OKAY... GENERAL LEBEDEV, CAN YOU EXPLAIN TO ME WHAT WAS YOUR FUNCTION ON THE SALT DELEGATION?

Well, I was much younger at that time, and... my position was somewhat different. Therefore, I was simply a military expert. So, my main duties were primarily to consult members of our delegation on military matters. Well... later, after SALT II, I was already working as a member of the delegation. That was during the negotiations on armament reduction in Europe.

WHO WAS HIS COUNTERPART IN THE AMERICAN DELEGATION?

Well, the American delegation did not have any direct counterpart to me. I didn't take part, for instance, in plenary conferences. I fulfilled, shall I say, purely functional duties at that time. Well, anyway, I knew General Rowney pretty well,... we worked together,... I also knew the member,... to be precise... this... the Chair... the head of the delegation, Mr. Smith of SALT I... I'd like to repeat, though, I didn't have any direct, head-to-head contacts, so to speak — I didn't have that.

CAN HE DESCRIBE HIS FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH THE AMERICAN DELEGATION? AND... WHAT WAS HIS FIRST IMPRESSION OF THE PEOPLE HE ENCOUNTERED...?

You see, at that time the entire atmosphere was a bit different. SALT I, as well as the beginning of SALT II were characterized by, I would say, a reciprocal desire on both sides to achieve results. True, there were some bitter arguments, there were... also... compromises made by both sides, but most important was the feeling that both the American and Soviet sides were looking for a resolution to the problem. And that atmosphere, in turn, created this... climate of trust, I'd say, when the work was productive, and when both sides felt that they were united by the mutual cause they were working upon. That's how I'd describe the atmosphere that existed during the SALT I and SALT II negotiations. A-hm... you know, I wouldn't say there were any especially outstanding emotional outbursts during the meetings because we started the negotiations when the outline was more or less agreed upon, generally speaking. Well, for example, I mean SALT II, when the Vladivostok Summit had taken place before. That is, at that time the delegations had worked out the agreement in practical detailed terms, unlike today when they argue what to reduce and how... and whether to reduce it at all. Then the work was goal-oriented. Therefore, the military delegees met rather frequently... We had these... sort of trips, excursions together. Well, sometimes... even... it became... humorous, may I say... for example, when Soviet and American delegations met each other by chance somewhere in town, there was always a delegee among us yelling: "Hey, look, our guys are coming!" ... All-right.

IN TERMS OF ... SPECIFIC ISSUES... THAT HAD SOME MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.. WHAT WAS, IN HIS JUDGMENT, IN HIS OPINION, THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ABM TREATY INSOFAR?...

Well, one of the peculiarities of the SALT I negotiations was the fact that from the very beginning both Soviet and American sides faced one basic obstacle. We came there to agree, before all, on reducing nuclear arms, the offensive ones. But, after looking closely at the matter, it became clear to both sides that the main obstacle to the solution of this problem was the deployment of the anti-ballistic defense systems, then undertaken by both the United States of America and the Soviet Union, because neither side, be it Soviet or American, was prepared to reduce its offensive arms, knowing that the counterpart was developing his anti-ballistic defense. That was the moment of the birth of the idea, that first and foremost it was necessary to have an agreement on the reduction of anti-ballistic defense on both sides. That's why both sides began to work out the agreement on the limitations of the anti-ballistic defense systems. Therefore, I think that the ABM agreement... it became a cornerstone, a basis for the reduction of all other strategic offensive arms. And, in that sense, its importance, its significance remains relevant today also. If this agreement was undermined, I doubt we could reach an agreement with the United States of America on the reduction of strategic offensive arms.

CAN HE EXPLAIN THE ISSUE OF FORWARD BASING AS IT CAME INTO NEGOTIATION OF SALT I, AND WHAT WAS THE OPINION OF SOVIET MILITARY ABOUT THIS ISSUE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS?

