WHAT WAS KHRUSHCHEV'S REACTION TO, WHAT DO YOU THINK KHRUSHCHEV'S REACTION WAS TO THE ELECTION OF JOHN KENNEDY AS PRESIDENT?

His reaction was a mixture of feelings, on one hand, he considered that all American presidents they represent big capital imperialists, but on the other hand I think he welcomed it, he liked it, and privately, in our circle, he had been saying something that was different from what he had been saying publicly. He definitely preferred Kennedy, John Kennedy, to be elected as the President of the United States.

WE AREN'T GOING TO USE ANY OF MY QUESTIONS IN THIS SO IF YOU COULD SAY KHRUSHCHEV OR PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV.

Ahh, OK, alright...

INSTEAD OF SAYING HE, SO IT'S CLEAR...

Alright, OK...

WHAT WAS IT ABOUT KENNEDY THAT -- CAN YOU SIT DOWN, PLEASE -- WHAT WAS IT ABOUT KENNEDY THAT KHRUSHCHEV FOUND MORE APPEALING THAN NIXON FOR EXAMPLE?

Khrushchev considered that Kennedy is a younger man with a fresh idea and he expected that it could be change in the American administration, positive change in a sense of improving Soviet-American relations, in which Khrushchev had been interested.

DID YOU HAVE ANY CONVERSATIONS WITH KHRUSHCHEV ABOUT KENNEDY?

Yes I did. I had conversations with Khrushchev about Kennedy. But later, after, sometime after the election, it was after, in a period, after the Cuban, before Cuban Crisis, after Cuban Crisis, but not immediately after his election.

WHAT WAS THE FEELING TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES IN THE POLITBURO AND IN THE SOVIET MILITARY FOLLOWING THE BAY OF PIGS DISASTER?

After the Bay of Pigs, Soviet military and the Soviet civilian leadership saw some weakness in Kennedy who changed actually all of a sudden his mind, didn't support, actually the people who had been trained on American territory and it was definitely been taken as a sign of weakness.

(TECH DIRECTION) I UNDERSTAND KHRUSHCHEV SPOKE TO YOU, OR YOU WERE IN A MEETING OR IN THE ROOM WHEN KHRUSHCHEV WAS SPEAKING ABOUT HIS REACTION TO KENNEDY AFTER THE VIENNA SUMMIT?

After Vienna Summit, I had an occasion to talk with Khrushchev in his office in the central committee in Moscow. And he definitely was of an opinion that Kennedy is a man who, whom Khrushchev could impress and even not only even impress, but even who can bully. And get some results.

WHY DO YOU THINK HE HAD THAT OPINION? DID HE TELL YOU ANY INSTANCES? ANYTHING THAT HAPPENED? ANY FEELING HE HAD OF KENNEDY'S WEAKNESS?

Khrushchev's feeling was that to some of the, quite of, forceful presentation which he had been making... Somehow Kennedy was rather timid and not always, been really, enough pressing for some of the points which Khrushchev had been making.

DO YOU THINK THIS WAS A SURPRISE TO KHRUSHCHEV?

I don't think that it was a surprise for Khrushchev, that he found Kennedy that way. Because prior to that, already been indications, that at least in the mind of Khrushchev after the Bay of Pigs, and that only reinforced his opinion that Kennedy is rather, not a very strong President, and he joked about that, and mentioned that he does not have a strong backbone, hinting that, to the fact that Kennedy was wounded in the War and that he had trouble with his backbone.

YOU GAVE THE INDICATION IN YOUR BOOK THAT FOLLOWING VIENNA AND THE BAY OF PIGS AND THIS FEELING THAT KENNEDY WAS WEAK, THAT KHRUSHCHEV WAS GONNA TRY SOMETHING, TO SORT OF TEST, AMERICAN STRENGTH?

After Vienna, Khrushchev definitely decided to try to test the will of the United States. It found an expression in building of the Berlin Wall, which even further reinforced the Khrushchev opinion because it was a... some little confrontation in Berlin, in connection with the, with the construction of the Wall. But all in all...Kennedy, and the American administration swallowed the Wall, so that it was a, another step in the in the direction of pressing the United States, and it was another indication with, I am sure, in the mind of Khrushchev that think he can go further.

WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS THE SOVIET GOAL IN BERLIN IN 1961? WHAT WAS KHRUSHCHEV TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH?

