THE FIRST QUESTION IS DID YOU AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN GENERAL REACT TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S CALL FOR AN ERA OF NEGOTIATION IN 1969?

Well, it was a positive answer. We did think that the time has come to start serious negotiations on controlling nuclear arms race. Especially because at that time there were new developments in the technology of weaponry, and it was high time we should sit down and discuss seriously what to do with the nuclear arms race.

WERE YOU SKEPTICAL ABOUT AMERICAN INTENTIONS?

Well, of course, we did have a lot of skepticism, and we think quite founded one. Because when we first--we were first approached by the Americans, we thought that they would like to limit those areas of Soviet strategic might in which we were perhaps ahead, and they wanted to keep those areas of the United States strategic weaponry in which the United States was ahead. So we thought that it was not fair enough.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE INCREASING SOVIET OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY AND THE VIETNAM WAR WERE WHAT HELPED THE UNITED STATES TO COME TO WANT AN ERA OF NEGOTIATION?

I think that many factors were instrumental. One of them was of course, the speedy development of the Soviet capability which was of course in follow-up of our Sputnik, the first Sputnik. Secondly, it was the US involvement which deepened at that time in the Vietnam War. And of course an important factor was the realization of the United States establishment that arms control, arms race might get out of hand, out of control. And that some effort should be made in order to limit, at least to limit if not to start the downward movement towards stopping it. So there was a number of factors involved.

INITIALLY, WHEN ROBERT MCNAMARA TRIED TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET UNION TO BRING ABOUT-- TO START TO LIMIT THE ABMS, THE SOVIET UNION TOOK THE POSITION THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT TO LIMIT DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. AND THEN THEY CHANGED THEIR MIND, YOU CHANGED YOUR MIND FOR SALT, THE BEGINNING OF SALT I. WHAT BROUGHT ABOUT THAT CHANGE OF MIND?

Well, of course at that time the important question was whether we should limit ABM capability. At that time the Soviet Union started to establish its own ABM system around Moscow, which I think is called in the United States, the Galosh system. And American proposal to cut it down, to put an end to this was, of course, viewed with some suspicion. We thought that it's important to create an ABM point system -- it's a point system of ABM, a point defense system -- at least because of the possibility of any unsanctioned or a unauthorized nuclear missile launching. And that's why we looked with suspicion. But then we came to the realization of an important fact. Which I think one of the underlying reasons for the whole further development in this in this field. That defensive and offensive weapons are very closely interconnected. You cannot do away with one category of weapons without doing away with the other category. This was a, an important realization, to which we come somewhere at the, at the end of the '60s. And that was the theoretical background for a SALT I effort.

SO FOR SALT I DID THE SOVIET UNION FEEL THAT YOU WERE BASICALLY MAKING AN AGREEMENT TO AGREE TO THE WHOLE STRATEGICAL SITUATION OF MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION? THAT WAS THE DOCTRINE BY WHICH YOU WOULD BE GOING BY?

No, we didn't-- we never accepted this doctrine. We don't accept this doctrine.

COULD YOU START AGAIN AND SAY "MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION" SO WE'LL KNOW WHICH DOCTRINE?

We we do not accept MAD, or Mutual Assured Destruction as a worthwhile doctrine. We do not believe in this doctrine. We think that this doctrine is a -- very detrimental. Mm, and our efforts, to promote SALT I exercise, SALT I operation, was because we thought that this effort will limit the reliance of the United States on this doctrine. This, this effort will start the trend, the movement towards the complete abolishment of nuclear weapons.

SO WOULD YOU REPEAT THE KEY REASON WHY YOU WERE OPPOSED TO THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION?

The MAD -- the Mutual Assured Destruction -- is the doctrine based on nuclear deterrence, based on the maintenance of nuclear weapons. We believe that nuclear weapons should be abolished, not maintained. And of course you cannot do it overnight. It's a difficult and strenuous effort that can make this effort to be to be achieved. And but we thought that SALT I effort was the first step in the right direction. To do away with this reliance on nuclear weapons.