The issue of nuclear means of forward basing of the United States of America was raised early during the first days of negotiations between our countries, during both SALT I and SALT II. Moreover, the Soviet side, from the very beginning, raised questions regarding the liquidation... of nuclear... er... of the means of forward basing... of the US nuclear forward basing... surrounding the Soviet Union. However, as you know, SALT I dealt exclusively with the issue of the ballistic missile reduction; strategic bombers were not discussed there... and, in order to solve the (immediate) problems, the Soviet side decided that... it would be proper for the time being to abstain from discussing the issue of US nuclear forward basing. During SALT II, though, this question reappeared, and remained a part of the agenda until the Vladivostok Summit. It was only at the Vladivostok Summit that the Soviet side made a considerable concession... though, there was undoubtedly a compromise, too. Yes, there also was a compromise... er...The American side said that we could have long-range rockets, and the long-range rockets would not be limited by any quota, while... the Soviet side... agreed not to discuss the question of US forward basing during SA II... SALT II as well. At the same time, the Soviet representative on negotiations, er... the Ambassador Semyonov, made it quite clear that though we dismissed this discussion for the moment, we had not terminated it, because, subsequently, during the proposed SALT III more... massive... strategic reductions were expected, and naturally, the specific role of nuclear forward basing would be noticeably increased within the general balance of nuclear power; and... to give up nuclear forward basing — I mean its reduction — was certainly not what the Soviet Union could then afford.

...IN... IN SALT.

Well, first of all, I would say that... sad as it is... but... every type of weapon that was ever invented 'till today was always first introduced by the United States of America... That also includes the nuclear armament of Europe. Just remember, August 6, 1945, the United States with a nuclear weapon in its possession for the first time started bombing Hiroshima. And, ever since the United States has led the arms race. It was the first to create a mighty air fleet of nuclear arm carriers. It started the ICBM deployment. It was the first to deploy the submarine missile carriers with nuclear weapons aboard. Later, it was the first to supply their ICBM with multi-heads, As early as 1948 the American bombers appeared in Europe,... with nuclear weapons capacity. A bit... later, somewhere about '60s, '50s... 1959-60 Europe saw the US middle-range missiles: TURF, Jupiters;... they were based in England, Italy, Turkey. Well, naturally, the Soviet Union could not just disregard it; it responded accordingly. Fairly quickly the Soviet Union also possessed... atomic weapons. Ballistic missiles were produced, too. Submarines also... but we did it as a result of being forced to. At last, somewhere... around the beginning of '70s an... approximate strategic parity was established between the Soviet Union and ... United States of America. This parity, mind you, was not a myth invented by the Soviet Union, nor is it my...personal invention; it was mentioned, and mentioned quite clearly in the SALT II agreement. It was SALT II, I think, that spelled out the existence of strategic parity between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. I think, the best proof of this... of this fact is the reason behind the United States' failure to ratify the SALT II agreement. As for today, for the very same reasons the Reagan administration simply undermined this agreement. The United States of America cannot accept the idea of equality. They simply can't accept an equal relationship with the Soviet Union. The United States leadership, it seems, has not yet adjusted its mentality — and, perhaps, never really wanted to — to the new reality, which would make them recognize the fact that it is acceptable to talk with the Soviet Union as an equal partner. By the way, to look back, SALT I and SALT II were both characterized by the feeling of equality on both sides; nobody tried to dictate his will to the other. That's how I would briefly outline the problem, or, if you wish, answer the question you asked.

REMIND THE GENERAL... TOGETHER.

I don't think it was a purely military... achievement. I think that the strategic parity... between the Soviet Union and the United States of America is the achievement of all the Soviet people, its engineers, its...scientists,... well, the military included. I think that...the achievement of military-strategic parity between... the United Sta... between the Soviet Union and the United States of America was, in my opinion, ... considerable factor in causing the United States of America to negotiate with the Soviet Union. Also, I would say, the very conclusion of the agreements made in 1972 by signing SALT II documents, were nothing but result of the fact that now the Soviet Union had to be considered as an equal, equivalently forceful power.

THERE IS... A DIFFERENCE IN THE WAY...AMERICAN WAY. TO THINK ABOUT STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND... SOVIET THINK ABOUT STRATEGIC WEAPONS...CAN YOU EXPLAIN IT FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW?

