LET'S START BEFORE THE MISSILE CRISIS ITSELF. DID YOU FEEL THERE WAS ANY CHANCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT PUT MISSILES INTO CUBA?

Not particularly. We knew that there was no feeling of rapport between the Soviet Union and the United States. But we never though that they were going into Cuba. We realized of course that they had close rapport with the Cubans. Castro ...But no idea that they were putting... contemplating putting missiles in.

THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN QUITE A PROVOCATIVE THING TO DO I SUPPOSE.

Oh, sure

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN OUT OF CHARACTER FOR THEM, WAS THAT YOUR FEELING.

To some degree, yes

THERE WERE SOME PEOPLE, I THINK, JOHN MCCONE AND THE CIA AND THERE WERE ONE OR TWO OTHERS WHO THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT DO SOMETHING IN CUBA. YOU WEREN'T ONE OF THOSE. YOU WERE IN THE MAJORITY, WERE YOU THEN?

Well, I had no suggestion that anybody thought they were going to put missiles into Cuba.

WHEN YOU HEARD THE NEWS THEN, DO YOU REMEMBER YOUR INITIAL REACTION?

I think my initial reaction was a normal one. Somethings going on that was not contemplated but right in character with the Soviet's intentions

WHAT DID YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DO? WHAT WAS YOUR INITIAL...

Well, I though the United States should have gone in with tremendous force: amphibious and airborne force. A big civil affairs program. And straightened the whole mess in Cuba out. If we had, we'd certainly avoided a lot of subsequent difficulties.

WAS THAT THE POPULAR VIEW AT THE TIME? WERE YOU EXPRESSING, FEELING SOMETHING THAT WAS COMMON IN THE PENTAGON OR COMMON IN YOUR...

Well, of course, nobody could guarantee that if they put the missiles in that not one could be fired. Nobody could guarantee that. We felt the whole operation would be successful. But to say that they would not fire a missile at the United States would be a little presumptuous.

I GUESS WERE YOU CONCERNED AT WHO WAS CONTROLLING THOSE MISSILES. WHETHER THEY WERE CUBANS OR RUSSIANS?

Well I figured, of course, that they would be Russians.

YOU WEREN'T WORRIED ABOUT THAT ASPECT OF IT? THAT THE CONTROL OF THE MISSILES THEMSELVES MIGHT NOT BE IN SOVIET HANDS?

No.

I GUESS SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO ARGUED AGAINST YOUR VIEW OF AN AIR STRIKE OR OF AN INVASION ARGUED THAT IN AN AIR STRIKE AT LEAST, SOVIET PEOPLE WOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED AND THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME RETALIATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION IN BERLIN OR MAYBE EVEN DIRECTLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

Well, I'd suggest you talk to McGeorge Bundy about that.

THAT'S WHAT HE WOULD HAVE SAID, I SUPPOSE. I'M SURE HE'LL SAY THAT SORT OF THING TO US TOMORROW, WHAT'S YOUR REACTION TO THAT POINT OF VIEW? HOW DO YOU DIFFER WITH THAT?

Well, I don't think the Russians wanted an all out war.

SO YOU DIDN'T SEE THAT AS A BIG RISK...

No, …If the United States had taken the island. As a matter of fact, President Kennedy said he didn't preclude doing something like this later on. There's the first step he'd fused the quarantine.

WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY A CIVIL AFFAIRS PROGRAM?

Oh a civil affairs psychological approach to the Cuban people. To point out to them that the United States did not want a war with them. Just wanted the missiles not to be, constitute a threat to the United States. To work on the psychology of the Cuban People. To alleviate some of the shortages they had. Medical supplies. Full guarantee of civil affairs.

OF COURSE THERE HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN A REVOLUTION IN CUBA IN '58, '59. WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING ABOUT THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND WHAT HAD BECOME OF THE POLITICS ON THAT ISLAND.

Well, just another event in world politics

I DON'T UNDERSTAND

Well, just another event taking place in historical developments. Batista, who preceded Castro, was certainly no commendable individual.

WHAT SORT OF GOVERNMENT WOULD YOU HAVE SEEN AFTER AN INVASION...

Well, some more popular Cuban people that...take care of the situation in Cuba. A democratic organization. After all, Cuba's a Latin Country

WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT?

Well, they have strong national feelings. Great pride. You certainly don't want to rub their noses in a situation.

DID YOU ARGUE FOR THIS APPROACH THAT YOU JUST SPELLED OUT FOR US IN MEETINGS AT THE JCS. CAN YOU TELL US A LITTLE ABOUT A JCS MEETING OR A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WHEREVER YOU WOULD HAVE ARGUED YOUR POSITION.

Well, largely in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary of Defense down there. ...The great concern was expressed by LeMay of getting rid of those missiles -- who favored an air strike

CAN YOU DESCRIBE TO ME WHAT A JCS MEETING WOULD HAVE BEEN LIKE AT THIS TIME AFTER YOU HEARD THE NEWS?