NOW, HOW DID THE RECOGNITION, THE GENERAL RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD AT LARGE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD REACHED A STATE OF RELATIVE PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, HOW DID THAT AFFECT THE POSITION OF THE USSR IN THE WORLD?

I think this, the realization that there is a parity, a rough parity or approximate parity -- there cannot be a total i-identical situation, total identical situation -- this realization I think was helpful in an effort to come to first agreements in the field of limitation of both ... offensive and defensive strategic weapons. This was an important factor behind this effort.

WHAT WERE THE SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN TERMS OF SALT I? WHY DID YOU COME TO THE TALKS AND WHAT DID YOU HOPE TO GET OUT OF IT?

We, we, our major objective was to start the process of nuclear disarmament. And we thought, and we still think, that SALT I was a very good way to start this process. And it was a successful start. And I believed then, as I believe today, that we were able to do this in a historically short time. It took us I think about two and a half years I think, to reach SALT I. It was a short time for a new exercise, for a completely new operation.

WAS THERE ANYTHING SPECIFIC GOING ON IN THE UNITED STATES AT THAT TIME THAT THE SOVIET UNION REALLY WANTED TO REACH SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT TO STOP?

I'm looking at you. Mm, well of course any-- I wouldn't say anything specific. I would say that there is in our view, the United States has been constantly trying to go ahead of us in nuclear weapons. Not, not only in nuclear weapons, in the delivery systems, in overall military situation. Because whatever weapon you take, the United States was the first to develop it. So there was nothing specific at that time. This has been a constant process. We wanted to prevent the United States, prevent the world from another spiral in the arms competition.

NOW, ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. WHY DIDN'T THE SOVIET UNION REALLY PUSH FOR A BAN, SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT ON THE MIRVS AT THOSE TALKS?

Well, we did want to put an end to MIRVs then. But we realized soon that the United States was so intent on going on with this, so we were not able to reach that uhm, goal. We, we did reach to some extent, that goal later on, during SALT II.

WHEN WE TALKED WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER, HENRY KISSINGER, HE SAID THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN REALLY INTERESTED IN MAKING AN AGREEMENT ON MIRVS, THEY WOULD HAVE REALLY PUSHED FOR IT AT SALT AND MADE A MORE REALISTIC PROPOSAL. BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION HAD REALLY PUSHED FOR OTHER THINGS THEY REALLY WANTED AT SALT.

You see, at that time, we did have some hope for a time, that the United States might not go along, might not, might not go on with the, with the MIRV project. Of course, MIRV project did mm did m-make the whole th-- thing more difficult. But we were we knew very well that the United States were not prepared to do and go along with the idea of limiting it's MIRV program.

HOW DID YOU KNOW THAT?

It's off the record, because I just don't know this. So don't ask me this, I don't know. I knew that there was a realization that the United States will not accept this. I say it not for the record, because we wanted to have a start. And if we brought into the picture the MIRV thing, we wouldn't have achieved anything.

SO YOU BASICALLY THINK IT WAS TOO DIFFICULT, TOO BIG A STEP TO TRY TO TAKE AT SALT I?

Yeah, it was, it was, it was a too big a step. It was a too big a step. And we knew then that the United States was not prepared to do away with the MIRV project.

THAT LEFT YOU IN A SITUATION WHERE THE UNITED STATES WAS TRYING TO LIMIT YOUR ONLY ONGOING OFFENSIVE PROGRAM -- OFFENSIVE PROGRAMS, ICBMS AND SOBMS, BUT YOU WEREN'T GOING TO TRY TO LIMIT THE ONLY US ONGOING OFFENSIVE PROGRAM, WHICH WAS MIRVS.

We wanted in a nutshell, we wanted a start. We wanted to find a solution that would be a quick solution, so that we could, after reaching the first agreement, we could go on further to next agreements, to the whole series of agreements, one following the other, one more radical than the previous ones. That was our major goal. That, that's why we didn't want to place-- to put before us too ambitious a ideas. We wanted something which would be realistic. And we did have quite a good idea as to what could be feasible then. And as I, as I want to repeat again that we did it in a in a quite a short time, overall.

