IN 1957 THE IAEA WAS SET UP IN VIENNA. WHY DID PAKISTAN JOIN THE IAEA?

Um... Because we were very strongly in favor of the control of uh, nuclear energy...

STOP HERE. USE STATEMENT... IN 1957 THE IAEA WAS SET UP. WHY DID PAKISTAN DECIDE TO JOIN THE IAEA?

Pakistan was very strongly in favor of the control of this new uh, phenomenon of nuclear energy and all of us were aware that uh, it was used to build bombs which were dropped on Japanese cities, of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So therefore the international community that there was a danger of the civilian peaceful nuclear programs in being also diverted for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, because nuclear technology is ambivalent. Simultaneously that you use it for the um, y... for um, development purposes, for developing, u-using energy for peaceful purposes. You can also use the fissionable material for the manufacture of weapons. So it was felt important that um, the, this full nuclear facility should be placed under international, under an international safeguard system. And to that end the Atomic Energy Agency was to be set up at that time and particularly in the Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program under which research reactors, small research reactors were supplied to a number of developing countries.

AT THIS STAGE PAKISTAN HAD A VERY SMALL PROGRAM IN THE EARLY DAYS, BUT HOW DID THESE IAEA SAFEGUARDS APPLY TO PAKISTAN?

The safeguards were meant to apply to all states which were participating in the negotiating for drafting the ster-... statute or the charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency and it was hoped they would sign uh, the statute and they would become members of the new organization to be set up, And uh, Pakistan uh, was one of those um, countries which participated. And uh, I recall I was a member of uh, d... our delega-... of the Pakistan delegation to the conference in 1956 which was held at UN headquarters in New York. And uh, Pakistan presented a proposal that uh, the international safeguard system which was to have been approved should be applied to all facilities pe... uh, for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This would have exempted those facilities of the nuclear weapon powers which were being used to produce fissionable material for their weapons programs. But since there were only a few nuclear weapon powers then, about four or perhaps uh, not more than four — perhaps three... So it was felt that except for those three all the other nuclear facilities in other countries would be placed under safeguards but this was rejected by the Soviet Union. And I'm afraid that that was the first of m... great opportunity that was lost to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

CUT A MINUTE. HOW DID PAKISTAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND ON PROLIFERATION AT THE END OF THE FIFTIES THERE?

The proliferation debate had not really commenced in the fifties. It was in the early sixties m... that I think the Irish delegation at that time put forward a proposal for curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and he pointed to it as a clear and present danger. But disarmament debates were taking place in the forums of the United Nations and at that time they were dealing with uh, measures of conventional disarmament, measures of nuclear disarmament and uh, banning the nuclear weapons test and uh, such proposals. But soon afterwards when they found that it was not possible to make progress on comprehensive measures of disarmament such as general and complete disarmament proposed by Khrushchev, they decided that there was greater promise in addressing uh, diplomatic efforts towards what they called collateral measures of disarmament.

I'M ONLY INTERESTED IN PAKISTAN'S ROLE IN THAT.

Pakistan was most interested of course, along with other countries, in the control of nuclear weapons because the outbreak of nuclear war would end of all countries, not only the nuclear weapon powers. At that time they were very conscious of the dangers of radioactive fallout. Uh, but as far as conventional disarmament was concerned this was uh, of more immediate concern because m... in different region — the Middle East for instance between the Arab countries and Israel and in South Asia between India and Pakistan — uh, we were stepping up the acquisition of armaments and we thought that if under the auspices of the UN measures could be adopted for the reduction of armaments. That would be a net gain for all of us.

WHY DID PAKISTAN DECIDE TO SIGN THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY AND YET DIDN'T RATIFY IT?

At that time I think this had to do with the relationship that Pakistan had come to develop with a number of countries. Uh, particularly the People's Republic of China which at that time felt that the partial test ban treaty was designed to insure the monopoly, nuclear monopoly of certain powers. And uh, since our relations with China were developing we wanted to show some consideration to how they felt. M... But uh, I think there's no good reason for Pakistan not to ratify this treaty. And I hope that it would be done before long.

YOU SAID LAST NIGHT THAT IT WAS ACADEMIC. JUST AROUND THE SAME PERIOD, 1963, PRESIDENT KENNEDY PREDICTED THAT BY THE SEVENTIES THERE WOULD BE 25 NATIONS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DID YOU SHARE HIS CONCERN AND WHICH COUNTRIES WAS PAKISTAN WORRIED ABOUT?

That was the general... concern at the time uh, because um... countries were acquiring the know-how in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Research reactors were being spread to different parts of the world and uh, even developing countries, some of them were quite advanced and they had embarked on, uh, ambitious programs for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. So they simply felt that the civilian reactors would yield a lot of burnt field —

STOP AGAIN. SAY PAKISTAN'S VIEW ON THIS. WHICH COUNTRIES WAS PAKISTAN CONCERNED ABOUT?

Well at that time naturally we were very concerned that India would uh, emerge as a nuclear weapon power. Israel, South Africa. And of course others were perhaps concerned about uh, the spread of nuclear weapons. For instance the Soviet Union was very concerned that Germany should not have its finger on the nuclear trigger. Also so about Japan. And then it was felt that Argentina and Brazil uh, could become nuclear weapon powers within a decade or within the next twenty years or so. And uh, in Europe itself there were other countries? Switzerland, Stockholm and Sweden. So um... It was felt that uh, with the diffusion of the technology, knowledge of the technology there were be uh, trend was general proliferation of nuclear weapons.

AND IN THE FOLLOWING YEAR THE CHINESE EXPLODED THEIR FIRST BOMB. WHAT WAS PAKISTAN'S REACTION TO THAT?

Well of course Pakistan's reaction at the official and diplomatic level I should say was correct... uh, in the sense that um, we were all committed to the uh, an end to nuclear explosions. And also to efforts at the control of nuclear uh, armaments or the limitation. But in as much as China was a very friendly country to Pakistan, there was considerable admiration. At the same, that China had been able by its own efforts on the basis of self-reliance to muster such a difficult technology and to achieve uh, that stage of development in which it could m... produce a nuclear weapon. So I should say it was an ambivalent feeling in Pakistan. Concern mixed with admiration for their achievement.

COULD YOU REPEAT THAT A LITTLE BIT BRIEFER? WHAT WAS PAKISTAN'S REACTION TO THE CHINESE TEST?

It was Pakistan's reaction was I should say in retrospect somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand Pakistan was committed...

CAN YOU REMEMBER HOW YOU FELT AT THE TIME?

Pakistan's reaction at that time was ambivalent. On the one hand along with other member states of the UN which had participated in disarmament uh, negotiations it was committed to all measures of nuclear disarmament and wa... had it, it had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty and was against explosions. At the same time as China was a very friendly country and it was felt that it could play a meaningful role in strengthening security in South Asia. The uh, nuclear explosion achieved by China was regarded with a considerable degree of admiration and also uh, there was sympathy for the fact that China, being such a great large country, uh, was perhaps entitled to take its rank among the great powers of the world.

IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE DEBATE ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, IT SEEMS TO BE THAT PAKISTAN WAS VERY SUPPORTIVE. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE PAKISTAN'S ROLE IN THOSE EARLY DAYS?

Pakistan's role was in favor of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But a large number of the non-nuclear states which were participating in the negotiation on that treaty felt that the text presented by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom was unbalanced, that it was discriminatory and that while the non-nuclear states were called upon to renounce for all time the right to manufacture nuclear weapons...

WE'RE ONLY INTERESTED IN PAKISTAN. WHAT WAS PAKISTAN'S ROLE IN THE EARLY PARTS OF THE DEBATE?