Well, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met three times a week. Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chairman, who was then Max Taylor who had replaced Lemnitzer, Chief of Naval operations, and usually the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Paul Nitze would come down and sit in those meetings.

AND CAN YOU RECALL A MEETING IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE MISSILE CRISIS WHEN YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN ARGUING YOUR POSITION AND GENERAL LEMAY...

Well, it was largely a question of interrogation of the Secretary of Defense through the chairman, Maxwell Taylor. What was the... how could you guarantee that missiles could be taken out by an air strike. How... effective an air strike would be. Nobody of course could say absolutely that every missile would be taken out.

DID THAT CONCERN YOU?

To some degree, yes. I think you had to balance that against the subsequent events that have taken place in Cuba and... Central America, South America, Africa. Nicaragua at the present time.

WE PROBABLY WOULDN'T HAVE ALL THOSE PROBLEMS, IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE SAYING?

No. That's right.

DID YOU FEEL A BIT FRUSTRATED IN THESE MEETINGS THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OR NITZE OR GILPATRIC WEREN'T LISTENING TO YOU...

No... not frustrated. Different points of view. There were reasonably dispassionate discussions.

WERE THE JSC UNITED WANTING AND AIR STRIKE AND AN INVASION OR WERE THERE DIFFERENT... HOW DID THE DEBATE GO AMONG YOU AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE JSC?

Well, I think everybody except LeMay sort of felt that the strike would not be nearly as effective as he LeMay thought it would be.

AND WHAT ABOUT YOUR IDEA? WERE PEOPLE SUPPORTING YOU IN YOUR INVASION IDEA?

Oh, there was a lot of talk, about that. Combination of amphibious forces and airborne forces. The president didn't rule out those courses of action. Ultimately he said they might have to come back to them. But not initially.

I'VE SEEN SOME FILM OF THE PRESIDENT AND I THINK YOU MIGHT BE THERE AND ADMIRAL WARD I BELIEVE WATCHING SOME PRACTICE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS DOWN IN…

North Carolina.

...NORTH CAROLINA. DO YOU REMEMBER THAT? IS THAT THE TYPE OF A MANEUVER THAT YOU WERE…WERE THEY PRACTICING FOR THAT TYPE OF A POSSIBILITY'

Well, that's an amphibious operation. And for an operation QB would have had amphibious operations, airborne operations. Preferably both mutually supportive.

DID YOU HAVE THE FEELING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA OF WHAT THAT WOULD HAVE INVOLVED? HAD

Oh, yes. I think the President had no illusions about anything in this situation.

HOW DID YOU FEEL THEN WHEN THE DECISION WAS MADE TO GO FOR A BLOCKADE? WHAT WAS YOUR INITIAL REACTION WHEN YOU HEARD THAT THAT HAD BEEN THE DECISION?

Well, I guess my reaction was that this was not the solution to the problem. The problem of Cuba was going to continue. Soviet hostility against the United States was going to continue. That, on the other hand, that the action adopted by the President was moral. Was certainly in the good character in the American people. Postpone the decision.

DID YOU THINK THAT A BLOCKADE WOULD WORK. WERE YOU CONFIDENT -- WERE YOU WORRIED THAT A BLOCKADE MIGHT NOT WORK AND THAT YOU'D HAVE TO GO TO THE NEXT STEP?

Yes. There was no assurance that the blockade would work. But you could, sitting there in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we could not determine what the Russian reaction would be...

MUST BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MAKE THOSE MILITARY DECISIONS THAT HAVE SUCH ENORMOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR PEOPLE.

Yes.

CAN YOU GIVE ME A SENSE WHAT IT'S LIKE TRYING TO BALANCE OUT THE VARIOUS...

Well, you make an estimate of the situation and a judgment of the conclusions. Consider what the implications would be of various courses of action... I think that a great factor in those conclusions would be what the Russians themselves decided to do. Whether they tried to assemble these missiles quickly and shoot them off. Or... sort of acquiesce and fold,

APART FROM THESE MEETINGS WITH THE JCS AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DID YOU HAVE ANY DIRECT MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AT THE TIME?

(REPEAT QUESTION)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the President. Finally the President sent for the Joint Chiefs. Told us the decision he'd made. He said, this is up to the Navy. I said, Mr. President, the Navy will not let you down.

MUST HAVE BEEN A VERY SORT OF IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY THAT YOU WERE GIVEN...

Well, it was... something that we were prepared to carry out. Got a decision.

HOW PREPARED WERE YOU FOR A BLOCKADE OF CUBA? THAT'S QUITE A BIG OPERATION. ALL THESE MEETINGS SO FAR HAD BEEN GOING ON IN SECRET. CAN YOU TELL US, IT'S AMAZING HOW QUICKLY THIS THING WAS ORGANIZED AND BECAME OPERATIONAL.

Well, that's what the Navy's prepared to do. To meet... situations of this sort.

