I suppose the question is, why bring this all up now? It's forty years later. What difference does it make? Well, I believe it does make a great deal of difference. I think it makes a great deal of difference in a democratic society when a government demonstrates that it does not use power responsibly. I think it creates bad habits in government. In any case, I don't think there's ever any warrant for government lying to the American people. At least the basic theory under which this government was established was that the people could take the truth. But whether or not they could take it, they had the obligation to receive it. There's something else, and this has to do with how power's used. We live at a time when vast power is at the disposal of nations. If faulty decision making is involved we could touch off a series of hideous explosions. The same thing is true of the Russians. So I believe that it's precisely because the test of our time is not whether we can make power, but whether we can control power that it becomes necessary to face up to everything in our history. Even something 40 years ago that may have a bearing on our situation today.

WHAT IS THE LEGACY OF THE BOMB, THE DECISION, FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES TODAY?

The decision to drop the bomb had an effect, I believe, not just on events at the time. Not just on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but did have an effect on the course of the post-war world. The scientists who made the bomb implored the President not to use it because they felt that once the bomb was used, our ability to set up world controls would be jeopardized. They felt too that our use of the bomb would set... would almost start an atomic armaments race. And so that decision to drop the bomb has significance, it seems to me, on almost everything that has happened since. But more than anything else it does have a bearing on the responsible use of power. Lord Acton said that power tends to corrupt. Absolute power corrupts absolutely. The big test in a democratic society is whether power placed in the hands -- great power placed in the hands of government can be responsibly used in the national interest.

1962, DECEMBER. THERE WERE TWO MEETINGS YOU HAD WITH KHRUSHCHEV...

Did you see a book I wrote called the Improbable Triumvirate?

YES. IF YOU CAN COMBINE THOSE TWO MEETINGS IN THIS INTERVIEW. AND I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU FIRST OF ALL WHAT YOU THINK THE IMPACT OF THE MISSILE CRISIS WAS ON KHRUSHCHEV?

