CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE HISTORICAL REASONS FOR THE OPENING IN TERMS OF DÉTENTE AND SALT I?

(TRANSLATES QUESTION INTO RUSSIAN)

You asked about the reasons that brought the Soviet Union into the SALT negotiations with the United States. One would rather talk about the reasons that brought the United States of America into these negotiations...

LET'S STOP FOR A SECOND. OKAY, THE REASONS THAT LED THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN SALT...

One rather should speak of the reasons that led the United States to the SALT negotiations. The Soviet Union, from the very beginning of the nuclear age, stood for the liquidation of nuclear arms, for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, for the betterment of humankind. As for the United States, they were the first to deploy their nuclear armaments, and then tried to exercise their policy of power, the policy of "atomic diplomacy" based upon (this deployment). Which was demonstrated first in Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The Soviet Union stood, and still stands, for the limitation and liquidation of nuclear arms, but, in as much as the United States resorted to deployment, the massive deployment of nuclear armaments, so have we been to do the same. When somewhere around '60s in the late '60s — early '70s parity was achieved between the USSR and the USA in terms of strategic arms, causing some soberly-thinking US politicians to propose negotiations. Naturally, the Soviet Union always standing for the reduction and liquidation of nuclear arms, accepted the idea of negotiations. The basic principle of such negotiations was the principle of equality and balanced security. Using this principle as a basis, both sides ranged to proceed forward in this new way which then had no precedents in the history of diplomacy.

CUT.

...that parity exists in terms of strategic armaments. There is no superiority on any side. That's what I mean by the principle of equality and balanced security.

THE SECOND QUESTION WAS ABOUT THE ATMOSPHERE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT IF YOU CAN TALK ABOUT THE ATMOSPHERE, IF YOU CAN REMEMBER THE FIRST MEETING, WHAT WAS YOUR IMPRESSION THE FIRST TIME YOU MET THE AMERICANS IN THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION?

(TRANSLATES)

The SALT I negotiations started on the 17th of November, 1969, in the Recreation Hall of Helsinki. That was the first time we met the American delegation, as well as Ambassador Smith. The speeches were said, Ambassador Smith read President Nixon's address to his own delegation, in which the great importance of their mission was emphasized. We, in turn, made our own statements, and after that we joined each other at the table along with the Finnish leadership. One should say, the very first meetings were of, so to say, ones of adjustment, but pretty soon a productive and I'd say constructive atmosphere was established, though, the negotiations themselves, were very complicated. The negotiations, in general, were hard; they were difficult, because for the first time in history issues were discussed that had to do with the immediate key problems of (national) security of both the United States and the Soviet Union. And these key problems were discussed candidly by both delegations, which also was not quite usual. These were innovative negotiations. What was the atmosphere of negotiations? I would describe it as follows: from the beginning, and during the entire negotiations the atmosphere was well, sometimes rough, but what was noticeable was the desire on the part of each delegation to really think over the position of opposite side. Not to answer immediately "No" or "Yes", but we held our answers, we thought through the questions asked, then contacted our capitals, consulted with (the members) of the delegations, and, only afterward, when the response was sufficiently ripened, we expressed our balanced and properly motivated opinions. Thus, the negotiations were on a very complex scale, far more complex than that of modern music, even. Nonetheless, they were characterized by the strivings of both delegations to look for solutions, for mutually acceptable decisions, compromises That is what distinguished these negotiations and was manifested by the behavior of all participants in the negotiations. One must note that both sides of the delegations' personnel were quite strong. It included representatives from different Departments, ones of national importance, and the representatives, themselves, were of rather high levels. Apart from that, the delegations, of course, contacted their capitals in order to make sure that their responses had been approved by. So to speak, the national level, regarding a particular event a particular issue. Thus, we worked rather intensively. At first, inasmuch as the subject of the negotiations was barely familiar to us, barely researched, there was the negotiations were I would say, rather stretched in time, but, eventually we started doing better, when we became more familiar with the positions of the opposite side, which, in turn, helped us formulate our own positions accordingly. One must note, that in 1971 the first agreement was concluded concerning measures in case of measures there was an agreement on measures decreasing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war between the USS the USA and the USSR. It included measures preventing accidental and unauthorized launchings of missiles. It was quite an important agreement. At the same time, we worked on two other agreements moving further ahead Those were: an agreement on the anti-ballistic defense systems limitations, and a provisional agreement on measures limiting the strategic offensive armaments. It became clear during the negotiations that the increase of defensive arms served as catalyst, as a factor hastening the process of the increase in strategic offensive arms. Therefore, both sides came to understand the necessity of drastically reducing the anti-ballistic systems. At that time the United States had their "Safeguard" Plan, a full-scale plan of protecting the territory of the United States from missile strike but this plan proved to be ineffective. It was also very expensive. In order to shoot down a single missile entering the lower strata of the atmosphere it required a minimum of three anti-rockets. Each of these three anti-ballistic missiles cost as much as the attacking one. And both economically and militarily, it was by no means justified the deployment of these systems, I mean. The most important consideration, though, was that the development of an anti-ballistic system served as a hastening factor, and still remains so today — the same rule works as it did before of offensive arms development. For this reason, the agreement on ABM was worked out, the one which is observed and, as it's known, still works very effectively in terms of limiting the offensive arms race as well.

