WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE MX MISSILE PROPOSAL?

Well. In my judgment I've always felt that the MX missile was a destabilizing weapons system. It's a first strike weapon, by the way. It's...you use it or you're going to lose it. And I did not want to think that that was the posture of our government, to have that kind of missile in place at a cost of billions and billions of dollars. For many years we argued the point that the Soviets were developing and putting together and producing mobile systems. And on the one hand we had...Mr. Carter who didn't want a mobile system, who was defeated by Mr. Reagan when Mr. Reagan took office. Mr. Carter wanted 200 MXs, and by the way they can carry 10 nuclear warheads. Mr. Reagan wanted 100 through the Scowcroft Commission report. And quite frankly and fortunately I did play a very instrumental role in limiting that at 50 to be put into the present '50s. It's not a good missile because it's a destabilizer and number two, and perhaps more importantly, it's either you're going to use that darned thing, or you're going to lose it. It's one or the other. So therefore it's not a good defensive deterrent or a capability for the security of our country.

WERE HIS CONSTITUENTS CONCERNED ABOUT THE MISSILE?

Well you have diverse groups, of course. We had the Nuclear Freeze Movement at the time, they were opposed to any proliferation of nuclear weapons which would include the MX missile. Others on a parochial basis, and I can appreciate very much, perhaps worked on the MX missile right next to my, my own district in some of the defense industries. And I think when that kind of argument comes before you, you must take the national perspective in mind prior to a parochial perspective and I did that exactly. And I feel good about that.

WHAT WAS ATTITUDE IN HOUSE WHEN REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TRIED TO GET DENSE PACK APPROVED?

Well that was a last-minute decision on the part of the Administration when you talk about the dense pack. They were desperate, believe me, they were desperate to get some kind of a basing mode after around 30 or 40 of them fell through for the MX missile. They came, they came out with a dense pack idea, some kind of a vision that if you have all of the incoming missiles we could blow them up and ours could go out. In my judgment a very crazy idea. And then they came up with another idea that we could harden the present silos and make them hard enough for any attack by the Soviet missiles and that doesn't hold water. Now they're talking about another system, a rail garrison system to make it mobile. But at the same time they want to build an additional 50 MXs to make it 100, and I think they're trying to get away from the Midgetman missile which I support. I supported it from Day One. That would be going, if their position should be upheld, that would be against the Scowcroft recommendation made by that Commission.

HOW DID HE FEEL ABOUT SCOWCROFT RECOMMENDATIONS?

Well I think it proved that the window of vulnerability simply wasn't there to be extreme that the Administration was talking about. It did say that we had to firm up in other areas. They recommended a very strong posture for a three phase deterrent, air, land, and sea. But quite frankly, I think, the initiative undertaken by the Scowcroft Commission and all others superfluous quite frankly, was to get the MX missile built. And they succeeded in doing that.

DID HE FEEL ASPIN, DICKS AND OTHERS, WERE GETTING SUCKERED WITH EMPTY PROMISES?

I think they were suckered by the Administration quite frankly, and Norm Dicks and Les Aspin are my good friends. I worked very closely with them on other arms control legislation. They are being used by the Administration and that's why it made it very difficult originally for me to kill the MX missile which I tried to do. I remember back the year before I was able to get the 50 cap. I lost that fight in the House floor by 3 votes, and that was with all the power of the Administration and many of my moderate Democrats. So I thought we did quite well. Yeah, I think they were used quite frankly, and what I'm saying to you and those who might be listening, I've already told about.

WITHOUT THEIR LOBBYING WOULD THE HOUSE HAVE CUT FUNDS FOR THE MX MISSILE?

Yes. Without their support from the White House,...

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When I talk about Mr. Aspin and Norm Dicks with regard to the MX missile, they were working in conjunction with the White House. Without that coalition, in my opinion, the MX missile never would have got off the ground.

WHY WAS THE FIGHT SO BITTER?

The debate on the floor of the House was bitter because we truly believed in our firm positions. I believed very strongly that once you open that door, it's hard to close. And that now is beginning to come to fruition because when they got to 50 MXs, now they are talking about an additional 50 MXs. And then if you give that to them, they'll ask for another 50 MXs. And before you know it, the proliferation continues in nuclear arms weapons systems and a devastating weapon. What people refuse to talk about, they refuse to talk about a triad. If indeed we were impotent with regard to sea-launched cruise missiles and submarines, and we did not have an Air Force capable of striking with nuclear weapons, I could see the argument. Then we're bare. But we never talk about our strength, all we do is talk about our weakness.

ASKS ABOUT BARGAINING CHIP ARGUMENT.