Pakistan was um, most active in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty uh, because we felt while on the one hand it was necessary to curb the spread of nuclear weapons; at the same time we felt that there should be a better balance between the rights and obligations of the non-nuclear states such as Pakistan... nuclear weapon states. Pakistan would have been called upon by this treaty to renounce for all time its right to acquire nuclear weapons which is a sovereign right. In return it was expected that there would be adequate security guarantees to Pakistan and all such states renouncing the right to acquire nuclear weapons, but the Non-Proliferation Treaty failed to provide for guarantees against the threat of use of nuclear weapons, against a non-nuclear state like Pakistan. So therefore we said that while we would be prepared to support the treaty but at the same time uh, we expected that the nuclear weapon powers would agree to our proposal to hold a non-nuclear weapon states conference which could discuss the inadequacy of the non-proliferation insofar as security guarantees were concerned and could evolve better more positive security guarantees than what the three nuclear weapon powers were expected to provide.

WHAT KIND OF SECURITY CONCERNS DID PAKISTAN HAVE AT THAT POINT?

Well we felt that India's nuclear program was far advanced and sooner or later India would emerge as a nuclear weapon power, while Pakistan would not be able to compete in this field and acquire for itself uh, countervailing nuclear weapons capability. Also we felt that the Middle East uh, was an area of tension which could uh, erupt into conflict at any time. And that Israel would soon acquire nuclear weapon capability and uh, in that context it could lead to uh, very serious consequences. And during the fifties it had become clear that the US.. France was uh, helping Israel in a secret manner uh, to develop reprocessing. And uh, also India had acquired a reprocessing plant from France which was not only effective safeguards. So we felt that the burnt fuel from the Pluto... from the research reactors could be reprocessed and plutonium separated and built into nuclear weapons.

I'M JUST GOING TO GO BACK OVER THE NPT AGAIN. WHAT KIND OF NPT DID PAKISTAN WANT?

Pakistan wanted that the security guarantees should be incorporated in the NPT whereas the three nuclear weapon powers which sponsored the NPT; that is the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain, they did not wish to go beyond uh, agreeing to a resolution adopted by the Security Council. As s-stating that in the event a non-nuclear weapon state was threatened with uh, aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons, these three nuclear weapon powers had the intention of going to its assistance — extending assistance to it uh, in accordance with the procedures of the UN Security Council. This meant that uh, any action by these three powers in the event that a non-nuclear state was threatened with aggression could be subject to veto. So it would be ineffective. Secondly, the formulation fell short of a commitment or an undertaking. It amounted only an ex... in expression of intention.

WHY WAS THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR GUARANTEES SO IMPORTANT TO PAKISTAN? WAS IT BECAUSE THIS WAS THE PERIOD WHEN THERE WAS SOME TENSION, 1965 WAR WITH INDIA? WHY WAS IT SUCH AN IMPORTANT ISSUE?

Well it was important issue in view of the history of relations between Pakistan and India. We had a war in 1948 with India.

WHY WAS THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR GUARANTEES IMPORTANT. IF YOU COULD START BY SAYING...

Nuclear guarantees were important to Pakistan in view of the history of relations between Pakistan and India. There was a war in 1948 between the two countries on account of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Just before consideration — just our — before the consideration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty there was a war in 1965 between India and Pakistan again over Jammu and Kashmir. And uh, we felt that in, in uh, South Asia uh, unless there was a kind of semblance or at least some, to some degree there was a military balance, Pakistan security would be threatened. And I think I said earlier that the Middle East was another area of potential conflict and the introduction of nuclear weapons in such situation uh, we felt was fraught with danger for peace/security and stability of the whole region.

WHY WAS THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR GUARANTEES SO IMPORTANT TO PAKISTAN?

Nuclear guarantees were very important to Pakistan beca... in view of the history of relations between Pakistan and India. Uh, the country ha... the two countries had fought two wars; one in 1948 over Jammu and Kashmir? again in 1965 over Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan felt that India was militarily stronger and that it w... had refused uh, to agree to any fair method of peaceful settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute. And that it had denied the people of Jammu and Kashmir oh... with all their, with their affiliation with Pakistanis uh, the right of self-determination. It has frusted... frustrated all efforts of the UN to resolve the problem and therefore it was felt that if India in addition to its preponderant uh, military power also acquired nuclear weapons the security of Pakistan would be greatly imperiled and therefore as a countervailing um... uh, uh, as the, to, as a countervailing measure uh, there should be security guarantees provided internationally under the umbrella of the United Nations to Pakistan as to all non-nuclear weapon states. We — uh, Pakistan did not want it exclusively for itself but uh, for all non-nuclear weapon states which were ready to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty under which they would renounce for all time nuclear weapons.

AT WHAT POINT DID IT BECOME CLEAR THAT INDIA WAS INTENT ON CARRYING OUT A NUCLEAR TEST?

Pakistan felt that um, India's nuclear program was so, was taking such shape and that it was moving towards the development of a self-reliant capability in the nuclear field cycle. In other words, from the mining of uranium to the development of m... uranium oxide, processing into uranium oxide and then into processing into fuel for reactors and then reprocessing the burnt fuel into the act... from reactors into plutonium that India was developing nuclear weapons capability. I uh, in fact speaking in 1965 soon after the India-Pakistan war I pointed this out to the United Nations and said that it was high time that uh, international efforts were made towards controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. And uh, also that the danger was not only confined to South Asia but uh, it could, it was uh, ra... it uh, it was a over a vital field because research reactors would lead in course of time to the accumulation of burnt fuel and plutonium would be extracted and could come into the position of uh, many more countries than was the case at that time. And something had to be done early enough to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

ONE OF THE REASONS YOU GAVE FOR NOT SIGNING THE NPT WAS THAT PAKISTAN WANTED TO KEEP HER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION OPEN IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT INDIA HAD. DO YOU REMEMBER ANY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO AT THAT TIME ABOUT THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? WAS HE INTERESTED IN A PAKISTANI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM?

Pakistan and uh, ra... uh, for... at that time Foreign Minister Bhutto were not so much interested in nuclear weapons but uh, they felt that if Pakistan withheld its signature to the Non-Proliferation Treaty it would be able to exercise more leverage in regard to controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and regard to uh, exercising influence on India to submit to the International Safeguard System, its research reactor and reprocessing plant, than by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That was the rationale for not signing. And uh, this was clear from the fact that Pakistan declared — it supported the Non-Proliferation Treaty but would not sign unless other threshold nuclear powers such as India and the others were also signatories because uh, otherwise the treaty would not be meaningful.

I JUST WANT TO GET YOU TO THE INTERNAL DEBATE. THE ONE OF THE MANY QUOTES THAT WE HAVE FROM THESE DAYS IS THIS FAMOUS ONE BY FOREIGN MINISTER BHUTTO; "IF INDIA BUILDS A BOMB WE’LL EAT LEAVES, EVEN GO HUNGRY, BUT WE WILL GET WE HAVE NOALTERNATIVE." DO YOU REMEMBER ANY CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM TO THIS EFFECT?

I don't recall any serious conversation that we should consider building a... nuclear weapon. At that time Pakistan had only one small research reactor gifted by the United States for five research reactor. And uh, whereas India had a research reactor which was and it was free of safeguards because Canada uh, did not harken to the fears expressed where Pakistan that unless safeguards were imposed there was a danger of the fissionable material being direct... diverted for clandestine weapons purposes. But uh, then and also because India had succeeded in acquiring a reprocessing plant for um, to work which uh, the United States had trained some Indian scientists and also s... probably supplied uh, heavy water. So we were very concerned about it, but at that time uh, Prime Minister Bhutto was not really thinking in terms of a nuclear weapons program for Pakistan but more um, that the whole, Pakistan — what was, would be Pakistan's answer through international diplomacy to safeguard the security against a potential emerging nuclear weapons threat from India. We're talking now about 1965, 1966.

HOW DID PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO'S VIEWS ON THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DIFFER FROM THOSE OF PRIME MINISTER AYUB KHAN?