Essentially the -- Khrushchev's goals in constructing the Berlin Wall was, of course, to prevent a drain of the pe-, of intellectuals, of engineers or other people, from East Germany to West Germany, using the West Berlin for these purposes. And then of course West Berlin was a sore point, because it was a window of the West, and free moving of the people from the, of the people, Germans who lived in the, in the GDR, in East Germany they'd been attracted by what was going on in West Berlin, and it was discrediting the regime, system, in East Germany.

WHY DO YOU THINK KHRUSHCHEV THOUGHT HE COULD ACCOMPLISH BUILDING A WALL? THAT MUST HAVE BEEN QUITE A BRAZEN ACT IN A WAY, AN UNUSUAL ACT?

Construction of the Wall was definitely an unusual act; it divided the city in some way, in a very awkward way -- but, it was an effective step, because it really prevented people from moving freely from East to West Berlin. Of course, some people was trying to cross the Wall, but it was very dangerous.

BUT WHY DID KHRUSHCHEV THINK HE COULD GET AWAY WITH IT? WITHOUT A RETALIATION, WITHOUT A REACTION?

Because there were... several things ... in this connection "Why Khrushchev thinks that he could get away in constructing the wall?" There were many things: Bay of Pigs preceding meeting with Kennedy in Vienna, which had been indications that they can get away with that separate treaty with the, with the East Germans, had all been indications that he can move further.

BUT THAT SEPARATE PEACE TREATY WAS THREATENED BY KHRUSHCHEV RIGHT WHEN KENNEDY WAS FIRST ELECTED.

Yes, it was... the peace treaty was threatened before; it was a, it's an only, it has a long story of itself -- it relates to the German question -- but the idea of the construction of the Wall was born after Khrushchev really thought that he can do it and there will be no strong reaction from the West.

WHAT WAS THE SOVIET REACTION TO KENNEDY'S T.V. ADDRESS, WHEN HE SAID THAT AN ATTACK ON BERLIN WOULD BE AN ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES?

That the... Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership didn't really took seriously this threat, and just considered it empty words... and that the United States will not do it.

WHY?

Because there had already been an example, in Bay of Pigs, already been some other indications there with the, witnesses which is how Khrushchev perceived them.

SO THE NUCLEAR THREAT WAS NOT TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

The idea of nuclear threat was not really being taken seriously particularly since Khrushchev didn't intend to go further. It's a... constructing the wall, it was not really an attack, in how the Soviets or...the East Germans interpreted it. It was not something which was moving the troop in the, in a sector which had been western sectors of Berlin or... encroachment of the, of the, even of the, of the territory of West Germany or something like that. So they considered that the...United States will not start, initiate nuclear war, because only over the construction of the wall.

MCNAMARA GAVE A SPEECH IN JUNE OF '62, THE FAMOUS "ANN ARBOR" SPEECH, WHERE HE OUTLINED THE CASE OF NUCLEAR WAR AVOIDANCE. DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA OF THE SOVIET REACTION TO THAT? YOU WERE IN GENEVA AT THE TIME.

It was a, it's a... no, it was... it was before the... before the crisis.

YES.

It was before the crisis, yes. That I... Why do you attach such infinite importance to that?

THE ANN ARBOR SPEECH. IT WAS "AVOIDING CITIES, AND TARGETING MILITARY FORCES IN CASE OF WAR..."

Ah! This was, the yes. The... that I don't, don't... frankly speaking, that I even don't... I didn't touch about that in the book and... because I was not in Moscow.

LET'S GO ON TO THE SITUATION IN -- THE RESUMING OF TESTING THAT HAPPENED IN '62, PRIOR TO CUBA. WHY DO YOU THINK THE SOVIET UNION RESUMED TESTING, AND WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL REACTION TO IT?

Resuming of the testing in August of '61, it was really something which shocked me, because I understood that the Soviet Union -- and Khrushchev personally -- will not do such a thing. For quite a while a moratorium existed actually, the United States didn't test, only France continued -- which was absolutely insignificant from the military point of view and didn't change any kind of balance. Khrushchev decided to resume testing for two reasons: one was a pressure by the military; and secondly, it was a realization that the Soviet Union was rather much behind the United States in both, not only numerically, but in sophistication of the nuclear warheads. So, two things led Khrushchev to this decision, which was done in such a clumsy way that I personally was ashamed even for my country, because there was no arguments. The arguments which the people had been provided that France was continuing to test, it was a ridiculous one, absolutely not convincing; and really it was one of the things which had... shaken me very much, and shaken my faith in Khrushchev's sincerity in pursuing arms control negotiations.

