...of the whole story. But the situation was very tense, I'm sure of that. And I have talked to many people, in autobuses, in cars, in the elevator, and people were, very, I would say nervous and apprehensive of further developments. And on the other side, you could see very heated debates on the problem, in all these places I have enumerated, in bars, it was coming, tensions were very high. Sometimes people would quarrel very, I would say heatedly at each other. But Kennedy was right in establishing the blockade, or even the Bay of Pigs...

LET'S DO THAT, WHATEVER YOU FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH. LET'S TALK ABOUT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

I remember it started... I got to know about this in a peculiar way. We had some teleprint, teletypes, and all of a sudden, the information about the situation in Cuba was cut. There was some dispatch about a hurricane near Cuba, and then was a blackout of the news for a short period of time. And this was, my first recollection about this time.

WHAT WERE YOU WRITING, DISPATCHING TO THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT IT?

About the Cuban crisis? I covered it mostly from the United Na... from the United Nations room, the Security Council. And I remember these duels between our representative, the deceased Zorin, and Stevenson. It's a very heated debate. Both of them showed... tried to show the best of their eloquency. But still the situation was pretty tense, pretty tense. I covered and they publish it, there were some very long stories, I would say some five-six pages of discussion. Of our representatives, and Stevenson's speeches. I was out in the hall at the time. I stayed in a pressroom at the United Nations, but you could feel the tension.

IF YOU THINK ABOUT IT, WITH RETROSPECTION, WHAT WAS IT THAT WAS EFFECTING YOU THEN? WHAT WERE YOU THINKING ABOUT? WHY WAS IT IMPORTANT?

You mean the Cuban crisis? The thing is that the Americans had, my first reaction as a reporter, as a man, as a human being... Americans had the missiles in Turkey, Italy, in other places in Europe. And at the same time, we thought it was double standard. We thought it was double standard. One of the curious things that persist until now, I think. They had the right to deploy their missiles at the... at our door, but they reacted very wildly against our missiles in the same position. This was my reaction. It was this way. It is now this way.

WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS KHRUSHCHEV'S MOTIVATION. WAS IT TO ESSENTIALLY TO CORRECT THIS DOUBLE STANDARD OR MIGHT IT HAVE BEEN ANOTHER MOTIVATION?

I think one motivation it's equal security. Equal security, that's my idea about this.

ANY OTHER ARGUMENTS?

Equal security. This is the major thing. And, what else comes to my mind?

WAS HE WORRIED ABOUT CUBA?

He was worried about Cuba, too. Yes, for sure. And the previous events in the Bay of Pigs show that. I was... I was covering the Bay of Pigs invasion too, mention that.

TELL ME ABOUT YOUR COVERAGE OF THE BAY OF PIG INVASION AND YOUR ENCOUNTER WITH...

Actually, first we covered it from our office in the... Press building. Then they decided three of us, Pravda, Isvestia, and TASS, we decided to go Miami, after the collapse of the whole thing. And frankly, judging by the reports, false reports, of the collapse of the whole thing. We were expecting to see some, you know, boats, with people coming there after the defeat. There was none of that. Nothing like that. No one has returned, as you know. And we saw some people still trying to raise attention and went to see the recruiting centers there. All in disorder. A lot of papers, very depressed people, sitting around, then there was some headquarters of theirs, of the Cuban contras. I remember this place up until now. A lot of Coca-Cola bottles, everything in disorder, disarray. And still people demanding further actions. In Miami a local newspaper, The Miami Herald, I think, came out the day of our arrival there, on the huge headline, “A Second Wave Invasion”, where they were describing, you know the American forces which are going to attack Cuba again. And the local reporter before that from Miami news offered us an accreditation with the invading forces. Then they ask me a question, aren't you afraid to come here at that time? We younger and with a lot of pepper, said we have a lot of American reporters in Moscow, why should we be scared? Funny things.

TELL ME ABOUT, DID YOU TRY TO SPEAK WITH CUBAN AT THE TIME, WITH CUBAN EXILES IN MIAMI?

No. When we came there, we saw a lot of them. They would wear white fish on their lapels. Some historical sign, that they're going to come back again and invade Cuba the second time or something like that. Anyhow tensions were very high. A lot of people were depressed. People were depressed again. No boats from Cuba.