CUT FOR A SECOND...

A very important aspect of these negotiations was the fact that, when difficulties occurred, when it was necessary to look for some unexplored ways paths, the negotiations involved not only delegates, but also higher levels, the Foreign Ministers, as well as the highest levels. That fact assured the success of the negotiations, their progress, therefore, it could be said, that the process of negotiations on strategic arms limitation was a process that involved all national hierarchies concerned. The delegations were negotiating the formulation of the texts of the agreements, while receiving from above from their leaders additional directions instructing them on matters of their work...

PLEASE, GO AHEAD...

The answers to these questions are the results reached by the negotiations. The things that were achieved were submitted for approval There were difficulties but they were overcome. I mentioned earlier, in 1971 an important agreement was reached concerning the prevention of launchings that were either unauthorized, or provocative. This was the first agreement. The second agreement concerned ABM systems. I have already outlined the significance of that agreement. I was worked out through lengthy and complicated discussions but the results were obvious: this agreement remains in effect today, working perfectly. At the same time we concluded the SALT I agreement which concerned measures limiting strategic offensive arms. There were two questions strongly linked to one another — the ABM issue and the strategic offensive arms limitation; and conclusion of SALT I, that is, the agreement of it — the SALT I agreement, was a very important step in the development of the entire process. For the first time, some quantitative, as well as, to some extent, qualitative limitations were established. Though, the limitations only embraced the ballistic missiles. The air forces were not included during that stage (of the talks). Well, the SALT I agreement the SALT I agreement was based upon the principles of equality and balanced security, which did not mean an "item for item" exchange. But, rather, it meant considering the asymmetric structures of armaments, that parity was cumulatively observed; nether side felt cheated or shortchanged. The agreement took into account both sides' interests in security and was definitely of historical significance.

Well, the role of negotiations in the limitations of... OK, détente is the only logical alternative to a confrontation. Détente means the preservation of an ongoing relationship between the countries in terms of the political, economical scientific, technological, humanitarian areas, and other areas as well. The most important aspect of détente, however, is, of course, reduction and limitation in the military area, the area of strategic armaments, because these serve as the very backbone of the relationship between both sides. Progress in the field of strategic arms limitations also means an improvement in the relationship of each side, an increase of trust and the establishment of, er…conditions or terms that increase cooperation with respect to other peaceful activities. Er… therefore, we considered the negotiations on strategic arms limitations as conducive to an improvement to many aspects of the relationship between the USSR and the USA to the extent possible at that time.

WE ARE STARTING WITH KISSINGER...

(TRANSLATES)

With Nixon, you mean... Unfortunately, I had no chance for close contact with President Nixon, nor with State Secretary Kissinger. I was present during meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, as well as on higher levels (of government). But I myself had no personal contacts. If one was to judge them according to the policy of US politicians regarding issues of strategic arms limitations, I think, the answer to question regarding who and what these politicians were like could be surmised from the results they achieved throughout these negotiations — which were positive. As for Mr. Gerald Smith and Raymond Garthoff. I had lengthy and meaningful discussions with him. They were both hard negotiators, I mean, first of all, Smith, the head of the delegation. They were hard negotiators; they firmly stood up for the positions and the interests of the United States of America. But personally, they were primarily people seeking solutions to the problems and, secondly, as for Mr. Smith, I remember him as a very pleasant and wise man. We established a good personal relationship. Well, also a relationship between our families, Madame Bernice was frequently in the company of my spouse and that somehow eased the personal aspects of such complicated negotiations.

WE ARE MOVING TO SALT II. WHAT WERE THE REASONS FOR DEPARTURE FROM DÉTENTE?