In 1959 President Eisenhower asked me to go to the Soviet Union as a private citizen for the purpose of seeing whether it might be possible to create dialogues between well-informed citizens of both countries. The president felt that the diplomatic process needed to be strengthened between the two countries. He also felt that diplomats tended to dig in at a very early stage in negotiations fearful that the slightest conciliatory attitude or statement might be regarded as weakness by the other side. But he felt that individual citizens could discuss important questions without penalty to either government. And then if they perceived that there might be daylight at the end of some tunnel, they could report back to the diplomats who then might start from an advanced position. And this was the beginning of what is now known as the Dartmouth Conference Series. It got its name because the first meeting was held at Dartmouth College in Hanover. But it's been held alternately in both countries. And we've now been through 26 years of Dartmouth Conferences. Well they have had... they've been of some use to both governments. In 1962, October the Russians arrived to start a meeting with the Americans in Andover, in Massachusetts. And when we all arrived on that Sunday night we tuned in and looked at President Kennedy on TV announcing that the United States was going to have a blockade of Soviet shipping and the reason was because the presence of missiles on Cuban soil. Russian missiles. The gravity of the crisis was not lost on anyone as we started that meeting. As a matter of face the we had to take a vote at the start to ask the Russians if they wanted to continue or whether they thought it'd be safer for them to go home. We'd put them on the next plane. But they said they would go on with the meeting if we would. And of course we were very eager to go on with the meeting. And this The meeting at Andover became something of a minor clearing house between both sides. For example, we got a message from Khrushchev which we transmitted to the United States. Pope John XXIII got in touch with us asking us to put questions to both sides as to whether they would welcome a statement by the Pope proposing that the United... that the Russians withdraw the shipping and the United States withdraw the blockade. And this was communicated to both sides. Khrushchev said, Yes, he would remove the shipping. President Kennedy said that the told us to relay Pope John XXIII his response which was that he was grateful for the intervention of the... of the Pope because he took very seriously the implications of the crisis at that time. And he felt that all the help that was available should be brought to bear. But the issue, the President asked us to tell the Pope was not the shipping or the blockade. The issue was the missiles on Cuban soil. And the President said that if they don't come down by Saturday at 6 o'clock, we're going to have to knock them down. Well, all that week we met with the Russians trying to talk this out. We talked about many other things too. And then we all drove down from Andover in a bus. All together. We arrived at my home in Connecticut En route to New York at about 5:30 I guess it was very close to the deadline. And then just as we walked in the house, there was the report over the radio that Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle the missiles. And I need not tell you of the mood of celebration that we were all in. But there was some aftermath of that which is that the Pope was very eager to have his good friend, Bishop Cardinal Josyf Slipyj, released from house arrest in the Ukraine. He had been interned ever since the end of the war. And I was asked to go to the Kremlin for the purpose of putting the request to Khrushchev. The... the reason that I was asked to it was because of the access that we had as a result of the Dartmouth Conference Series and also the fact that we had been this liaison for the Pope during the week of the missile crisis. And so I went to the Vatican first and had a talk with the Pope. He was then I think 79. Was ill. Had cancer. But he was determined to use whatever days he might have on earth in order to create a situation of increased safety for all the human beings on earth. And he wanted... asked if I would communicate this to Khrushchev. And he also asked if we could get the distribution of bibles, holy bible, old testament and new in the Soviet Union. And then the request about Archbishop Slipyj. I went to Moscow. Had a meeting in the Kremlin with the Mr. Khrushchev. We talked this out. He was not very enthusiastic about releasing Cardinal Slipyj. He said that he knew about Cardinal Slipyj since he, Khrushchev, was Ukrainian. And he said that the Archbishop had collaborated with Nazis in that period just before the end of the war. And I could point out to him that what was described by collaboration by some was an attempt to save as many people as possible. But in any event, all that was now behind us. That it was 19 years earlier. And it would be a very humane thing to release the cardinal. And then Mr. Khrushchev turned to me and he said...he said...he said, I still don't know why should I do this? And so I just with simplistic as it might sound, I said, Why, I think it's the... it'd be a decent thing to do. And he said, Oh. See once we lifted this out of the... out of the political... out of its political frame, and once we just put it on a moral level, he saw the point. And when I got back to the United States, I received a telephone call from Ambassador Dobrynin saying that he'd received a message from Khrushchev and that the archbishop was released and asking about the methods of release. Where... where would they like the Cardinal Slipyj to be delivered. To Vienna or Rome or whatever. And I got in touch with the Vatican which was very pleased of course. And the arrangements were made.

LET'S MOVE TO THE MISSILE CRISIS BUSINESS.

The conversation with Premier Khrushchev about the missile crisis was fascinating. Khrushchev was very somber as he spoke about it. He said that I get nightmares when I think how close we came. And suddenly he said, I had this terrible responsibility. Was I going to try to, out of pride, just to determine... just to demonstrate to the world that the Soviet Union could stand up to the United States? Was that decision going to result in the destruction of my country and your country? He said it was insanity. And when the United States assured me that it had no intention to invade Cuba, there was no reason he said, for me to continue the blockade. And so he said, I was very happy to write to the President or send the message to the President that we were withdrawing the shipping. We would take down the missiles. The criticism of Khrushchev inside the Communist world for that decision was wide spread and very severe. When I returned to the Soviet Union the next spring for the purpose of seeking the release from prison of another cardinal at the request of the Pope Khrushchev invited me to accompany him to the meeting -- the congress meeting of... with representatives of the party from all over the country. And at that meeting it became clear that Khrushchev was under attack because the claim by Albania and China was that the... he had knuckled under and that he was afraid of a paper tiger. Had surrendered in effect to a paper tiger. He met that criticism by saying be... before the congress: Yes, he said, people will say this about me. But I'm not interested in taunts. I am interested in seeing this country go on. I'm interested in, if we can do it, to prevent a war. And that's what I think we ought to concentrate on and not try to make decisions just out of false pride. At that the second meeting with Khrushchev took place in Gagra on the Black Sea. He felt that we would have a better opportunity to have sustained conversations at his retreat. At this meeting or the second meeting, President Kennedy had asked me to try to...