SO YOUR FEELING WAS THAT THIS WAS NOT SO MUCH KHRUSHCHEV'S DECISION, BUT THAT HE WAS BEING PUSHED INTO IT, FORCED INTO IT, IS THAT ACCURATE?

Khrushchev was not really forced, but I think it was a pressure on him, and the Soviet military convinced him that it was essential and necessary.

WHERE YOU SURPRISED THAT A CONFRONTATION WOULD ARISE IN CUBA?

Really I was surprised because I didn't, never thought that such a bold action would be undertaken by Khrushchev.

WHY? WAS IT A PARTICULARLY RISKY ACTION, DO YOU THINK? OUT OF CHARACTER?

I thought that this is an action that would be very risky. I had a lot of conversations on this subject with the Soviet military, of course afterward, because before this action I didn't know about it, anything, and I was in Geneva. When I returned from Geneva, I had quite a number of conversations with many people. But let me tell you my first reaction when I heard about that. We all heard, in our delegation, just from the foreign broadcasting. We were never, had not been informed by our government -- Khrushchev tried to keep it as a really big secret. But we had all been really very much concerned what might happen when we heard the news. In watching every half an hour the news -- television and the broadcasts -- in Geneva and waiting for the moment when it would be a confrontation, and what will happen? All being very nervous and really had the feeling that... the worst might happen -- nuclear war.

Which in fact is not true, Khrushchev, the Soviets never intended to use nuclear weapons. Actually it is now known that we've never been on the brink of a nuclear war in October.

NO? CAN YOU ELABORATE ON THAT? I MEAN MANY PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES FEEL WE CAME... EVEN THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF FELT...

No, no, of course not. No. No... No, the President didn't know. How he can know what was going on in Moscow?

SO TELL US...

Yeah, okay... There was the feeling -- in the West in general -- there is a belief, a strong belief, in October '62 we had been on the brink of nuclear war. And I strongly believed that when I was in Geneva. Later on, I found that it was not so. I found that neither Khrushchev nor the Soviet military never intended to use nuclear weapons against United States, even in case of it would be a shameful defeat, shameful performance, even they would be forced really to withdraw in a way which would be even much worse than the way that happened in reality, all these Cuban agreements. The explanation of that is very simple: that Khrushchev and the Soviet military understood at that period of time what was the balance, the nuclear strategic balance, between the United States and the Soviet Union. The ratio in favor of the United States was so strong that Soviet leadership never at any moment even thought about using nuclear weapons. Of course if the President of the United States would know about that, then I would not blame anyone as not knowing what was going on in the Khrushchev office in the Kremlin. Maybe many things would be different in the post-Cuban period, because all in all, looking backward now, I would say that the Soviets gained. It seems that it was a big victory of the United States, but in fact what happened in '62 -- Soviets withdrew their nuclear missiles from Cuba, true, but United States took the obligation never to invade Cuba. At the present moment, there is no need for the Soviet Union to deploy nuclear missiles on Cuban territory, because they are in Soviet submarines -- they just have some facilities for their sailors, people in submarines. So the necessity to deploy on Cuban territory any nuclear weapons has ceased to exist at all, but the American obligations not to invade Cuba remain.

DO YOU THINK KHRUSHCHEV MADE A WISE DECISION TO PUT THOSE MISSILE IN CUBA?

I think that Khrushchev had been gambling -- it was a bad decision, bad judgement, to begin with first of all to misperceive and misjudge the decisiveness of President Kennedy. And secondly, the naive belief that he could conduct such a wide-scale operation without any kind of detection by the United States. And all that despite the warnings by the Soviet military that it is impossible to hide such an operation. Despite the warnings by the military that the Soviet Union cannot do anything in case of blockade or something. They, the Soviet military, is wise and shrewd enough to understand that what could be the reaction of the United States. They saw the possibility of the kind of measures which been undertaken later by Kennedy, but Khrushchev didn't listen to them. And this is unfortunately, these beliefs that Kennedy would not be strong enough, that again it would be a position of what happened in the period of Bay of Pigs, and that he could do it in secrecy, and then just reveal everything and when all ready everything would be deployed and it would be a threat to the United States.