CAN YOU GIVE ME A SENSE OF WHAT HAD TO BE DONE AND THE TIME THAT YOU HAD TO DO IT IN GETTING THE THING TOGETHER?

You got an organization that's geared to this. That's officers, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, Fleet Commanders, Well I would say they were. The organization went very well.

IF YOU COULD GIVE ME AN EXTENT OF THE SIZE OF THIS OPERATION: WHAT DID IT ENCOMPASS, WAS IT LIKE THE ENTIRE AMERICAN NAVY INVOLVED?

Oh, yes. The entire Navy was involved, because you had to be prepared for an escalation.

IF YOU COULD GIVE ME A SIZE OF THE EXTENT OF THE OPERATION...

Well, basically, the entire Navy was involved. Although it was localized around Cuba, we had Pacific fleet, our Asiatic fleet, the forces involved in nuclear war. Submarines were deployed all over the Atlantic, the Mediterranean. So I would say, basically, the entire Navy. Our reserve forces. It was a large-scale operation.

AND IT WAS DONE VERY QUICKLY...

Well, that's what the Navy's supposed to do.

IT WAS A GOOD TEST IN A WAY OF HOW QUICKLY...

Oh, surely.

I UNDERSTAND YOU'RE PARTICULARLY PROUD OF THE ASW WORK.

Yes. The Russians had quite a few submarines in the Atlantic. They were not nuclear-powered submarines, but they were conventional submarines. And, I think it's safe to say, we made everyone of them come to the surface. Because we did not want them basing in Cuba.

WAS THAT A DANGEROUS OPERATION AT ALL? NOW SOME CRITICS OF THIS WHOLE THING HAVE SAID THAT THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED A KIND OF PROVOCATIVE THING TO DO...

Oh, no. ...I imagine they expected it just as we would expect their reaction. Now if they'd all been nuclear subs, or a large percentage of them had been nuclear subs, it would have been more complicated.

CAN YOU JUST GIVE US A SENSE OF HOW YOU GET A SUB TO THE SURFACE?

Well, you have a destroyer or an airplane on top of the subs location and you stick with them. It's a matter of patience. Persistency. And we do that all the time in peacetime against our own submarines.

AS A PRACTICE?

Surely.

IS IT DIFFICULT TO LOCATE THESE SOVIET SUBS? HOW DO YOU DO THAT?

You use all sorts of intelligence. You follow them across the Atlantic. You know where they're headed for. You have your ships deployed. Your aircraft flying over the Atlantic. Regular coordinated anti-submarine warfare operation.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU'D DONE SOME WORK ON THEIR CODES -- THE SOVIET CODES?

To the extent that it was practical.

HAD YOU BROKEN THE SOVIET'S CODES FOR COMMUNICATING? WAS THAT PART OF THIS?

Well, you do the best you can on that.

SOMEWHERE I THINK I'D READ OR MAYBE WE SPOKE ABOUT THIS LAST TIME...THAT YOU IN A SENSE HAD BROKEN THE CODES. AM I RIGHT ABOUT THAT?

No, I don't think you are.

THERE'S ALSO SOME OPERATION OF DROPPING BUOYS OF SOME SORT?

Sonar buoys.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN HOW THAT WORKS?

Well a sonar buoy is a means...a technical means of transmitting communications from under the water to surface ships and aircraft. And these buoys are carried in airplanes usually. And when you have a location of a submarine or a prospective location, you drop those buoys. They float down to the surface. Part of the weapon goes below...beneath the surface. Picks up the sound. And broadcasts it.

SO IT'S LIKE AN UNDERWATER MICROPHONE?

Yes.

AND HOW DO YOU KEEP TRACK OF A SUBMARINE WHEN IT'S MOVING? DO YOU HAVE TO KEEP DROPPING THESE BUOYS?

Surely.

WHAT WAS YOUR RECORD IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIET SUBS DURING THE MISSILE CRISIS?

I would say almost a hundred percent.

WHAT DO YOU MEAN?

That we, I think we located almost every one. We'd follow them across the Atlantic. When they get in the area, they'd be picked up by surface ships and aircraft.

THERE'S THE STORY ABOUT THE JACK DANIELS AND I KNOW THAT HAPPENED SOME YEARS BEFORE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, BUT CAN YOU TELL ME THAT STORY OF ADMIRAL WRIGHT'S JACK DANIELS?

I believe Admiral Wright as the Commander in Chief, Atlantic fleet, had put out word to all his ships that anybody who located a Russian submarine reported it would receive a prize of a case of Jack Daniels. That was not a factor in our operation.

WAS THAT SAME SORT OF SPIRIT THOUGH...

Oh, there was good spirit. Any submarine detection work is very tedious. So anything that can relieve the tension is all to the good.

HOW IMPORTANT WAS THAT ASW WORK IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

It was very important.

WHY? CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT FOR A CIVILIAN AUDIENCE?