GOING BACK TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, APPARENTLY IN THE INITIATION OF THE IDEA OF PUTTING THE MISSILES IN CUBA, WAS KHRUSHCHEV'S, NOT CASTRO'S? OR DO YOU KNOW?

I don't know the details. For sure, Castro gave his O.K.

TELL ME MORE ABOUT THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE DISCUSSIONS?

The whole... the Security Council hall was packed. A lot of reporters, a lot of just people, tourists, and I remember one day the announcement about a withdrawal came early in the morning. And I was in the elevator with my colleague from TASS, Vasily. He's now in the United States. And we talked to some lady, and she said 'oh, you have listened to the news?' she asked us. I said yes. We are Russians. 'Oh,' she said, 'reason has prevailed in Russia.' This was our first reaction from the American side. I think it was true.

HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT IT? HOW, WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING DURING THE CRISIS AS A PERSON, AS A RUSSIAN PERSON?

It was mostly work. I covered thoroughly. I spent a lot of time on that. But the reaction was that the world is coming to a very dangerous line. This is for sure. As if, you know, it was like old American game when two cars on a narrow road come into each other, and the side, with the loser, and the winner would come to hospital or even further. This was my impression.

HOW DID YOU FEEL WHEN THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW THE MISSILE WAS ANNOUNCED?

I heard it on the radio, I told you... in our room, just before I went to TASS Office in Rockefeller Plaza. The reaction was mixed. I didn't know what happened. They said just, they reported the events. And then we met this lady in the elevator. I remember this case up until now. When we came and we started covering the details of those things. And some Cuban reporters came, and this was a revelation again. And little by little came to understand what happened. We couldn't grasp it for a second.

AND HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT IT?

I think reason has prevailed. Reason did prevail at that time. I wish it would happen now.

IF THERE IS A LESSON TO BE LEARNED FROM THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS...RELEVANT FOR TODAY, WHAT MIGHT IT BE?

The lesson. I would formulate it this way. There was an age of equal danger. We should shift, switch to the age of equal security. This is or position, our major position. And that is a paradoxical thing. In the old days... The situation is now, is such which may look like paradoxical, some forty years ago. Now, each side should take care not only to lag behind the other side, but should see to it that it doesn't overtake the other side from arms and armaments. It looked like paradoxical, such a thing some forty-five, fifty years ago. But this effect... want equal security. If the United States lacks security, it will be dangerous both for us and for the United States. The same thing is true, if you put things vice versa. The diminished security of the Soviet Union would be equally dangerous to the United States. It's a funny thing. Which is a new thing for our age. And that's why we think some steps should be taken just to normalize the situation. To bring about these equal security to a certain degree at least to begin with.

YOU COVERED THE MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV AND EISENHOWER?

Yes. Camp David.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE ATMOSPHERE OF THAT?

Not all reporters were let inside. I wasn't one of them. And we were waiting, discussing things with American reporters, trying to make some prognosis, near this wooden hut. Have you ever been there? Yes. Then Khrushchev and Eisenhower came out and they made a joint statement, and people started taking pictures, and I remember one American reporter would say, it's much better than I expected... Anyhow, the atmosphere was very good. The call it the spirit of Camp David, not to be mixed up with later things.

TELL ME, IN THE AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS, KHRUSHCHEV IS OFTEN ASSOCIATED WITH EXTRAVAGANT BEHAVIOR IN SOME STATEMENTS. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN IT AND HOW DID, WHAT WAS YOUR EXPERIENCE OF PEOPLE, OF AMERICAN'S REACTION TO HIM WHEN YOU WERE THERE?

I can tell you one thing, perhaps, if you mean this “I'll bury you” statement. I don't think it was serious, by the way, frankly. When American football players they come together, they hug each other and say, kill 'em. I don't think they mean physically, kill him. I think this was the same type of thing. He just wanted to express the idea that we are going to prevail economically, politically, among other things. Peaceful competition, it was not physical killing or murder. I don't think that was right. And...