Well, first, I think... that everything regarding the strategic arms reduction talks between the... Soviet Union and the United States of America was clearly defined, and there were absolutely identical notions of strategic arms. That is, speaking of... ballistic missiles, it embraced those with the range of no less than 5000 kilometers. Also, included in the SALT II agreement were submarine-based strategic missiles, that... those which were based on modern submarines, atomic ones. And/or the missiles which were...which, though being modern themselves, were based on the old-type submarines. Also, the air strategic carriers were defined, i.e. long-range heavy bombers. Note that there were specific... specific types of planes, well, for the Soviet Union there were Tupolevs, Myasishchevs, and for the United States there were B-52s and, if I'm not mistaken, I think... they were already included...there were also B-1 heavy bombers. But... later... later, after the conclusion of SALT II, when both sides were following it, to be precise, in 1983... in October 1983, after the decision was made... no, it was even a bit later, after making a deci... yes, in October 1983, that was correct... — after the December Decision was made to rearm NATO, when the United States of America began to deploy their medium-range missiles Pershing-2s and their land-based cruise missiles on territorial Europe, — then, naturally, the Soviet Union could and had to consider them ... as being weapons of strategic tasks, of a strategic nature. Why? Simply because of the fact that these rockets were able to reach the deep regions of the European territory of the Soviet Union, they were....

That's what I'm about to start.. Why do we consider these medium-range weapons as strategic? Well, first, they're based within reach of the depths of the European territory of the Soviet Union; they can strike strategic objects, they can strike command centers, er... targets of national importance; thus, these arms have changed the strategic situation in Europe. We think these arms considerably augment the current strategic potential of the United States of America. Therefore, at one time the Soviet Union, while proposing liquidation... I mean, reduction of the nuclear arms of the USSR and USA...I mean, the strategic ones,...also included weapons capable of reaching each other's territories. That is, we meant that the the United States of America had nuclear arms capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union's missiles of medium-range capacity, such as the SS-20,... they... couldn't reach the territory of the United States of America. Though, later we conceded to some extent: in Reykjavik, as you know, er... — even earlier, before Reykjavik (Summit) — we... dismissed this question in order to speed up decision-making on strategic arms reduction,.. to facilitate the process.

IN RETROSPECT, MANY AMONG THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS... SPECIFICALLY KISSINGER — BUT THERE WERE ALSO OTHERS... THERE IS A REGRET THAT... THAT NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON MIRV AND ON ... CRUISE MISSILES, AND... ONE OF THE COMPLAINTS IS WHY THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT PUSH HARDER... IN THAT DIRECTION?

I don't think it's exactly so. Inasmuch as we talk about multi-head missiles, the Soviet Union proposed during the SALT II negotiations the following: each side should have rights to produce one more new type of ICBM, though, only a single-head one. Only with a single warhead. This proposal was not accepted by the American side. It was the American side that insisted on the rights to have yet another new type of ICBM with a choice of either single head, or MIRV. Indeed, there is a lot of talk that the SALT II agreement did not limit the number of warheads. I don't accept that either, because the SALT II agreement clearly defined which type of missiles was tested with single heads, and which had a warhead... was a multi-head reentry... vehicle. Apart from that, the number of warheads was limited for each type of intercontinental ballistic missile. Therefore, without even mentioning it, I'd say, there were built-in limitations on the number of warheads, including MIRVs, embraced by the SALT II agreement. Now, speaking of cruise missiles, be they air-based, or... land-based, or sea-based... cruise missiles,... it was the Soviet Union that first proposed a ban on this type of weapon, inasmuch as it was a new type of weapon. And it was only the United States of America, the United States of America, solely, that didn't want to give up long-range cruise missiles, I mean cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers. During the agreement... I mean, SALT II negotiations both sides agreed on limitations of air-based cruise missiles. As... for the cruise missiles of both the sea- and land-based types, they remained in the protocol of the agreement. And then, the United States of America — unilaterally, right after the expiration date of this protocol, without even consulting their negotiation partner, though, it was required by that... protocol and agreement — began cruise missile deployment, and production of cruise missiles of both land- and sea-based types. Therefore, the appearance of this particular kind of weapon is the sole responsibility of the United States of America.

(TRANSLATOR)

...I didn't understand... Well, as I mentioned before, SALT I was just the beginning stage of negotiations between the USSR and the Soviet Union, dealing with very sensitive problems regarding the national... interests of national security. Therefore, at that time, both sides restricted themselves by discussing just... I'd say, only basic limitations,... limitations of the basic parameters, and... the launching sites were limited...I repeat, only the silos... of ballistic were...