CAN YOU START THAT AGAIN...

Yes. The second meeting took place...

START AGAIN, I'M SORRY.

The second meeting took place at Khrushchev's retreat on the Black Sea. He felt that there was a better chance for uninterrupted conversation. My purpose in going on this trip was two fold. First to seek the release again in behalf of the Pope of another cardinal who had been imprisoned behind the iron curtain, Cardinal Beran of Czechoslovakia. And the second purpose was to attempt in behalf of President Kennedy to clarify the situation with respect to the test ban. The negotiations were stalled because of what the President said were misunderstandings about the American position on inspection. Khrushchev had claimed that the United States had gone back on its word concerning the number of inspections that it wanted but the main point that President Kennedy asked me to try to register with Khrushchev was that he, President Kennedy, was genuinely interested in reducing the tensions between both countries. And in laying the basis for genuinely and work genuinely workable peaceful relationship between the two societies. When we met I thanked Khrushchev for the release of Slipyj. He asked about the Pope. About the Pope's health. He conveyed his good wishes. And there's a rather interesting episode there. I'm going to have to move back chronologically now, because after I returned from the first visit to the Kremlin to seek the release of Cardinal Slipyj and I reported to the Pope, he felt that the situation looked promising. And so he gave me his personal medallion by way of thanking me. I said, No thanks necessary besides, I am not the one who's going to release Cardinal Slipyj, Khrushchev is. If you're going to give it to anyone, give it to Khrushchev. And he said, well, I've got two medallions. One I will give you and this is the one you will keep. Now he said, I will also give you another. And with this I will confer on you the power to award this to anyone in the world you think is deserving. You see, he said, the holy father does not bestow awards on heads of state. But you have that authority now. And so through the diplomatic pouch I sent Khrushchev his medallion. And now, when I saw him several months later at his retreat in the Black Sea he held it up and he said, You know, this has been very useful because when party functionaries come to see me I play with it very ostentatiously hoping they will say, Nikita Sergeevich, what is that? And they if they don't ask me I contrive to let it fall and sometimes if I'm lucky it will fall on their toes. And then they will say, as I pick it up, what is this? And I will say, Oh nothing, just a medal from the Pope. He had a good sense of humor, but in any event we did discuss the problem of the test ban.

The reason that the negotiations over a nuclear test ban treaty had been stalled had to do with the matter of inspection. Khrushchev said that he was told that the United States wanted just three inspections. He felt that the United States didn't need any inspections as all; that it would be possible to monitor any explosions inside the Soviet Union from the borders of the Soviet Union. And therefore he was told by his advisors, he said, that the only purpose of American inspections was to get information which they couldn't get otherwise. But he said, it was important to have a test ban treaty. It was also more important to have general agreements with the United States which he believed in. He wanted to end the Cold War. And so he persuaded the Central Committee of the Communist Party that give them their inspections, he said. What are they going to find out. That he said, so far as we're concerned the important thing is to get on with the treaty. So he said, we agreed with the three, but no sooner did we agree with the three than the United States asked for six. Well, I tried to point out to them that this had been a misunderstanding. And we kept going around and around on this. And he said, You know, he said, you sound like a broken record. You keep bringing up the fact that... the President Kennedy is acting in good faith. He said, I'm acting in good faith too. But the fact of the matter is that the United States has no desire really to do this and wants inspections for the purpose of military espionage. And I at that point -- we were now well into the second day, I guess-- I packed my briefcase. Put all the papers in my briefcase and got up. And he said, What are you doing. I said, I'm going home. He said, Why are you doing that. I said, Well it's clear that I've failed and I am going home and I'm going to have to confess my failure to the President. I had hoped to be able to convince you that he was acting in good faith. And that the question is not whether it's three or six inspections. The question is whether we should start all over again. You and the President. And without trying to find out what went wrong before. But apparently I failed in that and I'm going to have to go home and confess failure not just to the President, but to my wife and my daughters. He said, "Please sit down." He said, "You haven't failed." You know, again that human touch. And he'll say, "We'll start all over again. All right." So, I came back and told the President that Khrushchev was willing to make a fresh go at this. And I also told the President about the sequence of events with respect to the six inspections and the three. And the President just held his head and he said, "Gosh. I can understand exactly how he feels and how and what that situation is, but we'll make a fresh start." And they did and they won.

