I'D LIKE TO START BACK...HEAD OF THE AEC IN THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION?

All right.

THERE WERE MANY PEOPLE WHO WERE IN FAVOR OF A TEST BAN AT THAT TIME, WHO WERE MARCHING IN THE STREETS AND LOBBYING THE GOVERNMENT IN VARIOUS WAYS, WHAT WAS YOUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO IT, THE TEST BAN.

Well, I was in favor of the test ban if it could be verified, but the latter part of the Eisenhower administration we did have the technical facilities to insure that the Soviets would be complying uh, with the test ban and for that reason I was opposed to it.

WAS IT ALSO A QUESTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY FOR YOU THAT YOU WERE AFRAID THAT IF WE DIDN'T, IF WE WEREN'T ALLOWED TO KEEP TESTING THAT IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEM FOR THE UNITED STATES?

No, I didn't think it'd be a particularly security problem, we had some improvement; to make on our missiles, our weapons, uh, there was always room for improvement and there was always room to verify that there's no deterioration of your stock pile of weapons, but uh, I didn't look upon as a security problem I thought it was uh, necessary that uh, we make the advances and not permit the Soviets uh, to advance their weapon system unbeknown to us. That's why I opposed the test ban at that time.

WE'RE YOU CONCERNED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO TRUST THE SOVIET AT THAT TIME?

To trust them? Yes, I thought it would be. Uh, uh, I thought it'd be difficult to trust them at that time. I uh, feel that uh, we can trust them if we have adequate means of verifying what we do.

THERE WAS A GREAT INCREASE IN THE AMERICAN ARSENAL IN THE SORT OF '58 TO '61 PERIOD IN THE LAST COUPLE OF YEARS OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, AND I UNDERSTAND IN '59, WHEN YOU WERE HEAD OF THE AEC, YOU OBTAINED PERMISSION TO OPEN ANOTHER NUCLEAR REACTOR WHICH WOULD PROVIDE PLUTONIUM FOR SOME OF THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT WERE BEING BUILT. DID YOU CONSIDER AS PART OF YOUR JOB AS CHAIRMAN OF THE AEC TO SATISFY YOURSELF THAT THE WEAPONS WERE MILITARILY NECESSARY FOR THE—DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES.

No, that was not the responsibility of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of the Commission itself, oh, our responsibility was to uh, provide the weapons needed by the uh, Department of Defense uh, and to provide the facilities to produce the plutonium and u-235 and so forth. So they, we could meet their requirements. But, it was not our responsibility to make a determination as to just what was necessary

DID YOU CONSIDER IT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE AEC TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY UH, NECESSITY OF THE WEAPONS YOU WERE PROVIDING THE PLUTONIUM FOR?

No, as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission that was not my responsibility, nor was it a responsibility of the Commission, Uh, we were, that was a responsibility of the Department of Defense and our responsibility was to fulfill their requirements.

HOW MUCH DID YOU FEEL THE GAITHER REPORT, ...HOW MUCH DID THAT INFLUENCE THE DECISIONS THAT WERE MADE ABOUT UH, WEAPONS PROCUREMENT IN THE '58, SORT OF '61 PERIOD?

Well, I can't answer that. That's a good many years ago and I've forgotten the Gaither report.

I THINK IN ESSENCE THIS IS WHAT LED TO THE WHOLE MISSILE GAP CONTROVERSY IN THE 1960 ELECTION THAT ESSENTIALLY IT SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD A LOT OF MISSILES AND HAD THEY...I THINK ESSENTIALLY WHAT THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES WERE TELLING THE GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME, WAS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD A LARGE NUMBER OF MISSILES AND HAD THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE A LARGE NUMBER OF MISSILES...THIS WAS OF COURSE BEFORE YOUR EXTENSIVE U-2 FLIGHTS AND THAT SORT OF THING.

Well there was...said in the election in 1960, about the missile gap, but uh, and uh, President-elect Kennedy uh, used that in his campaigns as you know so well. After he became President and his administration took over they found there was no missile gap.

HOW MUCH DO YOU THINK THOSE FAULTY ESTIMATES THAT WERE MADE IN THE LATE '50S AS TO THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSILE ARSENAL, HOW IMPORTANT WERE THOSE ESTIMATES IN DETERMINING US GOVERNMENT POLICY?

Well, I can't very well answer that uh, they were important to be sure. They gave us to concern but the estimates were not based on hard intelligence, because we had very little hard intelligence on what was going on inside the Soviet Union at that time and uh, I think the estimate for more a judgment of what might be happening rather than a specific knowledge of what was happening.

DO YOU THINK THAT UH, GIVEN THE INFORMATION THAT WAS AVAILABLE AT THE TIME THAT THE ESTIMATE WAS JUSTIFIED, DO YOU THINK THAT THE...

