My understanding is that the commitment by this time was quite strong. We can ah get back later to the text of some of the messages exchanged between Mr. Thieu and Mr. Nixon before the conclusion of the Paris Agreement.

But, at the San Clemente meeting, our understanding was that ah the message was in clear terms, you can count on us. And, Mr. Thieu believed strongly in this commitment from the President of the United States, Mr. Nixon by that.

Okay.

Of course, prior to the signing of the Paris Agreement in 1973 there was an exchange of messages between Mr. Thieu and Mr. Nixon, but at the San Clemente meeting our understanding was, you can count on us, the message, I mean. And, Mr. Thieu believed it strongly in this kind of commitment from the President of the United States, Mr. Nixon, by this time.

Of course, all of us know that ah there was, and still is, a strong debate eh about the right and wrong of the US commitment in Vietnam for more than indicated between the '65 and til the end in '75. But, eh, I would like to stress the point of view of a Vietnamese who look at the problem and who happen to have ah participated here in Washington in many of the developments at this time. Let us put aside the problem of right and wrong of the US commitment in South Vietnam.

But, from the point of view of the Vietnamese, we would say that we think the US in terms of a responsible great nation whether it was wrong or right, we hoped and we believe strongly by then that the United States would believe as a respectable nation. Suppose that you are wrong by this time, you cannot say after committing the more than half a million troops in South Vietnam and well, putting the whole house in shambles and say that well, we are wrong. Let us ah call it quits and you leave the country.

We, Vietnamese, we cannot think of the US adopting such an attitude. We understand that for one reason or another, the United States would consider theeee, some sort of solutions in South Vietnam. Not exactly the way it had been expected by the time the US began to get involved in South Vietnam, but we didn't expect that that suddenly the US drop South Vietnam. And ah we thought it by then that this attitude is not the attitude of a responsible country.

This is what you believed in 1974?

Yes.

As a man who lived in Washington at this time and who traveled back and forth between Saigon and Washington, to a certain degree I understood then the complexities of the problem, the preoccupation of the US and all the international problems and the Watergate problem too in 1975.

But, for the man in the street in Saigon, for the common man in South Vietnam, it was quite difficult for them to understand the attitude of the US, because in their mind they thought, they did not care about the right and wrong of the original US commitment in South Vietnam. They knew only one thing. The US was there with half a million men with a lot of problems to them, and they thought that by the time the US made it out of South Vietnam quite a house in shambles, they would expected from the US a different attitude than the kind of quick drop that the US had adopted, quick drop policy that the US had adopted by this time.

Thank you. Cut.

Obviously, Mr. Thieu was really disappointed when he saw that Mr. Nixon resigned because eh he had nnnn the strong belief that Mr. Nixon somehow would help him in South Vietnam. But ah after one day or two of dis—disappointment Mr. Thieu received another letter from President Ford by then and I remember that it was quite a strong effect on Mr. Thieu because Mr. Thieu brought the letter written by President Ford then and he read the letter to the whole cabinet meeting in Saigon and it was quite a strong effect on all those people over there and they thought that well, even if Mr. Nixon resigned, they can still believe it on a commitment from the US to help South Vietnam.

Cut. Excellent.

I think that Mr. Thieu was a complex man by nature. In spite of the fact that he had been elected regularly as president of South Vietnam, he had a constant concern about the opposition and he felt that to a certain degree it was insecure because the US can do a lot of things in South Vietnam.

And, consequently, he kept it asking himself the question, what the US would be up to? What kind of policy? He believed strongly in the US commitment in South Vietnam in general terms. But, as far as his ah personal position is concerned that is another problem.

Mr. Thieu was a man of a very complex nature. In spite of the fact that he had been regularly elected as president of South Vietnam, he was ah concerned about ah the opposition. And, ah, he knew by then that the American had great influence on internal politics of South Vietnam.

So, in spite of the fact that that generally speaking he believe in a strong US commitment in South Vietnam, he had some...some concern, some questions about his ah, the US attitude toward himself you see as president of South Vietnam and as a politician.

Cut.