WHAT ABOUT HE WOULD SAY THINGS LIKE, WE'LL PRODUCE MISSILES LIKE SAUSAGES?

Yes, I remember that. The same time the Soviet Union proposed cutting all these things. And even in those days...

YOU STARTED WITH NOT A SENTENCE...

I'm sorry. You speak about sausages, I remember this phrase that he said some place. And I remember the meeting in San Fran... in Los Angeles, I was there. A very tense meeting, too. Then we came to San Francisco and the atmosphere was absolutely different. And people were friendly, hospitable, and the situation was absolutely different... I could compare it to one thing... once I covered the first track and field event in Palo Alto in America. I could tell you that people were organized in such a way. It was just touching. The stadium was packed to the brims. And it was a demonstration of real friendship, of real, I would call, detente on the human level. And the meeting in San Francisco, all the speeches there, I would say were pleasant for myself, as a reporter of the Russians. But not in Los Angeles at that time.

HOW WOULD ONE EXPLAIN, WHAT ARE YOUR PERCEPTIONS THAT THERE IS A ATTITUDE OF FEAR TOWARD RUSSIANS, OR MISTRUST. WHEN YOU WERE WORKING IN AMERICA, HOW WOULD YOU EXPLAIN TO THEM THE ATMOSPHERE ON A VERY BASIC LEVEL? DO YOU HAVE A SENSE OF THAT?

On a human level.

ON A HUMAN LEVEL...

At that time, they didn't come to love us, they came to respect us. That's my general impression.

...AT THAT TIME, WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE LATE SIXTIES, WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S VIEW OF THE SOVIETS, AS YOU PERCEIVE...?

I don't think it was a true image they had of us. I'm sure of that. And you could feel it in meeting common people. You could feel it at high levels. But I met a lot of people who came to respect each other. And I found many good features in American people I have met. Most of all common sense. Common sense. It's an important thing. Things seem to have changed a bit, frankly. Now they tell the Americans that the best way to disarmament lies through building up more arms. And nobody seems to put it to question. They say the best way to stop nuclear explosions is to conduct more of them. I think there is something wrong with the common sense of some Americans now. It's quite a change, frankly. I haven't been there for a very long time. I can judge only by the press reports in the newspapers. And other messages. But there seems to be a change.

WERE YOU IN THE STATES WHEN KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV MET IN VIENNA?

No. I was in the states.

YOU WERE IN THE STATES?

Yes. This meeting doesn't bring about many positive results, I remember that.

WERE YOU IN THE UN WHEN KHRUSHCHEV BANGED HIS SHOE?

I was in my office, and then a reporter from some American local papers crashed in and said, do you have photographs of Khrushchev doing this thing. I said, no I don't. I didn't think he banged his own shoe, by the way. That's all I know about it.

EXPLAIN IT IN TERMS OF, I THINK MOST AMERICANS THINK … HOW WOULD YOU EXPLAIN IT IN TO THEM?

There was some tradition, they say, some people say, in the old Russian Duma, Russian Parliament, and they say one Bolshevik did not agree with the tsarist officials, they would bang something on the tables. That's all I know about this. I don't think it's that important.

OK, LET'S TALK ABOUT THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION. DID YOU REPORT ABOUT THE GROUP OF PEOPLE THAT KENNEDY BROUGHT INTO THE WHITE HOUSE, I'M PRINCIPALLY THINKING ABOUT MCNAMARA?

Yes.

WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING THEN ABOUT THIS YOUNG GUY?

They called him, what did they call him... the university they come from...

HE CAME FROM STANFORD, FROM THE...

No. The whole gang was called after the university he came from.

STANFORD?

No.

Harvard.

Harvard, sure. Harvard gang, they called them.

BUT THAT'S LATER.

Harvard. Sorensen, I think was one of them. Then who else...

WELL I'M THINKING ABOUT THE ... OF MCNAMARA. MCNAMARA CAME FROM DETROIT AND HE BROUGHT HIS PEOPLE FROM CALIFORNIA. DO YOU REMEMBER YOUR FIRST IMPRESSION OF THEM?

