MR. PRESIDENT, YOU MET WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD TO DISCUSS OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL. AND YOUR INTEREST AT THAT TIME WAS IN REDUCING IT. DO YOU REMEMBER – CAN YOU RECALL THE DISCUSSIONS, WHAT THEY SAID, WHAT YOU SAID TO THEM, AND WHAT THEY ANSWERED?

Well I... when I was elected and before I was inaugurated I realized that on Inauguration Day I would be the President and I would be responsible for the management of all our military forces including our nuclear arsenals. So I tried to become thoroughly familiar with my duties and with the factors involved at the time that I was meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other experts before Inauguration Day. We discussed the relative strength of the of the Soviet and Chinese and French, and British and American nuclear arsenals. How a President's duties related to a possible attack. What the experience had been recently concerning nuclear arms control. And of course I already knew the history of previous negotiations by President Kennedy and Johnson and Ford and Nixon who came before me. So by the time I was inaugurated I was as thoroughly familiar with these factors as possible. I had made major campaign commitments that I would revive the nuclear arms control process, both in negotiating with the Soviet Union and also implementing a strong non-proliferation restraint on our own nation and perhaps on others through legislative means.

YOUR INTEREST WAS IN REDUCING?

Yes. It seemed to me inconceivable that we would go to a zero nuclear arsenal on either side as a commitment because of the problem with verification. And I discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also with experts like Paul Nitze the next to the ultimate goal, or penultimate goal, we discussed quite thoroughly the advantages of a... of a relatively small number of nuclear launchers, maybe 100 or 200 with single warhead...heads on each of the launchers located in practically invulnerable locations on the south side of steep mountain ranges and deep silos or in areas of the ocean that were safe havens where the other nation, the Soviets would agree not to try to penetrate. This would have left us with a very stable nuclear arsenal on both sides, which would have forbidden or foregone the prospect of a preemptive first strike, but left the retaliatory capabilities intact. And that was a goal that I had in my mind throughout my Presidency.

BUT WHAT WAS THE JOINT CHIEFS' REACTION TO THIS? WERE THEY SURPRISED? WERE THEY WORRIED?

They were intrigued with the idea. And volunteered some comments, not unfavorable about this as an ultimate goal. And within two months of the time I was inaugurated, we presented to the Soviet Union two alternatives: one, a dramatic reduction in the arsenals on both sides as one alternative; and the other alternative was a progressive reduction which came naturally from the Vladivostok Agreement that had been worked out tentatively by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev.

BEFORE WE GET INTO THAT, IN FEBRUARY YOU HAD A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH SCOOP JACKSON, FEBRUARY '77, AND DISCUSSED OUR STRATEGIC ARMS POSTURE. DID YOU SHARE SOME OF HIS CONCERNS?

Yes, as a matter of fact I was familiar with Scoop Jackson's condemnation of the SALT I treaty, claiming that it was grossly unbalanced against our nation's interest. And Scoop had been a very close associate of mine. I nominated him when he ran for President. And he delivered his delegates to me when I was finally nominated in 1976. And I respected his judgement. And so Scoop and I not only had a long personal conversation but I asked him to put down his views in what turned out to be a fairly extensive memorandum, 20 or 30 pages highly confidential, which I kept in my personal safe. And on occasion, when I was preparing a negotiating position I would refer to Scoop Jackson's recommendations and I derived a great benefit from them.

WHAT WAS THE – WERE YOU BOTH CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES?

Yes, I think Scoop was particularly concerned that in SALT I we had agreed to permit the Soviets to have unilaterally an arsenal of extremely heavy missiles. And of course we worked on that particular problem with the Soviet Union. As you know, following Vladivostok they were never able to resolve the question of air-launch cruise missiles or cruise missiles in general and some of the Soviet systems like the backfire bomber and these were the questions that I inherited as a President. In all the negotiations I was never able completely to satisfy the demands of Scoop Jackson and others. But we never put forward a proposal in Europe at the negotiating table or in my own personal negotiations with Foreign Minister Gromyko or President Brezhnev or Ambassador Dobrynin of the Soviets without full support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor. So we had a harmonious proposal each time we went to the negotiating table.

