WHAT MOTIVATED YOU TO WRITE THE PLAY ABOUT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

First of all, this is my personal problem, because I worked that time as a political adviser and took part -- maybe not in the decisions -- but in... explanation, an explanation, described it after it happened, yes. And then the second reason is goes it is very important lesson for today. It seems to me it was maybe only one example after Second World War when both sides, I mean United States and Soviet Union, was really in a case with atomic crisis. This is very important for our time because the danger of catastrophe growing during this time. And then you know, I like John Kennedy, his activity especially on the end of this crisis and after this when he and our leadership decided to go to limit the... test of atomic bombs.

TELL ME A LITTLE BIT OF WHAT WAS, OR WHAT IS, THE SOVIET PUBLIC'S RESPONSE TO THE PLAY? WHAT DO THEY FIND INTERESTING? WHAT DO THEY FIND SURPRISING?

You know it is very strange story for me, that, Soviet public opinion, usual people, have so big interest to this political story. I am surprised, because it is not a usual drama, it is a political drama. Maybe they are interested to first of all, in the question of new thinking about certain American relations and about our mutual future. I mean some agreements, some compromise between both sides, to go back for arms race. And then the second, maybe they have some interest to John Kennedy. There is a myth, heroic myth about this president, especially after his death, tragic death.

HOW MUCH DO THE VIEWERS, OR THE THEATERGOERS, HERE KNOW ABOUT THE SOVIET PART OF THE STORY? YOUR STORY IS THE AMERICAN ASPECT, HOW MUCH DO THEY KNOW OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING HERE?

You mean public opinion, of theater, or...

...THE PEOPLE WHO GO TO THEATER.

You know that they, the public opinion had information during that time, especially about, Soviet position. But maybe they don't, did not have big information about American's position. And, I believe that our generation remember this story because we were shocked during that time. But the young people, maybe not know about this, not exactly, maybe they have no big information of this. Therefore, they have so big interest, not only to the play, but to the information and truth about Cuban missile crisis and the activities of both sides.

I'M ONLY ONE PERSON I'M SURE WHO BROUGHT YOU SOME RESPONSE FROM THE WESTERN PRESS. DO WESTERNERS UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO DO? ARE YOU WELL UNDERSTOOD BY THE REVIEWERS IN THE WESTERN PRESS?

I have no information about this, maybe I know about publications in some American newspapers and some magazines. But I am surprised too, that there is so big interest to this play. It is very good feeling for, my heart and the actors are very satisfied about it. I know that there are different views about the play. But as I understand, usually, the newspapers write about this with sympathy, information about our play—objective, usually, information—and this is a good fact in my opinion.

LET'S MOVE FROM THE PLAY TO THE PERIOD. YOU ARE THE FIRST PERSON THAT I HAVE MET THAT KNEW KHRUSHCHEV...WHO WAS I THINK IN EVERYBODY'S MIND A VERY INTERESTING -- NOT ONLY IMPORTANT, BUT ALSO INTERESTING PERSONALITY. WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT HIS INITIAL MEETING, HIS INITIAL FEELING TOWARDS KENNEDY? I THINK THERE WAS THE FIRST MEETING IN VIENNA. DO YOU HAVE ANY SENSE HOW HE FELT FOLLOWING THIS MEETING?

I was not, in Vienna, with our leadership. It is difficult for me to explain his feeling. But, I believe that Khrushchev liked John Kennedy. But maybe had an opinion that he's a very young leadership. Yes. It was before the Cuban crisis. But after Cuban crisis maybe he understand, that John Kennedy is not a bad partner for him, or for new decision in Soviet-American relations.

KHRUSHCHEV HAD, ON OCCASION, MADE SOME VERY STRONG STATEMENTS, IN TERMS OF HOW THEY WERE UNDERSTOOD BY AMERICAN PUBLIC. SOME OF IT I THINK WAS FULL OF HUMOR, SOME OF IT WAS FLAMBOYANT, EXTRAVAGANT. CAN YOU EXPLAIN THIS ASPECT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S PERSONALITY?