SO WAS THERE A SENSE THAT IT WOULD MAKE MORE SENSE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO GET TO THE SAME STAGE THAT US WAS IN TESTING MIRVS BEFORE TRYING TO TALK ABOUT THEM AT SALT? AND WAS THE SOVIET UNION AWARE AT THAT TIME WHAT LATER CAUSED A BIG CONTROVERSY, THAT BECAUSE OF THE LARGER SOVIET MISSILES THAT ONCE SOVIET MISSILES WERE MIRVED THEY WOULD ACTUALLY BE AN ADVANTAGE ON THE SOVIET SIDE?

See in general we did realize quite soon that United States would be prepared to do something with this or that category of weapons when they did see for themselves that the Soviet Union was on a par with the United States, or close to being on a par with the United States. That was the idea that was advocated by many United States representatives then. So that's why we were trying to reach realistic goals. And I think that is the right way to proceed.

SO, BUT WERE YOU AWARE THAT ONCE YOU HAD MIRVED YOUR MISSILES THAT YOU WOULD ACTUALLY HAVE AN ADVANTAGE AGAINST THE AMERICAN MIRVS?

No. We never tried to reach any advantage. We the whole process over the post-war era, over the post-war period, was that we were catching up with the United States, in different areas of weaponry. We, we never were ahead of the United States. We always caught up with them. And this process has been going on for forty years, and perhaps it's about to put an end to this and to abolish everything at the same time in a short period of time. And to put an end to this continuous process of one country trying to get ahead, the other country trying to catch up.

SO LET ME SEE IF I'M GETTING WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IN A NUTSHELL. YOU'RE SAYING THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ONE STEP AT A TIME, AND YOU COULD DO WHAT YOU DID IN SALT I, AND THEN MOVE ON TO MIRVS AS A NEXT STEP, AND THAT THE THING THAT WOULD GIVE THE UNITED STATES THE INCENTIVE TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT ON MIRV WOULD BE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT?

Well, at that time we thought that we should do in a step by step way to reach one goal after the other. Now after about fifteen or seventeen years since then, we come to a conclusion that this approach is not the right approach. Now we have come to a conclusion that we should try to work harder to work faster to accelerate the whole process. Because we cannot catch up with the development of technology. That is the basis of our recent ideas of how to stop the arms race in a short period of time.

WHY WAS THE SOVIET UNION INITIALLY OPPOSED TO MAKING AN OFFENSIVE AS WELL AS A DEFENSIVE AGREEMENT IN SALT I?

We had some suspicions of the United States because we thought that they might wish to put an end to our modest project of ABM defense around Moscow. And that's why we -- for the...in the beginning stages of these negotiations we were trying to find out what was the real United States goal and intention. And and then we come to a...came to a conclusion that we could agree to some joint effort which would limit at the same time both defensive and offensive systems. That was the rationale behind the SALT I agreements.

BUT INITIALLY THE SOVIET UNION SAID, WE JUST WANT TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT ON ABMS FOR NOW. AND MAYBE WE'LL DO OFFENSIVE IN THE FUTURE. WHY WAS THAT?

Cut it out. I just don't know. I don't recall.

WHAT WAS THE ARGUMENT THAT YOUR DELEGATION PRESENTED ABOUT INCLUDING THE US FOREIGN BASES IN NATO IN THE SALT I AGREEMENT?

The reason is obvious because we have geographically asymmetric situations. The United States is divided from the rest of the world by oceans. And we are surrounded by United States forward based weapons in Europe and in Asia too. So this has been a perennial problem with us. And this problem stays, because we have geometrically geographically different situations. For instance the. ..the present Pershings II can reach the Soviet territory in a matter of minutes. While say the Soviet ICBMs can reach the United States only in a matter of half an hour or so. So this is the situation in which is of concern to us. It has been, and is still of concern to us.