For a period of ah let's say nine months and one year after the signing of the Paris Agreement, there was a period of comparatively calm in South Vietnam. But, immediately after that the situation gradually deteriorated.

First of all, the inflation was up to fifty and sixty percent, and the the diminishment of...in terms of ah American economic aid and, most importantly, military aid, because we couldn't replace the spare parts, and ah we have not enough oil to fly the planes, and ahm, the Communists intensified their attacks along the corridor of ah the eh Laos and Cambodian border and ah the political opposition in South Vietnam became quite, quite vocal. So, it was quite a dangerous situation.

But somehow, it was eh rather an unreal atmosphere ahhh—unreal atmosphere in the sense that we went through a lot of crisis before that. We went through a kind of military offensive at the Tet '68. We went through the kind of military offensive from the North in '72 and ah the Communists came quite close to take over South Vietnam, but somehow, we survive.

And, so, there was an unreal atmosphere in the sense that we believe that somehow we could get out of it and it explained to a certain degree the kind of psychological shock after the withdrawal from Pleiku and Kon Tum and after the debacle in Da Nang and in Hue. So, unreal atmosphere in spite of a lot of difficult problems, almost unsurmountable problems for South Vietnam.

Okay.

Obviously, Vietnam had a lot of problems even before '75. After the Paris Agreement we had a period of comparatively calm for almost nine and twelve months and after that the situation gradually deteriorated.

The situation deteriorated, not only on the military field, because the Communist intensified their attacks, but on the political, economic and social fronts too. The situation deteriorated because we had no more at the previous level the US economic aid, and the inflation was by then up to fifty and sixty percent per year.

More than that, in the political opposition to Mr. Thieu's government became very, very vocal by then. So, all eh these difficulties combined together made the situation very, very dangerous.

And, precisely at this time, the Communist set up to launch their offensive in March 1975. To a certain degree, they succeeded by the kind of mistakes committed by the South Vietnamese themselves. I am talking about the withdrawal from Pleiku and Kon Tum. This withdrawal from Pleiku and Kon Tum, whether it was a kind of tactical or strategic withdrawal, the military strategists and tacticians would argue about it. But, somehow, it provoked a kind of psychological effect on South Vietnam in general.

The withdrawal alone with hundreds of thousands of refugees along the road that described by the press and seen on TV, and in the same time, immediately after that the the debacle in Hue and in Da Nang created an impression that the collapse is coming. And, everyone was running to some sort of cover.

If South Vietnam was helped by them, perhaps it would be...a kind of boost in morale, and by then the Vietnamese the South Vietnamese, I mean, could stand longer. To what extent they could stand against the Communist offensive prepare by the South Vietnamese, how long they could stand it, that is an open question. And, it is a matter of, I would say right now, open debated right now.

But, South Vietnam by then had a lot of difficulties, of course, but in the same time, there is a combination of very unfortunate circumstances. And, this kind of unfortunate circumstances came from the psychological shock provoked, by the debacle in Pleiku and Kon Tum and in Da Nang and Hue.

What was, what was the role of of leadership? The problem with leadership? How did that affect it?

The overall problem of leadership, of course, was a prime factor in the defeat of South Vietnam. From my strictly personal point of view, and I stress it many time my point to Mr. Thieu himself.

Eh. The leadership was focusing too much on the appearance of the problem and not enough on the substance of the problems in terms of getting on the South Vietnamese united together and in getting the machine of the government completely clean of all the elements which provoked the deterioration of the situation — I am talking about corruption and I am talking about the the lack of ah annn real concern about the situation.

Could you talk about Mr. Thieu's isolation and his growing isolation from the Americans and from his own advisors?

Well, I don't know how to define it his attitude by then, but I know for sure that ah his contact with the Americans were not so were not so frequent, the way it had been before, and ah somehow there was a lack of ah understanding between the two side. Nobody talk about it. What should be done. What could be done in very in general terms ehhhh you see. What should be the strategy in such ahh circumstances and so forth, you see.

And, ah more than that ah ehhh Mr. Thieu believe perhaps in his own star and he believe that the other Vietnamese were unable to help him. I happen to keep another opinion about this problem.