WHY DO YOU THINK KHRUSHCHEV MADE THIS DECISION TO PUT THESE MISSILES IN CUBA?

Khrushchev made the decision to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba because he thought that it would be a cheap deterrent, and that by doing that he can avoid a very costly arms race, costly new programs involving the production and deployment of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles on the Soviet territory. And it seems that it's a cheaper way, to use existing missiles, to place them, very close to American shores, and to resolve all the, all the problems.

DO YOU THINK IT WAS HIS IDEA?

Definitely the idea of deployment of nuclear missiles on Cuban territory was Khrushchev's idea. Ah…I don't have a clue that perhaps he consulted with some military or somebody in the certain way…suggested, and then he developed this idea... but essentially it was his idea, and what I know from the conversation, from my conversation with a lot of Soviet military, the majority of the Soviet military been against this idea, because they saw the flaws of the idea; they didn't believe that it could be properly implemented, on one hand, and on the other hand, the Soviet military considered that it's essential for the Soviet Union to go ahead with the costly programs because they didn't believe in these halfway measures, palliatives — they wanted really to build up a solid nuclear potential, on the Soviet territory. And they believe in concern that Khrushchev, in a certain way, can cheat them, by putting the existing missiles, and then cracking the substantially the... Soviet military expenses, for the purposes of some of civilian programs, which Khrushchev really had in mind. You remember all his grandiose ideas of catching up with the United States and surpassing and the...promises of a lot of consumer goods and everything. And we shall have these ideas.

. I GUESS, THEN, AFTER THE CRISIS, THAT THIS MUST HAVE BEEN SEEN BY THE MILITARY AS SOME SORT OF JUSTIFICATION, THAT IT CHANGED THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV AND THE MILITARY?

After the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev lost one of his aces, and he lost... actually all arguments in favor of cutting any kind of the Soviet military expenditure. Actually I would say, and what I saw -- it was "green light" for the military. Khrushchev actually considered that he was defeated there, and in fact serious efforts by the Soviet Union to achieve what is called, now, "strategic parity," started, I mean vigorously, the following the Cuban crisis.

SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV WERE ALIKE IN SOME WAYS: THEY WERE BOTH BATTLING WITH THEIR MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS. KENNEDY NEVER FELT VERY COMFORTABLE WITH THE MILITARY...

I would say that both Kennedy and Khrushchev... they'd been fighting, had serious disagreements with their military. Let me remind that these Khrushchev's disagreements with the military started, began not only during the, during or, after the Cuban crisis -- they started in 1960, when Khrushchev decided to cut very substantially the Soviet armed forces, and then produced a new Soviet doctrine. Which doctrine was that it should be the main Soviet the... essentially should be nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrent, and he proclaimed that neither the navy, nor aviations, nor even tanks are not necessary -- they started even to cut the military cruisers, and so on and so forth. It was really something which definitely... the Soviet military not only didn't like, but, it was a serious disagreement between the military and Khrushchev. And later was followed by his idea to deploy in Cuba nuclear missiles, which was... perceived by the military as another measure, another method by Khrushchev to deprive them, of really of having the such programs, long-range programs, which are to ensure, in their view, the Soviet nuclear potential for the future.

HOW DID IT CHANGE THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION IN CHINA, FOR EXAMPLE, AND THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD (THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS)?

Oh, in the, in the eyes of the world of course it was a... very serious defeat, and even in the Soviet Union and not only in China, or in other parts of the world...what we all felt, at this moment, that we'd been defeated, and it was a strong feeling that it was a...wrong action, which should not be undertaken.

I would say that it was, we had a strong feeling that it was both defeat and humiliation. And... a lot of people been telling, "No more Cubas." Which meant that we will be serious in the future, and will have enough nuclear weapons, and we will pursue such programs which ensure, eventually, parity of the Soviet Union with the United States.