HOW DID KHRUSHCHEV FEEL HE STOOD WITH RESPECT TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT THIS POINT? DID YOU GET THE FEELING FROM HIM THAT AS A RESULT OF THE MISSILE CRISIS HE WAS UNDER SOME PRESSURE?

I have no direct information about Khrushchev's...

COULD YOU START AGAIN?

I have no direct information about Khrushchev's position with the party leadership. But he had moved so far and so fast in the direction of reforms and the direction of trying to open up the Soviet Union. And also in contesting the authority of the party that his position became, I think, increasingly precarious. I also understand that at some meetings of the Central Committee, he would chide some of the older party members for being old fashioned and dogmatic. And I don't think this sat well with them. But what part this played in his ouster I have no way of knowing.

KENNEDY SAID TO YOU AT ONE POINT THAT HIS POLITICAL POSITION IN THE UNITED STATES WAS IN SOME WAYS SIMILAR TO KHRUSHCHEV'S POLITICAL POSITION.

Khrushchev would refer to the fact that his generals would come to him and say, We're responsible for the security of the Soviet Union and we have information that the United States is ahead of us in these particular weapon's development. And unless you give us more money, unless you enable us to proceed the security of this country will be impaired. And the generals, as Khrushchev said, always come to us with their horror stories. When I reported this to President Kennedy, he said that's exactly what the generals tell me.

WERE THERE OTHER WAYS IN WHICH THE TWO MEN WERE ALIKE?

I don't think that there was that... President Kennedy and Khrushchev had very much in common. I thought that Khrushchev and Pope John on the other hand had much more in common. As Khrushchev himself said, We both come of poor parents. He said, I come of peasant stock. And he said, I think the same thing is true of the Pope. He said, we're fairly philosophical and I think we've got pretty good senses of humor. So I understand the Pope, he said, And I think the Pope understands me. But Kennedy, you see, came of this aristocratic background. Very well educated. Very sophisticated. And I think that Khrushchev tended to feel that he was a little out of place in a... or a little awkward in talking to Kennedy. But Kennedy, understanding this, went out of his way to seem very accessible.

DURING THAT TIME YOU HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH MEN, THEIR FEELINGS ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR WAR.

Both of them had.

CAN YOU REFER TO THEIR...

Yes. However there was one thing that President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev did share. And this was a blazing awareness of the implications of nuclear warfare. And as Khrushchev said, He didn't come to office for the purpose of paraphrasing Churchill at one point -- for the purpose of presiding over the destruction of the Soviet Union. President Kennedy said these weapons represent a mandate to us; a mandate to find some other way to maintain our security, maintain our freedom. And we're going to do everything we possibly can to explore those other possibilities.

HOW MUCH DO YOU FEEL IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE TWO MEN THE MISSILE CRISIS EXPERIENCE PUSHED THEM TOWARDS THE PARTIAL TEST BAN.

The... the impact of the missile crisis on President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev was much the same. But the experience of the missile crisis was somewhat different. Khrushchev, I think, and some of the things he said made me feel that this was so -- Khrushchev followed his own council. Yes, he would speak to the military and to party leaders, but in the end that decision was his. President Kennedy had constant dialogue with the key members of administration and with the... his aids in the White House. And he was prepared to go all the way in nuclear war if the Soviet Union didn't take down those missiles. Khrushchev, I think, never really intended that the crisis would get that far. I think he was testing the United States. We had missiles in Turkey and it's a fair guess that he felt that he could use the Cuban missiles as the basis for a trade with the Soviet Union under which we would take the missiles down in Cuba and he would take the missiles down in Turkey. But I think Khrushchev was being rather strategic in playing this game, but to Kennedy it was not a political game at all. He was facing the ultimate and he knew it.