As the first question it sounds rather illogical. What if we start with SALT II, and afterwards...

OK. PLEASE, I CAN TAKE THE SAME NOTES I CAN TAKE NOTES THAT I...

Yes. After SALT II negotiations ended, agreements between the President and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU were reached regarding the continuation of negotiations, and that is how we stepped into the next stage of negotiations known as SALT II. At that point the personnel of the American delegation was changed new people arrived. On our side the staff, generally, remained the same. The goals for the delegations with respect to SALT II accords—or agreement were- incomparably more complex than those accomplished by SALT I, agreement. The thing is the tasks were more extensive; limitations and reductions involved the whole triad the strategic triad. Which which included strategic bombers. It was also necessary to resolve certain qualitative limitations, to establish limits within each particular type of armament. All very complex issues which naturally required more time than those of SALT I. Considerable difficulties occurred also because, exactly at the time of the SALT II negotiations, the American side undertook the deployment of missiles equipped with MIRVs; cruise missiles were also in a preparatory stage of development, the long-range type. Undoubtedly, that factor could not help but increase the difficulties in solving these issues. Nevertheless, both sides continued to proceed in the direction toward a searching for mutually acceptable solutions and the working out of the SALT II agreement. This agreement included more substantial limitations; limitations having to do with the qualitative aspects of armament developments. Apart from the agreement, a protocol was worked out outlining those future issues that had to be solved during the next stage of negotiations, so to speak, SALT III. And in as much as it doesn't exist anymore, nothing came out of it, this protocol remained unrealized. In addition to it the mutual document was agreed upon a statement about the intentions of both sides to undertake further negotiations. These intentions were oriented toward the same goals, that is, toward the limitations and reduction of strategic armaments. The work on SALT II lasted, as I already said for six and a half years. It required a number of summits on both the highest levels, and those of Foreign Ministers. Despite the personnel changes in the delegations, I would say, a constructive and productive atmosphere was preserved, during the negotiations and the work progressed; and, later, was resulted in the conclusion of a rather important agreement, SALT II. As for the present, this agreement appears to be under massive attack in the United States of America. Nowadays the United States of America is passing some of the most important quantitative limitations. Why it is happening? We're absolutely convinced that there is a reason behind it. In this case one senses the influence of those who dream of violating our balance of parity, to gain one sided superiority. The abandonment of the policy of détente which was characteristic of that period of the Soviet-American relationship happened not for reasons coming from the side of the Soviet Union. In this abandonment a role was played by the fact that certain circles in the United States of America decided to break down the parity and, thus, obtain military superiority. And, inasmuch as these intentions emerged, it was embodied by efforts attempts to ruin the judicial foundation which restrains the arms race and which serves as the basis of negotiations. I already mentioned that this basis is one of equality and balanced security. But it was boldly stated in President Reagan's election platform of 1980 that the Republican party planned as its task to achieve military superiority (over the Soviet Union). This is the underlying reason. Up until now there is a widespread rumor promoted in the United States of America, that the abandonment of SALT II agreement as well as failure to ratify this agreement could, supposedly, be explained by events surrounding Afghanistan. This is a statement, though, with absolutely no basis. The thing is, that the Soviet Union responding to the request of its legitimate government ordered limited strictly limited contingent of military troops to enter Afghanistan; it took place after the American side made statements regarding the necessity of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union in the areas of strategic armaments. It happened as early as Autumn 1979 it was stated regarding the alleged presence of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. When this propagandist firecracker blew up, nothing remained but this public mood which did not favor détente. What happened later the following steps were undertaken by NATO: - that happened one moment in December 1979 when the question of Afghanistan hadn't even been raised the NATO decision was made, despite the terms of agreement (of SALT), about deployment of the American missiles of preemptive strike capacity on the European territory. That was also a step toward gaining military superiority.

It would be wrong not to mention the present actions of the US administration with respect to the SALT II agreement. I mean the recent decision to surpass quotas quantitatively established by the agreement concerning strategic offensive arms. This is not compatible with the spirit of Reykjavik; it is also not in accordance with the goals set forth for the SALT negotiations. One should note that the Soviet government eventually denounced this action by calling it a mistake. The Soviet Union had every reason to resort to a similar path of the arms increase, but so far, we are not following this way in the hope that those in Washington will think twice about further developments and take into account this well-thought out position of ours. Which would mean an increase in the mutual trust between our countries. Therefore we stand for the maintenance of the SALT II agreement, and object to the surpassing of quotas set forth by this agreement.