I can always say to you that the MX missile has never, never been put on the table as a bargaining chip. It was a ploy by the President's negotiators and many of my colleagues were taken in by that argument. If you recall during the last three or four years, every key moment with regard to a weapons system when we thought was going one way, would turn around and be taken out because the Administration wanted to say, "Well look, don't cut the legs from our negotiators. Do not...take away their effectiveness. Give them the power to do the job right." And if you continue that kind of posture, you're never going to get any arms control. And therefore, I've always felt that the best way to call the bluff of any Administration, is to take an action. And once you take an action, we'll find out where they're coming from.

DID HE SAY THAT WE HAVE AN ARSENAL FULL OF BARGAINING CHIPS?

Absolutely. You've got many, many bargaining chips. You've got the, you've got the D-5 missile. You've got submarines. You've got bombers. You've got the B-1. You've got Stealth you're working on. You've got bases that we have in key strategic areas all over the world. The Soviets know that and the American people do not know it.

ASKS IF WE NEEDED IT AS A BARGAINING CHIP WITH THE ADMINISTRATION TO GET THEM TO GET SERIOUS ABOUT ARMS CONTROL AND GO INTO MIDGETMAN.

The Midgetman concept, I believe, was a ploy put forth by the Scowcroft Commission, quite frankly, to give to those of us, at least cited by the MX argument, but to give those others an opportunity to say, "Well, wait a minute, now, we can limit the MX and we can go full strength on the Midgetman." That's being turned around completely now because the Administration wants to eliminate the Midgetman altogether. A good mobile system, one warhead. A very effective deterrent factor. And they're going to ask for more MX missiles. That's the way they keep playing games with the Congress. Congress, I think, lacks courage, to take the proper position. And that is to kill a weapons system rather than give them R and D money to continue the system building every year. Before you know it, every R and D turns into procurement. And when it turns into procurement, you got weapons...coming out of our ears. And you cannot stop the proliferation.

WERE WEINBERGER AND AIR FORCE SINCERE ABOUT PROMISING TO PURSUE THE MIDGETMAN?

I think that the sums of money that they put in for the Midgetman indicated that they were not serious. That it was the Congress who would upgrade and increase the funding for the Midgetman missile. We can't, in all fairness we kind of forced it down their throat. Deep down, from Day One, I don't think they wanted the Midgetman. Yet it's a much better system and it's mobile. It is not a destabilizing weapon. And by the way, if you can develop the Midgetman the way we think it should, you can cut about 45 or 50 percent off the SDI program. That will not be needed. And we can save the taxpayers of this country billions and billions of dollars for a greater defensive capability.

ASKS IF MIDGETMAN IS TOO EXPENSIVE AS WILSON AND AIR FORCE ARGUE?

I question that as a matter of fact. An unknown fact is that the technology from the MX missile can be transferred, about 85 percent of it can be transferred to the Midgetman. Yet when we talk about hardening the silos for an MX missile, we never, never, up to this date have gotten a firm control of firm figures, as to what the hardening of what that missile will cost. I remember people talking $50 billion for the Midgetman program. Then they came down to forty. Now they're down to thirty-five. And there are those who will say, "We probably can build the whole darned thing for $20 billion." And I would think we could build it for less than that, quite frankly.

DOES HE THINK IT IS WORTH IT?

Yes I do. It's a great deterrent factor. It does not bump up against the ABM treaty. It's mobile, and it's very, very accurate.

ASKS FOR STORIES ABOUT DEBATE, MANY VOTES, PRESIDENT WON ON 100 MX. THEN WHAT HAPPENED?

Well the President never did win on the hundred MX. We won on the 50 cap. He's trying, he's trying to win now to go back up to 100. The debate was very intense. I think there was honest and intellectual...an intellectuality on the subject. I think people truly believed their positions. I thought it was a healthy debate for the country. Don't forget now, it took three years for me to get the 50 cap. So for three years we had that debate ongoing on the floor. I still think I was right, quite frankly.

WHY DID HE PERSONALLY INVEST SO MUCH TIME AS A LEADER IN THIS STRUGGLE?

Well because it was a destabilizing weapon.

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The MX, the MX missile was a destabilizing weapon and I truly, truly tried to...make my point very clear to all our constituents and to the members of my Congress.

REPEATS QUESTION ABOUT MOTIVATION.

Well the fact is that I thought it was a bad weapons system for the country. It didn't do anything for our security, quite frankly. I mentioned to you before that the MX missile is either a use it or lose it missile. So therefore, it does nothing as a deterrent factor. It was never put on the table in a bargaining session way back when they talked about START a couple of years ago. The Soviets didn't show any concern whatever. Or demonstrate any concern or fear about the MX missile. At the same time we have an opportunity to develop a single-warhead deterrent Midgetman missile which I believe does a greater job. That will protect people, not only missile systems but protect people. And we can reduce substantially the research and development on the SDI love affair that the President has going on with ...by the tune of probably $4, 500 billion. I think we owe that to the next generation.

