach a compromise, which was then disavowed by the American Government.

WHAT WAS THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT?

Well, I do not know who first started it, I don't know... I do not remember...

WAS THERE...IN THE STATES IT IS RELATIVELY EASY TO IDENTIFY WHAT PEOPLE ARE PROPONENTS OF WHAT VARIANT OF IDEAS. IS THERE, FOR EXAMPLE IN REYKJAVIK, WHAT WERE DISCUSSIONS, LET'S SAY BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN NEGOTIATORS AND MILITARY NEGOTIATORS, OR WHAT ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE, MORE USEFUL...

We have discussions, of course we have discussions what to do. It's a democratic process of formulating foreign policy. I remember at Reykjavik at that ship "Georg Ots", there was a preliminary meeting before the beginning of the summit, where I participated and I also was given floor and I expressed my views on this and that, and Gorbachev listened and other people contributed to this discussion, so it was a discussion and then coming to certain conclusions. And it was not unanimous, there were differences of opinion in the discussion, it's only natural.

BUT ONE SELDOM IS HEARING ABOUT IT IN THE SOVIET UNION.

No, it is the way how we are reaching our decisions. The same actually, I guess, everywhere...

WHO WAS THE FINAL DECISION MAKER ON THE SEPARATION OF THE INF FROM THE STRATEGIC AND "STAR WARS"...

When we saw, that we are moving nowhere, we discussed to have this separation, it was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Central Committee, Ministry of Defense, three bodies mainly.

NO DISSENSION?

They do work together. Again, the same there was discussion, and then they came to the common position.

WAS IT A CALL FOR THE SECRETARY TO MAKE, OR WAS IT REACHED AS A CONSENSUS DECISION?

After discussions they come to a consensus decision. You see, there's the change of position. We had our package and then we unpacked it, so it is a change position. It is not done by just like this, it is after discussion, after hearing all the arguments for and against it.

WHAT WAS YOUR SENSE AT REYKJAVIK OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION? DID YOU...FOR YOU THAT WAS AGAIN...

The problem with American delegation is that it speaks with many voices, usually. There are differences of opinion which we can see. So this is the difficulty because you do not know whom to talk to. Now, you may have discussions, but if you are going to the negotiating table you must have one position, otherwise your opponent does not know whom to listen to. "Uncertain trumpet," they say in Bible. If the trumpet sounds uncertainly, it is uncertain trumpet, how can you prepare for the battle? That's what the Bible says.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE A SPECIFIC ACCIDENT IN WHICH... NEGOTIATIONS SUFFER BECAUSE A VARIETY OF POSITIONS BEING PROMOTED VERSUS THE SOVIETS FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE?

There were many episodes like this.

NAME ONE.

I do not remember now. We went to one fellow, and he was saying one thing, we went to another fellow and he was saying different thing, especially on this "Star Wars".

IT'S...THERE IS ALSO A CONTRADICTION IN THE RUSSIAN STATEMENTS ON THE "STAR WARS". ON ONE HAND IT IS TREATED AS A BIG MENACE, ON THE OTHER SIDE IT IS TREATED AS AN ABSURD IDEA. CAN YOU RECONCILE THESE TWO?

With ease. It is a silly idea, if you think that you are going to have an insurance against the nuclear attack. Our scientists are telling us that it is technically impossible and if and when the opponent is going to try to have this shield, there are counter measures which will be hundreds of times cheaper...penetration, as...and other things. So it is silly. It's dangerous, because in the process of preparing for these "Star Wars" you can get new offensive weapons, you can put them in space and there will be no flight time, nothing, just pushing the button and these weapons will be in action. That is the danger. Not the shield, which is technically impossible, but offensive side effects, side products, so to say, which can be very dangerous, tempting. That's it. Is that all?

NO, JUST A BIT MORE...YOU MADE THE STATEMENT TODAY, BUT CAN YOU GIVE A BIT MORE OF DETAIL WHAT KIND OF A FUTURE STRATEGIC AGREEMENT DO YOU ENVISION IS WORKABLE BEFORE NEXT SPRING?

Before...next spring? And you asking me you want to show it in autumn, next year, this program?

NO, WE WILL SHOW IT IN ENGLAND IN SUMMER.

But then it will not be next spring, still during the summer...

NO, NO, LET ME... WHAT TIME IS THE NEXT STRATEGIC AGREEMENT, WHAT TIME?

The next agreement we agreed with the United States, the next agreement is going to be an agreement to cut our nuclear forces by half, which does not mean cutting them to size, they are still too big. Our scientists published a report about strategic stability when we have radical reductions of strategic arms. And in this report they are saying that only five percent of our present nuclear arsenals are enough to have nuclear deterrent, so we can easily cut by 95 percent and still have this strategic stability.

THE STRUCTURE THAT YOU ENVISION, AS PUBLISHED, HAS TO DO WITH...BOTH SIDES MEETING THE TOTALITY OF NUCLEAR CHARGES, RATHER THAN SPECIFYING NUMBERS BY DELIVERY SYSTEM, IS THAT CORRECT? CAN YOU TELL ME MORE ABOUT THAT?

What's the question?

THE QUESTION IS HOW THIS LIMIT IS GOING TO BE...

