Could you start Mike, by telling us what your initial brief was from Washington before you were assigned in to Phnom Penh on your arrival in...

Well before I went to Phnom Penh I was told that I should go there and re-establish relations with Prince Sihanouk improving our relations with him, gradually keeping that famous low profile, as it was called in those days, with a small staff and gradually try to re-build his confidence in the United States.

My second job, though, once I got better acquainted with him when his government, was to try to convince him of the dangers of the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia by supplying him with intelligence information.

And during that time did they develop a sort of a trusting relationship, were they accepting the information you were passing on to them about the incursions...

Can you hold it for a second?

Could we just continue with you telling me about the sort of intelligence you were giving him and the way they reacted to it and why they didn’t um make any public protest.

Well when I first got there I didn’t give any intelligence information at all, but then when I had been there for a few months I started giving briefings and passing pieces of information which I always believed added to their own information, but did not necessarily increase it that much. I think that actually the Cambodian government knew as much or more than I did about what was going on along the borders.

Uh they did protest to me once I got there, very frequently, about any incursions by US aircraft and anybody else into the country. Ah it was assumed by many people, and I think probably up to a point correct, that they were large pro forma protests, uh through which they tried to keep a balance in their attitudes between the United States, China, Soviet Union, Vietnam and other countries.

What about the bombing – could you explain about how you f— what you knew about the bombing, and could you say, “What I knew about the bombing...” in your response?

I didn’t know anything about the bombing when I went to Cambodia, in fact I didn’t know anything about it until after it broke in the newspapers. For some reason I was never briefed on what was going on.

I was aware of bombing, but not necessarily in Cambodia, because in my house on the banks of the Bassac River, at night I not only could hear the bombing but the whole house shook from the load of the bombs when they were dropped, I assumed, in Vietnam. But I suppose eventually, I mean, most of them were being dropped in Cambodia.

Why do you think at the time Prince Sihanouk never publicly protested about the secret bombing?

Well, I think it’s been assumed, and I think probably correctly, that he knew about it.

Could you say, Prince Sihanouk.

I’m sorry. Well, I believe that Prince Sihanouk knew about it...

Sorry, it—the bombings.

Uh, I’m sorry. Apropos of the bombing, I think that Prince Sihanouk knew perfectly well it was going on and that some of it was going on in Cambodia.

But again, I think that he failed, or deliberately didn’t protest the things publicly because, as he said himself once, as long as they fell in areas which were largely uninhabited and were aimed at Vietnamese he was perfectly willing to let them go.

Turning now to the March period, building up to the protest against the Vietnamese presence, uhm, could you give me your assessment of Sihanouk in what he should have done, what wasn’t done, by Sihanouk in the whole crisis?

Well form the time I arrived in Cambodia until the crisis started in March, ah Sihanouk had been playing his usual political game which was taking more and more power under himself and gradually cutting his government out of uh the action.

He did this at regular intervals and in the past had always been a build-up to the point where ah things got very difficult, and then he would back off and there would be an arrangement and a re-division sort of powers, he’d give a little bit more to the Prime Minister, et cetera.

And this was happening again. But Sihanouk had not had a vacation or been on leave for a long time so he finally got to the point where he went off to France believing that things were going to be stable in Cambodia. He was wrong in that estimate and then while he was gone, of course, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak led the overthrow of his government.

Um ould you explain how things could have been different if Sihanouk had returned – your assessment, if you say, “I feel or whatever...”

I feel that when the crisis came and the government, the assembly voted to overthrow Sihanouk that if he returned immediately to Cambodia, he could have taken power again, or retained power that is, and there would have been just one of those arrangements.

I remember very well when the government uh announced, the Lon Nol government, announced that Sihanouk was going to be replaced and the assembly voted to support that, Prince Sihanouk himself made a very strident declaration in Paris in which he said he was returning home immediately, and that heads would roll, etc.

And that night, believing him, the government obviously gave instructions that the city should be prepared. Because when I was driving home from a late dinner, the troops were in the street painting white lines on the sidewalks, and down the middle of the streets and all the flags were being put up on the on the um telegraph poles which was the obvious sign that he was returning. The fact that he didn’t return and went down to Moscow and Peking, I think proved his undoing at that time.

Can you give me an idea about the atmosphere in Phnom Penh right after the change in government?