DID REAGAN COME UP WITH SDI TO MAKE AN END RUN AROUND VULNERABILITY ISSUE?

I think he came up with that, quite frankly and I cannot read his mind properly, I think he came up with that to see if we can bump up against the ABM treaty. And one day break the ABM treaty. And it just simply isn't going to work. If he tries to break the ABM treaty in any way, shape or form, you can bet the Soviet Union will then do what they have to do. And before you know it, not only have arras in space. Now isn't that crazy? That's ridiculous.

DID HE SEE AN INHERENT CONFLICT BETWEEN LARGE MULTI-WARHEAD MISSILE AND NEED FOR SURVIVABILITY?

Well we kept getting reports from the Secretary of Defense that the MX could be survivable with a hardened silo. And we said to him at that time, "Show us, prove it." And up to this point, although they claim they have made great strides toward the hardening of the silos, we haven't seen any indication that they can do it. And yet to survive. And why do we want a first strike missile. That should be the first question. Why do we want that? The...the small Midgetman ICBM is not a first strike weapon. It's a mobile weapon that cannot be taken out by any attack and the Soviet Union knows that we can retaliate with that.

WHY DOES THE MX SEEM A FIRST STRIKE WEAPON? THE AIR FORCE SAYS COUNTER STRIKE, A RETALIATORY STRIKE AND THAT'S WHY IT MUST BE SURVIVABLE?

They are now going into the old Minuteman III silos, according to the legislation. In my judgment we cannot harden those silos with greater accuracy on the part of the Soviet missile. We can get them out fast enough. They'll be taken out before they can get out of their little hole. And therefore they are non-survivable. It's a first strike weapon. That should not be the posture or the policy of our country. We're better than that.

BEFORE THEY WERE DESIGNED FOR SILOS, DID THE AIR FORCE MEAN THEM FOR A FIRST STRIKE?

Absolutely, in my judgment, yes. Well they, they, they...of course they have got to be a first strike weapon in the eyes of the Air Force although they were telling people differently.

WHY DOES THE AIR FORCE WANT THAT?

I don't have any idea. They can, they can...do so much better. The Air Force can do so much better by having a mobile system that we can retaliate with. I mean after all, isn't that deterrent? Isn't that what we are talking about? Now you take the Air Force, along with what we have in our submarines, and the mighty power that we have in the air. You have more than enough for a deterrence system.

ASKS ABOUT ARGUMENT WE NEED TO MAKE CREDIBLE OUR THREAT OF A FIRST USE TO PROTECT EUROPE?

How would you protect Europe with the MX missile? I just don't understand that. I don't see where the Air Force is coming from on that one. If you want a first strike, you have your bomber force, you have your submarine force, which is very potent, by the way. Submarine power is extremely heavy. Let me give you one example of the kind of power that we have, and it's crazy on both sides. One Trident, fully manned, without the D-5 missile, can destroy almost every city in the Soviet Union of 100,000 people or more, just one, just one little submarine. So I think the excessive power is ridiculous to even comprehend.

THEY SAY WE NEED AN ACCURATE, HARD TARGET KILL TO MAKE FIRST USE CREDIBLE.

Um huh. And I think we do have that kind of capability. You want to remember, you can have all the hard target...silos to, to withhold, to hold off a major attack, but when you have accuracy, I don't care how strong you are, it's going to take out that, that particular location.

DID HE OPPOSE THE CARTER BASING MODE?

Well at that time I was unaware, just coming into Congress, that that, at the time that Jimmy Carter was proposing, I thought we at least should have looked at it. We were talking about a mobile system for many years. And if you recall, President Reagan, at that time candidate Reagan, took that on as a major issue. Out West he made himself an awful lot of points. That's on the one hand. Yet today it's the same, same guy, who opposed it against Carter, who's proposing it to this Congress.

WHAT MOTIVATED IT, HOUSE WOULD HAVE KILLED IT WITHOUT COMPROMISE WORK OF ASPIN AND DICKS.

There is no question in my mind that if Les Aspin, Norm Dicks and other moderates of the Democratic Party had supported my amendment and my initiatives, the MX missile would be, would be history today.

WHY WERE THEY MOTIVATED TO FIGHT FOR THE MX?

Well you want to remember, and I respect their views, by the way, I don't have any personal feelings here. That Chairman Aspin was a very good friend of Scowcroft and apparently Scowcroft convinced him that we were doing the right thing. In my opinion, Scowcroft, the Scowcroft Commission did one thing. That was to keep the MX missile alive.