CAN HE TALK NOW ABOUT HIS FEELINGS ABOUT THE PERSONALITIES?

I think, there is one more question before this one...

I'd like to speak about our policy regarding the solution of the space nuclear arms problem. We stand for the strengthening and further development of the positive results of Reykjavik. In Reykjavik both sides were literally one step apart before making an accord of major, of top importance. The reasons that prevented it are known; we regret that these obstacles emerged. Though, we still hope the positive results achieved in Reykjavik will be secured, and the bricks required to complete this structure will be eventually laid, thus making it possible to embody by practice the dream of mankind regarding nuclear disarmament which threatens the very existence of the human species, and which should be eliminated. This is exactly the content of this year's program of January 15, as well as the entire position of the Soviet Union concerning the issues under discussion.

Well, as for President Carter and Mr. Brzezinski, I didn't have a chance to meet them. Together with Mr. Vance I did participate in his meeting with our Minister of Foreign Affairs several times. He left the impression of being an open-minded statesman. As for Mr....

CUT.

As for Mr. Warnke I had lengthy, and sometimes lively and candid discussions with him. One should admit he really seems to want the arms race limitations. Actually, that was what was entrusted to him; and when one's personal interests coincide with the job entrusted to him, work (with such a person) also becomes interesting. Mr. Warnke and I had good, productive, and well, I hope, also personal relations. I respect him deeply. The list of questions is over...

I'LL ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT NEGOTIATION ITSELF. IF YOU WANT TO STOP AND THINK IT OVER, PLEASE, FEEL COMFORTABLE...

(TRANSLATES)

Alright, I'll do it all I will only make some notes in order to catch up with your questions....

AREN'T YOU, OR WERE YOU DISAPPOINTED IN RETROSPECT ABOUT THE MIRV NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT WAS THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AS OPPOSED TO THE ONE OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION?

(TRANSLATES)

...achievement of the agreement?

MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT...

That's alright. I do know what MIRV is. About MIRV agreement? Which one? Reached when?

I'M TALKING ABOUT SALT I.

(TRANSLATES)

There were no MIRVs at that time, though.

(TRANSLATES)

WHAT, THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT...?

(TRANSLATES)

BUT THERE WAS TALK ABOUT IT THEN...

(TRANSLATES)

...AND NO ACTION WAS TAKEN. I WONDER WHETHER YOU ARE, IN RETROSPECT, DISAPPOINTED ABOUT THAT.

Well, of course, it did not make our forthcoming work easier, the fact that while negotiating SALT I the American side was preparing the deployment of other types of weapons. It certainly made the SALT II negotiations more difficult. I spoke about it already...

(TRANSLATES)

WHETHER... THE STYLE OF NEGOTIATION, THE PERSONAL STYLE... THAT IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT SUCH A NEGOTIATION TOOK PLACE. DID IT CREATE SOME HUMOR? WAS THERE SOME FAUX PAS, SOCIAL OR OTHER? CAN YOU TELL ME ANECDOTES ABOUT THE FIRST MEETING WHICH SUGGESTED A DIFFERENT STYLE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES? A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE?

(BOTH TRANSLATORS TRANSLATE)