IN TERMS OF WHAT THE MISSILE CRISIS MEANT FOR THE MEN AFTERWARDS, DO YOU THINK IT MOVED THEM TOWARDS THE TEST BAN?

The specific result of that week in October was to provide momentum that would carry the united States and the Soviet Union into a series of agreements not just with respect to a test ban, but with respect to some resolution of the Berlin crisis and other sources of tensions between the two so.... societies. Once Kennedy was able to get the missile crisis behind him he was determined never to let anything like that happen again. And so he as he said to me, You tell Mr. Khrushchev that there's no one in either party who is more eager than I am to address all the problems confronting our two nations in the hope that this will never happen again.

YOU SPEAK ABOUT THE MISSILE CRISIS AS A KIND OF A WATERSHED IN BOTH OF THEIR THINKINGS...

It was a... the Cuban Missile Crisis was a watershed not just in the thinking of President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. Not just a watershed in their personal lives as well, which it was. But a historical watershed. But I'm very much afraid that today the meaning of that crisis and the blistering reality of it have been somewhat dimmed and once again I think we are witnessing a test of nerve on both sides rather than a fundamental and common realization that both these countries are on the same lifeboat. And we're not really meeting the threat represented by the Soviet Union by saying to them, We can drill a larger hole in our end of the lifeboat than you can drill a hole in yours. This sense that of a common destiny I think is yet to become fundamental in the foreign policies of the government. Both governments.

DO YOU FEEL THAT THE PARTIAL TEST BAN WAS A GREAT LOST OPPORTUNITY?

The partial test ban, I think, was as far as was possible for the United States to go at that time considering the temper of Congress and considering the fact too that for a long time most of the mail of the Congress was against a test ban treaty. The partial test ban treaty enable the President to get the support of Senator Dodd who had been the principal opponent, a powerful one, against a treaty. And it had been the President's hope that we could follow up on the success of that partial test ban with a comprehensive test ban which would extend to all forms of testing: on the ground, on the sea, or in the air.

IN SPEAKING TO SOME OF THE OTHERS WHO WERE INVOLVED, THEY FEEL VERY SAD NOW THAT MOMENT WAS LOST. THEY BOTH FEEL THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY, AN OPPORTUNITY THERE...

Well, considering the fact that we just squeaked through the Senate with that partial test ban treaty I don't think that one can say confidently that we missed an opportunity at that particular time. I do think, however, that we missed an opportunity in the months following the test ban treaty to come back with a wider ban, a complete ban. And certainly after the death of President Kennedy one might have been able to say that we will finish the job and as a tribute and a memorial to President Kennedy, we would propose the kind of treaty that he wanted very much and felt was in the American interest and the human interest. That was the opportunity that was missed at that time. I believe that President Johnson was in a position to do that which Wiesner and the others said might have been done earlier.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY SPEECH -- OBVIOUSLY A VERY CRITICAL TIME. I KNOW YOU HAD SOME ROLE IN THAT. WE'RE INTERVIEWING SORENSON ABOUT THAT, SORENSON, SO I DON'T REALLY WANT YOU TO DEAL WITH THE SPEECH ITSELF. DID YOU GET ANY SENSE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S REACTION TO OR FEELING ABOUT IT.

I did not speak to him after the speech so I have no direct information about his attitude of the speech. We do how... however have some indication in the fact that the Soviet Union at the time was engaged in rather serious negotiations with the Peoples Republic of China. Khrushchev's aim, his whole strategy, had been based on strengthening the Soviet Union in its relationship with the united States in order to free the Soviet Union for dealing with China. The problem with China was a very serious one from Khrushchev's point of view because China was demanding the return of vast territories seized from China during this... the period of the Czars. Khrushchev had no... Khrushchev had no intention to return those territories. Another problem was that China was seeking leadership of the Communist world. Therefore these countries the two great Communist countries were on a collision course. Khrushchev's whole aim had been to effect a reconciliation with the West and in particular with the United States. And that was why the resolution of the missile crisis was so important to him.