(TRANSLATOR)

Well, I mentioned already that it was, I'd say, only the beginning stage of negotiations, when...the sides wanted first to reach at least a minimal level of understanding. Only the limitations on the number of launching sites of ballistic missiles, both land- and submarine-based, were debated. Apart from it, at that time, only the United States of America possessed MIRVs, and not too many. The process of equipping rockets with multi-heads had just begun, speaking of land-based missiles, and...I would like to say, it was one of the examples of the US tendency not to include in the limitation agreement those very items which they themselves already possessed, while the other side still did not. A little bit later... A little bit later we would discover yet another interesting fact on the same theme, the fact that the Soviet Union did not have land- and sea-based cruise missiles in her possession, while the United States had already started testing such missiles; and, again, the very — er... a bit later, the same situation would be repeated, when the United States of America would try to avoid limitations on the type of arms the Soviet Union had yet to possess, in order to achieve military superiority, even within the framework of the concluded agreement.

SO...THAT WAS A... HOW WAS IT UNDERSTOOD BY HIM AT THAT TIME?... THE ABM... THERE WERE THREE-TO-ONE, FOUR-TO-ONE, TWO-TO-TWO...

Are you talking about regions?

YES, IT HAS TO DO WITH,... LOCATION OF THE DEFENSIVE...

So, it's about regions...

...HALF OF THE TIME HE SHOULD LOOK AT ME...

You're not taping me right now, though... Alright. Yes, indeed, your question is quite relevant... that,... during the negotiations about... —

HE DOESN'T... HE DOESN'T HAVE TO EXPLAIN, HE HAS ONLY TO... REACTING; WE CAN EXPLAIN MUCH FASTER THAN HE...

Got it. Yes, indeed, there were talks at that time about the quantity of regions approved as sites of anti-ballistic systems. And I think, for the very purpose of securing a ban on the territorial deployment of ABM systems, both sides, quite rightly, did not adopt the three-region principle; gave up, later the second region (to be defended) in the 1974 protocol; and left each side only one region. The sides were free to choose protection using their ABM for either their capitals, or for one of their ICBM bases. Well, as you know, the United States chose the Grand Forks (?) base, while the Soviet Union chose the region shielding our capital. And, I think, the decision was quite correct due to the very fact that only one region per side was being defended...in territories of the United States and the Soviet Union. And, with only one defendable region, you cannot organize the anti-ballistic defense of the entire territory of your country; it is not even possible to prepare a basis for deployment of such a system. That is, the very (basic) condition was fulfilled: it became possible not to create new arms capable of penetrating the anti-ballistic systems, i.e. it did not stimulate the offensive arms race. I think, this decision was very wise.

I DON'T REMEMBER PRECISELY, BUT... THE SITUATION WAS THAT AMERICA MADE A PRESENTATION, THE RUSSIANS ACCEPTED IT, AND THEN, THE AMERICANS CHANGED THEIR MIND...

Why, I do remember this proposal, made by both the American side and by our side... You see, both sides had agreed at the beginning to have two regions... two regions. Well, but later the United States of America, after having chosen regions to protect their ICBM silos suddenly proposed: "Let's have only one region each." Well, by that time the Soviet Union had already chosen (to defend) her capital and, thus, could not start to protect her intercontinental ballistic missiles. I think, that was the reason...that was the reason behind the United States' sudden desire to have only one region for each side.

THE...THE AMERICAN SIDE... CAN HE COMMENT ON THAT... THE DIFFERENT STRUCTURES OF TWO DELEGATIONS...

M-m-m... I didn't understand the question.

...THAT APPARENTLY... THE SECURITY...

I think, it's,... in general, a wrong impression, because,... the Soviet delegation was adequately informed about our arms. As for the details, the characteristics, the capacities of these arms, our military, quite naturally, knew more. That's why they served as the experts on military matters.

(TRANSLATOR. Translation of the American joke about Soviet secretiveness)

Ha-ha-ha... I don't think it's a funny joke... Well, not a funny joke. I know different case, ...during a talk with member of the delegation on the American side when the question of arms would come up, he would usually stop me and admit quite frankly: "I am not competent enough to debate on this issue, allow me, please, to invite the expert on this matter to join us." And that was, in my opinion, quite a correct move.