I should say that both sides took the issue of delegations' personnel very seriously. As well as advisers and experts of the delegations. Very solid persons were appointed. As for our side, the Deputy Minister of Defense was appointed, Nikolai Alekseyev; Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army Nikolai Ogarkov; one of the biggest academicians Aleksandr Shchukin, the scientist. He was Paul Nitze's counterpart in the negotiations. There were also other diplomatic experts and they worked both during the preparation of the sessions, during the sessions themselves; they also worked with one another. Each one had talks with his counterpart from the American side after the conference ended. Thanks to the high level of competence of these people, we managed to locate effective work methods. And what important, we managed to discover principles of approach that led not to the erosion of the basis of work but to the strengthening of it. At the beginning it was something like an immense ocean covered by fog In as much as we discussed issues that were absolutely new to us, those which were considered un-discussable before, at least by us. And suddenly, here they were open for discussions with the opposite side, the issue "top secret" ones, and they required talks, negotiations. Naturally enough, amusing accidents took place, as well as some that were not so amusing. Well.. what was really amusing that happened to us?. Wait a second, perhaps I'll recall He he him well okay I'll tell you about the following case. As it happened, I received instructions to present a proposal for the American delegation's consideration which have to do with an important issue, which had already been under discussion. But this proposal consisted of only half a sentence, and when I read it to Smith (Head of the American Delegation) he asked me, whether I had anything further to add regarding this matter. I told him: "Of course, I have", and next just repeated this first part of the sentence. He asked me: "Could you use different words to say the things you just said?" I said I could, of course. Then I changed the pattern of words and said the same thing. Then he says: "How do you negotiate with only half a sentence?" So, I said: "Well, as far as I know, we have bilateral negotiations, not one-sided ones. I just gave you half of the sentence, and now I'd like to listen to your opinion of the second part. This is your work to complete. Had we been talking to ourselves, we would use the full sentence, but in as much as we have two-sided talks, let's give the other side the chance to look for words also." He started laughing and said all right, he informs Washington; and after a while Washington cabled the rest of the sentence, and it hastened the solution to the problem. Well, there were many such cases of accidents between the interlocutors. After the sessions they met each other and exchanged their opinions in an informal manner looking for ways acceptable to both of us to follow. Well, all kinds of jokes sometimes inevitably happened. Nicknames were widely used as for me, I'm quite familiar with both the Old and New Testament, as well as the Koran, Indian Scriptures (Religious Books) and all kinds of other materials suitable for such talks. It made the negotiations a bit livelier and also allowed for the possibility of locating the right path. Through the hints we could find the right spots to step on. We could find the right moves, and I think that these casual and sometimes funny methods of negotiating very serious matters were very helpful in overcoming both essential and technical obstacles.

THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION WAS OFTEN UPSET BECAUSE OF SECOND CHANNEL. I WONDER, WHETHER THE RUSSIAN DELEGATES HAD SIMILAR PROBLEMS?

(TRANSLATES)

Yes, yes, there was something like that.

(TRANSLATES)

Its a complex question that you asked, from a psychological point of view. Of course, the existence of a second channel, i.e., the existence of negotiations between Ambassador Dobrynin and the Secretary of State as well as the negotiations that were performed by the exchange of communiqués on yet another level didn't simplify the delegations' tasks. Looking at the business in a narrower, more technical sense, on the other hand, this method proved to be effective. It did cause some inconveniences to the delegation but one could cope with it. And in that respect we didn't have any complaints or comments. We considered it as one of the integral aspects of a new and difficult technique of the new style of political thinking. Which was fruitful.

BACK TO THE MIRV QUESTION...DID THE SOVIETS, DID YOU PRESENT TO NITZE ANY KIND OF PROPOSAL TO STOP THE AMERICAN TESTING OF MIRV?

(TRANSLATES)

I'm not going to answer this question right now. I don't remember now.

...THE NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO THE SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES?

(TRANSLATES)

This question was quite this issue had quite a few complications, and these sometimes had to do with inquiries attempted by the American side during the negotiations. And it is known that the United States of America has sea power, the great sea power. It has open access to the seas, the oceans. The Soviet Union is a great land power, the backbone of our strategic defense, of strategic dimensions is land-based missiles. So the American delegation more than once proposed the transference of the majority of our land-based missiles to the sea. From land to sea! That would be a rather ingenious way of solving the problem, if it were possible to change the entire structure of armaments that already existed in reality solely by negotiations — or to change the entire geopolitical situation. I then asked him: "What do you want? Do you like our armaments more? Do you want an exchange? Do you want us to go under water, while you settle on land? Do you want to say our armaments are better?" "No," he says, "we didn't mean to say so". "So, what do you want then? To change the geographical environment? Probably you want to move the seas and oceans? "No", he says, "that's not what we want." "Then, your proposals don't make sense. These unrealistic considerations are about unrealistic matters. You have to take reality into account as well as the asymmetric structures of the armaments. Because each side had its own historical means for the deployment of its armaments much before the negotiations started and, thus, independent of the negotiations. So, there were many things (to be said).

THE CONCERN OVER A THIRD COUNTRY ATTACK, A PROVOCATION ATTACK, A CATALYTIC ATTACK. CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE ISSUE THERE?

(TRANSLATES)

THE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE PREVENTION, OR DEALING WITH A CATALYTIC ATTACK...

(TRANSLATES)

Err.

IF HE DOESN'T REMEMBER LET'S TALK ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE...BUT IF HE REMEMBERS, IT WOULD BE INTERESTING.