It is rather...don't...let us not go into technical... it's nuclear warheads and delivery systems, and they have some limits, it's a technical...6,000 warheads on 1,800 delivery systems, 4,900 warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Also limits within 6,000 without...Above these 6,000 we must agree on limits on sea-based cruise missiles, so it is technical. Shall we go on?

NO, BUT WE'LL FIND A WAY TO ANIMATE IT. GIVE ME A SENSE OF YOUR FEELING ABOUT THE SUMMIT NOW, AS A PARTICIPANT.

Which summit?

THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

Very productive, constructive, very good summit, real dialogue. I wish we could have more summits like this.

THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. WHAT, IN YOUR SENSE, WAS BOTH THE ATMOSPHERE AND THE ACHIEVEMENT?

The atmosphere was extremely good. Cooperative attitudes, frank discussions, not hiding disagreements and differences, but trying to find common ground. That's how it should be. So in this sense it was exemplary. What was achieved? A treaty was signed and the guidelines were laid for the next treaty, for the diplomats to work on. Instructions were given to them; the figures which I've mentioned were agreed upon; cruise missiles, sea-based cruise missiles were discussed and their fate decided. These are the agreements.

HOW DID THE SOVIET DELEGATION FEEL ABOUT THE NON-NEGOTIABILITY, OR THE NON-MENTIONABILITY, OF STAR WARS, OF THE SDI SYSTEM?

They were not discussed; what we did discuss, it was ABM Treaty; and we decided to stick to this ABM Treaty, as signed. In 1972, the period of adherence was not established. We like to be...to, this period to be at least 10 years. Actually, we'd like it to be from here to eternity, but the Americans feel that their Star Wars program is going to clash with this treaty, so...they want to stay with this treaty only for a certain period of time, so this is going to be discussed.

HOW DID YOU FIND WORKING WITH THE AMERICANS?

Working? Well. They, they like last minute bargaining. But we know their tactics. For instance, at this summit, the departure ceremony was put at 2 p.m., and at 1:55, we were still bargaining. At two, we were still bargaining. So the departure... ceremony was delayed for 35 minutes.

WHAT WERE YOU BARGAINING ABOUT?

Certain... key clauses in the statement.

USUALLY THE SOVIETS ARE ACCUSED OF BEING THE TOUGH BARGAINERS THAT KEEP BARGAINING INTO THE...

Well, both sides were very, were rather tough. Both sides. But mainly, I guess, the Americans... this time.

WHAT IS THE SOVIET-AMERICAN CONFLICT ABOUT?

It is, it has an old story...a long history. The conflict, in my view, is that the Americans still do not accept us. They still that, they still think that we are an illegitimate child. Once I went to New York Public Library and looked into a New York Times for November, 1917, and this influential newspaper wrote about Maximalists, it's Bolsheviks, wrote about Maximalists that this is just a bunch of... buglers who want to rob the banks in Petrograd and to divide the money between themselves. This was from the very beginning a very hostile attitude. And then in the '20s, the Americans had a Red scare, and the only time we were really together was during the war. And Americans were very late in recognizing us, only in 1933, when President Roosevelt came to power. So this is the attitude, and we see it as a... as a... fear of losing their capitalist freedoms, though we are... we do not want them, to deprive them of their capitalist freedoms. If they like them, let them enjoy them, but our policy is litt and let litt. Live and let live. Or... you can call it "peaceful coexistence." But now, in this nuclear age, it's just, it is just the imperative of time to find common ground and to find how we can escape nuclear danger, which is equal for both of us.

BUT WHAT IS THE CONFLICT ABOUT?

It's ideological. It's ideological conflict, which we suggest we must resolve by arguing, not by shooting. It's it's different systems. But again, China has a different system from the American, from...the United States, and for many years, in the '50s, beginning in the '50s, and the '60s, for many years...the United States was very hostile to China, and they also thought there are two Chinas. Reagan, at that time, was a proponent of the, advocate of two-China policy -- one China, mainland China; another China, Taiwan. And where all this is now? Now China and the United States are, have normal relations. So, the ideology is still different, so why not have the same attitude to other side?

YOU SEE, I USE THE SAME EXAMPLE... I USE THE SAME EXAMPLE AND I SAY "WELL I DON'T UNDERSTAND IT" --

But there are, there are so many, there are so many reasons. For instance George Kennan once said, "Suppose tomorrow the Soviet Union is going to the bottom of the sea, with all its missiles and tanks. And ideas. What's going to happen to the United States?" In his view, the United States is going to be extremely unhappy, what to do with those, all those arguments, what the military-industrial complex is going to do. So, his idea is, you must have an enemy, to rearm, to make your economy going, this military-industrial complex is there...So it's one of the answers, maybe it's partial, but it's one of the answers. The other is...the other answer is psychological in a sense, that...the word Communist has negative connotations to every American. They feel that it's something very bad, they cannot explain...but they feel it's extremely bad and dangerous, and they must fight it though they don't know the enemy. It's just perception, but in politics perception is also...a very serious thing.

WOULD YOU SAY THAT THERE ARE SIMILAR PERCEPTIONS IN REVERSE...?

No. I wouldn't say so, because we are...if you go into the streets and ask anybody about Americans, everybody will tell you that Americans are very good people, wonderful people, they'll, do we want to be on friendly terms with them, but also they have the wrong government, in a sense, that it's very hostile to ours.