THE MARCH PROPOSAL WAS REJECTED BY THE SOVIETS.

Yes.

AND THEN GROMYKO CAME TO WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER OF '77, AND SALT GOT BACK ON TRACK. WHAT...WHY? DID YOU HAVE TO GIVE UP AT THAT POINT?

No. There was no giving up. The main reason that the Soviets rejected both proposals in March which were put to them as alternatives was – the altercation about human rights. I was insisting that the Soviets honor their commitment on human rights. And giving them long lists of people who were known as "refuseniks" that should be permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union. And President Brezhnev, I think, and the Soviet leaders interpreted this as a direct political attack on their nation. And when the Soviets rejected Secretary Vance's proposals on nuclear arms control in March in Moscow, the main points that Gromyko made in an unprecedented press conference was about human rights. So I think they had to go through a phase of understanding that our human rights concerns were legitimate, that we weren't singling out the Soviet Union for condemnation on a worldwide scale. And following that they were very, I think, cooperative, both on human rights issues and also on nuclear arms control negotiations.

WHEN THINGS GOT BACK ON TRACK IN THE FALL OF '77 DIDN'T IT MEAN THAT YOU HAD TO GIVE UP WHAT WAS SO IMPORTANT TO YOU ABOUT MAJOR REDUCTIONS? GETTING RID OF THOSE HEAVY SS-18S?

Yes. We would much have preferred the dramatic reductions, 50 percent basically across the board to be consummated in SALT II. But that became impossible. So then we had to negotiate on a step-by-step reduction. And as you know this involved about a 10 percent reduction in all the Soviet nuclear launchers, and it also involved a prohibition against more than one new weapons system on both sides, limitations on the back-fire bomber, definitions of what is a new missile, those kinds of things. So I think ultimately in June of 1979 we came out with the SALT II treaty that was the maximum that we could get at the negotiating table at that time. Now Brezhnev and I however, in Vienna, prior to signing the SALT II agreement discussed quite definitively the factors that might go into what we called SALT III, that is much more dramatic reductions. We also proposed to the Soviets in Vienna, with the full support of the Joint Chiefs, a five percent annual reduction in the SALT II limits, which over a period of five years, that is the life of SALT II, would have resulted in much more dramatic reductions.

I'LL COME BACK TO VIENNA, BUT LET'S TALK FOR A MINUTE ABOUT SOME OF THE EVENTS IN '78. THERE WAS CONCERN ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS WHEN THEY WERE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. DO YOU RECALL THE POSITIONS OF VANCE AND BRZEZINSKI ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS IN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA PARTICULARLY WHETHER WE SHOULD PROJECT POWER...?

Yes, that was an altercation that I didn't particularly deplore because it involved conflicting and contrary opinions with me being the final arbiter. Concerning linkage of confrontations, or competition with the Soviets on a worldwide basis on the one hand and a commitment to nuclear arms control on the other. My decision was that although there was indeed some political linkage that we should proceed with negotiations towards SALT II in spite of those relatively inevitable competitions with the Soviet Union in Angola and other places.

WAS BRZEZINSKI PUSHING FOR LINKAGE?

More than Vance, but they both had to comply with my final decision which was to minimize the factor of linkage and go ahead a rapidly as the Soviets would agree on nuclear arms control.

BUT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE WHOLE LINKAGE ISSUE, JUST IN TERMS OF WHAT YOU DO, HOW DO YOU HANDLE THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE THERE, HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THE FACT THAT THEY'RE THERE IRRESPECTIVE OF SALT? DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT THE DEBATE WAS? I GATHER BRZEZINSKI WANTED A PROJECTION OF AMERICAN POWER, OF CARRIER TASK FORCES.