TELL ME MORE ABOUT YOUR OPINION... ABOUT PEOPLE LIKE... SMITH. YOU KNOW, WHAT WAS HIS... PERSONAL FEELING TOWARD SMITH... OR OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION.

I am very... I would say I had rather infrequent encounters with Mr. Smith on a personal level. I had meetings with General Rowny little bit more often, but...

NOW WE HAVE TO START AGAIN...

Well, I would like to say that, somehow, I cannot characterize Mr. Smith, because I... didn't have any personal contact with him... I did happen to have meetings with General Rowny. Well, what should I say... to define some of his character traits... is also...I can hardly do it, too,... because at that time...we were on two different levels. That's it. I started working closely with people only later, such as, let's say, with General Burns (?). Although, it was as late as the 1980 negotiations. Well... I can say he's quite a competent expert,...a competent expert, er...and, er... it would be alright to work with him, I'd say, but... BUT!... wouldn't it be for the GENERAL atmosphere in the United States of America. It felt that... — If during SALT II we were, as I mentioned before, looking for a mutually satisfactory solution, one, reciprocally acceptable, in 1980 there already was an absence of mutual understanding, even among the military, because the one-sided manner of defining issues was already felt from the American side...from the side of the American delegation. Well, it was creating, in turn, a certain atmosphere. The... day by day atmosphere,...more reserved, more alienated.

... MUCH...MUCH BROADER, MUCH, ... MORE IMPORTANT AND, ... SUBSTANTIAL THAN THOSE... WERE REJECTED. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY?

The first and foremost reason (behind the Soviet rejection) of the proposals made by President Carter was that they required liquidation of a significant number of the Soviet intercontinental missiles, including heavy rockets. That was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. That's why, at that time, we did not accept these proposals. This is the first reason. There was yet another one. By that time, in fact, — and if I'm not mistaken, that was in March 1977 — Secretary of State Vance came over here and brought these proposals, both a minimum and a maximum program, essentially a "package deal." Actually, had we started negotiating these new proposals, all talks would have to start all over again, from the very beginning. That meant to throw away almost five years (of previous contacts). Therefore, the Soviet Union decided that it would be better to talk...to stick to the agreements already arranged at that time, those that could be concluded in the shortest possible period. And both sides adopted this way, after all. ... Yes, we preferred the Vladivostok agreement, because the Vladivostok arrangement provided us with precisely outlined parameters of both delegations' goals. Well, as practice of negotiations subsequently showed, m-m-m... the Soviet side, including...Soviet military had had correct foresight. ... If it doesn't disturb you, I...

DURING THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS... SCHLESINGER'S DOCTRINE CAME ABOUT... CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT WAS THE MEANING OF IT TO THE SOVIET MILITARY?...

Well... the Schlesinger's Doctrine was quite frank, in the sense ... that the strategic arms of the United States of America were always oriented toward counter-strike; that is, to combat Soviet strategic objects, the arms. By the way, ... this striving for precision, for the higher striking capacity of their strategic arms, was always characteristic of the United States of America, throughout the entire history of the development of her strategic forces. It was Schlesinger, though, who spelled it out, made it a cornerstone of all the activity of both industry and the Pentagon, i.e. to confidently establish their counter-strike capacity against the strategic forces of the Soviet Union. That's what I would say about this concept. ... If I don't know something, I would speak right to Obuch (the translator?) to help...

... NEGOTIATIONS OF JUST BEFORE... THE PRESIDENT CARTER...CANCELLED THE PRODUCTION OF B-1. ... WEREN'T YOU SURPRISED THAT IT HASN'T BECOME A PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WASN'T CANCELLED UNDER THE PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION?

Well, I wouldn't say that the production was really cancelled. That is first. The work on the B-1B bomber, in fact, continued. ... and, in general, we weren't surprised by the fact that the United States of America suspended deployment of this bomber at that time. Well, at first, we weren't surprised that even the American military, the Defense Secretary Mr. Brown, in particular, were supporting this idea. But, as one can see, the United States of America later started deployment of this bomber, anyway. And in the near future this bomber will take one of the most important places within the Strategic Air Force of the United States of America.