SO WHAT DID YOU THINK WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REDRESS THAT IN SALT I?

In SALT I we wanted to discuss the forward-based weapons too. But then we, when we saw that it is impossible to ...to reach that goal, then we without giving up this position. Without relinquishing our right to raise this matter in future, we agreed to the SALT I. But also saying we shall take up this matter later on.

I UNDERSTAND THAT ONE OF THE BIG QUESTIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF SALT I IN HELSINKI WAS JUST THE TWO DELEGATIONS AGREEING ON WHAT THE DEFINITION OF A STRATEGIC WEAPON WAS.

Yes, that's correct.

COULD YOU TALK ABOUT THAT A LITTLE?

Yes, of course that was important to agree. It was a difficult thing to agree. Because for the United States strategic weapons is something which may be over 5,000 kilometers but for the Soviet Union United States weapons close to the Soviet territory may be just 500 or 1,000 kilometers. This is a difficult problem which is based on the objective situation in the world, because of the geographic asymmetry. Now after a long wrangling, they did agree to a definition of strategic weapons that was a definition for the purpose of a SALT I agreement. That... that may not be a definition forever. But for a SALT I agreement that was the definition accepted I believe it's 5,500 kilometers. That is the...I think the shortest distance between the Soviet Union and the United States. But we still believe that the problem of forward-based weapons exists and of course we...will be discussing and trying to reach agreement on this problem in the future.

NOW IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED THERE WAS A LOT OF PROTEST BY PEOPLE WHO THOUGHT THAT IT WAS UNFAIR THAT THE SOVIET UNION GOT A HIGHER LEVEL OF SLBMS AND ICBMS, ESPECIALLY SLBMS OVER IN THE INTERIM OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT. WHAT WAS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THAT?

Well it was not I don't think it was ever officially discussed. I can give you my personal view on that. I believe that this justification of slightly more numerical numbers of the Soviet SLBMs is that again here we have a different geographic situation. I mean in order to be in an equal status with the United States as to the numbers of SLBMs adequately placed in the oceans we have to cover longer distances and that was the reason behind -- and that was the reason which was understood by the United States side. That is why it was possible to reach agreement on SALT I.

WAS IT ALSO IN SOME WAY A COMPENSATION FOR THE FORWARD BASES, AND THE BINDING PARTS?

I don't know. I don't think so. I think this is the -- the main is a geographical factor, but again as I said this was never officially discussed by the Soviet authorities and this is my personal explanation.

WERE YOU SITTING IN ON THE SESSIONS WHEN THE UNITED STATES PRESENTED THAT SERIES -- AFTER THEY HAD SORT OF WITHDRAWN THE ONE-TO-ONE NCA, ABM AGREEMENT PROPOSAL THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACTUALLY AGREED TO? AND THEN LATER ON IN THE SESSIONS THEY SUBMITTED THE FOUR-TO-ONE, THE THREE-TO-ONE, THE TWO-TO-ONE AND THE ZERO-ZERO AGAIN? WERE YOU THERE AT THAT TIME?

No, I was not.

DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE REACTION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS TO GETTING THIS NEW SET OF PROPOSALS THAT WAS SO DIFFERENT FROM THE ORIGINAL ONE?

I'm sorry. Either I was not present there or I just don't recall this. I'm sorry about that.

THAT'S OK. ON TO ANOTHER SUBJECT THEN. IN 1968, THE UNITED STATES CANCELLED THE SALT TALKS THAT HAD BEEN PLANNED AFTER THE SOVIET UNION WENT INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HOWEVER THE USSR DIDN'T CANCEL THE TALKS WHEN THE UNITED STATES INVADED CAMBODIA IN 1970 OR JUST BEFORE THE SUMMIT WE BOMBED HANOI AND MINED HAIPHONG HARBOR. WHY DIDN'T YOU REACT TO THESE OTHER ADVANCES?