Well, we were monitoring very carefully the Soviet presence in Ethiopia. And in the war between Somalia and Ethiopia. This was a matter of concern to us. And when I was negotiating with Gromyko on SALT II issues in the Cabinet Room at the White House we also brought up the question of Soviet military presence in Ethiopia. Gromyko falsely assured me that there was no Soviet military presence in Ethiopia. Of course through our own capabilities we knew that he was not telling the truth. He knew that I knew that he was not telling the truth. And we kept maximum political pressure on the Soviets to minimize their role in Ethiopia and to try to work out a peaceful resolution of the war in the Horn of Africa. But all during that time we never slacked off on our own efforts to conclude the SALT II treaty.

BUT IN TERMS OF THE DEBATE OVER WHETHER WE SHOULD HAVE A SHOW OF FORCE, BRZEZINSKI LOST. YOU DECIDED IN FAVOR OF VANCE?

Well, the ultimate decision was obviously mine. And what we did to handle this matter with restraint and without a military confrontation with the Soviet Union was the decision that I made.

ON THE NORMALIZATION OR RELATIONS WITH CHINA...

Yes.

DID YOU FEEL THAT THEY WERE MADE IN A MANNER THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE FELT WAS DELIBERATELY ANTI-SOVIET?

We assessed the likelihood that the Soviets would see this as a deliberate challenge to them. In other words, two of the so-called superpowers aligning ourselves against the third. That was not a fact. Because neither I, nor Deng Xiaoping, ever considered it to be advantageous to have this sort of division in international political affairs. And we made this clear to the Soviet Union. I notified Brezhnev as soon as I notified the American people that we had agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with China. Emphasized that this would contribute to peace and stability in the western Pacific, it was not a challenge to any other nation, that is the Soviet Union. And when I was in Vienna with Brezhnev, the Soviets brought this subject up on more than one occasion both at the negotiating table with a number of people present and when I had a private meeting with Brezhnev himself and just an interpreter present. And I again assured them, accurately that this was not designed to challenge the Soviet Union or to align ourselves with China against the Soviet people.

WHAT ABOUT THE TIMING OF DENG XIAOPING'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON? IT WAS RIGHT BEFORE A SUMMIT THAT YOU HOPED FOR?

Yes. We hoped to have a summit meeting with Brezhnev no later than early in 1979 because we had almost concluded the major agreements on SALT II. And I had to decide at the time we were approaching agreement with Deng Xiaoping on normalization whether to delay that decision to honor a possible summit meeting. My decision was to go ahead with the normalization announcement and with Deng Xiaoping's visit. When this announcement was made the Soviets decided not to meet with me early in 1979 and we later scheduled this meeting for June of 1979. So I think it worked out very well, so that our nation benefited not only from normal relations with China, but also with a carefully drafted and concluded SALT II treaty.

DID SECRETARY VANCE URGE YOU TO PUT OFF THE MEETING WITH DENG XIAOPING?

I don't recall specifically. I was never tempted seriously to put off the normalization agreement. We'd negotiated with the Chinese for more than a year quite avidly and never knew when the... when the Chinese would agree to our terms. And... and basically, quite early in December or maybe later in November Deng Xiaoping decided because of internal Chinese factors to go ahead and accept basically the proposals that we had put forward for a long time in Beijing. And as soon as he made this decision we decided to move expeditiously. I announced the decision in December 15th, 1978, and invited him to come to the United States to consummate the agreement personally. He sent word back that he would like to come as soon as possible and he came I think toward the end of January. But that was an episode that I decided was propitious at that time. And I think Secretary Vance was more inclined to relegate the China normalization to a lower priority than I did, and to assume that the time for negotiating the SALT II treaty ought to be preeminent. But I made the decision and I think it was the right decision.