Well for example, if we had to go out and intercept a ship, a Russian ship, we certainly didn't want to expose our ships to being hit by a torpedo fired by a Russian submarine. So the important thing was to know exactly where the Russians were all the time. Keep them under control. To keep them...getting too adventuresome.

WERE THERE EVER ANY INCIDENTS?

No. ...But we anticipated there might be.

SO THE SOVIETS SHOWED RESTRAINT IN A SENSE.

Definitely.

CAN YOU PUT THAT IN A SENTENCE?

Well did the Soviets exhibit any restraints? Yes, they were not too adventuresome.

DID THAT SURPRISE YOU? WERE YOU EXPECTING SOME SORT OF INCIDENT?

We wanted to avoid them.

DO YOU THINK YOU TOOK THE SOVIETS BY SURPRISE WITH THIS BLOCKADE AND ASW WORK?

Well, I guess we did. Mr. Khrushchev certainly backed down. And, I think when he went into the thing he had no intention of backing down. But he didn't want a war with the United States in that area. With situations which were advantageous to the United States. Close to our... own American shores. Thousands of miles away from the Soviet Union.

WAS IT JUST CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT WERE PUT ON ALERT AND THAT WERE INVOLVED IN THE BLOCKADE?

Well, that were involved in the quarantine. The blockade were conventional forces. But actually, the...strategic nuclear forces the United States would deploy our own nuclear-powered submarines with missiles aboard were deployed in the Atlantic. I'd say it was basically a conventional operation, a conventional anti-submarine warfare operation.

DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD HAVE HAD TO USE ANY OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT YOU HAD AT YOUR DISPOSAL IF IT HAD GOTTEN INTO AN INVASION SITUATION OR ANYTHING MORE SERIOUS?

Well, not if it had gotten into an invasion situation, but only if the Russians had fired nuclear weapons against the United States do I think we would have used our nuclear weapons. But we were ready to. The air force was ready.

DO YOU HAVE GREAT QUALMS ABOUT USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS? OR DO YOU SEE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS JUST ANOTHER WEAPON AT YOUR DISPOSAL IN THE ARSENAL?

Well, I think it's a quantum jump in the...in the scope of the...of weapon and rock… arsenals. I...would prefer to see no nuclear weapons available. I think the world would be a lot better off if we had scrapped them all. Both sides. But there's no alternative to us having them with the Russians having them.

BUT IN TERMS OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE SHIPS OR IN THE SUBMARINES, IF THEY WERE READY, THEY COULD HAVE BEEN USED HAD THEY...

Well, surely, they could have been...subject to release by the President. And I don't think the President would have been in the mood to initiate nuclear warfare. He wanted to avoid it

LET'S TALK A LITTLE ABOUT THE PRESIDENT DURING THIS PERIOD. I KNOW HE WAS VERY FOND OF YOU. I'D LIKE TO GET A SENSE OF YOUR FEELINGS OF HOW HE OPERATED DURING THIS PERIOD AND THE DECISIONS HE…

I think he operated very, very well. Operated as a president should. He considered all the information. He evaluated it. Took the advice of his people. He didn't want to get into any more military operations than were absolutely necessary. In other words, the decisions he made were completely in accordance with the character of the United States. And I think he did fine.

DID YOU EVER GET THE SENSE THAT HE WAS A BIT MISTRUSTFUL OF THE MILITARY? I DON'T KNOW IF THAT'S A FAIR WAY OF SAYING IT. I MEAN HE HAD THIS TERRIBLE EXPERIENCE WITH THE BAY OF PIGS... THAT HE WASN'T PREPARED TO GO ALL THE WAY. THAT IF HE HAD TO...WERE YOU CONCERNED ABOUT THAT?

No. I think that the President was...acted the way he should have acted. ...He had the experience of the Bay of Pigs behind him...so I think that, no...I...I give high marks to the President.

YOU SAY HE ACTED THE WAY A PRESIDENT SHOULD HAVE ACTED BUT HE DIDN'T DO WHAT YOU WOULD HAVE DONE. THAT'S THE QUESTION I GUESS.

That's all right. He...he knew the views of the Chiefs of the invasion. And he said without rejecting it that we're just not doing it at this stage, but we may have to.

SO YOU THOUGHT THAT IF PUSH CAME TO SHOVE IN A WAY, THAT IF THERE HAD TO BE AN INVASION THAT WOULDN'T BACK DOWN AT THE LAST MINUTE. YOU WERE CONFIDENT IN HIS RESOLVE.

Oh, I had confidence in the President, yes.

THERE'S THIS FAMOUS INCIDENT THAT'S BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT OF COURSE IN FLAG PLOT. COULD YOU TELL US WHAT HAPPENED THAT EVENING? IT WAS LATE IN THE EVENING WASN'T IT?