IT DIDN'T BECOME A COIN OF EXCHANGE, ... WITH THE AMERICAN DELEGATION... IT WAS CANCELLED BY THE PRESIDENT...

Well, as I already noted, in my opinion it was not a cancellation. I think, that was rather a forced postponement; at that time, I mean, the plane still needed some finishing work. And... as I mentioned already...time merely proved this fact.

... HIS THINKING, THE REAL NEGOTIATION, WHEN THE MX DECISION WAS BEING MADE IN THE STATES?...

Well, to recall the story of the MX missile, it did have some negative effect on the negotiation process, because, as you probably know, at the beginning this missile had to be installed in all kinds of covered silos. There was...a so-called "leaping circle;" there also were separate shelters the mobile launcher could enter, ... with its rocket — there were many such shelters. And this way of deployment, as it was stated by the Soviet government, by the Soviet side — this way, ... violated one of the basic principles of... the SALT II agreement, the principle of control, the principle of... not obstructing control by national- technical means. Therefore, the Soviet side then objected. And...consequently, as you know, these missiles are now going to be installed in specially made shafts. Though, this will be only for the first fifty of them. But there already are plans for the next fifty missiles to be mounted on platform railway cars, mobile version of them. Anyway, this could be controlled by national technical means. But the things previously proposed during SALT II were obviously contradicting... those... conditions of control which were established in the agreement, and obstructing control by national technical means...Well, this notorious directive about the possibility of localized war adopted by the United States of America... well, at that time it, of course, ... didn't affect the negotiations, inasmuch as, ... not immediately... inasmuch as negotiations were on the strategic arms of the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Though, the doctrine per se, was certainly considered as negative, because there could be no limited war, especially within Europe, That is, it would be impossible to regulate such a war. Were it to erupt in Europe, it would certainly spread all over the globe. I mean, both the Soviet Union and the United States of America would be fully involved. Therefore, the Soviet reaction to this doctrine was, naturally, quite negative.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE YOUR FEELINGS WHEN THE SALT II AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED?

I felt that the ice started probably melting. Perhaps, I thought, the time had come when both sides really started practicing what they preached; when the reduction of nuclear arms would begin; when, upon completion of the reduction agreed upon by SALT II, the opportunity to start the SALT III negotiation would arrive, allowing us to proceed much further, quantity- and quality-wise, on the strategic arms reduction.

WHAT ABOUT... WHAT ABOUT... SALT II?

Are you asking me about SALT I? ... Well, (I felt) that... perhaps, the question of the nuclear arms reduction was solvable... That it could be solved. Could be solved with the United States of America, and, should both sides want to reach an agreement, one could be reached.

WHAT WOULD YOU THINK ABOUT BATTLES FOR VERIFICATION OF SALT II, DID YOU FOLLOW IT? AND WHAT WAS HIS FEELING OF THAT?

I didn't quite understand the question... (TRANSLATOR) Well, I simply referred to the facts that I knew first-hand. I mean, the fact of the issue of control being included in the SALT II agreement. The basis of this control was the national technical means. Apart from that, there was an agreement as to the exchange of certain information between sides such as the ballistic missile ... launchings; and... the entire volume of of agreements embraced by SALT II was... ...in my opinion, quite satisfactory served by, ... the regulations of, or, within the framework of the agreed control. Therefore, the talks about the supposed... uncontrollability of some of the parameters of the SALT II agreement... which... were heard in the United States of America, were quite puzzling to me at that time... It seemed to me that... somebody was simply trying to discredit these agreement... by using this very issue, the issue of control.

ONE MORE THING... BUT ASK HIM TO THINK VERY HARD. SOME ANECDOTES THAT RELATE TO THE COST OF NEGOTIATIONS... WHICH HAVE... MORE PERSONAL, AND LESS FORMAL TEXTURE... EXCHANGES, TRIPS THAT WERE TAKEN...

Well, human texture... human face... There were many such events. But, I have to admit, you have already exhausted me too much to expect me to recall a particular anecdote. ... Usually, these... Well, you know, it's really hard now to recollect these things. It's simply hard: these things are usually recalled in more casual situations...