OK, no well, there were some concerns expressed that considering the widespread development of American nuclear arms within immediate proximity to the Soviet Union, a situation of missile launching from a third side could emerge. It could be some sort of accidental or unauthorized, or also coming from behind-type launching or, as they used to say, a shot coming out of an L-shaped barrel of rifle. That is, a missile is suddenly dropped on you, but nobody knows whose, though its point of launching is more or less definable, so the situation could become quite murky. This problem was partially solved by the 1971 agreement. It was known to us that, as we did, the American side undertook serious measures to strengthen their security in this respect -- measures of strengthening the system of control of these weapons. In as much as the danger was quite clear to both sides, we resolved the issue of control rather ingeniously. We concluded that there is no need for any control whatsoever; each side was so genuinely interested in preventing such launchings that there were no doubts that all necessary measures would be undertaken to eliminate such dangerous possibilities and, as far as we know, these measures were undertaken by the American side, not to mention the Soviet one.

IS HE AWARE THAT KISSINGER THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION DELEGATION HAD CHINA IN MIND?

(TRANSLATES)

I would like you to forget this question, so I will not answer it. You'd better not ask it, and I'd better not answer it.

BACK TO THE SALT QUESTIONS. CAN YOU TELL ME WHETHER YOU HAD A CHANCE TO WORK WITH NITZE AND WHAT DID YOU THINK OF HIM?

(TRANSLATES)

Nitze's counterpart was the academician Shchukin. They met frequently for private meetings and had rather lengthy conversations. My immediate counterpart was the head of the delegation, sometimes it could be one of the diplomatic advisers but I never had close diplomatic negotiations with Nitze, except for conferences or sessions.

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT YOUR FEELINGS, YOUR EMOTIONS WHEN SALT I WAS SIGNED? HOW DID IT FEEL TO HAVE IT SIGNED?

(TRANSLATES)

NOT IN TERMS OF POLITICAL TERMS, BUT IN PERSONAL TERMS.

(TRANSLATES)

I felt like a chapter, the whole chapter of my professional life, was completed of my activities both diplomatic and personal. I understood that this was the first step in a direction that history itself will follow, and I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to participate in the preparation of this historical event; and I felt like a man who had just completed extensive scientific research or a literary creation, and though it demanded so much of my strength, it was, after all, a great source of personal satisfaction. It was a complex combination (of feelings) -- (the Russian writer) Gogol after having completed a huge book had similarly lengthy periods of tranquility relieved from the tension (of the book), and also wasn't quite sure what to do next. Well, I didn't create anything that could be compared to Gogol's even smallest creation, but, nevertheless, it is a common feeling to experience simultaneously with satisfaction, almost a sense of having just missed being run over when business is done.

I JUST WONDER, WHETHER IN LIGHT OF NITZE'S POLITICS DURING THE RATIFICATIONS OF SALT II HE HAD ANY IMPRESSIONS OF NITZE?

(TRANSLATES)

I had no reason to change my opinion (about him) in as much as I had no negotiations with him.

(TRANSLATES)

I did have an interesting talk with General Rowney left the negotiations seven months before the completion of SALT II. Once, in the evening during a party he gave in his living quarters in Geneva, we danced together. There were no women around, so we danced man to man. So, I danced with Rowney and Rowney asked me: "Do you agree that during peacetime the military should also dictate the policies of the countries including their internal policy?" I told I told him, "You are actually repeating the concept of the Austro-Hungarian chief of staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. Conrad thought that the military should define policies in peacetime also, including financial problems, etc. I said: "So, you quote Conrad, I see". - No, I mean, my question as it is..."The answer to your question," I replied, "was Conrad's fate." The Austro-Hungarian monarchy fell apart and its general staff ceased to exist. If military dictates politics during peacetime, at the time of peace there will be something like the following: Conrad is the head of staff. The general staff is the brain of the armed forces. According to Conrad's concepts the brain should exceed the physical skull capacity, exceeding the limitations of its functional expanse. The brain expanding its field of activity, tried to act beyond its field of activity; nothing good could come out of it. "Watch out," I said, "President Eisenhower also spoke about that. One shouldn't permit military to excessively influence politics during peacetime."

DURING THE TALK THE US AND USSR HAD DIFFERENT NOTIONS OF LINKAGE. WHEN IN 1968 THE SOVIET ARMY MOVED INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE UNITED STATES CANCELLED SALT II. WHEN THE UNITED STATES INVADED CAMBODIA AND BOMBED HAIPHONG, THE USSR CONTINUED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS. CLEARLY, I THINK THE NOTION OF LINKAGE IS VERY DIFFERENT FOR THE US AND THE USSR. CAN YOU THINK ABOUT THE DAY IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES INVADED CAMBODIA OR WHEN THE HAIPHONG HARBOR WAS BOMBED? WHAT WAS THE ATMOSPHERE DURING THE TALK, WHETHER THE EVENTS IN THE FAR EAST HAD AFFECTED THE NEGOTIATIONS?