It was late in the afternoon. McNamara and Gilpatric came down from their offices.... Offices of the Secretary of Defense down to the Navy Department. You might call it the War Room. And he started going into the situation in great detail. He started asking questions. And the questions bordered on highly classified information, which not only many of my own people who were on duty were not cleared for the information. So I tried to dissuade him. Finally...he said he didn't care about the days of John Paul Jones. So I suggested he come into an inner sanctum that we had. I explained the situation to him. And he was apparently happy. He left happy. ...Well, I think it was blown up far beyond its intention.

BLOWN UP BY WHO? FOR WHAT PURPOSE?

By the press. Perhaps by some of the civilians in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Arthur Sylvester and company.

WHAT WAS HIS PROBLEM...MCNAMARA? WHY WAS HE THERE? WHY DID HE COME DOWN AND...

Just avid for details. And basically he didn't trust the military as well as he should have.

WHY NOT? HOW DO YOU ANALYZE HIS CHARACTER. WHAT WAS HIS PROBLEM?

Well, McNamara never admitted to a mistake except when he took the advice of somebody against his own better judgment.

WAS THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS DURING THE MISSILE CRISIS DO YOU THINK? MCNAMARA'S PERSONALITY OR MCNAMARA IN THAT POSITION?

Well, I don't think McNamara was particularly suited to be in that position. McNamara was the type that always liked to tell the President, whether it be Kennedy or Johnson, what he thought the President wanted to hear. He's not the type of an individual I would want to have if I were President to have as Secretary of Defense of the United States in a crisis. There or in Vietnam.

I UNDERSTAND HE WAS CONCERNED, DURING THIS MEETING WITH YOU IN FLAG. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE OPERATION OF THE BLOCKADE. WHAT WAS IT THAT HE WAS...

Well, one of our destroyers was sitting on top of a Russian submarine. And the line of the blockade had been broken. It wasn't a homogeneous line. He said, What's that ship doing out there? I said, He's on top of a Russian submarine. How do you know he is? Well, that was from classified information. Highly classified. So my own people were not cleared for that.

I UNDERSTAND HE FELT THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING DIFFERENT THAN A BLOCKADE IN THE SORT OF NORMAL MILITARY OPERATIONS MANUAL. THAT THIS WAS A QUARANTINE. IT WAS A POLITICAL ACT AND THEY WERE VERY WORRIED THAT SOMETHING MIGHT GO WRONG.

I suppose to defend his position that's what he thought.

DO YOU FEEL YOU AND THE NAVAL PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF THIS WERE CLEAR WHAT THEY WERE TRYING TO DO IN THE WHITE HOUSE?

Oh sure. There's no doubt in my mind.

NO DOUBT WHAT?

That they were trying to get the Russians to withdraw the missiles. Prevent putting any more in.

CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT YOUR PLAN WAS IN TERMS OF THE BLOCKADE? HOW YOU DEVISED IT? HOW YOU FELT IT WOULD WORK? WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF A SOVIET SHIP DECIDED TO TRY TO RUN IT? WHAT WAS YOUR GAME PLAN?

Well, we would warn them off. And if they persisted then we'd have to take forceful action.

HOW WOULD YOU DO THAT?

Well you'd g...gunfire to disable the Russian intercepting ship. Inter... interdict their control. But fortunately it didn't come to that.

I GUESS THE WHITE HOUSE PEOPLE WERE WORRIED ABOUT STARTING A REAL WAR WITH THE SOVIETS...

Oh surely.

YOU FELT THAT COULD BE AVOIDED EVEN IF YOU HAD TO SHOOT TO STOP A SHIP?

Oh yes. I thought so. Could be a slight escalation of the whole problem.

SOME OF THESE SHIPS WERE TANKERS, WERE THEY?

Container ships and con-tankers. We had — In the quarantine line we had aircraft... patrol aircraft. We had a carrier. Anti-submarine aircraft. We had destroyers. We had a great preponderance of power in the area. Which the Russians realized they...we had.

I UNDERSTAND YOU ALSO HAD A BIT OF TROUBLE WITH THE WHITE HOUSE AND PEOPLE WANTING TO SPEAK DIRECTLY TO THE CAPTAINS OF YOUR SHIPS OR TO SOME OF THESE SHIPS THAT WERE OUT ON THE QUARANTINE LINE.

No particular difficulty.

WHAT HAPPENED? CAN YOU DESCRIBE SOME OF THOSE INCIDENTS?

Not that I can recall.

DID THE PRESIDENT WANT TO SPEAK TO THE SHIPS OR WAS IT MCNAMARA OR HOW DID IT... DID THEY GET THROUGH…

Well, I guess Robert...primarily McNamara...

WERE THERE TIMES WHEN HE WAS TALKING TO...

He didn't know how to do it in the first place.

I'M SORRY?

He didn't know...did not know how to do it.

HE HAD TO GO THROUGH YOU AND YOUR OFFICE AND

Atlantic receiver, Atlantic fleet...

WERE THEY ABLE TO GET THROUGH IN THE END? I'VE HEARD THAT THERE WERE SOME COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTLY...

No. Not to my recollection.