We do not believe in reacting on a quid pro quo thing. We do not want -- we do not believe in that kind of reaction because we believe that the matters of SALT of the nuclear disarmament is so important that it should not be linked to any other considerations. We were then as we are now, against any linkages here. We are -- I recall very well we had specific instructions from the government during the SALT I negotiations not to link them and not to... not to ever discuss any extraneous matters. Extraneous and alien to the... to the discussions that we held on during SALT I negotiations. We are against linkages and that is... was our very consistent policy.

HOW DID YOU FEEL WHEN PRESIDENT NIXON AND BEFORE SALT I WAS AGREED TO, WANTED TO LINK AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN SALT TO SOVIET HELP ON ENDING THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

I'm sorry. I didn't quite get this point?

OK, WHEN... EARLY IN '69 BEFORE NIXON HAD AGREED TO ENTER INTO SALT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, HE ANNOUNCED THAT AMERICAN PARTICIPATION WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS. AND HE WAS REFERRING TO SOVIET HELP PERHAPS IN ENDING THE WAR IN VIETNAM, AND MAYBE IN STRAIGHTENING THINGS OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

I think we come to the same area of linkages. We were... we are... against any linkages when discussing arms control issues. I believe that should be taken at their face, really on their merits, without linking them to any other problem.

WERE YOU AT THE SUMMIT IN MAY OF 1972 IN MOSCOW?

No, I was not.

DO YOU REMEMBER WHERE YOU WERE AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING?

'72? I was at the '74 Summit.

I SEE. DO YOU REMEMBER HOW YOU FELT WHEN THE AGREEMENT WAS FINALLY ACHIEVED AND THE ACCORDS WERE ASSIGNED. WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING?

Well, I was not present when the SALT I was signed because I did not participate in the first -- in that last round of talks. But I was very I was elated. It was a very happy occasion. It was the most important agreement ever achieved in the field of arms limitation. And it still is the most important agreement. The whole debate now is around ABM treaty as is known by everybody. And this is I was very much happy about that.

WHAT DO YOU FEEL WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT?

I think -- I thought then as I think now that it is the ABM treaty. This is the most significant achievement. But also of course the interim agreement was also important, because it... for the first time it established certain limits on offensive nuclear weapons.

COULD I JUST INTERJECT ONE THING? SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT SALT I WAS NOT ALL THAT SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE BOTH SIDES WERE PREPARED TO GIVE UP ABMS. IT WAS NOT HARD TO GIVE UP ABMS. ABMS AS A TECHNICAL SYSTEM WERE QUESTIONABLE. AND ON THE OFFENSIVE SIDE IT WAS NOT ALL THAT SIGNIFICANT EITHER. THE LEVELS STAYED AS LARGE AS THEY WERE. AND IN FACT SOMEWHAT LARGER THAN THEY WERE AT THE MOMENT THAT THE AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED. HOW WOULD YOU REACT TO THAT?

I would react to it in this way. I think that we must look at these things from a historical perspective. And the present day situation does prove that the assessment by the two leaders in '72 when this was signed was a correct one. They looked -- they both of them looked into the future of arms limitation. I agree that both agreements are very limited in their dimensions. But they were the first agreements. They they were the first agreements which put an end, number one to any attempts for territorial ABM defense, which is why it was very important. Many people in the United States wanted the territorial defense which I think was called the safeguard system. Then, if you take the offensive part of it was the first time the figures were set... the first time the figures were set. It was only a quantitative limitation, not a qualitative. But it was the first limitation. And after that we started to discuss the qualitative limitation. So it was, I think, an historical act of tremendous importance, which is -- this importance is felt and recognized even today after about 15 years.

WHAT DID YOU HOPE AT THAT TIME, AFTER SALT I WAS SIGNED, WHAT DID YOU SEE AS HAPPENING NEXT IN SALT II?

Well, next we wanted to come to grips with the qualitative limitation on nuclear weapons. Additional, quantitative and qualitative. And this was it took us many years, though, about seven years to reach this agreement, but we did reach it. Unfortunately this was never ratified, but it was a great achievement too, in '79.