(TRANSLATES)

The negotiations on strategic arms limitations have to deal with global issues of mankind's existence, to be or not to be, to exist or seem to exist, therefore, its impossible to link the development of negotiations on strategic arms limits with all kinds of conflicted situations of an regional nature or any other problems. If one would make a link then the damage will be brought upon international security, in general, and, perhaps neither issue would progress closer to resolution. We, in fact, had a principle adopted a principle; to negotiate regardless of what happens in any other area or any other problems. This principle was based upon clear understanding of the universal significance of these negotiations. As for the conflict situations or domestic problems, the Soviet Union's position is known: the General Secretary of the CPSU CC, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke about it more than once. We stand for investigation of ways to mitigate and avoid conflict situations in different regions, but for that purpose different talks exist and different forums. If one links one forum with another and continues with such linkage, I think we are we would slip down. Of course, different linkages could work, when one links one global problem with another, for example, hundreds of millions of dollars are spent, and now we are speaking of trillions for the development of nuclear or space armaments. Its insanity, first, because neither nuclear war, nor space war can have a winner or losers also there is no country that could be interested in an arms race; there is no side that can win. However, insane amounts of money are spent instead of solving the issues of no less a danger, of no less a threat. Well, for instance, the problem of the preservation of the environment, the issue of the liquidation of the backwardness of third world countries, the issue of international debts of some countries, problems of food resources, of energy resources, the issue of using space for peaceful purposes, etc. All global, extensive world problems. Today they are still not solved, because they try to use as an excuse.

CAN HE TELL ME NEVERTHELESS ABOUT HIS FEELINGS WHEN THEY WERE DEALING WITH THE SIGNING OF SALT I, AS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE WORLD THERE WERE AGGRESSIVE MILITARY ACTIONS...

(TRANSLATES)

I would say the following in this situation...

SORRY...

I would say the following: In such a case it is worth to rereading again a part of the novel "War and Peace" by Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy which describes Kutuzov's feelings regarding military developments. Kutuzov approached the issues from a general point of view. He generalized his attitude. He had very many unpleasant reports. Unpleasant, as a rule Therefore, he looked at the problems from his own, Kutuzov's angle, I'd say, as major strategist, a commander, a statesman should look. The questions should be free from being linked with any other problems. Or else mankind will never reach the straight way of peaceful progress, but will always be facing — let'S say, now, we don't think a lot about problems of ecology, and people are right when they're protesting, because the global problems of ecology should be solved, or mankind could become extinct not because of nuclear war, but of contamination of the entire environment.

(TRANSLATES)

The renowned scientist, Kovalsky, who is now in charge of the department previously headed by the academician Vernadsky — I meet with him from time to time. That's what he says: "Young man, (you see, he's about ninety years old) you'd better watch out when dealing with world problems. You have to bring to their attention the necessity to agree upon many matters. Take (the issue of) fish, for instance. Today you can locate schools of fish from satellites. So, with the help of modern technology it would take no efforts to send modern fishing flotillas to suck these schools dry. If you don't reach an international agreement (on that), soon mankind will be without fish. I think this ...friend of mine is a clever Jew, a wise Jew. He knows where crayfish spend their wintertime. (Equal to: "Can answer where is the beef.")

...I WONDER WHETHER WHILE YOU WERE NEGOTIATING SALT II, AND THE SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA WAS GRANTED, WHETHER YOU WERE AFRAID THAT IT MIGHT AFFECT THE NEGOTIATIONS?

(TRANSLATES)

I simply did not deal with Ethiopia, therefore I did not feel any apprehension. Afterward, though, I got to know that even Kissinger resorted to the position of linkages. That was what ruined the whole business.

CUT.

Rabbits. It's like taking rabbits out of a hat...

As for the rabbits, I simply repeated Dean Acheson's joke. When he negotiated with (then, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs) Molotov...he asked Molotov about rabbits...

One must joke, otherwise you die...or else, it's very difficult to work.

...IN 1978, DURING SALT II THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BRZEZINSKI MADE COMMENTS THAT THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA MIGHT AFFECT SALT. WAS THERE ANY REACTION IN THE SOVIET DELEGATION. DID YOU RECEIVE ANY REACTION FROM MOSCOW? WHAT WAS THE SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMERICAN NOTION ABOUT THAT?