WAS THAT YOUR JOB IN A WAY. TO TRY TO KEEP…

To keep them from interfering, yes.

CAN YOU PUT THAT IN A SENTENCE FOR ME?

Well, my job was to see that the White House was kept fully informed. The Secretary of Defense was kept... informed of developments. And to protect our operating forces at sea from any interference by the civilian side of the government. Keep it in military channels. And we were successful in that.

THERE WAS A BOARDING OF ONE OF THE BOATS, I UNDERSTAND — ONE OF THE SOVIET SHIPS.

I don't recall the details of that.

I'M TRYING TO FIND THE PEOPLE THAT WERE INVOLVED IN THAT BOARDING PARTY. I'VE GOT THEIR NAMES AND WE'RE TRYING TO TRACK THEM DOWN AND HEAR THEIR STORY ABOUT THAT. BECAUSE THAT WAS QUITE AN INTERESTING INCIDENT IN THIS WHOLE EPISODE. THERE WASN'T ANYTHING ON BOARD OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND THE SHIP SAILED THROUGH.

I recall something about it, but not the detail.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE TO ME JUST ONCE AGAIN HOW THE OPERATION WAS TO WORK. THE BLOCKADE LINE, THE SHIPS COMING IN, WHAT YOU MIGHT HAVE TO DO?

Well, we didn't have to do anything except by making our presence known. So the question was what the Soviets would do. Now if they persisted and tried to go through. Then it was then up to us to take action to prevent them from making contact.

AND WHAT WAS YOUR PLAN? HOW WOULD IT WORK?

Well, warn them off. Use gunfire, if necessary. As I say, fortunately, they didn't persist.

WERE YOU CONCERNED THAT ANY OF THESE SHIPS MIGHT BE ARMED? THAT IT MIGHT TURN INTO A FIGHT?

Concerned yes, but not overly concerned.

DO YOU THINK THE PEOPLE AT THE WHITE HOUSE WERE SUFFICIENTLY COGNISANT OF WHAT YOU WERE DOING OUT THERE? OF HOW THE THING WAS BEING MANAGED?

Yes. I think they...within their competence. They didn't know very much about naval operations.

I UNDERSTAND WHEN YOU TOOK OVER AS THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, YOU TOLD ME YOU HAD A CHAT WITH ADMIRAL BURKE ABOUT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH MCNAMARA DURING HIS TENURE...

Yes?

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THAT? WHAT SORT OF ADVICE HE MIGHT HAVE GIVEN YOU OR HOW YOU...

Well, he sort of warned me against the avid curiosity of McNamara and getting his hands in where they shouldn't have been.

WAS THIS HARD FOR YOU TO DEAL WITH, THIS WHOLE PROBLEM WITH MCNAMARA? WAS IT GETTING IN THE WAY?

Well, I guess I suffered from a little bit of impatience and annoyance.

HE THOUGHT HE KNEW A LOT...

He thought he knew a lot more than he actually does. He's a very bright man. He's a very arrogant man.

YOU TOLD ME LAST TIME THAT AFTER THIS WHOLE MISSILE CRISIS, KENNEDY'S FATHER GAVE HIM SOME ADVICE ON HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH MCNAMARA?

Well, this was...later when my tour was about up. McNamara had gone to the President and said, either he had to go or I had to go. And I understand that Jack Kennedy told that to the...to his father and his father said, Well, you fired the wrong guy.

HOW DID YOU FEEL WHEN THAT HAPPENED, WHEN YOUR TOUR WAS UP? IT MUST HAVE BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING.

Well, it was sort of a shock. But realizing what McNamara was and is, to be expected.

I UNDERSTAND HE WANTED TO FIRE LEMAY TOO...

But he couldn't do both. You haven't interviewed LeMay.

NOT YET. NO.

You got him on the list?

YES. YES. I THINK WE'RE GOING TO TALK TO HIM SOON. ONE OF OUR PRODUCERS HAS INTERVIEWED HIM WITHOUT A CAMERA. DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY DURING THE MISSILE CRISIS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT CUBA...

Oh, yes. I think that we could have solved the problem of Cuba. As I say, if we had gone in with an invasion force. A lot of subsequent operation would have...difficulties would have been avoided.

WAS THIS MISSILE CRISIS KIND OF THE HEIGHT OF HIS ARROGANCE OR HIS...

Lack of integrity. . .

WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY LACK OF INTEGRITY?

Well, his sense of his own infallibility.

COULD YOU SAY THAT AGAIN, I'M SORRY.

McNamara's sense of his own infallibility. I told you that he -- One of his remarks was he never made a mistake except when he took the advice of somebody... that he shouldn't have.

YOU MENTIONED EARLIER THAT THE DECISION NOT TO INVADE WAS A KIND OF MORAL DECISION. DO YOU THINK THAT MORALITY SHOULD PLAY A PART IN MILITARY OPERATIONAL...