TALK ABOUT THE MX FOR A MINUTE. WHEN DID YOU DECIDE THE MX WAS NECESSARY? DO YOU REMEMBER A PARTICULAR EVENT OR MEETING? I THINK THERE WAS ONE I HEARD ABOUT AT CAMP DAVID WHERE SECRETARY BROWN SAID THERE WERE REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TESTED NEWLY ACCURATE HEAVY MISSILES. WHEN IN YOUR MIND DID YOU DECIDE THIS WAS REALLY NECESSARY?

Well, I can't recall the date, but it was prior to the conclusion of the SALT II treaty and we were very careful in the negotiations to make allowance for the MX missile in the SALT II treaty. I looked upon the MX missile in multiple silos as being a great stabilizing factor. It meant that the Soviets would have to expend almost two dozen missile warheads in order to be sure to destroy one MX missile. And this would tend to prevent a preemptive strike and give us the same kind of retaliatory capabilities that we have with our nuclear submarines. So the MX missile was decided upon long before June 1979. It was well understood by the Soviets that this was a proviso that we made. And the basic question was that the factors that went into the design of the MX missile, how large to make it, what sort of flexible launching site would be advantageous, whether it ought to be on rail cars or in multiple silos. That sort of thing took so much time.

YOU HAD HOPED NOT TO ENTER NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHEN YOU TOOK OFFICE?

Yes, I think that would have been better for us if we could have had a drastic reduction, zero nuclear weapons and so forth. But of course we had to have agreement with the Soviet Union on what to do. And they preferred a very careful step-by-step reduction with specific limits both on the number of launches, the number of warheads, the number of airplanes, the number of air-launch cruise missiles and also the number of new weapons. And one new weapons system was the optimum that we could derive at the negotiating table.

DID YOU DECIDE TO DEPLOY IT FOR STRATEGIC REASONS OR POLITICAL REASONS TO GET THE JOINT CHIEFS ON BOARD?

A combination of the two. I think almost every decision we made in the SALT negotiation was had a culmination of strategic and political factors. And and they are not separable because the strategic matters were judged not exclusively but predominately by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And if I had made a preemptory decision, we will do this at the negotiating table over the firm opposition of the Joint Chiefs it became obvious to me that in their subsequent testimony to the Congress that it would be unlikely for a doubtful Congress to approve. So in every case in a negotiation I first concluded I would say a unanimous acceptance of the basic negotiating positions including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then, we'd negotiate it with the Soviet Union. And we kept key members of the Congress informed as well. And so I don't think you could separate strategic from political reasons. I wanted the treaty not only to be concluded but to stay effective over the five year period and perhaps longer.

JUST BEFORE YOU WENT TO VIENNA YOU APPROVED THE MX, AND IT WAS AT THAT TIME THAT SCOOP JACKSON IN TALKING TO THE COALITIONS FOR A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY CALLED THE SALT II TREATY YOU WERE ABOUT TO SIGN "APPEASEMENT." HE LIKENED YOUR GOING TO VIENNA TO NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN 30 YEARS EARLIER GOING TO MUNICH. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT?

Not positive. I think when Scoop Jackson insinuated that it was another sign that we had to make sure that a SALT II treaty would stand the scrutiny of objective experts who were strongly inclined towards nuclear arms agreements and some of those who think inherently that nuclear arms agreements acceptable to the Soviets are inherently not good for our country. And so I faced the potential opposition of Scoop Jackson with concern, but with equanimity. The MX missile was a very strong factor in the relative equality of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals. And as I said earlier I always consider the MX missile in a flexible basing mode to be highly stabilizing and not destabilizing as it would be in fixed silos.

IF IT HAD BEEN RAINING WHEN YOU GOT OFF THE PLANE IN VIENNA WOULD YOU HAVE CARRIED AN UMBRELLA?

Well, I never have equated myself with any sort of appeasement. My—

THE REASON I ASKED IS THAT SOMEONE HAS SAID THAT – YOU SAID SOMEWHERE THAT "I WOULD HAVE RATHER DROWNED THAN CARRY AN UMBRELLA."

I don't remember saying that, but I don't remember. I can't deny it. I don't remember it.