I have uh... I do not know of any discussion between Prime Minister — at that time Foreign Minister Bhutto and President Ayub Khan because as long as Ayub Khan was in power uh, Mr. Bhutto uh, did not become Prime Minister. He became uh, later on he became President. That was the post- era. During uh, Ayub Khan's uh, presidency Mr. Bhutto was Foreign Minister but up to 1966. As you know after the India-Pakistan war of 1965 uh, differences developed between Mr. Bhutto and President Iyoupe over the conduct of the war. And after the Tashkend conference of 1966, January uh, under the mediation of Prime Minister Kosegan of the Soviet Union and the between Bhutto and Ayub Khan and uh, Ayub Khan dropped uh, Mr. Bhutto as Foreign Minister. There were attempts to get Ayub Khan interested in getting a reprocessing plant from France. And that was under the pressure of the uh... small but influential scientific community of Pakistan uh, which felt that uh, we were a developing country, a backward country but we should not be backward in everything and here was a new field and there were some promising scientists so at least in, in uh... one field of national endeavor Pakistan should not lag behind. But Ayub khan uh, attached more importance to eca... development projects such as textile mills, factories rather than the acquisition of a reprocessing plant. Um, he, he was on very good terms with President DeGaulle and uh, it was felt in Pakistan in official circles that if he had really pressed General DeGaulle uh, he would have been able to acquire a reprocessing plant. But the fact is he just didn't do so. So this proves that the government had no plans for the acquisition of uh, nuclear weapons.

WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF 1971 AND HOW DID IT AFFECT PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CONCERNS?

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971... served to isolate Pakistan from its friends because that treaty said in one of its articles that in the event of a threat to peace in the region the two sides, that is India and the Soviet Union, will consult with each other with a view to removing the threat. So in diplomatic language this is, was as good as a treaty of military alliance. And that treaty also said that neither party would take any action which would be uh, to the prejudice of the interest of the other side. So this meant that the Soviet relationship with Pakistan would be subject to a kind of Indian veto because India could always object that to what length should the Soviet Union — for instance if Sov... Pakistan got interested in acquiring some Soviet tanks, India uh, under the treaty uh, was in a position to block. So I'm only saying this by way of illustration because at that time it was impossible for us to get anything from the Soviet Union. Because you would recall that this treaty came in the wake of Dr. Henry Kissinger's visit, secret visit to via Pakistan. And Pakistan was playing a role to bring about a, between the United States and China and naturally this infuriated the Soviet Union because it felt that Pakistan was acting to bring about a which could potentially alter the world balance of power. And so therefore the Soviet Union... turned to India and India was also looking for some guarantee against Chinese intervention in behalf of Pakistan in the Bangladesh crisis, because India had massed its forces and we were expecting that it would attack East Pakistan and therefore in order to prevent Chinese intervention uh, on behalf of Pakistan, the Indo-Soviet Treaty was concluded under which the Soviet Union is stated to have warned China that if it intervened then all its nuclear facilities would be blasted out of existence. So this was the significance of the Indo-Soviet Treaty which isolated Pakistan and created the conditions for Indian um, attack on East Pakistan and the subsequent dismemberment of Pakistan by the creation of Bangladesh. The Soviet Union assisted India in this war through providing surveillance aircraft and other. I believe through missile boats and in other manner. In uh, in other ways. Uh, so therefore it was a treaty — it is still in existence. Uh, the Soviet-Indian relationship has become a strategic one and this treaty is uh, hailed by both sides as uh, making for the peace and stability of South Asia, which means that um, in, in diplomatic language that um lends support to Indian ambitions for preponderance or hegemony. But I must say that... the recent move or the recent declarations by Secretary General Gorbachev...

WE'LL COME TO THAT LATER. JUST GOING BACK, 1972, THIS MULTAN MEETING THAT WE ALWAYS HEAR ABOUT. WHAT WAS THE MULTAN MEETING?

I have no first-hand knowledge of that because I was Ambassador to China at that time. A lot has been written about the Multan Meeting and I think that — and uh, there is a book also called Islamic Bomb which bases itself on this Multan Meeting and what at that time President Bhutto

BUT

...told his scientists about uh... asked them whether they were capable of manufacturing an uh, atomic bomb. And they showed him they could and so therefore some program was launched, but as I told you I don't have personal knowledge of it. I have read the book, but I take uh... I'm s... extremely skeptical about the um... voracity of many of the statements made in that book.

YOU SAY PROJECT 706 DOESN'T MEAN ANYTHING TO YOU.

Later on I came to know about Project — when I came back as Foreign Secretary I became aware of Project... what is seven-o? You know, seem to know the number. I forgot it.

IT'S SEVEN-O-SIX. WHAT WAS PROJECT 706?

Project 706 was concerned with the technology of reprocessing... first, because you recall that we had made an agreement with France in 1976 which was registered with the United Nations and the Atomic Energy Agency subject to its safeguards, approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency, that Pakistan would get a 25 ton reprocessing plant from France. And they gave us the blueprints and this was to separate from the burnt fuel from out reactor in Karachi, the Canada reactor....

WE'RE COMING TO THAT. BUT WASN'T PROJECT 706 SOME KIND OF NUCLEAR POLICY? I MEAN, IT WAS SOME KIND OF DECLARATION.

No, no, no. Uh, Project 706 concerned the actual uh — it was a kind of a workshop, not a policy uh, declaration. It was a code word for any project. It was just an engineering laboratory where if we had got the reprocessing plant we would have installed it and used it for a b... basing it on the French blueprint we would have uh, started reprocessing the burnt fuel from our Canada reactor in Karachi.

IT'S JUST THAT PROJECT 706 WE'VE GOT AS STARTING IN '72 AND THIS WAS BEFORE YOU GET TO THE REPROCESSING.

I'm afraid Project 706 was not started in ‘72. It was started after '76.

HOW DID THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO AFFECT PAKISTAN?

The Arab oil embargo was imposed um, on account on of the intervention by the United States in the war of 1973 and it was designed to bring about a situation in which negotiations could take place for a Middle East settlement based on the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab territories. But it... Well uh, the oil embargo... Well it was too soon to affect us because this was imposed uh, during the war. But later on it became an instrument for raising the oil prices.

YES.

And I believe the oil prices were raised with the concurrence of the United States because the United States wanted a higher price for oil so that other sources of energy could be developed such as from Shell Oil and uh, in other ways.

LET'S STICK WITH PAKISTAN. WE'RE STILL IN '74, RIGHT?

Right.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE INDIAN TEST OF A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVICE IN 1974?

Pakistan was stunned by this explosion although Pakistan had been expecting from the late sixties that a nuclear explosion could take place but when it actually did it uh, gave rise to very deep concern so the immediate reaction of Pakistan was to turn to the nuclear weapon powers and ask them if they could strengthen the non-proliferation regime, which I said before was not effect... which was not effective uh, on account of the lack of security guarantees.

WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL REACTION TO THE INDIAN TEST OF A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVICE?

My personal reaction was one of deep concern because I was uh, concerned with the advising on foreign policy and therefore had to think of what steps were open to us, were there any steps open to us to safeguard our security against a new threat which had emerged. Uh, we turned to the nuclear weapon powers. Uh, we asked the Uni... United States whether it was prepared to strengthen the non-proliferation regime of the NPT by strengthening the security guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states. In other words, could it — in other words could it provide a nuclear umbrella. There was a negative response from the United States. In fact Dr. Kissinger said he saw no advantage to the United States in going against a fait accompli which could not be reversed. The Chinese told us that uh, their uh, nuclear capability did not extend to the proportion of a nuclear umbrella and their nuclear program was rather experimental. So therefore we realized that uh, there was no uh, guarantee uh — that no guarantee would be forthcoming from any of the nuclear weapon powers bilaterally or individually and for that matter even collectively. Uh, nevertheless uh, we proposed to the United Nations that South Asia should be established as a nuclear weapon free zone. We got good majorities for our resolution but it was opposed by India. And uh, as you know in the United Nations nothing moves except on the basis of consensus, particularly in the General Assembly and uh, we also tried very hard to revive interest in nuclear guarantees by putting forward a draft convention uh, ari... which would uh, require the all nuclear weapon powers, all threshold nuclear pewa... weapon powers once they acquired nuclear capability to undertake not to threaten non-nuclear weapon states with the use of nuclear weapons. But these efforts are continue ra... uh, uh, these are perennial items on the agenda of the UN and so far there's been no result.