WHAT -- MAYBE YOU CAN COMMENT ABOUT WHAT WAS DIFFERENT ABOUT PRESIDENT NIXON'S STYLE OF CONDUCTING FOREIGN POLICY AND APPROACHING THE SOVIET UNION THAN HIS PREDECESSORS?

I think the major factor was the realization of the fact that the world then as the world today cannot develop successfully without arms limitation and disarmament. The realization that both countries cannot live in a constant competition. The realization of the fact that there should be some kind of peaceful coexistence between the two superpowers. This was realized by the then...United States administration, and that realization made it possible to reach all of these agreements.

DID YOU HAVE ANY PERSONAL DEALINGS WITH HENRY KISSINGER?

Not at that time. I did have a chance to participate in the concluding stages of the negotiations on the threshold test ban treaty in '74, which was two years after SALT I. And I was impressed by the way that the two negotiators, that is Minister Gromyko and Secretary Kissinger were putting the finishing touches to the agreement on the threshold test ban treaty on the limiting of nuclear explosions.

DO YOU KNOW HOW KISSINGER WAS REGARDED IN MOSCOW AT THE TIME OF SALT I?

I think he was respected and he was respected as a responsible and reasonable United States statesman and politician which was quite instrumental in making these agreements reached and implemented.

HOW DID YOU REGARD NIXON AND KISSINGER'S OVERTURE TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA?

Well overall we believed that there should good relations between the three of us. So we have no problems with United States overtures to China. Because we believe that China should have good relations both with the United States and with the Soviet Union. So we believe that all three of us should have good relations.

DID YOU FEEL THAT PRESIDENT NIXON AND KISSINGER WERE TRYING TO GAIN SOME SORT OF LEVERAGE OVER THE SOVIET UNION IN MAKING THIS OVERTURE TO CHINA?

Personally, I do not think so. I do not exclude that some people might have felt that way. Of course there are...there are efforts on the part of some politicians to play these different cards and different games. I don't believe in that. I think that whatever efforts are made to use certain leverages the overall -- the end result would be an objective improvement. There should be an objective improvement because I feel that the realization of the necessity to live in peace and in respect of each other is growing. It is there may be some ups and downs, but this realization is growing. So irrespective of the fact that someone might use this or that for any kind of leverage, the overall result, the end result would be the genuine improvement.

DID YOU THINK THERE SHOULD BE SOME ALLOWANCE MADE FOR THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION -- I MEAN AT THAT TIME THERE WERE SOME BORDER CLASHES WITH CHINA, AND THERE WERE SOME THREATENING WORDS BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA. WAS THERE A SENSE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS HAVING TO DEAL ON BOTH FLANKS, ON THE EASTERN FLANK AND ALSO WITH THE UNITED STATES?

You see the point is that the Soviet Union has a -- historically been in the... in the situation when they had to deal on both fronts, or on three fronts or on many other fronts. During the civil war in 1918 - 1920, we had against the Soviet Union something like perhaps 14 different adversaries, different enemies, and still we did win. So we were... we are historically prepared to have both front situation. So for us there is no special concern about this.

WHAT DO PEOPLE IN MOSCOW MAKE OF WATERGATE? WHAT DID THAT SEEM LIKE?

I think the... in Moscow there is a constant general feeling that there is a lot of -- well, politicking, corruption and unfair treatments and policies in the... in this country. Because we have a different system. You have one system of government, we have a different system of government. And we have a feeling, in general -- I mean the public, the Soviet people have a feeling that from time to time something has gone... is going wrong, something is rotten here in this country. So whenever something happens we look at this in a I would say in a philosophical way, as something which is imminent, and which is inevitable, in this society. So overall this is a we look at this I would say with Olympic quietness. So after Watergate there may be some other gate, and we would not see anything sensational about that. It is your problem. We don't want to get involved in this problem. Maybe you will solve this problem, maybe you will not, but this is your business.