He was... at that time, he was mostly famous as the man responsible for the Vietnam War. My attitude was very negative, for sure. He was called Vietnam... the McNamara war in Vietnam. They call it this way. My attitude toward him was according to that. They have... people have changed.

DO YOU REMEMBER HIS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ABOUT ...?

You mean counterforce?

COUNTERFORCE.

I think Schlesinger was the author of this thing. Schlesinger. He first used this term. He put it on the government level. Perhaps I'm mistaken.

(BACKGROUND COMMENT) NOTHING ELSE COMES TO MY MIND.

Counterforce, in general, this is...

I THINK MCNAMARA CAME WITH IT, BUT...

They called it Schlesinger concept by the way.

SCHLESINGER I THINK WAS USED...FLEXIBLE RESPONSE...

They called Schlesinger Doctrine.

THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE?

No. Counterforce. The avoidance of large cities.

LARGE CITIES...

I think he came down in history as the author of this concept.

NO HE GAVE US FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

McNamara was the one?

NOT HE SPECIFICALLY, BUT HE, THE PEOPLE THAT STARTED THE NOTION...

I could just comment on the doctrine, if you like.

WHICH ONE?

The counterforce.

LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT COUNTERFORCE, VERSUS COUNTERCITY. COULD YOU COMMENT ABOUT, BY TRYING TO COMPARE SOVIET THINKING TO AMERICAN THINKING?

I think the counterforce doctrine... there's one great fault. It's an American scenario. Which they think we'll follow, which we will not do for sure.

OK START AGAIN. SO THE QUESTION IS ESSENTIALLY WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY?

Many American doctrines, military doctrines, counterforce concept one of them, was built on one premise. This is a scenario to be followed by the Soviet Union. I don't think we will follow a scenario which was conceived to defeat us. No. It's senseless. And counterforce... proposes... counterforce doctrine means that we'll exchange strikes in a very regulated way. You strike here, we strike there. And in the end, you come out and say, that's the end of it. We're not... we're never going to follow the American scenarios which, in the long run, would lead to the American victory. In this particular case, I would say one thing, if one bomb goes, all other goes. If one nuclear bomb goes all other bombs go.

THE SOVIET STRATEGY REJECTS THE CONCEPT OF...

Absolutely. It is impossible to restrict nuclearconflict. As it is impossible to say to restrict consequence of a burning match which is thrown into a barrel of powder. Same thing, you cannot restrict it. It's going to be an all-out capacity. That's why we lay so much stress on the problem of stabilization. Destabilization is not just bad relations with Americans, it's a situation where one of the sides has an urge to push the button. And this situation, the danger of destabilization, in my opinion was understood in the sixties, in the seventies, but I'm sorry to say, it is ignored now.

WHEN WAS IT RECOGNIZED BY THE SOVIETS? IT WASN'T FROM THE BEGINNING RECOGNIZED THAT A NUCLEAR WAR IS NECESSARILY ALL OUT WAR. IT WAS AN EVOLUTION. WHEN WAS, HOW DID THE SOVIET THINKING DEVELOP IN THIS AREA?

We always stuck to one idea, that any nuclear conflict will lead eventually to an all-out war, if I'm wrong perhaps we'll have some arguments...

I...NO I SUSPECT THOUGH, THAT WHEN THERE WERE, THE NUMBERS OF THE WEAPONS WERE VERY SMALL, THAT THE NOTION WAS THAT YOU CAN FIGHT A LIMITED WAR? IF THE AMERICAN HAS TWO WEAPONS, IT'S NOT A DECISIVE... STALIN, FOR EXAMPLE, DIDN'T THINK ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS DECISIVE WEAPONS...

I cannot tell you about Stalin but I know that we would always say, even a demonstrative explosion would be a signal to an all out war. And the conception of the ABM treaty, it is equal danger. And the recognition of the impossibility of waging the war and winning it, these two concepts.

BUT THE SOVIETS NEEDED TO BE CONVINCED TO GO INTO THE ABM TREATY. IT WASN'T THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIES RECOGNIZED...