SO WAS THIS A TIME OF VERY PERSONAL FRUSTRATION FOR YOU?

Yes. Of course it was um... a time of great frustration and uh, we had to pacify the anxieties of the people of Pakistan. And uh... and that situation continues.

AT THIS TIME THE CIA PUT OUT A REPORT THAT YOU'RE PROBABLY FAMILIAR WITH FOLLOWING INDIA THAT PAKISTAN WAS LIKELY TO GO AHEAD WITH A TEST. WHAT WAS YOUR OPINION?

I've seen reports, which uh, have predicted that a nuclear explosion by Pakistan is imminent and this has gone on since 1978. I don't know on what basis they conclude it. Surely they knew that uh, we had no fissionable material at that time and that the Canadian reactor was under safeguards. We couldn't separate the plutonium from the burnt fuel because we had no reprocessing plant so how could we carry out a nuclear explosion? So it shows that it was — a great deal of propaganda was mounted in order somehow to prevent Pakistan from acquiring uh, knowledge of nuclear technology, because there're many uh, circles in the world which somehow seem to have a kind of uh, fear that Pakistan if it acquires nuclear capability will manufacture a bomb called the Islamic bomb and make it available to Colonel Gaddafi or Yassar Arafat, all totally baseless. Pakistan is a responsible country. A nuclear device is not something that you sell to other people off the shelf like you sell a tank or even — even if you want to sell a tank or an uh, fighter aircraft, uh, that is subject to a political and other relationships and uh, I think this was entirely, totally unfounded. And as you know, there was a great propaganda campaign mounted just a few years ago in Europe and TV programs were shown about how Pakistan through clandestine means uh, accumulated bit by bit the various components...

WE'LL COME TO THAT. THERE WERE ALSO ALLEGATIONS THAT IN '73 MR. BHUTTO WENT ON A TOUR TO GET FUNDING FOR AN ISLAMIC BOMB.

I'll show you nothing of the kind. In the first place it would have been unwise for Mr. Bhutto to have solicited funds for such a project. If at all such a project he wanted to embark upon he would have done it through our own resources because of the secrecy that was involved. And uh, uh, what happened after 1973 was that on account of the oil embargo and uh, the rising prices of oil all developed countries, including Pakistan, felt themselves uh, squeezed very hard about how to meet their foreign exchange expenditures. And therefore uh, he went on a tour of these countries asking for assistance uh, to Pakistan — economic assistance, balance of payments assistance, but it was mistakenly given out as uh, the assistance for building a bomb project, which was nothing of the kind.

...THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIBYA AND PAKISTAN AT THIS PERIOD?

The relationship was a good one. It was one of gratefulness on the part of Pakistan because in 1971 and '72, right up till 1973 Colonel Gaddafi strongly denounced the Soviet Union for its assistance to India in the war in dismemberment of Pakistan. So since uh, Colonel Gaddafi took this position in the non-allied conference, conferences felt many supporters of the Soviet Union prevent the adoption of any resolutions against the Soviet Union no matter how wrong the Soviet Union is on any particular issue. We felt beholden to Colonel Gaddafi for the expression of the sympathy and support at a moment when our country had been dismembered. So therefore, uh, the relationship was warm at that time. And uh, after the rise in oil prices Colonel Gaddafi expressed an intention to assist Pakistan and developing countries with funds. We did enter into negotiations for the da... for some development projects, even some defense projects such as the manufacture of sub... submarines and under license from France or Germany. But for one reason or the other uh, these projects fell through.

I WAS GOING TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE MILITARY COOPERATION AGREEMENT. WHAT DID THAT INVOLVE?

We had no military cooperation agreement except that uh, we sent uh, some na... uh, naval contingent to train the Libyan navy, uh, officers as we have done to other countries, as India has sent to contingents to where, in our, to train the Air Force and to other countries. We have training contingents in several countries of the Middle East... and some of Africa too.

CAN YOU REMEMBER ANY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT COLONEL KHADAFI?

I was present at uh, several meetings that the presi... Prime Minister Bhutto had with Colonel Gaddafi. Um, discussions related to Middle East situations, situation in South Asia, Pakistan's relationship with the Soviet Union and America. At one time Colonel Gaddafi was interested that Pakistan should try to play uh, a role which would um, promote somewhat better understanding between the United States and Libya. For instance he was very interested in buying some... I believe seven or seven aircraft or for aviation and uh, but I think these efforts did not come to anything. And because his major... His main cause of quarrel with the United States was the support given to Israel and the uh, role played by the United States in uh, building up the military power of Israel uh, and uh, support given to Israel for its, in spite of its uh, violations of international law in regard to Palestine and the occupate... occupied territories and whatnot. That was the major cause of difference. And on that we are we also have taken the position against the United States and we continue to do so.

DO YOU RECALL ANY MENTION OF BOMBS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH THEM?

I don't recall any mention of bombs or nuclear weapons between President Bhutto and Gaddafi. I think there were two or three occasions on which these meetings took place and I was present, but we discussed these political relationships and uh, how to improve. And he was interested at one time in seeing whether Pakistan could play a role in improving US-Libyan relations.

WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE IN THE CHASMA REPROCESSING PROJECT?

Uh, which...?

THE CHASMA.

Chasma. Chasma. Well I made uh — This.

WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE?

You know, this Chasma, the reprocessing plant that we were going to acquire from France was to be located at Chasma. But there was another project for a civilian reactor at Chasma so the two tend to beget... get confused. So as regards the reprocessing plant, that was negotiated — the agreement was negotiated by Mr... the chairman of Atomic Energy Commission.

THE CHASMA PROJECT WAS THE SUBJECT OF MUCH INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM.

You mean the reprocessing plant.

THE ACTUAL REPROCESSING ONE. COULD YOU EXPLAIN PAKISTAN'S INTENTIONS SINCE YOU WERE INVOLVED AS A NEGOTIATOR. WHAT WERE PAKISTAN'S INTENTIONS?

Pakistan's intention was to reprocess plutonium from the accumulated burnt fuel of the Canadian reactor in Karachi. And to use the plutonium as fuel for light water reactors. We had a program of acquiring six to eight — Munir Amat Khan would be in a better position to tell you about the exact plan. So we wanted to develop — I mean uh, accumulate this fuel. And we offered to France not only international inspection to prevent any clandestine diversion of this fuel for illicit purposes but we also offered to Prance that they could take away all the separated plutonium and keep it in their custody and only give that much of it for which we could demonstrate a present requirement such as uhf reactor actually ready to use the fuel. They are now under the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. There's a provision for a plutonium management regime. That is

LET ME JUST STOP YOU. WHAT WERE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU ENCOUNTERED IN GETTING THIS DEAL THROUGH?

The deal was gone through. It was signed and it was acted upon but uh, when the delivery started Dr. Kissinger came and said that we should cease and desist from reprocessing because President Carter then a candidate for President in 1976 made non-proliferation a principle plank of his campaign and he targeted his attacks on Pakistan. He said Pakistan should be prevented from acquiring this nuclear reprocessing plant because Pakistan cannot be trusted whatever the safeguards not to use the plutonium which it would reprocess for making clandestine bombs. And Pakistan's nuclear program would be a threat not only to the region but to world peace. So he made it a principle plank and President Ford was the incumbent president and he was the Republican candidate so under the pressure of Carter, Dr. Kissinger came and took uh, exerted a considerable amount of pressure for us, on us to um, renege on the reprocessing plant agreement, which of course President uh, Prime Minister Bhutto refused to do.

WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT THAT?

I think it was totally uh, unreasonable because there was no way — no considerable way by which Pakistan could have cheated on this agreement to uh, secrete plutonium in a clandestine manner because it would have been subject to IAEA safeguards, to French safeguards. And also when we offered that the whole thing should be taken over by France, then what was the uh, justification for coercing Pakistan into — uh, in coercing France into uh, violating a solemn contract that it — and not only that. Since that time the United States pressure has been unremitting on countries from which we want to buy a civilian nuclear reactor under safeguards. So the US policy towards Pakistan has been a highly discriminatory and I should regret to say, an inimical one in regard to our peaceful nuclear program.

NOW CANADA ALSO WAS INVOLVED IN SOME OF THIS AS WELL. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE CANADIAN WITHDRAWAL?

Well Canada punished us because India carried out an explosion. We had warned Canada that it should insist on the application of safeguards to the research reactor they had given India, the 40 megawatt reactor. But Canada paid no heed to our protestations. Then when India carried out an explosion, uh, India carried out an explosion, Canada came to us and said, "We have an agreement with you to help you in regard to the running or the maintenance of the Karachi reactor. Now agree to additional safeguards." And they said, "We will not continue to provide spare parts and other maintenance facilities, technical assistance unless you place all your other nuclear facilities under safeguards." So we thought that this was uh, contrary to all the principles of uh, international relations. They were amending an agreement unilaterally. We refused so then they withdrew. And they said uh, they would, they stopped giving us any technical assistance, spares and maintenance so we were left to our own devices.

WHY WERE YOU NOT PREPARED TO PUT ALL YOUR NULCEAR UNDER SAFEGUARD?

Because uh, we felt it was discriminatory that Pakistan alone should be asked to do this and not India, not Israel, not South Africa. We said, "If you are willing to apply uh, international regime or whatever conditions equally without discrimination we are ready." We said, "We will sign the NPT if they sign. We will open our uh, nuclear facilities to your inspection if they also do it to IAEA's inspection." We said, "We are ready to have mutual inspection with India. We are ready to have a nuclear free zone in South Asia," but none of these were acceptable. They said no. Well, their attitude was that it was too late to do anything about India. And Paki... but Pakistan could be stopped. And one distinguished American diplomat who came to pressure us on this question of giving up the reprocessing plant uh, said on that or a subsequent occasion that, "Well," he said, "People say that uh, we are bolting the door after the horse, uh, horses fled." Well how many horses has fled? Or have fled? So he said even if two, three or four have escaped there's still some there and you stop the others. The others have gotten away. Now this was not acceptable to us.

OVERALL WHAT WERE YOUR CRITICISMS OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S POLICY?

Merely this: that he was uh, highly discriminatory. Uh, for instance, the, in his time, the Congress adopted the nuclear non-proliferation act, 1978. That act prohibited uh, or demanded the cut-off of US aid, economic or military aid to countries which were engaged in reprocessing a uranium enrichment. But uh, after a certain date — th... after this Symington Amendment was adopted... Symington Amendment was adopted in '76 but then so formulated it applied only to Pakistan whereas the other countries; India, South Africa, Israel, had done these things before 1976. So the non-proliferation act was highly discriminatory, applied only to India. And then President Carter supplied endless uranium to India in spite of the non-proliferation act. Uh, but he did not uh, he imposed all and he imposed sanctions on us. So it was highly discriminatory, unfair.

THE CONFUSION IS IT'S CALLED THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. COULD YOU SUMMARIZE AGAIN WHAT YOUR FEELING WAS ABOUT THE CARTER POLICIES?

Carter policies were based on discrimination and coercive diplomacy. They dealt only with the nuclear program of Pakistan. They were not addressed to the general problem of the danger of prod... proliferation. For instance, in Latin America, in South Africa, South Africa vis-a-vis the front line states of Africa. And in future there could be a Black African state like Nigeria which would say, "Why shouldn't I be considered a nuclear weapon power? I'm a country of hundred million." If small countries can be considered nuclear weapon powers, why not the big countries? Because if status is to be, going to be based on power and nuclear weaponry is uh, considered the currency of power. So therefore it is only natural. When you have a number of states who are likely to be now, 1966 there were five nuclear weapon powers. Today there are eight including South Africa, Israel, India. Another five, ten years there may be three or four, five more. For instance, today I don't think that um, anybody can stop uh, the emergence of Brazil or Argentina as nuclear weapon powers if they so exercise the option. So therefore you must approach this problem on a different basis. That is you cannot prevent possession. At least do something about preventing the use of nuclear weapons and for that the non-proliferation regime should be strengthened.

HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THE COMBINED EFFECT OF THE US DECISION TO WITHDRAW AID AND ALSO THE FRENCH DECISION TO WITHDRAW NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE? HOW DID THIS AFFECT THE PAKISTAN PROGRAM?

Pakistan... felt that it must uh, follow a policy of self-reliance. And that uh, in particularly in this field of nuclear technology it was um, vain to rely on external sources. So that was the genesis of our efforts to develop the process uranium enrichment in Pakistan.

HOW DID YOU GO ABOUT IT?

About uranium enrichment? Well uh, the technology — now a great deal of uh, technical literature is available in the libraries of uh, Western countries in Europe. So the scientists are aware of the process. The only question was uh, how do you manufacture those centrifuges and how do you build them into cascades? And then how do you uh... transform — go through the various stages from uranium mining to oxide to hexaflouride and to enrichment. So this was done. You know, it, it is astonishing. Although Pakistan cannot be considered um... as sophisticated uh, in uh, industrial technology, but there's a great deal of ingenuity among our you know, people who are not uh, haven't been to universities but you know, who practice in . For instance we hac... we have some excellent motor mechanics... uh, engineers and others, and who can take things apart and put them together. Like that we went to all the little, small shops, unimpressive looking things and explained to them what was wanted. And they built over a period. And the — we had some talented bright scientists. Uh, some of them had worked in centrifuge uh, uh, plants. And uh, they came back. And uh, they put a — by trial and error they developed this thing on an ingeni... indigenous basis with the result that they say uranium enrich... enrichment project is indigenous in its origin and its, in its base and in its development. So that is how we built it. And we have uranium in our country. Uh, we uh, turned the natural uranium into uranium oxide. We have a fuel fabrication plant. Now we manufacture the fuel for our Canadian reactor in Karachi. The Canadians stopped supplying six, uh, eight years ago. But we have kept the reactor running. It's from our own fuel rods that we have manufactured. And like that we have developed uh, this process by trial and error.

WHY WAS IT FELT NECESSARY TO DEVELOP IT?

Because again, we wanted a light water reactor that uses uranium. But because of our opposition of the United States we have been prevented from acquiring one. We invite tenders and bids and many companies, foreign companies which are interested, they tell us that great pressure has been exercised by their governments not to put in a bid. So therefore, we have been frustrated in our efforts to have a civilian nuclear light water reactor. So this uranium enrichment would provide sufficient fuel for one light water reactor. That is all we are capable of doing. But the technology has been mastered. The quantity is little, barely sufficient for one reactor.

IF THE PLANT IS FOR PEACEFUL USES WHY ISN'T IT SAFEGUARDED?

Well I said it should be safeguarded but then again, the question arises of discrimination. Why only Pakistan should submit to safeguards? We have offered to India mutual inspection. Other two countries signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty which means that we open our doors to atomic, International Atomic Energy inspection. We have said, "All right. If you don't want inspection, let us jointly renounce nuclear weapons." That has been turned down. We said, "Nuclear weapon free zone," which again will f... uh, require that we open our facilities to nuclear inspection on a, you know, m... basis... um, on a collective basis, but that has been turned down. Uh, so therefore it's a question how can we tell our own people that now we've submitted to this unilateral discriminatory command? And what is the quid pro quo if we submit it? Is anybody prepared to guarantee us a nuclear umbrella? We have no capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. But in the future we could have an option. Well, we are not going to throw out a card without getting anything. And that point is what are we going to get? Is anybody prepared to guarantee us a nuclear umbrella? Because at the present time we are without one but we want to see whether we can use it to some purpose. But what is being expected of us we just give up. And the other should have. How is that to be justified. We live in a — this uh, international um... fe... the international life is life in a jungle.