I don't work so close with Khrushchev. I was not his political adviser. Yes, and therefore I had no such feeling, but, in my opinion, he was a very open person. Who was, don't like "top secret" in this activities. Yes. And the same time, he was a person with maybe a humor style. He like it. He like it. Yes, but I can't explain exactly this, because I am not my own feeling...

I'M THINKING NOW ABOUT HIM TAKING HIS SHOE AND BANGING IT AT THE UNITED NATIONS... HOW WAS IT VIEWED HERE, WHAT DID IT MEAN TO...?

Maybe it was a joke. Not only a joke, but to show that we Russians are normal, usual people, we can joke about serious problems, and we are open... for conversation. Maybe he was to broke the stereotype about Russians, I don't know. I believe that he, that he, that he didn't understood the results of his joke.

I THINK MAYBE THERE IS NO PROFOUND POLITICAL THING ABOUT IT. IT HAS TO DO SOMETHING WITH HIS PERSONALITY RATHER THAN... IT IS NOT A POLITICAL ACTION, BUT IT IS AN INTERESTING ONE FOR A POLITICAL LEADER. IS IT EXPLAINED BY HIS PERSONALITY?

I mean it's only open political style. It's only this.

THERE ARE SEVERAL IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS THAT HAPPENED DURING THIS TIME... THERE WAS THE SECOND -- OR ONE OF THE OUTBURSTS OF THE CONTINUOUS CONFLICT ABOUT BERLIN. DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT WERE THE POLITICAL THINKING AT THE TIME ABOUT THESE ISSUES?

I don't remember the stories, it was so long time ago, Yes it is difficult for me to...

ANOTHER THING WHICH AGAIN WAS PART OF THE POLITICAL SPHERE WAS THE BREAK, IF YOU WANT, OR THE REARRANGEMENT IN THE SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONSHIP... CAN YOU RECOLLECT THAT, AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE LEADERSHIP TO THIS?

You know I published maybe four or five books about Soviet-Chinese relations during that time. Including the biography of Mao Zedong. Yes. And I tried to explain our views, our policy during that time, in my books. And, I don't want come back because now we want to... normalize our relations, to better our relations with China, as you know. But that time, as you know, Mao Zedong had his own position, his own opinion, about détente, and Soviet-American relations. He was against this. And this was maybe big problem for détente in the world in general. And therefore, we, had some polemics, as you know, with him. He was against our policy during Cuban crisis, and after Cuban crisis, as you know. And, maybe this was one of very important aspect, of this crisis, especially about decisions after this.

I WANT TO COME BACK TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, BUT I WANT A LITTLE BIT MORE UNDERSTANDING OF KHRUSHCHEV. I WANT IT, BECAUSE IT IS SO OFTEN ASKED. WHAT FOR EXAMPLE DO YOU THINK KHRUSHCHEV MEANT BY THE SENTENCE "WE WILL BURY YOU..."?

Bury you?... Ahh, bury you. You know, I don't believe, that he give big attention to his sentence. It was like a joke for him, as a... and he wanted to show the open style in the relations. Maybe without understanding the results of such sentences. But many Americans especially, I mean, the conservative and reactionary politicians and writers give a big attention to that sentence; that this is show our policy and our aims against capitalism, against United States, I don't believe in it. I don't believe in it. I am sure that our leadership don't want to say more than he has said at that time... a joke. Maybe it is... a not so good joke, but it was a joke.

LET'S COME BACK TO THE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS. HOW DOES ONE UNDERSTAND THE MOTIVATION OF KHRUSHCHEV? WHAT WAS THE GERM OF THE IDEA, OR WHAT WAS THE BASIS FOR THE GERM OF THE IDEA TO MOVE THE MISSILES TO CUBA?

You know, I can only explain this, because I don't know exactly, his personal feeling, his personal aims.

MAYBE TO START, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS STORY... KHRUSHCEV APPARENTLY HAD A VERY STRONG REACTION TO THE BAY OF PIGS. CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THAT?