(TRANSLATES)

You know as we used to say, a dog is barking on the moon, while the moon is not even aware of it. Brzezinski crossed political skies like some meteor and disappeared forever. Only a few people can remember his name today. Therefore, to refer to his statements and, even more, to respond to them is like saying "Bless you" to everyone's sneeze in the world.

(TRANSLATES)

I MEANT AN EMOTIONAL RESPONSE. HE TOLD ME HOW HE FELT WHEN SALT II WAS SIGNED, AND THEN CAN HE THINK HOW HE FELT WHEN SALT II WAS NOT RATIFIED? BUT MAKE IT SEPARATE, OK?

(TRANSLATES)

The SALT II agreement was not ratified. We began procedures for ratification of this agreement, but when we became aware that the Americans didn't intend to ratify it, we suspended the procedures. The SALT II agreements, though, were observed by both sides, which was a sign of the righteousness and importance of the main points of this agreement. What were my emotions when this agreement was not ratified? I will give you one answer that will cover all sorts of questions like that. In two years it will be half a century of my diplomatic activity, and I have always been in charge of so-called sharp-edged issues. I was never entrusted with insignificant missions. I've always been "blessed" by my destiny to struggle in the most difficult directions, the most complicated ones. So, I can approach these issues from the general angle of my half-a-century experience in this field. Thus, (these issues) will show their actual will show their actual configurations, will reflect their actual dimensions — when viewed from this; angle. There were many things (in my professional life) that were even worse than that which I had to overcome, and, despite everything, as you see, business goes on. The earth is still spinning, after all...

I HAVE TWO MORE QUESTIONS TO HOW MUCH THE NEGOTIATION OF SALT II WAS (MORE) AFFECTED BY THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA?

(TRANSLATES)

I've never been to China and only recently visited Japan, therefore I can comment with respect to Japan; as for China, I really can say nothing because it was never within my realm of responsibility. I was never involved in this direction.

(TRANSLATES)

BUT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, TO WHAT EXTENT WERE THE NEGOTIATIONS AFFECTED BY THE AMERICAN DEALINGS WITH CHINA?

(TRANSLATES)

I cannot answer this question.

ANOTHER QUESTION RELATES TO YOUR PRESENCE IN POTSDAM...

(TRANSLATES)

THE QUESTION IS: WHAT DID STALIN UNDERSTAND FROM TRUMAN STATING "WE'VE GOT A WEAPON OF UNUSUAL DESTRUCTIVE POWER." HOW DID HE REACT TO IT AFTER THE MEETING?

(TRANSLATES)

He understood that this statement contained a threat, but he didn't make his understanding obvious, nor did he react. Thus leaving Truman with the impression that Stalin either didn't hear him, or didn't comprehend what he was talking about. Stalin clearly got it all right, the meaning of that remark, and within his inner circle of the Soviet delegation he qualified it as an attempt to have leverage over the Soviet delegation. Well, as a direct result of it, there was a speeding up of the work on atomic energy and this speeding up was helped by the fact that a chain reaction was already achieved by us, first received by the Soviet scientist, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov, if I'm not mistaken, in 1939. Therefore, quoting Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, we were on an intimate basis with this (scientific problem). We've never forced it ahead, but we were familiar with it as well as with the space problems, which we are also familiar with. We are not... In any case, an underestimation of our scientific or technological, or military abilities would be wrong; the Soviet Union occupies the highest strata of modern scientific knowledge.

(TRANSLATES)

WHAT WERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH HE HEARD ABOUT THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN HIROSHIMA AND HOW HE AND WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT IT IN POLITICAL TERMS BUT ALSO EMOTIONAL TERMS?

(TRANSLATES)

At that time I was a political adviser to Marshal Zhukov, and I think that at that moment I may have been present in his study. I don't recall what we were occupied with. Of course, I'm a man with some political understanding, and well it's even hard to explain to you, that it was quite clearly comprehensible to both Zhukov and myself as to what this explosion meant, but only time could show whether this move from the American side was either wise or unwise; and what time did show is that it was, to say the least, a very dangerous step the use of an atom for the purposes of war. Look what's going on, even today, in Japan to many people who lived through it is written in every newspaper, and I'm not going to repeat it. Anyway, however, I think I answered this question of yours.

You were quite persistent in your questions. I tried my best to answer them. I have one request. It could be (that) some error (occurs) with improvised questions, so I would ask you not to abuse it.