CAN YOU UNDERSTAND WESTERN ANXIETY ABOUT PAKISTAN HAVING —

I — It is, I think totally unwarranted. How is Western, any Western interest threatened by Pakistan's enrichment program? We have said that we will not manufacture nuclear weapons. President Zaire has given a commitment to President Reagan. President Zaire has said that we will not carry out an explosion. So what is the West worried about? You think that the Pakistan can threaten the West with uh, nuclear weapon? Why is the West so concerned. They should be more concerned about the Middle East. There's a much greater likelihood of nuclear weapon being used in the Middle East than it is in South Asia. So therefore unless the West has a more comprehensive inclusive uh, viable outlook, but this constant pressure of interest groups and lobbies in the United States and in the media to just coerce Pakistan. Well... I don't think that any government in Pakistan is going to yield on this question whatever the cost... because no government would last here in this country if it did that without adequate constant guarantee of our security. Because we have a potential, not an actual; a potential. So it is good to acquire an option, not to exercise it but to keep the option. So therefore we are behaving like any normal state. Isn't it perfectly rational? Which other state would in our position, exposed to this insecurity, would in order to get a pat on the back and say you're good boys, give up this uh, advantage that we have acquired by exertions. In the past I can tell you when Pakistan acted as a bridge between United States and China... pre...Premier Chou En Lai reminded the United States, "Don't forget Pakistan. The bridge you crossed to come to China." And we were told that, "Don't worry. We will not forget this great service in the cause of world peace and stability." But within a year or so promptly uh, it was forgotten. And then when um, one uh, distinguished American uh, official came to Pakistan to again um, pressure us into giving up the reprocessing plant or uranium enrichment, he said, "Well... relations between ours must start from the beginning from a clean state. President Carter has come and I have come. We have nothing to do with the past." So all the past services, all the past relationships in which so much has been invested were wiped out clean by a change of administration in the United States. This is something we have learned about international politics.

LET'S STICK WITH THE CARTER PERIOD. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO — THINK ABOUT THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIES GROUP AND THESE VARIOUS, THE EMC...

The was uh, a well intention effort by President Carter but it did not succeed because most of the developing countries, the threshold countries I have in mind.

HOW DID PAKISTAN INTERPRET THIS?

Well it was an attempt to find out if there could be a substitute for plutonium or uranium which uh, such material which could be used in reactors for developing energy but which could not be used for weapons. That was the idea. But there was uh, consultation for, I don't know, some weeks....

BUT WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT THAT?

Well I think the effort was well intentioned but uh, the results could not be achieved.

START AGAIN.

The effort, the proposal was well intentioned. That is, to find out if there could be a substitute for plutonium and uranium so that the legitimate requirements for developing nuclear energy could be met without at the same time uh, uh, courting the danger of using the same material for weapons purposes. As you know, uranium and plutonium are used for both purposes. So this was an attempt to find out some other kind of process. Uranium in such a way that it could not be used for weapons but it did not succeed. Uh, the number of countries which took part; Argentina, Brazil and uh, France and others uh, I don't think that they were very enthusiastic about it. And then um, the lack of results uh, discouraged any continuation of that exercise.

ALL THIS TIME THERE'S STILL THE REPROCESSING CONTRACT GOING ON WITH FRANCE. IS IT TRUE THAT THE SAUDIS OFFERED TO COVER THE COSTS OF THE REPROCESSING PLANT AT SOME STAGE?

No. The reprocessing plant wasn't that costly. Uh, I believe it wasn't in the more than about a hundred-million dollars.

HAS SAUDI ARABIA BEEN —

But I tell you, Saudi Arabia at one time, we approached them for the Chasma civilian reactor, power reactor. We didn't approach them for the reprocessing plant since I told you that the reprocessing plant was to be located at Chasma. And also the reactor was to be located at Chasma. So when people talk of Chasma project they have in mind reprocessing plant whereas we had approached the Southeast for the reactor they think we approached them for the reprocess... it's quite different. That's not so.

SO HAS THERE BEEN ANY COOPERATION BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA?

Not at all. As far as this nuclear program is concerned as a matter of policy Pakistan took a conscious decision that it should not enter into partnership in this regard with any other country. The only country in which we were interested in developing a partnership on the reprocessing plant to save it from being cancelled by France was to approach the late and ask him if he could become our partner because uh, we, I felt that he was in the confidence of the United States and they would have greater confidence if he entered into a partnership with us over the reprocessing plant, that it would not be used for any illegitimate purposes even if they didn't believe in the safeguards but the late was not interested. But we did not offer partnership in our nuclear activities to any other country.

WHAT'S YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF YOUR VISIT TO FRANCE IN '77 TO SGN?

77?

77. THIS WAS WHEN THERE WAS THE PERIOD OF THE US TRYING TO ABORT THE CHASMA PROJECT?

I did pay a number of visits to France and uh, at that time I don't recall that I negotiated at all on the uh, reprocessing plant because that was being handled. By that time the agreement had been signed and the technicalities were a condu... the concern of uh, Munir Amat Khan.

BUT YOU DID HAVE A MEETING WITH CYRUS VANCE, I GUESS YOU HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS.

I had a meeting — number of meetings, yes. But I had one in 1979 in which uh, we engaged in a two day discussion about our nuclear program.

COULD YOU START AGAIN?

I met with uh, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance uh, in 1979. Um, I had a delegation accompanying me. And uh, on the United States side there was a formidable delegation headed by Cyrus Vance himself... which included his Deputy Secretary of State, Christopher Warren... Christopher and Garret Smith, their adviser on arms control. Or he negotiated — Garret Smith I believe negotiated the SALT I agreement. Uh, SALT, sorry... SALT II agreement.

WHAT DO YOU REMEMBER ABOUT YOUR CONVERSATION?

Well the conversation related to our nuclear program and they said, "Well uh... uh, we understand that your nuclear program is directed towards the manufacture of uh, weapons. "So I said, "I can give you the categorical assurance that we have no plans to manufacture nuclear weapons." Uh... then they said uh, that "We believe that you're going to transfer this technology to your Arab friends." And I said, "I can also give you a categorical assurance, a commitment that this program, knowledge of technology will not be transferred to any other country, any country." Had he said uh, uh, "You are receiving assistance from, uh, it is said from uh, Colonel Gaddafi and others." So I said, "Well the United States has a very uh, effective intelligence uh, service, I should be grateful if any evidence is produced that Pakistan has received any financial or other assistance from any Arab country including Colonel Gaddafi." So I was told that uh, they had no such evidence. Then a further demand was made that I should give them assurance that there would be no nuclear explosion. I said that uh, "This is a premature question. At present Pakistan has no capability of carrying out an explosion. Therefore I cannot say that uh, we will carry out an explosion. I will also not say that we will not carry out an explosion in the future. But when this question arises in the future, all the pros and cons will be taken into consideration but that would be a decision for the government of the day, not for the present government." So uh, I was told that that is an ambiguity on their part in regard to the explosions. So I said the ambiguity is inherent in the technology.

WHAT EFFORTS HAS PAKISTAN MADE SINCE '74 TO OBTAIN NUCLEAR GUARANTEES FROM THE US?