You know, it was a terrible action, an aggressive action against Cuba, who was our, in alliance with Soviet Union. Maybe, John Kennedy made big mistake at that time. And I believe that after this, he had very bad feeling. Maybe I'm wrong, but I remember... Dulles who ask him to do this. Yes, go back, and lost his political position after this. And John Kennedy said that he had a feeling to go on from the White House. Yes, and Soviet leadership, and Soviet officials, had such feeling that this action, was against Cuba first of all, but not only against Cuba, but against Soviet Union too. And maybe this fact shocked our leadership because I remember we had a feeling that we'll go together with United States to decide some, to do some decision in arms control, and so on. Maybe they was shocked, our leaderships was shocked.

IN OUR PROGRAM WE VERY OFTEN WILL SHOW IN A PICTURE, KHRUSHCHEV MAKING A SPEECH... THE FIRST... DEMAND TO RECOGNIZE, MAYBE NOT THE PRESENT-TENSE PARITY, BUT ESSENTIALLY A PARITY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAME FROM KHRUSHCHEV AFTER THE MEETING WITH JACK KENNEDY IN VIENNA, DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT WAS THE LOGIC OF IT? THE FIRST TIME THAT A SOVIET INDICATION OF PARITY CAME, WAS IN A SPEECH BY KHRUSHCHEV AFTER VIENNA... DO YOU REMEMBER THE CONTEXT OF THIS SPEECH? IT WAS THE TELEVISION SPEECH BY KHRUSHCHEV AFTER VIENNA IN WHICH THERE WAS A STATEMENT ABOUT PARITY...?

I don't remember this speech exactly.

ANOTHER DRAMATIC EVENT DURING THIS TIME WAS THE CONFRONTATION IN BERLIN, AND BERLIN WALL... DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON THIS SUBJECT?

Well, we supported the German Democratic Republic, in its decision about the Wall, and especially about the Wall, not only especially about the Wall, but about the his, their position, especially to... secure their defense. To secure the defense of their country, and to secure their frontiers against any penetration into German Democratic Republic. We backed up this policy, and we shared decisions made then and still relevant today.

THE INITIAL QUESTION THAT I ASKED YOU WAS...WHAT WAS THE MOTIVATION OF KHRUSHCHEV IN MOVING MISSILES TO CUBA?

Yes, we discussed the first reason. It was to help Cuba, for their defense, especially after aggressive actions. Big, big actions, yes, big. But, in my opinion, the second reason, I mean the bases, American bases, around Soviet Union, especially Turkey, in Italy, in other countries. And there was... a reason question: Why Americans have such bases near our borders, and why we can't to do the same? What is the reason? This was big question from the point of view of parity and... from the point of view of security... equal security. Mutual, mutual security, equal security, I beg your pardon, equal security. Maybe this was a first time when we understand, that we not only need, but we must to have equal security.

WHAT CAN YOU SAY ABOUT THE RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS? DID... THERE IS ONE THEORY IN THE UNITED STATES THAT SUGGESTS THAT THE CRISIS WAS A GREAT SUCCESS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CONTROLLING CRISES, BUT THERE ARE OTHERS WHO SUGGEST THAT IT IS A GREAT FAILURE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENT... A POLITICAL FAILURE, BECAUSE NOBODY ACHIEVED WHAT HE WANTED. THE AMERICANS DIDN'T ACHIEVE WHAT THEY WANTED, AND THE SOVIET UNION DIDN'T ACHIEVE WHAT THEY WANTED, AND IT BECAME FROM POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW SOMETHING ELSE ALL TOGETHER. IT WASN'T WHAT WAS INTENDED. KHRUSHCHEV DIDN'T ACHIEVE WHAT WAS INTENDED, AND KENNEDY DIDN'T ACHIEVE WHAT WAS INTENDED. I WONDER IF YOU CAN TALK ABOUT THE RESULTS?