MANY PEOPLE HERE IN THE UNITED STATES ARE TAUGHT THAT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS WAS A GREAT VICTORY FOR THE UNITED STATES. IT SEEMS TO ME WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IS IN MANY RESPECTS... THEY HAD TO AGREE NOT TO INVADE CUBA, THEY HAD TO WITHDRAW THEIR JUPITER MISSILES, AND IT ALLOWED THE SOVIET MILITARY TO GAIN MORE STRENGTH AND BUILD UP THIS ENORMOUS ARSENAL. IS THAT -- SO MAYBE THE UNITED STATES DIDN'T WIN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

Oh, well...a lot of people at the moment thought that it's a defeat, and a great victory of the United States. I myself thought that way, and people in the foreign ministry thought that way, Gromyko, Kuznetsov... and many military, many Soviet military thought that way. No one at that moment really could perceive that in the long range, it would be not really such a big victory, that... it might be even just a contrary thing. It may be historically, from the historical perspective, it could be rather more advantageous to the Soviet Union than to... rather than to United States -- since obligations by the Soviet Union, withdrawal of nuclear missiles, have no meaning... now. But the American obligations, not to invade Cuba, they are... forever, indefinitely will be obligations undertaken by United States, and which is to the Soviet advantage, because it's a, it's a kind of a guarantee that United States will not do anything against Cuba, and it preserved Cuba as a Soviet actually satellite, as a base for further actions... of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean and in Central and Latin America.

DID THE MISSILE CRISIS CHANGE KHRUSHCHEV'S VIEW OF THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Oh, no. The, the... After the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev's view about the nuclear weapons being only reinforced. Reinforced in the sense that Khrushchev realized that palliatives will not work, and it's essentially necessary to have the... to go ahead with substantial... also costly, programs, and to really to build up Soviet nuclear potential. Since he understood, he realized that without that, the United States will always will press the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union will be powerless to pursue its political goals anywhere. So, the lessons of Cuba for Khrushchev was that military were right: that the Soviet Union should go ahead with military programs and to a substantial degree change the whole philosophy and approach... Khrushchev's approach to domestic, even, affairs. He also understood that no cuts in the military expenditure... so from that point of view, Cuba also was, had a negative effect. If we, if you look now as Americans, now, that...after Cuba, actually Khrushchev and all Soviet military, could go ahead with all support of both civilian and military leadership in the Soviet Union, with long-range programs, which led eventually, at this moment to a situation where the Soviet Union has real parity.

YOU HAD A CONVERSATION WITH KHRUSHCHEV SHORTLY AFTER THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

Shortly after the Cuban crisis I had conversation with Mr. Khrushchev. Of course he was upset and he understood that his political position was undermined, but he preferred, he mentioned... he mentioned that, but he didn't elaborate much. He didn't like to, he didn't like very much to talk... in private, I mean -- publicly, of course, he'd been boasting that it was a victory... And he'd been right away mentioning that we'd, we'd get away from this situation in -- with American obligation to, not to invade Cuba, and even playing, you know, playing a role of the man... who is... really never been pursuing any kind of aggressive goals, by deploying the nuclear missiles on Cuban territory, but telling, "Look, I mean, we achieved what we wanted. We deployed...our missiles to protect Cuba." Which, of course, was, you know, absolutely a... ridiculous argument. So the main goal of the Soviet Union to deploy nuclear missiles on Cuban territory was a threat to the United States part-, of course it partially was true that it was to protect Cuba, but publicly he'd been telling that it's our victory, because we achieved an American commitment not to invade Cuba. But in private, he was a little bit even... I notice that... also Khrushchev was not a... person who would show his emotions or feelings when he was not right. He, he'd been showing, of course, his emotions and feelings on many occasions, but when he was not right, I know that he would rather... prefer not to express his view in a conversation with his subordinates, or his people. And I think, I had, I got an impression that he was not very, it was... had the feeling of, I had a feeling that he, it was not easy for him to talk on this subject.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE MISSILE CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH LED KHRUSHCHEV IN ANY WAY TOWARDS CONSIDERING THIS ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT -- THE PARTIAL TEST BAN? THE TEST BAN, NOT THE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, I'M SORRY...