WOULD YOU SAY IT NOW?

Well, that's...that's not something that I would say. The fact is that the basic terms of the SALT II treaty although denounced by people... primarily for political reasons in 1979 the treaty stayed intact in its basic terms for at least seven years, and I think served its purpose well. And even though it was not ratified the concepts within that treaty have to provide a good basis for future agreements.

BREZHNEV SAID TO YOU WROTE IN YOUR BOOK, THAT HE PUT HIS ARM AROUND YOU AND DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT HE SAID?

He said the Lord... "God will not forgive us if we fail." Yes, which was something of a surprise to me coming from an atheist. And so at the next meeting at the negotiating table I repeated what he said. Gromyko mockingly threw up his hands and looked up at the heavens, and said, "Yes, God is looking down on us now to see how we do." Brezhnev was somewhat disconcerted but he didn't retract his statement. I thought it was an interesting statement. I don't know the origin or sincerity of it. But I felt the same way that God and the human race were looking to me and Brezhnev to conclude an agreement that would reduce at least the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

WAS THERE ANY DOUBT IN YOUR MIND THAT THE MX AS YOU PLANNED TO BASE IT WAS ALLOWED UNDER SALT II?

There was never any doubt in my mind that it was permitted under SALT II.

NITZE TESTIFIED THAT HE COULDN'T SUPPORT THE TREATY EVEN WITH MX ALLOWED UNDER SALT II.

Well, there's no doubt that the Soviets have accepted the plans for MX subsequent to the signing of the treaty. They'd never rejected the treaty when we went ahead with those plans. And they have gone forward with their one new system as well and they have as you know, missiles in a mobile mode. So there's no doubt in my mind now nor was there then that the MX as we proposed it was permitted under SALT II.

I GATHER THE PANAMA CANAL WAS A FACTOR FOR SOME REPUBLICAN SENATORS IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR SALT II. SENATOR BAKER, WHAT DID HE SAY TO YOU?

Privately Senator Baker was very strongly supportive of the SALT II treaty. And I needed all the Republican support I could get. But Senator Baker was concerned about the political consequences of being too supportive of my programs. And he said to me one day in the Oval Office, "Mr. President if I vote right one more time I'll never get reelected in Tennessee." But I didn't give up of course on having Senator Baker's vote. Once the SALT II treaty ratification came to the Senate as a body.

AFTER THE SOVIETS INVADED AFGHANISTAN, YOU TOLD FRANK REYNOLDS OF NBC THAT YOU HAD LEARNED MORE IN THE PREVIOUS TWO DAYS THAN YOU HAD IN THE PREVIOUS TWO AND A HALF YEARS. WHAT DID YOU LEARN? WAS IT SIMPLY JUST THE DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD INVADED AFGHANISTAN OR WAS IT A VIOLATION OF SOMETHING THAT YOU – A PLEDGE THAT YOU THOUGHT THEY HAD MADE NOT TO DO?

I thought it was a serious and unpredictable strategic mistake on the part of the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan. Since almost 25 years they had not done any such thing. They had used surrogates—the Vietnamese in Cambodia, the Cubans in Angola, and Ethiopians and so forth. And for them to make the invasion themselves was extremely damaging to the Soviet position in international political circles. In addition it all—made it almost impossible, certainly impossible at that time to ratify the SALT II treaty, and I think that subsequent events have shown that even the Soviet leaders themselves, Gorbachev at this time, recognized that this was a serious mistake on the part of the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan. I look upon it as a parallel to our experience in Vietnam.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE SAID THAT YOUR WARNING IN THE STATE OF THE UNION THAT WE WOULD HOLD THE PERSIAN GULF A VITAL INTEREST AND DEFEND IT WITH FORCE IF NECESSARY, YOU WROTE THAT SOME PEOPLE SAID THIS WAS AN IDLE THREAT. DID YOU THINK IT WAS?