No, I don't think so. I think the estimate that there was a missile, missile gap was not justified. Uh, it was used for political purposes and it was used for the convenience of the Pentagon, but uh, as it turned out it was wrong.

WHAT, YOU RECALL YOUR FEELINGS AT THE TIME, DID YOU HAVE A SUSPICION, A CONCERN ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET ARSENAL...WHAT WOULD YOU...

Yeah, SALT was out of my uh, area of concern as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, uh, but uh, I was deeply disturbed that uh uh, after a series of hearings and uh, testimony from uh, military people and from intelligence people there was no specific hard intelligence concerning the uh, size or composition of the Soviet uh, missile force, and of course as it turned out a few months later the estimate for entirely wrong.

BUT AS AEC CHAIRMAN, YOUR RESPONSIBILITY WAS SIMPLY TO PROVIDE THE...THE PLUTONIUM NECESSARY TO BUILD THE MISSILES...

Well, the AEC Chairman, uh, uh, that was one of the responsibilities. Of course the Atomic Energy Commission uh, had a vast area of responsibility uh, which providing the uh, special nuclear material resources was one of them. But they had these expensive laboratories designing new weapons, uh, conducting research in a variety of areas, including the peaceful uses of the atoms and so on and so forth, so uh, but that was one of their responsibilities.

MANY PEOPLE THAT FROM THAT TIME, THAT GENERAL EISENHOWER WAS PERHAPS A BIT NAIVE IN TERMS OF THE SOVIET THREAT... CAN YOU GIVE US YOUR FEELING ABOUT GENERAL EISENHOWER IN THE LAST FEW YEARS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION.

I thought that he was not naive at all. Shortly before uh, the end of the Eisenhower administration maybe a year, uh, we met at Camp David uh, with Khrushchev and uh, and his people and the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense and I were there. And we had extensive talks. No one...naive about Eisenhower.

CAN YOU GIVE US A BIT OF A SENSE OF THOSE TALKS...OF WHAT THE FEELING WAS?

Well he thought uh, to reach an understanding uh, on uh, Berlin, which was then controversial and he sought to solve uh, many uh, issues that were under dispute with Khrushchev and if you will recall Khrushchev had made quite an extensive trip throughout the United States and uh, nothing was resolved. The fact is that was one of the summit conferences of which there was no communique at the end. You may remember that.

SO YOU DIDN'T, THERE WAS NO SENSE FROM YOU THAT EISENHOWER WASN'T TOUGH ENOUGH, THAT EISENHOWER WASN'T...

I didn't understand you.

THAT YOU DIDN'T FEEL THAT GENERAL EISENHOWER WASN'T TOUGH ENOUGH WASN'T CONCERNED ENOUGH ABOUT SOVIET THREAT?

Not by any means. Not by any means, I think he—I think he had the Soviet threat cased very well.

BUT COULD YOU ANSWER THAT LAST QUESTION AGAIN AND USE GENERAL EISENHOWER'S NAME INSTEAD OF HE, SO IT'S CLEAR FOR US.

No, not at all. I thought General Eisenhower was fully alert to the, to the threat. He lived with it for many years as commander...and as President uh, he was fully alert to it. Uh, he was not naive. He knew the dangers and uh, I think coped with them properly in his administration.

JUST ONE LAST QUESTION ON THIS ERA... CONCERNING THE TEST BAN AND ALL THE TALK ABOUT THE TEST BAN IN 1960 WHAT WERE YOUR FEELINGS THEN ABOUT THE DEMONSTRATORS AND THE BAN THE BOMB PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLE WHO WERE MARCHING IN THE STREETS AND THE PEOPLE LIKE, I SUPPOSE LIKE, THERE WERE SOME I WOULD THINK INSIDE THE ADMINISTRATION WHO WERE PUSHING FOR A TEST BAN, DID YOU THINK THEY WERE PERHAPS NAIVE ABOUT THE SOVIET THREAT ABOUT THE DANGER BECAUSE YOU COULDN'T VERIFY WHAT WAS...

Well they were, they were concerned, uh, very concerned because testing was going on, the atmosphere was contaminated. There was a certain amount of fallout and uh, while I believe the dangers were exaggerated they really were there. Uh, they were uh, naive in as much as they uh, did not recognize the necessity of uh, of being able to verify any agreements of understandings that were made.

AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE UNITED STATES TO KEEP TESTING, WAS THAT PART OF IT, I MEAN YOU NEEDED THE TESTS TO CONTINUE TO BUILD AND TO DEVELOP A RESEARCH WEAPON.

Well, it was necessary to test for two reasons, one is for the improvement of your weapons and the other is to be sure that the, that the weapons that you have in your possession are not deteriorating. And uh, testing uh, appears necessary to for those two purposes.