After the Cuban crisis the situation was a... that Khrushchev realized that it was necessary, at least for a certain period of time, to improve Soviet-American relations, and to stabilize, to a certain degree, the arms race. And after the speech by President Kennedy at American University, which encouraged also Khrushchev to do something, Khrushchev attached quite an importance to the to negotiations on test ban. Also, let me tell you that the negotiations on test ban... had been going on rather intensely since the... since the late '50s, but at this moment it was a ...possibility really to reach an agreement. Which would not affect, on one hand, the Soviet programs, because the Soviet Union had developed a technique, by that time, to test underground, and, that's why, unfortunately, the Moscow partial test ban treaty doesn't cover underground tests -- not because of the control of inspection really, because prior to that, let me remind you that the Soviet Union were willing to accept even on-site inspections or... to find a solution which would be acceptable. Really a... test ban treaty, the Moscow test ban treaty of '83 didn't cover underground testing, because the Soviet Union had...huge enormous programs, and it was not necessary to the Soviet Union to continue nuclear testing in atmosphere, outer space, or underwater. And at the same time, it was a step which could improve Soviet-American relations, and improve, in general, the political climate in the world, and Khrushchev and... others in Moscow will all realize that the continuation of testing in atmosphere really would lead to very unpleasant -- to say the least -- results eventually, consequences, because radioactive pollution of atmosphere or ocean waters was something which potentially would create a serious threat to the life of human beings and in general would be very dangerous.

HOW MUCH DO YOU THINK THE OUTCOME OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS LED TO KHRUSHCHEV'S OUSTER IN 1964?

The Cuban crisis was something which I would call a beginning. Khrushchev's going a little bit sliding down, in his career. I don't think that the Khrushchev, that the Cuban crisis itself led to downfall of Khrushchev later, but it discredited him definitely, and particularly in the eyes of the, of the military. And eventually it would lead... later, it's been used by those who would like, who would like to that would remove Khrushchev from power.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE ESSENTIAL LESSON WE SHOULD LEARN FROM THE MISSILE CRISIS IN TERMS OF THE SITUATION TODAY BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS?

Essential lessons of Cuban crisis that we should be remain strong, and particularly have a strong will not to, be impressed by some of the Soviet actions. This is exactly what we have, we learned from the Cuban crisis, that if we really determine to show to the Soviet Union that we will not give up, that we will not accept, their pressure, that they will not in our, they, the, they will be defeated. This is the lesson which we have to learn.

DO YOU THINK THIS LESSON IS UNDERSTOOD THESE DAYS IN BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND IN...?

I think that to a substantial degree this lesson is understood by this administration.

HOW ABOUT IN THE SOVIET UNION? ARE THERE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

The Cuban missile crisis in the Soviet Union -- the lessons of this crisis -- are not very much in the minds of the Soviets, because the situation is entirely different. At the moment of the -- or afterward of the crisis their lesson was that we have to go ahead with our own programs, to catch up with the, with the United States. But now it's...so much, so many things changed, and the Soviet Union is now in a situation in which they feel very comfortable with the present strategic balance, that I think that the lessons of Cuba are forgotten.

DO YOU SEE AS A HOPE IN THE NEXT YEAR, SOME KIND OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT?

I've always been an optimist as far as arms control is concerned, and I'm convinced that some mutual acceptable agreements on arms control would be useful, because we have to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation. Certainly through a verifiable agreement, the road to this agreement won't be easy; the, still the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States are very much apart; there are many complex problems of verification, and essential problems. But I believe, I believe that we will have some... agreements, maybe for the beginning not so drastic as some people would like to have but there is a reasonable hope that the Soviet Union has an interest at this moment, in some arms control agreement as not to spend so much for the military purposes. And I also believe that here in the United States, in our country, also, all in all, there is a desire to have some agreement which are would be mutually acceptable. There are openings, you know, there are different views on that in Washington, but there is also different views in Moscow.

CAN YOU JUST GIVE ME A BETTER SENSE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S REASONING IN PUTTING THESE MISSILES INTO CUBA? IT SEEMS TO ME THAT HE MUST HAVE HAD ENORMOUS ALMOST DICTATORIAL POWER IN THE SOVIET UNION TO BE ABLE TO ORDER THAT AND HAVE IT DONE...

In 1962, Khrushchev really accumulated such a power in the Soviet Union, which was really close to some kind of dictatorial power. I don't like to compare him... with Stalin, but his power really was unchallenged. And he began to ignore, even, the opinion of the members of the Politburo -- Presidium, as it was called at that time -- of the Party, even the meetings of the Presidium were irregular, and many major, important decisions being taken by Khrushchev personally. It was something which he I think overlooked, that it could lead to a serious, opposition in the, in the Party.