I constantly urged him after the signing of the Paris Agreement to adopt another policy toward the South Vietnamese, in general, and to try to get all the Vietnamese together because we have to face now a very important period in our history, and that the US from my point of view, because I was still traveling between Washington and Saigon, my point of view was that the American was trying to disengage gradually of, in from South Vietnam.

And, so consequently, there was still almost a very limited period of time during which we could count on the US and that during this very limited period of time we should try to slam them as much as we can the ranks of the South Vietnamese united together and try to improve the image of South Vietnam abroad because you remember that this, at this time Mr. Thieu was attacked as a kind of dictator, you see. I would hope that he was more dictator than that, but in fact, he was between halfway between dictator and benevolent gover—eh ruler of South Vietnam.

How did he react to this kind of suggestion?

Well, normally, he listened carefully to all these kind of suggestions and we discuss frankly about it to certain extent. I don't know why he ah he ah accepted this kind of su...discussions with me, but he constantly tried to postpone the decisions, you see. Ah. I realized that ah in many cases he admitted that I was right and he didn't try to take the counterpoint of it but he said simply that let us wait a little while and we'll see. And, so, with this kind of wait-and-see attitude from Mr. Thieu was extremely costly.

Cut.

I left my post as ambassador to this country in '72 but I came quite often after that to this country. Almost every two months as ambassador at large to try to improve the image of South Vietnam — talking with the news media, talking with members of the Congress and talking to the members of the administration. But, I sense that gradually after '73, it was as if I talk to, into a deaf ears, you see.

Ehh. It is very difficult to get the appointment with the Congressmen and the senators. Some of the Congressmen and the senators who had been favorable to our cause before and began to waiver and ah by then they talk in terms of preoccupation of the US in all the areas in the Middle East mainly with the oil crisis and with all the international developments of the situation by then. So, it was extremely, extremely difficult to talk about a problem of South Vietnam in '73 and later on in '74 and '75.

What was it like in 1975 at the very end as you were asking for emergency aid?

I came back ah to this country in at the end of March '75 to argue for more eh emergency military aid. Ah. On the side of the administration eh I got some sort of encouragement in spite of the fact that everybody thought without saying it to me that it was pretty late, but by the time I got to the members of the Congress and members of the Senate well it was real, real difficult. Nobody talk about it, nobody want to talk about it.

Cut.

I stressed the point with Dr. Kissinger when I came here before the Paris eh Agreement signature that for South Vietnam it was a que...question of life and death, while for the US perhaps it was a question of one more chapter in the US history. Ehh. I felt very, very disappointed myself and ah I think that ah...as a small nation Vietnamese, eh the Vietnamese people suffer a lot because ah somehow the country is lost right now to the Communist.

And, ah, probably it would serve as a lesson from other countries, especially small countries. The small countries should think over twice before putting all the eggs in one bag. Each country has perhaps its own interest and ah a nation how big it is can at some special circumstances behave completely the different way the small countries expect them to behave.

In a certain sense you're saying that it seems to you that what happened in Vietnam had very little to do with Vietnam. The Americans weren't really concerned about it. Is that right?

To a certain degree we thought and eh we still think that ah eh the US by then had other preoccupations which were perhaps more important for the US than for the Vietnamese people itself, and that is why the US did adopt this kind of drop policy the way it was in ‘45 in in in April, 1975.

Cut.

Well, we should elabor...

If, if you would elaborate on this point?

Before the signing of the Paris Agreement, I came to Washington to argue our case with Dr. Kissinger and I said to him that, while for the US it is perhaps a chapter in the US history, but for the South Vietnamese who try to fight for freedom it is a matter of life or death. My argument at this time didn't go too far because air we understood and I think that to a certain degree right now we understand it the American administration had other preoccupations.

I would say that the American people, not only the American administration, perhaps the administration would like to do something to help us, but, caught in a very special situation. Internal politics here in this country, the mood of the public opinion. All the international problems in the horizon. The US adopted this kind of attitude toward South Vietnam. We were really disappointed about it.

Okay.

Not enough from my point of view.