Yes. We would much
have preferred the dramatic reductions, 50 percent basically across the board to be consummated
in SALT II. But that became impossible. So then we had to negotiate on a step-by-step reduction.
And as you know this involved about a 10 percent reduction in all the Soviet nuclear launchers,
and it also involved a prohibition against more than one new weapons system on both sides,
limitations on the back-fire bomber, definitions of what is a new missile, those kinds of
things. So I think ultimately in June of 1979 we came out with the SALT II treaty that was the
maximum that we could get at the negotiating table at that time. Now Brezhnev and I however, in
Vienna, prior to signing the SALT II agreement discussed quite definitively the factors that
might go into what we called SALT III, that is much more dramatic reductions. We also proposed
to the Soviets in Vienna, with the full support of the Joint Chiefs, a five percent annual
reduction in the SALT II limits, which over a period of five years, that is the life of SALT II,
would have resulted in much more dramatic reductions.