You know, in my opinion, it was a big success. First of all, form the point of view of understanding the question that we must control crisis situation. And do some compromise. Some steps to each other and find mutual understanding, for preventing a nuclear war between both our states and a world nuclear war. And I believe that it was wishing... I believe that it was very brave and wise a decision of both the Soviet leadership and John Kennedy. They had found ways out of the crisis, (ways) to prevent its escalation, and thus to prevent nuclear war. I think, this decision was historical, yet by another aspect, both sides had as never before, sensed the necessity to stop the race of nuclear and rocket arms that became not only senseless, but also dangerous to security. And the Cuban crisis had stimulated a whole number of decisions regarding the arms race limitations. I think had it not been for the tragic death of Kennedy, a considerable success in the field of détente would have been achieved in that period.

...TO THE EXTENT THAT ONE CAN TALK ABOUT THE LESSONS OF THE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS RELEVANT TO TODAY. WHAT IS IT ABOUT THE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS THAT WE CAN MAKE USEFUL TODAY?

Yes. Maybe this is very important lesson for us. Because after this, we had not such terrible lessons. We are happy about this, but we must come back to this lesson, and understand that is very danger for us to go to the same way in the arms race. In which we are doing now. First of all, I mean the Americans program of star war, and the other military program which stipulate our answer the same way the Soviet people and Soviet leadership, understand that this is a wrong way, not only the danger way, a wrong way. For both sides. The real way for security, is only decision in the field of arm control. And must stop military competition. We don't need it, nor the Soviet Union or the United States. And, we must come back. Maybe many people don't believe that it's possible to come back have, to the time when we had no nuclear weapons, but we believe in it. And nuclear Cuban crisis is the best example, what can happen in any time, can happen without maybe a will. There is a process of escalation, or... regional crisis, some occasional military crisis, we don't know. Therefore, I believe that we must, come back to this lesson from time to time. It is very important.

I NOTICE THAT THE DIFFERENT STYLES... I NOTICE THAT AMERICAN SCHOLARS AND AMERICAN POLITICAL OBSERVERS TEND TO TALK ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV, YOU TALK ABOUT LEADERSHIP. WHAT IS THE TENSION? WHAT IS IT WE DON'T KNOW, OR DON'T UNDERSTAND, ABOUT WHAT WERE THE RELATIONSHIP DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV, AS THE HEAD OF THE STATE AND HIS -- AND THE GROUP OF LEADERSHIP?

I think Khrushchev had been expressing the general point of view of all the Soviet leadership. And I know nothing about the existence of different opinions or some sort of struggle (of opinions) around this problem within circles of our leadership. The fact that we always refer to the leadership as a term and not on this or that particular leader is simply a matter of our political lingo. Especially when talking about events of the past. The thing is that we never consider politics as a personal matter, (we always think in terms of) the party policy, state policy, the policy of the Central Committee of the Party of the Soviet government. We usually do not personalize these matters. Therefore, as you have noticed, I prefer to use the terms of leadership and not to refer to some particular leader, though I don't exclude this possibility.

BUT NEVERTHELESS, AGAIN I AM ASKING... WESTERN SCHOLARS THINK THAT IN SOME SENSE, OR TRY TO... DETECT THE TENSION BETWEEN, WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AT THE TIME. AND ONE SUSPECTS THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENT OPINIONS ABOUT HANDLING IT IN DIFFERENT WAYS. CAN YOU TALK TO THIS?

I don't believe in it...

IF YOU CAN RECALL ANY TIME DURING THE MISSILES CRISIS YOUR OWN EMOTIONS, NOT AS AN ADVISER, NOT AS AN EXPERT, JUST AS A PERSON.

Yes. It's a very interesting question. Especially for me, because I remember, that late Saturday day, I was coming to my car. And find there my friend. He was a political adviser too. And he asked me where is my family? Is the family here in town, or in the country? And I asked him what was the reason for such question. And he gave me the advice to send my family to the country, because it can happen, so that will be some atomic blow. Yes. I did not believe in it, at that time, but I was surprised, I was shocked. And had a very bad feeling after this discussion with him. You know, it was the first, my feeling. The second, you know, I wasn't glued to this story, maybe on the end of it, and I prepared with my friends, I helped prepared the Khrushchev speech at The Supreme Soviet after the crisis. I did it like Sorenson in the White House... therefore maybe I like Sorenson more, than, other persons other... pals of... John Kennedy. And was, I was very happy that both sides our leadership and the Americans decide to stop this collision of crisis. I remember that I was very happy, after this crisis. Yes, when I prepared the explanation why we did it so. I understand that time, that -- not on the Soviet side, because here was against war, especially after Second World War when we lost 20 million people. That was terrible for all families; my family too, I lost my father, my brother. Remember it is impossible for us to think about but war. But not only we, but Americans, especially American elite, some of them, especially the President John Kennedy, don't want atomic war. I was very satisfied to understand it. Maybe if, our, my...