Well I think this often happens in that kind of a case. There was considerable euphoria. I must say that myself, who was relatively new there, was surprised, but even more surprised were the old timers like the French, who had been there many years, who had expected a strong reaction by the peasantry in his favor. Contrary to that they accepted the new government with considerable enthusiasm.

What was the atmosphere in Phnom Penh itself, about, talk about recruiting and the people joining up?

Well after the coup, and of course Lon Nol’s government gave the Vietnamese forty-eight hours to get out, as I remember, there was wild enthusiasm in Phnom Penh itself, and there was no need to recruit anybody. All of the children from the schools turned out, en—enlisted, got weapons and off to the front and that kind of thing. It was real, really, real enthusiasm.

And what was your assessment um in the period of the excesses against the Vietnamese community, and before the invasion incursion. What was your personal assessment and what did you think America should be doing in that situation?

Well, following the coup and before the incursion, as you say...

Sorry, you can’t say, “You say”.

Oh, I'm sorry, yes, you're not, you’re not speaking! Heheh.

Before the incursion and after the coup, I actually observed from a distance what was going on. I was called in by the government and asked for help. There also took place a number of incidents like atrocities against the Vietnamese, bodies floating down the Mekong River which caused an international uproar.

In accordance with instructions I went and spoke to the government about this and said this would not be at all helpful and we didn’t approve of this kind of drastic action. However, I did feel that at the time the Cambodian actions...

Cut.

I'm sorry.

That's all right...and what your instructions were and what you thought.

Sound rolling.

After the coup took place in Cambodia and before the incursion, there were a number of incidents that occurred, particularly vis-à-vis Vietnamese, when bodies floated down the river and all that kind of thing. And in accordance with my instructions at that time, I pointed out to the government that this wasn’t very well viewed in Washington, very much in line with today’s uh attitude towards human rights. In other words, one didn’t do that, it was unnecessary.

However, I did feel that the reaction of the press, particularly, was unfair perhaps to the Cambodians. Um as I’ve tried to argue with some of my press friends, one had to look at the reason for these atrocities, behind the atrocities, to understand the Cambodian reaction.

There’s been a racial division and racial dislike between the two races for I don’t know how many – hundreds of years, if not thousands – and after all the Cambodian story begins with the use of their country by Vietnamese. And this is one thing that when Cambodia was criticized for these atrocities, it was never mentioned, there was no perspective ever given.

It’s always very easy to criticize people for atrocities, which I did crit— for which I did criticize them, but I always tried to put it in a perspective that there was a reason behind it which didn’t necessarily excuse it, but could explain it up to a point.

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Could you tell me how you first heard of the incursion invasion and what you felt at the time etc., etc.

Well, I first heard of the incursion into Cambodia by US troops on the radio and the president’s speech being broadcast at that time. The reason for this was that the Embassy did not have its own communications and therefore we depended on the local telegraph in the post, which closed from midnight to six in the morning.

The message had come in and at the time of the broadcast we were in the process of deciphering it. Therefore I heard about it at that time and as soon as it was deciphered I of course took the message to uh General Lon Nol.

What happened when you went to see Lon Nol at that time?

It was rather amusing in a way because as I arrived there was a television crew standing outside waiting to see General Lon Nol for an interview.

And of course they were puzzled to see me and I was rushed in, while they had to wait, and then I came out again, and they asked me of course what I had discussed and I said that it was really up to General Lon Nol to tell them. Because they hadn’t heard about it either at that time. General Lon Nol himself took it quite calmly although obviously he was surprised, also.

Did he make any comments about what he thought this meant for the future of his country, or the fighting between the two countries or...?

No. I think he was just too surprised, sort of stunned about the whole thing and to be informed ex post facto, if you will, uh obviously it’s a rough thing.

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Sounds rolling. Mark it.

I’ll ask you to go over again on your meeting with General Lon Nol. Just what happened, you, if you’ll explain.

After receiving and decoding the message informing us of the incursion and with instructions to deliver it immediately to General Lon Nol, I went to his house where he was staying at that time and delivered it to him. On the way in I was sort of amused to see that there was a television crew waiting to interview him, but not about that since they hadn’t heard of it either.

And then General Lon Nol himself took the message fairly calmly, although obviously he was surprised and then um when I left the television crew asked me what I’d seen him about, but I said, and I said that I thought it would be more appropriate to come from him.

What was the uh, what were the events around General Haig’s visit. If you would go into that a minute, anecdotally as you can.