No, it was not. In the first place there's no def — there's no doubt that had the Soviets consummated their control over Afghanistan, and then moved southerly into Pakistan or Iran, that this would have been a direct threat to the security of our country and to other nations and Europe, Japan, who rely on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region. And we would have responded accordingly. I made it clear in that statement that we would not confine our response just to that region, but that it would be a worldwide response. And it was a very carefully considered statement that I thought was necessary, and which we intended to carry out.

DO YOU REALIZE HOW CLOSE THE WORDING WAS THAT WE WOULDN'T LET – BE THWARTED BY THE – OUR ACTIONS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE CONFINED TO ANY SMALL INVADED AREA OR THE TACTICS OR TERRAIN OF THE SOVIET'S CHOOSING. DO YOU REALIZE HOW CLOSE THAT WAS TO JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND TALKING ABOUT MASSIVE RETALIATION? WAS THAT DELIBERATE?

It wasn't deliberate to copy what John Foster Dulles had said. But I think that had we threatened to actually send troops into that Persian Gulf region halfway around the world on the doorsteps of the Soviet Union it would have been a foolish commitment to make. So I wanted the Soviets to understand that we would not confine our own response, military or otherwise just to the region that they were invading, that it would be a worldwide response.

NEAR THE END OF YOUR TERM YOU APPROVED THE MX. YOU HAD HOPED AT THE BEGINNING NOT TO. YOU WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. YOUR VIEWS WERE GETTING MORE CLOSE TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER AND PAUL NITZE. DID YOU SENSE THE SHIFT IN YOUR THINKING IN HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS?

Well, there was no change in my goals, or my concept or my philosophy. You know, what we attained in SALT II was a maximum control of nuclear arsenals and the maximum reduction in nuclear arsenals that the Soviets would accept. And... and my own hopes for subsequent negotiations would have included much more dramatic reductions in overall arsenals, and also the inclusion of intermediate range missiles that were deployed in Europe and otherwise. So my goals did not change. Our SALT II treaty terms were shaped not by trying to accommodate American dissenting voices, but to accommodate the Soviets reluctance to move toward much more dramatic reductions.

CAN I ASK YOU ONE QUESTION ON NON-PROLIFERATION?

Yes, this will probably be the last question.

OK, YOU HAD CUT OFF AID TO PAKISTAN BECAUSE THEY WERE BUILDING A BOMB AND...BUT YOU REINSTATED IT AFTER THE SOVIETS INVADED AFGHANISTAN.

Yes.

WHY? WHAT WERE THE COMPETING VALUES? NON-PROLIFERATION WAS A VERY IMPORTANT VALUE TO YOU, BUT WAS NATIONAL SECURITY AS WE DEFINE IT AS THE TIME MORE IMPORTANT THAN NON-PROLIFERATION?

Well, you can't have non-proliferation or human rights as the only factor to be considered in dealing with a foreign nation, particularly one that's friendly to us as is and was Pakistan. We had assurances from Pakistan then that they were not contemplating the evolution of a of a nuclear weapon or of nuclear explosives. That assurance combined with the concern that I had for Pakistan's safety with the Soviets just across the border in Afghanistan those two factors combined together induced me to offer Pakistan what was considered by President Zia (Zia-ul-Haq) to be inadequate, but I think substantial assistance. And so the two factors were not incompatible. They were related. But I still would have been deeply concerned had I been convinced that Pakistan was planning to build nuclear explosives or nuclear weapons.

AND YOU CHANGED YOUR MIND ON INDIA, THE SALE OF URANIUM TO INDIA?

Well, there again we are not the only participants in non-proliferation. And I thought that our country had to set a leadership standard and do everything possible to reduce our own nuclear arsenals while we were demanding other nations do the same. And to keep India with some control, some monitoring over their nuclear reprocessing system was important to me. And I felt very close decision, reluctant decision that our supplying them limited nuclear fuel under controlled conditions was better than their acquiring available nuclear fuel from other sources without international controls.