KENNEDY MADE THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY SPEECH AT THE SAME TIME, I UNDERSTAND, KHRUSHCHEV GOT A LETTER FROM THE CHINESE. YOU REFER TO THIS AS A CRITICAL MOMENT IN HISTORY WHERE THE SOVIET UNION DECIDED WHICH WAY TO GO.

Therefore, Khrushchev had this balancing act If, in fact, it was not possible to have good relations with the United States, a modus operandi and perhaps modus vivendi then he had to turn to China and swallow some bitter pills. And that was why a great deal was in the balance. President Kennedy realizing this, very dramatically made a breath taking peace offer, not just to the Soviet Union, but to the Soviet people and talked about the long term aspirations of both peoples. And tried to restore some sense of sanity to the total picture. Now, for three days, President Kennedy's dramatic... dramatically outstretched hand was not reported to the Soviet people. Khrushchev was considering this letter from China which was conciliatory. And one wondered which way he would turn. And then we got the indication of what his decision was because suddenly, after three days, the President's speech was not only broadcast but rebroadcast, printed. And so the Soviet pe... people had dramatic access to the President's offer. It did serve Khrushchev's purpose because that enabled him to confirm that he was right in deciding that he would rather go with the United States. President Kennedy's dramatic, as I say, June 10, 1963 speech did have that essential purpose. Serve that purpose.

WHAT ARE YOUR OWN THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT WAS THE GREATEST BLOCK TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN? SOME PEOPLE SAY IT WAS KHRUSHCHEV. SOME PEOPLE SAY IT WAS KENNEDY...

We're talking about the situation as it existed in June 1963...

GIVE US A SENSE OF THE MOOD OF THE UNITED STATES.

In the summer of 1963, the test ban debate was very much alive. And the opponents of a test ban treaty, notably Edward Teller the key figure in the development of the hydrogen bomb, was opposed to any test ban or to any limitation on our ability to explode these weapons or test these weapons. President Kennedy on the other hand felt that the security of the United States depended more on the control of force than on the pursuit of force. He was well aware of the... of the menace to this country represented by the arms race and the accidents that could trigger an explosion. He felt no particular obligation to those who were manufacturing the bombs or the scientists who wanted to make sure that their work could continue untrammeled. But Teller's trip across the country and his appearances on television had their effect as did many speeches and statements by Senator Dodd and others who didn't want to cut into testing. But President Kennedy's appeal to the American people began to take hold and the mail to Congress shifted. Where at one time the mail to Congress had been 15-to-1 against the test ban treaty, now it turned so that it was almost even. And at that point, the President felt justified proposing a treaty.

CAN YOU GIVE US A LITTLE MORE OF A SENSE OF WHAT KHRUSHCHEV WAS LIKE IN THESE MEETINGS WITH YOU. THERE ARE ALL SORTS OF MYTHS AND FALSE IMPRESSIONS OF THE MAN.

I had the... Before meeting Khrushchev I expected that I'd feel... I would find someone who was dogmatic, bombastic rather arrogant short tempered. Instead I found someone who was incredibly polite. And observed all the amenities far beyond, I thought, those that were necessary. For example, when I visited him at his retreat in Gagra on the Black Sea, I found him standing in the cool weather -- very cool as a matter of fact -- waiting at the sentry gate outside to greet us, then discovered that he'd been waiting there 40 minutes. Our plane had been late, but he didn't get that word. Then in talking to him if he would say something that I disagreed with, I would start to speak but not wanting to interrupt him, but he would interrupt himself. And he would say, [Podjalsta] please. And he was extremely deferential. He was also rather formally dressed I thought for his retreat on the Black Sea. I was wearing a sweater and a sports jacket at times and he had on the his diplomatic clothing, gold cuff links and under his cuffs, I could see his winter underwear, long winter underwear. But his tie was immaculate. Beautifully knotted. He was very precise, very cordial as I say, almost deferential. Not what I expected. He was also very playful. And I had been told that strategically if I brought my daughters with me that would create a more responsive mood in the man. And it was right. He was enchanted by my daughters, then in their early teens. And so it was more like a family talk between fathers even though I was a lot younger then than I.... than I am now. He invited me to play badminton with him. I was a little reluctant to do this because he was then 69 and I was then in my late 30s I guess. No I was a little older than that, I was in my 40s, early 40s. But we played badminton. I was amazed at his agility. And he really slammed the ball. Later when I or the shot with the little bird. Later when I told President Kennedy about this he looked at me very sternly and he said, he said, I hope you let the old man win. I said, I... that I did. And it wasn't too much strain to do that either.