One of the results of the fighting that broke out after the coup were the frequent requests for assistance from the Lon Nol government to me to forward to Washington. At times those requests were frankly quite incredible in size. There was a helicopter...do you want to stop it?

I'm sorry.

I’m sorry

If you could just explain your encounter, or the business about the request before the regular story.

After the coup and before the incursion, or after the incursion, also, there were many requests made to me to be forwarded to Washington by General Lon Nol, Prince Sirik Matak, for aid from the United States, mainly aid in weapons and that kind of thing. Not troops, or American presence.

These I used to forward regularly, however, sometimes they were really exaggerated and on one of these occasions, I'd been given what we used to term as a shopping list, which was really quite incredible. So I told General Marshall, uh, Lon Nol as he was then, that this was really out of line and that he should not count on American aid to any great extent. We would not give him tanks and gets and that kind of thing.

We would give him what we thought would be necessary and he could use to defend himself, and I suggested in my own that perhaps he and his troops should think of guerrilla warfare, such as the Vietnamese had used against us in Vietnam rather than try pitch battles on battalion or regimental size.

He seemed to accept this perfectly well, but when I reported this to Washington and explained to them what I had said to him, within a few days uh General Haig arrived as a personal emissary of President Nixon and uh saw General Lon Nol. But without uh my being present.

He told me that I was forbidden to go with him which frankly surprised me and rather annoyed me because after all I was chargé and supposedly the president’s personal representative.

As a result of that interview of which I never was given a report or never told what happened, I have always suspected that General Haig gave certain assurances to General Lon Nol from the president which while not being specific perhaps nevertheless encouraged him in his never-failing belief that come the crunch, the US would send the Marines in.

Um what was the feeling of General Haig in his discussions with you about the whole situation. Did he ever say what the policy was or what President Nixon was looking for that you didn’t know about?

No. We didn’t really have that much discussion. He made it quite clear to me that the president was personally uh following every event and reading every cable from my embassy, and I assured General Haig that I was fully in sympathy and support of the Nixon doctrine which we were applying at that time.

The only disagreement if I may, well not disagreement, the only conversation that I had with General Haig, which I think sort of surprised him, was at one point he asked me what my feelings were about our assistance to Cambodia and I told him that I thought we should assist the Cambodians to help themselves.

But if they were unable to do it then we should drop them. I thought it was better to uh let them defeat themselves, if you want to put it that way, rather than have us do it. And at that point uh I think he misunderstood me and got quite indignant that I wasn’t supportive enough the Cambodians but I think we were able to straighten that out before he left.

What about the future developments up until your departure in December? Can you give me a personal feeling about how you saw the situation developing and were there any surprises in what happened from your earlier experience, or was it more, was it inevitable or predictable...

Well from the time of the coup to my departure from Cambodia in December of 1970 the situation had its ups and downs. In the beginning you saw this wild enthusiasm on the part of the population which surprised us all, as I've said.

And then you had the troops going into the front and they were while not victories, they were surprisingly favorable battles or little skirmishes at the time, but then uh the government became more and more convinced that they wanted to build a bigger and bigger army and to fight the pitch battles. And this is when things started turning badly for them.

And they could not face uh reality. As far as the United States position was concerned, as long as we followed what I was always pushing, if you will, the Nixon doctrine, I think things were going quite well. We were under continuing pressure uh from Washington, from CINCPAC, to increase the American military presence, for training and delivery purposes, not for fighting. I resisted this in the belief that every time we’d get bigger we’d get more involved.

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If you will just continue your story about military...go on.

Yes. As time went on there was more and more pressure from certain people in Washington and also from the Pacific Command in Hawaii which covered all the military activities in the Pacific for the US forces and military supplies to increase the American presence, American military presence, for supply and training purposes, not for combat in Phnom Penh.

I resisted this because I’ve always felt that the more staff you have the more involved you get. However, uh the longer I stayed in Cambodia, the more difficult it was to resist this pressure.

The first step, of course, was the set-up of our communications which was understandable but this involved a military unit which was flown in and then that was followed by a unit of State Department communicators and before I left we had what was called "proper scatter communications," which involved another unit in military, so that out of this staff of less than 200 people over half were military communicators to begin with.

And then we had the military equipment delivery team and this kept on growing and this encouraged the Cambodians I think also, because they had more contacts and they had more ways of getting their requests through.

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