We know that uh, the United States uh, feels inhibited from giving us any nuclear guarantees because it has to conduct its relations with India. Uh, we have tried to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime which consists of non-proliferation treaty, the international safeguard system of the Atomic Energy Agency and um, other — and then there is also the treaty of to, for the denuclearization of Latin America and similarly. And therefore we tried to promote a nuclear free zone in South Asia. And also a convention which we presented uh, which we've been presenting year after year. Also this uh, proposal on uh, nuclear free zone in South Asia is being presented every year. But so far with... without success. I believe that as I told you I'm coming to the reluctant conclusion that it is now too late in the day to prevent the possession or acquisition of nuclear and the efforts must be concentrated on preventing their use. And that can only happen if the Soviet Union and the United States join in an effort to act in every nuclear policemen. This is contemplated under the charter. There are permanent members of the Security Council. They along with the other permanent members can undertake collective responsibility to any country in any situation of regional conflict from the course to nuclear weapons. And if they are determined then I believe it'll be an effective preventive to the danger of use of nuclear weapons. Short of that I don't think you can go. And then as far as Pakistan is concerned... uh, we as I told you — Pakistan has made several proposals to India, none of which India is disposed to accept. Perhaps uh — I'm not very hopeful that if we propose that the two countries should enter into bilateral agreement not to carry underground... carry out underground nuclear explosions. I doubt that India will agree to that. But if it can then I think we would have found uh — gone a long way towards uh, non-proliferation in our region.

GOING BACK TO THE BHUTTO PERIOD, HOW MUCH OF THE SUCCESS OF THE PAKISTAN PROGRAM DO YOU ATTRIBUTE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO?

Prime Minister Bhutto started our nuclear enrichment program. And it has been developed by President. Carried forward by President.

BUT WHEN HE LEFT HIS POSITION HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN WAS ON THE THRESHOLD OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.

Pakistan we'll say on the threshold of nuclear enrichment. Nuclear enrichment is the first steps towards nuclear capability. Nuclear capability will... depends on a political decision. You understand? To develop nuclear weapons. But the base for that

CAN I JUST ASK YOU TO SAY A FEW WORDS IN DEFENSE OF DR. KHAN? I DON'T NEED YOU TO DESCRIBE EVERYTHING HE'S ACCUSED OF, BUT JUST BRIEFLY.

Dr. Kahn is a highly competent scientist. He worked in the Almelo... or at Almelo the Urenco Plant, ah in — he was knowledgeable about metallurgy.

[BACKGROUND DISCUSSION]

Ah, Dr. Khan as we all know was accused of having stolen some blueprints or plans to manufacture an atomic bomb. This is absurd because the Urenco Plant at which he worked in, at a place called Almelo, I believe, they were only enriching uranium. It was not a ah, factory where they were fabricating or designing nuclear weapons. So therefore to — it is totally false to say that he stole any blueprints or designs for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Of course he resigned and he answered the patriotic call to help ah, work in Pakistan's ah, nuclear energy establishment. In the beginning as you know, we were trying to get a reprocessing plant from France and we were interested in sending Pakistanis to be trained in France as part of the agreement in reprocessing. But when that deal fell through the government asked the scientists what should be done and some of them thought that we might try uranium enrichment and that ah, we perhaps would make a success of it on our own. And that is how Dr. Kahn was asked to resign and come and work on this project.

SINCE 1971 INDIA HAS VOICED CONCERNS ABOUT SINO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR COOPERATION. IS THERE ANY VALIDITY TO THEIR CLAIMS?

Cooperation in the nuclear field is quite different from cooperation in any other field, because the question of nuclear cooperation, particularly...I mean there could be cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy such as we had an agreement with Canada which worked for a number of years and we got ah, the Kandu reactor from them. Also we have made agreements, scientific cooperation in the scientific field with quite a number of countries and China is one such country. But to deduce from that that ah, somehow China is involved in our — that in the manufacture of nuclear technical assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons by Pakistan is totally wrong.

COMING BACK TO THE AREA WHERE YOU WERE REALLY DIRECTLY INVOLVED, WHY DID PAKISTAN TURN DOWN CARTER'S OFFER OF US AID FOLLOWING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN?

Because ah, it was not meaningful in terms of strengthening our security. President Carter offered us $400 million to buy some military equipment from the United States. And the indicative list of the equipment that the US was ready to sell to us was not meaningful. And ah, we thought that any such US aid would not be commensurate with our security ah, requirements and so therefore it was not accepted.

COULD YOU COMMENT JUST GENERALLY ABOUT THE FRUSTRATIONS OF DEPENDING ON THE US FOR OUR AID?

Well, once I asked ah, foreign minister Geringal of France. He was the foreign minister of President Gescard D'Estaing for some time. I'm sorry, later on he was a colleague of mine, and later on he committed suicide.

START AGAIN.

I once asked ah, foreign minister Geringal of France, as you know he was foreign minister for a time of ah, President Gescard D'Estaing. I told him that ah, "Look, we would like to enter into a long-term arrangement with you for our military aviation." We were very interested in buying Mirage 2000. But I said, "Your prices are exorbitant. You are much higher than those of the United States for ah, military hardware of comparable quality." So he said, "But don't forget one thing, when you enter into an agreement with us to buy military equipment we treat it as a commercial deal. There is no question of obtaining the concurrence of the legislature or the ah, other bodies, whereas in the United States even if you make an agreement it is subject to the vote of ah, authorization or appropriation by the cont... Congress of the United States and political conditions can be imposed. Whereas...

LET ME BRING YOU BACK TO PROLIFERATION BECAUSE WE'VE GOT A LIMITED AMOUNT HERE. ONE OF THE SCHOLARS THAT WE'VE BEEN READING HAS SAID THAT THERE'S BEEN AN AMBIVALENCE IN US POLICY. WE'VE BEEN AGAINST PROLIFERATION IN GENERAL, BUT NOT NECESSARILY IN PARTICULAR. WOULD YOU GO ALONG WITH HER ASSESSMENT?

I think ah, that they are yes, I think I would go along except that as regards Pakistan, the particular is also included. It is not only general, it is general opposition to non-proliferation but not to prol... general opposition to proliferation but not to proliferation by certain ah, special countries with certain special relationships. But where Pakistan is concerned they are opposed to what they call our nuclear, what ah, is our nuclear program.

HOW ABOUT WHEN THE TARAPOUR REACTORS WERE SENT IN SHIPMENT? WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT? WHEN THE US DECIDED TO STILL GO AHEAD WITH THE SHIPMENT IN SPITE OF THE PROLIFERATION POLICY?

Well, that is where we felt ah, the sting that ah, the US policy towards us was based on discrimination. Probably they considered India to be the more important country and therefore deserving of some special or more favorable treatment and ah, this was naturally gave cause to — gave cause for unhappiness in Pakistan.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE 1981 ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE...?

It was totally unjustified and in violation of international law. It was a pure act of aggression. It is another matter that Iraq was not able to retaliate, but the Iraqi reactor was under atomic energy safeguards. Nobody, the atomic energy had not made any finding that Iraq was violating any of the conditions of the agreement with the IAE. And therefore it was a unilateral act of aggression and we deplored. So therefore the question arises even if you accept safeguards and submit to all of the conditions of non-proliferation still if another country takes it into its head that that is not enough and that you must physically destroy its assets there's no protection.

CAN I JUST ASK YOU ABOUT THE SORT OF STATUS SYMBOL. DO YOU THINK THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE A SORT OF STATUS ABOUT THEM?

Well, as you know that there's a... Indian strategists think that nuclear weapon is the currency of power. And what an instance is quoted to show why they feel that ah, why they think this is true, because Nixon is quoted as having said that considering the fact that the People's Republic of China has got a population of nearly a billion people and that is nuclear weapon power the United States cannot afford to ignore its existence and it was high time that it recognized China and effected a rapprochement. So from that they say that if the great superpower the United States considers that the position of nuclear weapons is ah, ah, warrants a kind of respectful treatment, which would otherwise not be forthcoming. So they say if it's for China why not for us.

THE FRENCH ATOMIC ENERGY OFFICIAL BERTRAND GOLDSCHMIDT HAS SAID IF YOU WANTED TO BE SOMEBODY IN THIS WORLD YOU HAD TO HAVE A BOMB, WOULD YOU AGREE WITH HIM?