I ASK EVERYONE THAT WE TALK TO IN THIS COUNTRY TO TELL ME A BIT ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL AND THEIR FAMILY HISTORY DURING THE SECOND WAR... WHAT HAPPENED TO YOU AND TO YOUR FAMILY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR?

You know, my brother was in the war. He was born in the 1924. He was in the war from the beginning. The war, he was in Stalingrad, he was punished many times -- wounded, sorry, he was wounded there, many times during the war. And he took part in the war until to the end. And died from the wounds after the war. Yes. And my father, was an old man at that time, he was maybe 57, 58. He took part during the First World War, and the Civil War. Therefore, he was in the army, but not as soldier. He took part, maybe not on the front, on the front. Yes. But you know, he got terrible illness, tuberculosis, he died, after the war, after a short time. I was young at that time, and I had a dream to... be a pilot, yes. I had a dream to be a pilot, yes. And tried to do it, but the war would end. Therefore, I had a possibility to educate at the university. But I had strange feeling at that time. I must be there with my brother. Other people that... we were, we were terribly shocked about the fate of that generation. Our generation had such feeling that they saved our life, without... yes, without right. Yes, maybe. Because my brother dreamed about high education. Maybe it was something like John Kennedy feeling about Joe. You know? Therefore, this story touch my heart, you know?

YOU MENTIONED SOMETHING ELSE BEFORE ABOUT... I WONDER WHETHER KHRUSHCHEV EVER TALKED ABOUT IT? KHRUSHCHEV CAME FROM PEASANT STOCK, WE WAS A PEASANT WORKER, A WORKING MAN ESSENTIALLY... AND KENNEDY CAME FROM EXTREMELY RICH PRIVILEGED FAMILY. DID THESE BACKGROUNDS IN SOME WAYS CLASH? DID THEY ATTRACT? DO YOU HAVE A SENSE OF THE PERSONAL CHEMISTRY?

I believe that this was a problem, in their personal relations. Because Khrushchev was very proud that he was born in a poor family, and that his career is a result of his own activities. And he understands the feelings of simple people. John Kennedy had no such feeling. Maybe his relations with workers or peasants was like a political game. Maybe after Vienna talks there was some misunderstanding, between the two leaders. And this, maybe, is the reason. Because Kennedy maybe had such feelings that Khrushchev was not so intellectual political leader. Khrushchev, had an opinion that Kennedy is not strong enough, because his intellectual explanations are not so usual for our leader, who prefer a right and directly dialogue... Maybe it was a problem.

THERE WAS ANOTHER SPEECH THAT KHRUSHCHEV MADE ON JANUARY 14, 1960. I DON'T EXPECT THAT YOU REMEMBER THE SPEECH, BUT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE FUTURE OF WAR. HE WAS SAYING THAT THE NEXT WAR WAS NOT GOING TO BE A WAR OF CONVENTIONAL ARMIES, IT WAS GOING TO BE A ROCKET WAR, A NUCLEAR ROCKET WAR, AND I THINK IN SOME WAYS ADVOCATED WHAT LATER BECAME THE NOTION OF DETERRENCE... OR THE TERMINOLOGY OF DETERRENCE CAME TO BE USED. CAN YOU PUT IT IN CONTEXT? WHAT WAS THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET POLICY IN THIS AREA? I'M QUOTING FROM HOLLOWAY, DO YOU KNOW THE BOOK? ...HIS FEELING WAS WE DON'T NEED AS BIG A CONVENTIONAL STANDING ARMY...