YOU TOOK SOME GREAT PHOTOGRAPHS. BUT CAN YOU JUST TELL ME ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING THESE PICTURES?

Well, since I had my daughters with me, he decided to entertain them by getting his great bear coat and then doing his magic act of disappearing inside the coat and then suddenly having his head pop out of it saying, Boo. This is the sort of thing I suppose that would have made an even stronger impression on my daughters had they been a lot younger. But even at that age it was rather delightful.

THIS IS NOT THE MYTH. THIS IS NOT THE IMAGE OF KHRUSHCHEV AS THE HIGHLY EMOTIONAL, BANGING HIS SHOE ON THE TABLE...

Yes. The popular image of Khrushchev is of a -- in that famous scene at the United Nations where he took off his shoe and pound.... pound the table. I'm not sure that wasn't done for effect. I'm not sure that wasn't calculated. And it may be that sometimes with... within the party itself he would become bombastic. But there's also another side to him which is reserved very polite and also in which he uses humor to great effect. When he poured some vodka for me, I'd been told that even though I don't... don't drink vodka that you've got to get it down because it's considered an insult. And so I very deftly contrived to fill another vodka glass with water and in the toast I poured that down. And he looked at me and he said, This old dog knows all the tricks. And... and he said there was one other American who wouldn't drink vodka with me and that was Walter Reuther, the head of the Automobile Workers Union. And I said to him, Don't you drink, And Walter Reuther said, Mr. Chairman, come the revolution in the United States, I want to be the only labor leader who's sober. No I didn't drink the vodka and I made my peace with Khrushchev because of that fact.

THERE'S A STORY YOU TELL IN YOUR BOOK WHICH I'D LIKE YOU TO TELL BRIEFLY IF YOU COULD. ABOUT THE FEELING THAT IN THE UNITED STATES AT THAT TIME THERE WAS THE FEELING THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS SOME SORT OF A DICTATOR. AND IN FACT HE DIDN'T HAVE AS MUCH POWER IN HIS PARTY AS MANY OF US THOUGHT. AND I THINK HE SAID SOMETHING TO YOU TO THAT EFFECT.

Khrushchev had to carry many of the liabilities of Stalin in terms of the general impression of the style of a... the head of the Soviet Union. But his ambition, he said, was to be able to leave office in a natural way. Which meant without being shot. And he did, but I doubt that the changes that he wanted to bring about were regarded highly by leaders of the Communist party at the time or the Central Committee. I think they felt that he was moving too fast. I think too that they felt that Khrushchev had disadvantaged the Soviet Union side of the Communist world, Khrushchev on the other hand, felt that only as the Soviet Union freed itself from the fear that Stalin created would it be possible for the Soviet Union to become productive. And he felt that unless it could be productive in terms of its agriculture and in terms of its industry it would become... it would be in fact weak. The to him, Khrushchev, Soviet strength was measured by productivity and not by the size of its army. And I don't think the army was too happy about this and I think that his personal style didn't sit too well with the party leaders and when he was deposed it was done with very little ceremony. And as you know, at the time of his death there was a... the funeral service were nominal and he has been back-burnered ever since.

WHAT DID HE SAY TO YOU ABOUT HIS POWER AND ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF CONTROL THAT HE HAD IN THE SOVIET UNION?