DO YOU SEE THAT WATERGATE AFFECTED THE PROCESS OF DÉTENTE IN NEGOTIATIONS?

It might have affected I think because when such things as Watergate, or Contragate happens...

AND I'M GOING TO ASK YOU ALSO, IF YOU COULD INSTEAD OF SAYING THIS COUNTRY, WHEN YOU MEAN THE UNITED STATES, IF YOU SAY THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE THE VIEWER DOESN'T KNOW WHERE YOU ARE. WHAT THE FEELING WAS AT SALT BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS ABOUT THE BACK CHANNEL BETWEEN AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AND HENRY KISSINGER?

We did know that there was such a channel, and we hope that this channel would lead to successful results. I don't think that everybody was very happy about some other channel, but the realization that this channel might help us was stronger than any sort of parochial interests, if we may call them parochial interests that might have existed among some members of US or USSR delegations.

CAN YOU TALK -- WHEN YOU SAY THAT SMITH AND SEMENOV SHARED A SENSE THAT THEY WOULD RATHER HAVE THE SATISFACTION.

Well, of course both delegations and especially their heads, that is Ambassador Semenov and Ambassador Smith, of course they wanted very much, and it is humanly understandable, to have all the credit for any success that they could have had in reaching agreement. So they wanted very much to be the ones who were most instrumental, most important in reaching the agreement.

CAN I ASK ONE MORE QUESTION ABOUT -- BEFORE WE HAD THE BREAK YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT WATERGATE, WAS THERE ANY FEELING ON YOUR OWN PART ON IN THE SOVIET UNION OF SORROW THAT NIXON WAS LOSING HIS CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE SO MUCH HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED DURING HIS PRESIDENCY?

I wouldn't call it sorrow, because in policy...in diplomacy you have to be realistic. And to add on the basis of the existence of realities. So of course the... dismissal of Mr. Nixon, his leaving the White House did create certain difficulties, but we couldn't do anything about it. We had, at any moment in diplomacy you have to deal with the facts of life, with the realities. So whether you were sorrow in the bottom of your heart, or you were happy in the bottom of the heart, you... what you had to do was to deal with facts. That's how you have to do -- to deal with, you have to deal with facts.

WHAT DID YOU MAKE OF -- IN THE UNITED STATES, IN CONGRESS OF THE KIND OF POWER THAT A MAN LIKE SCOOP JACKSON, SENATOR JACKSON HAD? AND ATTACKING DÉTENTE REALLY AND THE POLICIES OF NEGOTIATION? FOR INSTANCE IN THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT THAT WAS ATTEMPTING TO MODERATE SOVIET IMMIGRATION POLICIES?

Well, of course we did, we were not happy that any attempts were made to ruin the possibilities of agreement, to ruin the results of the agreement as was the case with Senator Jackson and some other opponents of agreements. This was an unhappy fact. But what could you do about them? Of course you had to again here as in all other areas, you had to deal with the facts of life, and this is the fact of life.

WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT THE ATTEMPTS TO -- IN ORDER TO GRANT THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS STATUS OF TRADE BILL THAT WAS UP THAT THE ATTEMPTS TO REALLY DIRECT SOVIET BEHAVIOR ON THE IMMIGRATION ISSUE?

We don't like to be interfered with. We don't like that someone wants to impose on us their way of life. This is something which is very contrary to our concepts, to our feelings and so on. So whenever one... anyone wants to say how we should live we were very unhappy on that, because we cannot accept this. We never want to impose on anyone our way of life, our way of thinking. We don't want the United States to act the way the Soviet Union acts. But of course we accept any attempts to do... to tell us what to do with great concernment, and great I would say, indignation.

WHEN IN YOUR MIND DID DETENTE REALLY START TO CRUMBLE, WHETHER IT WAS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST WAR OR WATERGATE OR THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT OR THE TRADE BILL?