I wouldn't go along with that because Japan is a good example of a country which has so far abhorred the possession of nuclear weapons and it is a highly respected country by virtue of its qualities of its people, and ah, also because of the great ah, achievements it has to its credit in economic build-up of economic power, technological front-ranked position and what not. But I'm afraid that most countries seem to think that ah possession of military power goes with ah, importance, international importance of a country. So if that is the general feeling I'm afraid that ah, those countries, which feel that it is within their capability to ah, develop nuclear weapons or at least to develop an option for nuclear weapons ah, cannot be restrained from going ahead.

DURING THE PERIOD WHEN YOU HAD THE PROBLEMS WITH THE REPROCESSING PLANT AND YOU WERE STARTING THE ENRICHMENT PROCESS IT SEEMED LIKE YOU HAD A DELIBERATE POLICY OF AMBIGUITY?

I wouldn't say that. First we wanted to acquire the reprocessing plant. It was only when that was... that deal was cancelled and it was implementation was obstructed, then we began to think of uranium enrichment. Now uranium enrichment, I mean, gives great satisfaction to the scientific community in Pakistan, because they feel that it's something that they're — something of an achievement. And particularly this being a developing country being backward in so many ways, and being inefficient in... in so many fields of much less sophisticated techno... technology, so this is a matter of achievement ah, pride. Now uranium enrichment is one thing. It gives you a certain capability. Because as I explained to you nuclear technology is ambivalent in its very nature. There is an ambiguity. Because when you become proficient in the uses of — the peaceful uses of nuclear energy you also acquire the fissionable material which only to be reprocessed to be turned into a bomb. So but then the point is there is a big step from the enrichment or reprocessing to the manufacture of the weapon. I think it should be to the interests of all countries even if they have ah, acquired the technology not to proceed to the next step to develop nuclear weapons. But this can only ah, ah, be assured when the security concerns are taken into account. And for that as I told you that we must strengthen an international non-proliferation regime. Not only and not so much by coercive diplomacy or the sanctions of the nuclear suppliers club, but by really developing a system of effective guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons.

ALL WE KNOW FROM OUR NEWSPAPER REPORTS AND SO ON IS THAT PAKISTAN'S ACQUIRED THIS HIGH ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY, SO THERE'S A SORT OF UNKNOWN QUANTITY THERE ABOUT WHERE PAKISTAN IS AT IN DEVELOPMENT.

Well, as I told you we wanted since 1980 — ah, '76 to acquire a light water reactor. And the fuel for it would have been in enriched uranium. But our efforts to obtain that has been obstructed. So we are left only with enrichment because we didn't, we depended on ourselves. Now if nobody is going to give us, allow us to buy a reactor, or acquire a reactor, then I'm afraid that Pakistan would have to do something... do something by its own efforts to build a reactor, I don't know how long it would take. So we are left with this highly ah, quite of anomalous position of having the fuel but not the reactor. So I hope that the international community would reconsider, those at least who are opposed to Pakistan's acquisition of the civili... civilian power reactor that they would think again. There's no justification really to obstruct Pakistan in obtaining a power reactor. Under safeguards of course.

BUT YOU'VE DESCRIBED A POLICY OF...THE PROBLEMS OF THE AMBIVALENCE INHERENT IN THE PROCESS. REALLY WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS THAT WE HAVE TO TRUST THAT PAKISTAN DOESN'T GO AHEAD.

Yes, because ah, there are strong considerations also against, you know, there are pros and cons to every side, in international in life, in international life as in personal lives too. There is no decision which doesn't have its negative side. So you've got to balance the two. And we, I would prefer... I would devoutly hope that both India and Pakistan could find a way of agreeing not to proceed from their undoubted acquisition of ah, nuclear capability to developing nuclear weapons, because that would enormously complicate the situation.

HOW EFFECTIVE DO YOU THINK MPT HAS BEEN AS A NON-PROLIFERATION MEASURE?

Perhaps it's been — its effectiveness can only be shown in the future because in one respect that is in preventing the threshold nuclear weapon states from acquiring nuclear weapon capability I do not think it has much to ah, commend itself. Ah, of course a great number of countries have signed a treaty renouncing nuclear weapons so this is ah, something highly positive because if not now 20 years hence. No, but the other point is that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is only for a limited period of time. Then if the nuclear weapon powers go on testing nuclear weapons, they don't put an end to tests, and they go on accumulating ah, nuclear weapons, each has now 25,000 warheads, and ah, so ah, it is very doubtful that all the non-nuclear countries so many of them who have gone along with the treaty would they be ready endlessly to renew it for another period of 20 years? I doubt it, because knowledge of nuclear technology is spreading quite rapidly, the process of the enrichment or reprocessing will become cheaper and new methods will be developed and therefore nuclear technology may well be within the means of even ah, quite a number of developing countries, so the threat is there. So much depends on — it's a race against time. If the Soviet Union and the United States can reach agreement, begin their reductions of their nuclear arsenals by 50 percent, stop nuclear testing and then proceed, I think that would set the creative propitious climate for continued adherence to the policy commitment to renouncing nuclear weapons. But the basic problem is that of threshold states. You've got to consider — I mean countries like Japan, like Germany in particular, these are great powers, how long would they be expected when they feel that their importance is such and they're called upon to play a much greater role. They maybe asked even to assume some security responsibilities in their respective areas. So therefore it's a race against time, and I think that these superpowers have neglected opportunities, they've allowed things to drift. They've been concerned only with their ah, own relationships, their own power balance, and regardless of what is happening allowing the rest of the situation regarding the others to drift and soon they may lose control over the situation and independent power centers could arise. So therefore it's a question of a race against time.

IN ALL THE PERIOD THAT YOU WERE DEALING WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON BEHALF OF PAKISTAN A LOT OF THAT WAS — YOU WERE INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR POLICY ARE THERE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS YOU'D LIKE TO MAKE REFLECTING THAT?

Well, I think it is a tragedy that the, no disarmament measures have been achieved up to now. SALT I and SALT II are...

WELL, I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO, WAS THE NOTION OF AN ISLAMIC BOMB EVER SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED BY PAKISTAN?

Absolutely not, the whole idea is absurd. Islamic countries consist of 44 states, and there are 46 states members of the international organization. How could Pakistan manufacture a bomb to be at the disposal of Islamic countries that had nothing to do with Islam. Because if somehow it got this thing got... the... caught on, the phrase, and ah, so somehow it became an Islamic bomb. And then because we had good relations with Libya, I told you the background that how he supported us against the Russians when we were dismembered. And ah, we supported the Palestinian cause. We believe that they're entitled to ah, homeland.

CAN YOU GO BACK TO "BECAUSE WE SUPPORTED LIBYA?"

Because we supported Libya — No, we...we are friends with Libya. Libya didn't require our support, but Libya stood by us in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 and we have always supported the Palestine cause because we believe they are entitled to a homeland. So there is a fear on the part of some pro-Israeli circles in the United States that because Pakistan is so friendly, and there was a totally mistaken belief that Pakistan got financial assistance for its ah, ah, nuclear activities is totally wrong. As I told you we got for other things, but ah, that's why they wanted to — ah, they thought that Pakistan should be prevented from acquiring this technology.

HOW DID THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AFFECT YOUR — PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CONCERNS? HOW DID IT TURN THINGS AROUND?

Well, we ah, we faced a two-front situation. I mean ah, with the Soviet's troops actually entering Afghanistan and fighting the Mujahideen ah, they came very near our borders, and because there were transporter incursions by the Mujahideen we were threatened.

IF YOU COULD BRIEFLY SAY THAT IT MEANT THAT NOT ONLY DID WE HAVE INDIA BUT NOW WE HAD THE SOVIET UNION.

We... we... we had to face a two front situation. Not only India but the Soviet Union and... That's how it affected our security, it's a very great threat to security for a country, to have hostile ah, neighbors on both, both sides.

OK, THANK YOU.