He was concerned about the fact that the Soviet Union had not met its quotas in agriculture or in industry. And as he pondered this he realized that the reason for it was that there was so much fear among the people that the country was paralyzed. And that was why he said he went before the congress to try to get the... get Stalin expunged and to lift the fear of Stalin. And he said that he spent hours talking about the tyranny of Stalin and also about the fact that many soldiers had died because of capricious decisions made by Stalin. He went into this in great detail. And he expected, he re... really expected that being able to tell the truth about that tyranny would somehow liberate the Russian people. Four months later he said, I was amazed that there'd been very little change. And so he decided to go once again before the... before the party and the country. And this time he spoke for 4 1/2 hours I believe and went to great detail about Stalin's insanity about the murder of the Kulaks, about the irresponsible decisions made during the war. And then he hoped as a result of this speech that finally the Soviet people would be able to come out of that feeling of blind obedience and fear. It was the kind of fear that made it impossible even for workers to put suggestions in suggestion boxes. And... but the second speech before the party and the world apparently made not too much difference because he said, Despite those two talks, I now meet people who seriously think that Stalin was sane. So I think that he was deeply disappointed. When I asked him I said, Well don't you think that it is in the nature of a dictatorship that people will be paralyzed and that just trying to expunge Stalin from their memories is not enough? Don't you think you have to move along the path of reforming institutions themselves. And he said something about, Interesting. He said, We can learn. We can even learn from you.

WHAT. WE'RE JUST GOING TO WAIT FOR THIS PLANE...

There's one other thing I'd like to say about...

YEAH.

When we spoke about relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, I said, Mr. Chairman, You have to understand that so long as you say to the American people or the American country that we will bury you're not going to find that the people are going to be well disposed are you? And so he said, I run into that all the time. He said, I'm surprised that you should say that. He said, In the United States, when two friends have an argument, one may get a little angry and say "Drop dead." That's not because he wants the other man to drop dead. Here in the Soviet Union we have a similar expression meaning that if two friends argue and one says that I... he was going to be proved right -- he said, I will bury you meaning that he will outlive the other man. He will live long enough to be proved right. He says, This is what I believe. I believe that the strength of our institutions and our ideas is such that we will outlive you. But this doesn't mean that we're going to seize you and kill you and bury you. That's ridiculous. You've got a great society. And your greatest days are still ahead of you.

LOOKING BACK ON THAT TIME KNOW DO YOU FEEL HAS BEEN LEARNED FROM THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS TODAY IN TERMS OF THE NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP?

What the Cuban Missile Crisis taught just not the leaders of the countries but the peoples of both countries was that both had an ultimate responsibility not just to themselves, but to the world's peoples. And that whether they realized it or not, whether they liked it or not, they had the obligation to try and try and try again until the weapons were brought under control and until they... a workable basis was established to keeping the peace. Because ultimately it's not just the abolition of weapons that is important, but the abolition of war itself. This feeling, I think, was very much alive in the early 1960s. A new generation has come of age. And once again you hear the taunts on both sides. Once again you have both sides talking about their readiness to march to the brink. I still entertain the hope that the United States will declare to be the fundamental objective or its foreign policy to eliminate the basic causes of war. And to try to create a rule of law among nations. Because so long as we live in the present condition of anarchy, all sorts of things can happen far beyond our calculations. Accidents with computers that could trigger a war. We don't seem quite to accept the reality of that particular danger. And so we've lost a great deal of that primitive feeling of urgency that we had in the... in the early 1960s on both sides to try to eliminate the anarchy in the relations between the societies. And to work out a method of living so that we would not feel that we were threatened and they would not feel that they were threatened. General MacArthur, I think, perhaps put it best when he said that both the United States and the Soviet Union have to learn that their greatest aim must not be to destroy each other. Their greatest aim must be to eliminate the frictions between both societies that can become the fuse... the fuse of a war that can destroy them both. I think that General MacArthur's speech before the American Legion in 1953, I believe it was may be... may well be something that ought to be resurrected at this time.