First, we had to think it over and we came to the firm conclusion that... two points... that the war, is impossible to win a war, a nuclear war. And that's why, at least as a first stage, both sides should be open to retaliatory strike. This is the first stage. It's equally danger as we call it. We suggest that we should make another step. For equal security. Because even when you have equal danger, and the arms race is continued, even the parity, stragetic parity is no longer a very effective barrier. We should think of something else. Of equal security. Of cutting things. And we expect the American side would make the first gesture... Could you cite me just a single case of American gesture of good will in the field of disarmament in the last five years?

I'M NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF AMERICAN...

I know. My impression is...

I'M NOT HAPPY WITH AMERICAN POLICY BUT I'M NOT HERE TO NEITHER TO CRITICIZE OR...

Yes. I know that but just as a...

TELL ME SOMETHING ELSE... IS, WHAT DO SOVIETS POLITICAL PEOPLE AND STRATEGIES OF PEOPLE WHO THINK ABOUT THIS ISSUE THINK ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF MAD—MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION?

I say, you call it the concept of mutual assured destruction. We call it equal danger, equal danger. Which is not the best situation of all. Not the best situation you can think of, and since the arms race is continuing at high speed, we should switch to another situation. A situation of equal security. And we should...

BUT AGAIN, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF MAD?

My impression was that the Americans always drop assured from the formula. They drop the word mutual from this formula. This is my impression. Perhaps I'm wrong.

THE CONCEPT ORIGINATES WITH MCNAMARA?

I think Schlesinger... We'll call it in a different way. We'll call it equal danger.

TELL ME WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT THE AMERICAN CALLED MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION AND EQUAL DANGER?

In the first place just linguistics. Something, assured destruction, we call it equal danger. Which would bring about mutual destruction. That's the difference. We think it's that both sides are open to a retaliatory strike. This was at the basis of ABM Treaty. And if you add to this the concept of impossibility of winning the war, the vanity of any attempts of getting superiority... this is our concept. We found some common ground, there for sure... This was... it took shape in the treaties. SALT I, SALT II, ABM TReaty. With all our differences... in the past we had some common ground. We had some common ground, with all our differences on the problems of world peace. And one of these things which constitutes this common ground is the understanding of the danger of destabilization. When you have to make decisions, vital decisions, in three or five minutes, when you have missiles at your door, it's dangerous for both sides, the Soviet Union and the United States. In the old days they did understand that. The idea that worries me is now they ignore this problem of destabilization.

WE'LL COME TO SDI...HOW DOES...I'M ALWAYS STRUCK BY THE PROBLEM, THE WAY I SEE IT OF LATIN AMERICAN ARMY AND I SUSPECT THE SOVIET ARMY. ON ONE HAND LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES TELL THEM THE WAR CANNOT BE FOUGHT, CANNOT BE WON AND SO ON. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE THE JOB WHICH BY DEFINITION SAYS, IF THERE IS A WAR, IF THE... FAILS, YOU HAVE TO WIN. HOW DOES THE SOVIET COMMANDER THINK IN THESE KIND OF TERMS?

On which level? So far, you know, they're doing their job. All generals do. They're doing their job but they are not... they have to comply with decisions of our party. And this is the major difference. Then they don't have any personal... they cannot seek any personal advantages in war or economic, political, or otherwise. Our army, our armed forces, are subordinated to our party. And our generals are chosen in such a way that they comply with decisions.

ARE YOU SAYING THAT THERE ISN'T MUCH MORE CLEARER INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL LEVEL IN THE SOVIET UNION THAT THERE IS IN THE STATES?

The Party is the highest level, they are subordinate. They have to prepare plans for our defense and for the combat readiness, and things like that, but the final decision lies with the Party.

THEY STILL HAVE THE SAME DILEMMA OF BEING TOLD IT IS A WAR THAT SHOULD NOT BE FOUGHT OR CAN'T BE WON, BUT IF DETERRENCE FAILS, YOU GO AND WIN IT.

In this war, they'll be no victors, for sure. This is not one of our concepts. They cannot be a victor in a nuclear war.

SO YOU THINK THE SOVIET MILITARY UNDERSTANDS THEIR FUNCTION EXCLUSIVELY AS DETERRENCE?

Absolutely. ...This is latest example. He said that our forces, strategic missile forces are designed to provide deterrence, to ensure deterrence.