I was involved in the discussions and negotiations on the total test ban in the late '70s. And sometime in '78 I think in the middle of '78 or late '78, I did have a feeling that something was going wrong with the United States, because the negotiations on the complete test ban, that we -- which we call CTB negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were developing then in Geneva. At some point in '78 we were becoming slower and slower with long pauses, long intermissions, and I at that time had a feeling that the United States is backing up from agreement on the nuclear test ban. That was when I thought then as I think today the real change in the United States position began to materialize. But the. ..the major point of change came in 1980, after the elections in November 1980 when the republican administration came to power, Mr. Reagan came to power.

I JUST WANTED TO ASK A COUPLE MORE THINGS ABOUT THE SALT NEGOTIATION DURING THE TIME THAT YOU WERE THERE. HOW DID AMBASSADOR SEMENOV AND SMITH GENERALLY GET ALONG? WAS THEIR RELATIONSHIP IMPORTANT TO THE SUCCESS OF SALT?

I think they had very good personal relations between themselves, between other members of the delegations, between the families of the delegations. There was very good personal relationship. We spent a lot of time together, we traveled together, we spent weekends together and this human relationship was I think, to a large extent very instrumental in getting us closer to agreement. Of course the agreement was made on the instructions of the governments and the governments made the decisions, but to reach decisions you have to apply your personal qualities and this application of personal qualities is better done in a in a situation of human contact. Good human contact. And that was achieved by both delegations during those negotiations.

I KNOW YOU WEREN'T AT THE FIRST SESSION OF SALT, BUT DID YOU HEAR BACK THAT AH, WHAT THE MOOD WAS LIKE IN HELSINKI? DID THE DELEGATES COME TO REALIZE THAT THIS WAS GOING TO BE A REALLY SERIOUS NEGOTIATION ABOUT TO BEGIN?

Yes, I was not present during the first round. But I was told by my friends and colleagues that I think there was a general realization that we are starting a very important undertaking, very important, maybe the -- the first, for the first time in the history

YOU WERE DESCRIBING HOW YOU WEREN'T AT THE FIRST SESSION BUT WHEN YOU HEARD... YOU HEARD THAT THERE WAS A GREAT OPPORTUNITY.

Yes, I...was not present during the first round, but I was told by my friends and colleagues that there was a general realization by the members of two delegations that we are embarking on a very important project. The first time maybe in the history of relations between the two countries, when they have come to grips with the most important issues of war and peace. And this realization was, I think, important. Because that realization imparted to both sides, the sense of importance and urgency which made the whole project successful in the end.

THERE ARE SOME AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS WHO CLAIM THAT DÉTENTE WOULD PRODUCE SOME AMERICAN LEVERAGE GREATER AMERICAN LEVERAGE OVER SOVIET BEHAVIOR THROUGH TRADE AND RELATIONS AND OTHER INVOLVEMENTS. WHAT WAS THE ATTITUDE TOWARD THAT?

We do not accept any leverages. Never tried any leverages with regard to the United States and we are not going to do this. Because we know that it is absolutely counter-productive to apply any leverages against such a great country as the United States. And I hope that those who still think that they can apply some leverages against the Soviet Union will realize one day that it's counterproductive. Relations, agreements between us can be based only on the general respect for each other's positions. We are diametrically different in many ways, in many ways, in our ideologies, in our ways of life, in our understanding of certain important things of life. But we must learn to understand each other and to respect each other. And this is how we can reach agreements.

ANYTHING FROM YOUR TIME AT SALT THAT YOU REMEMBER THAT WAS KIND OF HUMOROUS OR WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE DELEGATIONS EITHER GETTING ALONG VERY WELL OR NOT UNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER?

We were along -- we were going along very well almost in all respects. We spent time together, we confided to each other. We discussed things with each other, and many important agreements and parts of agreements were reached during those personal contacts. When we were say invited by the Austrian authorities or the Finnish authorities, we were on a lake or on a beach, or on some sports events. During all these meetings we discussed business. And the pieces of business we agreed upon during such social events, led to the... to the overall agreement.