ASKS HIM TO ELABORATE IN TERMS OF THEIR MISSION.

Yes. I think that was their mission, to keep the MX missile alive. Quite frankly. And they threw in a couple of goodies with you can develop the Midgetman missile and... go along with a re, rehabilitation, perhaps a modernization, of your submarine forces.

DICKS TAKES CREDIT FOR PUSHING REAGAN INTO ARMS CONTROL.

Nobody in Congress, not one member, is responsible for pushing the Reagan Administration. The people throughout the country pushed the Reagan Administration, who then, they pushed the Reagan Administration, they pushed members of Congress, to get serious about arms control in this country. The Nuclear Freeze Movement back in 1981 and 1982 was a very fervent movement, very objective. And they made the awareness factor one that we could not ignore. They are the ones that should be taking credit, not members of Congress.

WHY DID SOME MEMBERS VOTE FOR THE FREEZE BUT ALSO FOR THE MX?

I don't have any idea, you'll have to ask them.

WHAT WAS RELATIONSHIP?

I've never taken a...a close study as to how people were voting on the floor of the house, where they're voting for the MX and for the Contra voting. There are many members who voted against the Contra aid and were supporting the MX missile. It may be in their mind that they were taking the right position for the country. I think they were wrong, quite wrong. To the tune of about...$15 or $18 billion of taxpayer's money that has gone down the drain.

DID THEY HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE TO OUR ALLIES THAT WE HAD THE WILL TO GO AHEAD?

My goodness. I think our country has demonstrated that by coming up with a B-1 bomber, the Stealth version of a bomber. Other research and development programs which they are aware of. The D-5 missile, the Trident submarine. How much more convincing do we need? Why should America be paying billions, and the Americans, the taxpayer, be paying billions and billions and billions of more dollars to convince our allies. Why don't they spend some money?

ASKS ABOUT ARGUMENT PERCEPTIONS ARE IMPORTANT, THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE HUGE MIRVED MISSILES AND WE JUST HAVE SMALL 3-WARHEAD MISSILES?

You can never take only one part of the triad. If you're going to talk about a deterrent system, you must include all three parts. We have superiority in the air, and in the sea. So therefore we can afford perhaps not to have that massive capability on land because you are much stronger in other areas.

ASKS ROLE OF COMMON CAUSE IN THIS DEBATE?

I think they played a very, very important role. Very objective. Common cause did a great job in pulling all the people together, along with the freeze groups throughout the country. They, they just did a superb job. Well organized.

ASKS LESSON, WHAT DID MX SYMBOLIZE?

I don't know what it symbolized. But I think what we ought to do as a, as a nation and as a Congress. We ought to be taking a closer look at some of the new weapons systems that are coming down the road and to not give carte blanche to any Administration, or for that matter, any weapons system. I don't know if you're aware of this, but the Congress of the United States has only eliminated one major weapons system in 32 years. In other words, whatever the Pentagon wants, they get. And in my judgment there are a lot of things the Pentagon wants that they should not have. And you're wasting taxpayer's systems.

ASKS EXAMPLE.

VIVAD is the only major system that we've killed, at least in my nine years here. And in retrospect they tell me it's the only program killed in 32 years.

WHICH?

VIVAD. The York. The anti... the protection for the tanks and mobile systems outfit.

ASKS ABOUT WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY.

I though it was a fake from Day One. Yes. I thought it was a fake from Day One ...

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The window of vulnerability in my judgment was always an argument being used for the purposes of building up our capability ...our nuclear arsenals. In my judgment I think that argument has been a fake from Day One.

WHY SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING SURVIVABLE MISSILES?

Actually, you're not spending a lot of money on that. You're making a decision whether you go for the Midgetman or whether you go full—fledged for the SDI program. The SDI program, according to the Administration, will protect only our missile systems. It doesn't protect people. When you have a mobile system that they know they can get hit with, that will protect people because they will not attack.

DOES IT HAVE TO BE MOBILE?

If you truly want a strong deterrent, you go with a Midgetman mobile system, accurate, and a great deterrent.

WHAT WILL CONGRESS DO?

We're going to find out what Congress will do next year. All of those arguments will be forthcoming in January and February. I would hope that Congress would not eliminate the Midgetman in favor of an additional 50 MX missiles. I can assure you of this, if you thought we had debate on the floor before, you wait until this one comes up.

WILL HE FIGHT IT?

Absolutely. That would be a waste of tax payers money to build 50 more MXs.

ASKS HIM TO REPEAT.

Well in my judgment...I am committed. Of course I am committed to killing any additional MX missiles. And to go along with the development of the single-warhead mobile system.