Oh, I think you can't avoid it. Particularly when you get involved in the possibility of civilian casualties.

HOW CLOSE DO YOU THINK WE CAME TO A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

I don't think we were very close at all.

CAN YOU SAY THAT IN A SENTENCE FOR ME?

Did we come close to a major confrontation with the Soviet Union. I think not too close because I think the Russians realized what the implications were and backed off.

THIS HAS BECOME KNOWN AS THE NUCLEAR CRISIS AND THE CLOSEST WE'VE COME TO NUCLEAR WAR AND THAT SORT OF THING. DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT ASSESSMENT?

Well, the possibility always existed, but I don't think it was a probability. They didn't want to engage us with the preponderance we had of power in the world, in the United States, in the Cuban area in particular. Right in the background of...backyard of the United States.

HOW IMPORTANT WAS THE NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY THAT THE UNITED STATES HELD IN THIS WHOLE THING?

We had significant nuclear power.

HOW IMPORTANT WAS THAT THOUGH IN THE RESOLUTION OF THINGS IN YOUR MIND. THE FACT THAT... CAN YOU EXPLAIN, FIRST OF ALL, WE HAD THIS NUCLEAR POWER GREATER THAN THEIRS AND WHAT IMPACT DO YOU THINK THAT HAD?

Well, I think the Russians realized we had a superiority. That after this was over, they went and greatly increased their nuclear strength and have achieved great superiority at the present time. But not to the extent where they could prevent having damage in their own backyard.

THAT'S IN A SENSE ONE OF THE AFTERMATHS OF THE MISSILE CRISIS — THAT THE SOVIETS BUILT UP THIS ENORMOUS...

That's right...

NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. DO YOU THINK THAT CAME OUT OF THEIR EXPERIENCE IN THE MISSILE CRISIS?

Well, I think that it was a Russian representative at the UN at the time who was negotiating for them. He said never again will the ...will... the Soviet Union be caught in a position of strategic inferiority.

IN A SENSE THAT'S ONE OF THE DOWN SIDES OF THIS WHOLE CRISIS, ISN'T IT?

Yes.

...IT LED TO A NUCLEAR ESCALATION?

Yes.

DO YOU THINK THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED?

No. I think the Russians realized it. That Khrushchev attempted a ploy and it didn't work. Didn't have enough strength to...carry it forward.

CAN I ASK YOU TO SAY THAT AGAIN?

No. I think that Khrushchev realized he attempted an operation and did not have enough strength to carry it out against what the free world had available to oppose him. And that's why he backed down.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION WHEN YOU HEARD THE NEWS THAT HE HAD BACKED DOWN AND THE INVASION THAT YOU HAD THOUGHT MIGHT BE INEVITABLE WAS NO LONGER REQUIRED?

Well, relief that the crisis was over. That it had not resolved the basic problems. That we'd have more problems in the years to come which we have had. Great pride in the American Navy. The performance of their officers and men. That we had a task to keep that good quality going in the future under difficult circumstances. Which we have.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE DEAL WHICH WAS MADE WAS A, THERE WAS A DEAL MADE, AS I UNDERSTAND IT TO EVENTUALLY REMOVE THOSE MISSILES FROM TURKEY AND TO PROMISE NEVER TO INVADE CUBA. DO YOU THINK THIS WAS A BAD DEAL? HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THAT ARRANGEMENT?

Well, I think the missiles we had in Turkey were relatively unimportant in the light of our total superiority. I think we've got them in more forceful and reaffirming our readiness to invade at any time. That would have put an inhibition on the Cubans.

IN A SENSE WHAT WE'VE GOT NOW AS A RESULT OF WHAT MANY PEOPLE REMEMBER AS A VICTORY FOR THE UNITED STATES IS WE'VE GOT A COMMUNIST COUNTRY PROTECTED BY THIS KIND OF AN UNWRITTEN AGREEMENT IN YOU KNOW, 90 MILES AWAY FROM FLORIDA. DO YOU SEE IT IN THOSE TERMS?

More or less.

HOW DOES THAT MAKE YOU FEEL?

Well, I'd like to keep the option open always to attack anybody who poses a threat to us.

INCLUDING CUBA?

Sure.

DO YOU THINK THAT MCNAMARA AND THE OTHERS WERE KIND OF HAD IN A WAY? WERE...

To some extent.

CAN YOU SAY THAT IN YOUR OWN WORDS?

Well, do I think that the United States made too much...too much of a commitment regarding the future operations? Yes, I think we did. Banning some of our freedom of action to operate in the future.

I UNDERSTAND AFTER THE MISSILE CRISIS, PRESIDENT KENNEDY CAME DOWN TO KEY WEST TO VISIT SOME OF PEOPLE WHO WERE INVOLVED IN THIS WHOLE OPERATION?

Yes, he did. I was there.

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT THAT EVENT?

Well, President Kennedy was very proud of the Navy performance. He wanted go over...around and let his President's... let his approval be known, which he did very graciously and effectively I think. I think the Navy had a re...recognition that it had done a good job. And the President had recognized it and appreciated it.