I don't remember this speech exactly. But I remember that our leadership, our officials, understand at that time the role of atomic and rocket weapons... Yes, I understand the role of the weapon. Understand not only this but understand that such was impossible. Impossible for Soviet Union -- for both sides. This is the main reason for our leadership, for Khrushchev personally. Yes, because at that time we had big rocket and atomic potential. And observe that it is real, yes. The point, and the position about usual weapons, and usual armies, I remember some discussion during that time, between Soviet specialists. But the conclusion was that we need not only rocket and atomic weapons, but we need an army, because, the other side had an army, and more modernized the usual weapons... yes, conventional. This is the reason for us.

DO YOU WANT TO SAY IT IN RUSSIAN? THE SAME IDEA. THAT KHRUSHCHEV, IN THIS PARTICULAR SPEECH SAYING THAT IN THIS PERIOD, POTENTIALLY, THE NEXT WAR IS GOING TO BE A ROCKET AND NUCLEAR WAR, AND MAYBE THE ROLE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMY SHOULD BE THE DE-EMPHASIZED... TRY TO RESPOND TO THE SAME NOTION IN RUSSIAN.

Well... I don't remember this particular speech you are asking me about. Though, as far as I recall, our leaders had achieved at that very period some new conclusions regarding the role of nuclear missile armaments. At that time, we possessed already, a big nuclear missile potential. We had gotten an opportunity to really evaluate this new factor either in our, in the Soviet-American relations, or, if it happened against out will, in the case of war. I recall that there was really a polemic among our experts regarding the correlation between nuclear and conventional arms, regarding the role of the army in new circumstances. But, as far as I recall, our leadership... kept following the principle, according to which we should not forget our conventional arms and our army needs, while modernizing, and we had been forced to do this because of the U.S. initiative in the arms race, our nuclear forces. Exactly as NATO countries were continuously occupied with their arms potential development, as well as reinforcement of their armies.

...THE PERSONAL ATTITUDE OF KHRUSHCHEV TOWARD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, NOT TOWARD THE LEADERSHIP OR NOT TOWARD SPECIFIC POLICY, BUT RATHER SOMETHING MUCH MORE INTUITIVE AND SOMETHING MUCH MORE -- LESS DIRECTED TOWARD THE POLICY AT HAND, BUT AN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NATION, IF YOU CAN RECALL THIS.

It is natural for Soviet policy to call to the population, to the nation because we believe that the international policy is not only the thing for political elite, but the thing for whole people, yes. And maybe Khrushchev didn't continue this tradition. But at the same time, he understand that he need to better our relations with the political leadership of the United States. He met John Kennedy, in Vienna, he was going to the United States, and had summits with John Kennedy, and his fellows. And therefore we see that it was not only the policy that was directed to the people, to the nation, but also, which includes decisions, first of all, with American political leadership.

NEVERTHELESS, WHAT WAS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PEOPLE, THE NATION, THE AMERICAN STREET, IF YOU WANT... WHAT WAS KHRUSHCHEV'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, TOWARD THE PLAIN PEOPLE OF THE STREET?

You know, I believe, that Khrushchev liked Americans, especially, simple Americans people. That is usual feeling for Soviet people, till today, till today. We like Americans, in spite of the fact that from time to time, the American government directed against us, many, not so pleasant actions. And Khrushchev's feeling was the same. You know, because we believe in American talent, especially in technical, technological, scientific fields; we believe in a American activities; and we like American open style of conversation, a simple style, like it. Maybe our leadership had the same opinion. He contact with many Americans, as you know.

DO YOU KNOW WHAT KHRUSHCHEV'S OR THE LEADERSHIP OPINION WAS AT THE TIME, OF THE PEOPLE THAT KENNEDY BROUGHT TO THE WHITE HOUSE... ESSENTIALLY ABOUT MCNAMARA... WAS THERE AN ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS GROUP, AND ESPECIALLY TOWARD MCNAMARA, AND IF SO WHAT WAS IT?

Yes, I can't answer your question exactly, but I can explain my own feeling. Yes. Maybe a typical feeling for political advisers, at that time. Yes, I like two things. First of all, that John Kennedy bring to the White House, young people. Second, intellectual people. You know that there where different people around then. I tried to explain this in my play. A struggle, especially in crisis situation, between Taylor and Sorenson, between McNamara and Stevenson. But we like, the fellows who were, good educated and tried to do something new in internal... and international policy. And give, maybe, best chance before, for Soviet-American relations.

LAST QUESTION, THE DIFFERENCE IN STYLE TOWARD AMERICAN AND AMERICAN POLICY... IN GENERAL UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF BREZHNEV... WHAT HAPPENED WHEN THE CHANGE OCCURRED IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP? THE CHANGES OF STYLE? DIFFERENCES OF STYLE? (WHAT WERE) THE CHANGES IN SOVIET STYLE OF LEADERSHIP WHEN BREZHNEV BECAME THE FIRST SECRETARY? WELL, IF THE STYLE CHANGED... PRICIPALLY TOWARD AMERICAN POLICY...

It is not so simple to answer such question, because the main...

WE COME TO YOU ONLY WITH THE HARD QUESTIONS. THE EASY ONES WE GIVE OTHERS.

Yes, the main direction of our policy was the same. Because we had the same aim to better Soviet-American relations, to prevent continuing of arms race, to find some possibilities for détente, yes. There were no so big changes, yes. About the style. You say, you believe that the personal style of Brezhnev was not the same as Khrushchev's style. I would say, Brezhnev was much more reserved and cautious a person. Especially when appearing in the international arena. Khrushchev had let himself go too far. Sometimes with success, sometimes with less success. Brezhnev had learned a certain lesson, and, as a personality he resorted to being more prudent, more reserved. More diplomatic in relations. I don't think it had any de-significant effect on the Soviet-American relations. It was really a matter of personal traits, rather than an indication of some changes in policy.

I THINK WE COVERED THE GROUND. IS THERE SOMETHING IMPORTANT THAT YOU THINK WE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THIS PERIOD, THAT WE DIDN'T TOUCH ON OR DEAL WITH?

No, maybe it is more than enough...

IS THERE SOMETHING YOU FEEL NEEDS TO BE... ABOUT THIS PERIOD... WHAT DO YOU THINK AMERICANS DON'T UNDERSTAND?

You know, in Russian I want to speak. I'm concerned about one particular problem. That is, that some gap occurs between periods of time, the '60s and '80s in the United States of America. I have an impression that Americans had not learned a lot from lessons of their past, I know how serious for the American public opinion, and even for the American elite were the lessons of the Vietnam War. Though nowadays, many of them are losing the sharp sensitivity that they had during the war. It had a shocking effect on the American public opinion. Nonetheless, Vietnam was much bigger a lesson for America than the Caribbean crisis, and some other aggravations of Soviet-American relations. It worries me very much. I see that Ronald Reagan's policy is trying to estrange these lessons (from their mainstream of policymaking). Even when recalling John Kennedy, Ronald Reagan sees him not as the wisely compromising Kennedy, but rather as the Kennedy who came to the White House with a dream to strengthen America and her defense. I think the Soviet people and the Soviet leaders are far more sensitive toward the lessons of the past than Americans, the American leaders. We learned a lot from World War II. The events of the Cuban crisis were very serious lessons to us. I would say, Europeans at all have more sense of history as a process than Americans, so I don't know, I repeat, it worries me a lot. I'm afraid, the Americans are still making the same mistakes which they have been making in the past. Which is quite injudicious to repeat. I mean, especially Star Wars program. Those colossal and, from my point of view, absolutely nonsensical efforts undertaken by the White House in the military area. I see in that the threat that, perhaps, is still growing. I have been to Geneva as an expert during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit. And, for the moment, it seemed to me that Reagan was in the process of the same evolution that had happened to John Kennedy, to Richard Nixon and even to Carter. But now I look at it with less optimism than before. That's probably, what I'd like to add to our dialogue, a speech.