WAS MCNAMARA AT ALL APPRECIATIVE OF THIS OPERATION?

Never had him express an opinion.

WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE ESSENTIAL LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

Well, the one is absolute readiness of the Navy as a first line of defense. To be a...ready to operate, under conditions which are more or less unexpected. To perform well. And to give the President the confidence that he has in his military forces.

DO YOU HAVE ANY LESSON CONCERNING THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE? THE TYPE OF PERSON THAT'S REQUIRED FOR THAT JOB?

Well, I think the situation would have been a lot better off if we had a continuance of...that the missile crisis of Tom Gates who was McNamara's predecessor or some of his successors.

I THINK THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THIS NUCLEAR AGE WHOLE THING: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND THE NAVY AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. AND I DON'T WANT TO BELABOR THIS BUT I DON'T QUITE UNDERSTAND WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS BETWEEN YOU AND MCNAMARA. CAN YOU PUT IT IN A FEW SENTENCES FOR ME?

Well, McNamara was very strong in his positions, not based on knowledge. Wanted to please completely the President in office at the time. ...There's a lot of talk about reorganizing the Department of Defense these days of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I think the important thing is to insure that good people are put in on both sides of the aisle, so to speak. Both the Secretary of Defense and the service personnel. The problem can't be resolved by perpetuation of either uneducated or incompetent people in either position.

DID THE NAVY LEARN ANYTHING FROM THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS? FROM THE RUNNING OF THE OPERATION OF THE BLOCKADE OR QUARANTINE?

Oh, yes. They...greatly increased the staffing of the offices of the Secretary of Defense, I mean of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rather than having it in a war room up in...by the naval... in the Navy department... Sure, we learned a lot, too.

CAN YOU GIVE ME A SENSE OF WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN LEARNED OUT AT SEA OR IN THE OPERATION OF THINGS?

To recognize the inadequacies of the civilian leaders. To keep them better informed of what the naval capabilities are... limitations of our naval forces.

HOW ABOUT THIS WHOLE QUESTION OF WHAT YOU CALLED MEDDLING?

Oh, yes. To do the best you can to keep the...keep the operations of the civilians and the military in proper perspective. To have well-trained, ready, resolute forces. And let the Secretaries of Defense and the White House know that they were ready. Were properly indoctrinated and trained. To keep a flow of information going to them. And I think this has happened over the years.

I UNDERSTAND THERE WAS AN ENORMOUS INVASION FORCE STANDING BY. THERE WAS A COUPLE OF MARINE, I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE CORRECT TERM IS...

Marine divisions, marine expeditionary force. Yes, plus the… They brought some from the West Coast.

SORRY, I WAS INTERRUPTING. COULD YOU START THIS AGAIN?

Well, there were amphibious forces, Marines from the Atlantic and The Pacific. We brought Marines from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The... airborne forces from the Army. We had a great preponderance of military forces who'd been put in.

DID YOU HAVE ANY IDEA OF HOW LONG IT MIGHT TAKE TO TAKE -- DID YOU HAVE ANY INVASION PLAN IN TERMS OF HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO TAKE HAVANA OR TO CONTROL THE SITUATION?

It would have gone very rapidly. A matter of days. But the question was, What would the Russians have done with their missiles during that period of time? Could you have immobilized all of the missiles? As I said, you couldn't guarantee that every missile would not be fired.

JUST TRYING TO GET A SENSE OF WHEN THE THING WAS RESOLVED ON SUNDAY, WHAT YOUR FEELING WAS. WAS IT A SENSE OF RELIEF THAT THE INVASION WASN'T HAPPENING OR WAS IT A SENSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT IN A WAY THAT YOU WEREN'T ABLE TO GO IN AND CLEAR UP THE SITUATION?

Well, I would say a sense of disappointment that the basic problem of Cuba and Russian influence in Cuba had not been resolved. A relief that the major hostilities had ensued... Those are the two conflicting forces.

DO YOU LOOK BACK ON THIS PERIOD WITH WHAT SORT OF EMOTIONS NOW?

Oh, satisfaction of the performances of the Navy. Great confidence in the Navy's ability to do the job. Great pride in the accomplishments of the individuals at all levels. And a certain amount of apprehension of what would happen in the future on the part of the civilian Secretary of Defense as witnessed Vietnam.

DO YOU THINK THAT IN A SENSE WE WERE FORTUNATE THAT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS CAME TO THE RESOLUTION IT DID CONSIDERING THE TYPE OF MAN THAT YOU HAD TO DEAL WITH MCNAMARA?

Yes, I suppose so.

CAN YOU PUT THAT IN YOUR OWN WORDS FOR ME?

Well, as I say, we in the Navy had a great satisfaction in the performance of our personnel. That the Navy fulfilled its obligations. Pride. And a little apprehension of what the future would hold as witnessed later when Vietnam...