WHEN JOHN FOSTER DULLES BEGAN TO SPEAK OF MASSIVE RETALIATION IN 1954, WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION?

I was at the dinner at which he made the speech in which he announced the the doctrine of massive retal-

COULD WE SAY... WE WANT TO ELIMINATE INDEFINITE REFERENCES.

In 1954, when John Foster Dulles announced the doctrine of massive retaliation, he announced it at a--at a dinner--dinner given at the Counsel on Foreign Relations in New York and I was present at that dinner and I immediately felt that this was entirely the wrong doctrine to have announced and I talked to the people at the table with me and they all agreed with me. That this was a--incorrect position for the United States to take.

WHAT WAS WRONG WITH IT?

What it really purported to do was to look upon nuclear weapons as the weapons of choice that you would use these at places and at times of your own choosing. And that suggested that we wanted to use nuclear weapons and it seemed to me that the last thing in the world that we wanted to do was to used nuclear weapons. We wanted to have nuclear weapons in order to keep the Soviet Union from pursuing its expansion as planned. And therefore, only under the circumstances where we could, there was no alternative, would we want to use nuclear weapons and that John Foster Dulles had gotten it just exactly reversed.

WAS THERE ANYTHING YOU COULD DO TO TRY TO CONVINCE THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION? DID YOU DO ANYTHING OF THE DANGER OF THIS POLICY?

I talked to John Foster Dulles about it. I talked to Bob Bowie who ran the policy planning staff under--under Foster at the time. I had the feeling that Bob Bowie agreed with me. Eventually Foster did understand what was wrong about it and changed it. But it took some time before he--he did change that policy.

LET'S TALK FOR A MINUTE ABOUT THE GAITHER REPORT. OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THERE WERE A GOOD MANY OF SCIENTISTS WHO GAVE TESTIMONY. WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE AMONG ALL THESE SCIENTISTS?

We're talking about the Gaither--Let me start again. The Gaither Committee Report was issued I think in 1959, and then we started work on it the year before. It was done by a large group of people under the chairmanship of Gaither, Gaither got ill then, a man by the name of Sprague took--took over the job. But a number of scientists and people knowledgeable in the field of defense worked on the report. It was supposed to deal with--with civil defense as a matter of fact, we turned away from that 'cause we didn't think that was the main problem at the time. We thought the main problem at the time, was that of the vulnerability to a surprise attack of our bomber force in the United States, now that the Soviets had demonstrated from Sputnik and the--they'd announced intention to build ICBMs. That those bomber forces would be vulnerable, they were on a small number of fields and bombers were not then prepared to take off on short notice and we had no radar warning system in order to give us advance warning of a Soviet attack. So that the main purpose of the Gaither Committee--the main result of the Gaither Committee Report or the main recommendation of the Gaither Committee Report was that we must with all speed cure that vulnerability of our major deterrent.

WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE, DID YOU WRITE IT?

No, James Finney Baxter was the--a professor at--at Dartmouth College or Williams College I guess, was the person who was given the role of writing it, but I was-I worked with him and I think I probably contributed more on the substance of the report than most.

DID YOU FIND THERE WAS ANY CAUSE TO BE ALARMED?

Yes, indeed. Albert Wohlstetter had done a very careful study of the vulnerability of our bomber force to a surprise Soviet attack and this was wholly persuasive to the leadership of the Gaither Committee, these included John Jay McCloy, Bill Foster, and Sprague I guess were the principal ones. That way they were it was a very large group that, and it was a very careful study that was done.

WHAT WAS PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S REACTION TO THE REPORT? DID HE SHARE YOUR SENSE OF CONCERN?

I think he did. Foster Dulles was very much opposed to his paying attention to the report, he wanted Eisenhower to listen to him, not to us, but in fact Eisenhower did all the things that we had recommended in that report, all the things we gave the highest priority to. During the last years of the Eisenhower administration, you know the defense budget was some 9 or 10% of the gross national product and the percentage of that which went into strategic forces was much higher than it's ever been since. I mean few people realize that.

THE REPORT FOUND ITS WAY TO THE WASHINGTON POST, WHAT WAS PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S REACTION TO THAT SO CALLED LEAK?

The report didn't find its way, but so--somebody uh--a--but I forget who it was, was told a good deal about the main points within the report.

DID THAT BOTHER THE PRESIDENT?

I believe it probably did. The administrations never like leaks.

HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE SOVIET THREAT. DID HE UNDERESTIMATE THE SOVIET THREAT AND CLING TOO LONG TO MASSIVE RETALIATION?

I always find Eisenhower's views ambiguous, he said a lot of different things at different times, and he was not I think a very precise and clear thinker on these matters. John Foster Dulles had the clear ideas. Admiral Radford who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he had clear ideas. When it came down to the issue as to whether nuclear weapons might be used in connection with the Quemoy-Matsu episode there the original decision was that they should be. I was very much against this and talked to--to to not John Foster Dulles but to his brother, Allen Dulles about it at length. But from then until the proposition was discussed with General Eisenhower and he turned down the use of nuclear weapons in connection with Quemoy-Matsu. I think h--when he really understood what the issues were about he came out on the right side. I think his instincts were on the right side.

THE BERLIN CRISIS IN 1961, WAS THIS A SERIOUS CRISIS?

It was a very serious crisis. Mr. Khrushchev had told us in no uncertain terms that he--he had put down a deadline of--of of December 31, 1961. He said, unless you will agree with our proposals with respect to Germany, we will turn over control of the access routes of Berlin to the East German government and we will wash our hands of any responsibility whatsoever. Now, it was perfectly clear that the East German government would take a very str--would probably take very forceful steps and would reinstitute the blockade which the Russians had lifted before. And it was a serious crisis. The problem at issue was how to respond to this ultimatum, because it was an ultimatum by Khrushchev, how should one respond to it when it took place. We thought it was going to take place.

WHAT DID YOU FEEL OUR OPTIONS WERE?

We went through all the options as to how we could immediately respond to the particular block, the particular stoppages that they might put in our access to Berlin, such as block--blocking the roads, or the railroads or the canals or the air space and what we might do immediately in order to see that this was serious, we did not propose to make the same mistake we made in--in the preceding Berlin blockade where we hadn't really tested their determination. But once having tested their determination then we thought we would have to recognize the fact that they had clear military superiority on the spot and that with--the result of going further than that say, putting 2 or 3 divisions into an attempt to get to Berlin would end up, clearly in a disaster, we did not have the military forces in order to do that. Therefore, the thing to do was to--after we'd probed their intentions, then what we should do is to go into a period of intense mobilization. And after having really mobilized our full capability then to try again, when we're in better shape to really see whether they really meant it or not.

WAS THERE--DO YOU KNOW BILL KAUFMANN--DID BILL KAUFMANN HELP IN THE PENTAGON'S RE-EVALUATION, EVALUATION OF OBJECTS?

It is my recollection that he did not. I think he worked on--he had ideas, lot's of people had ideas. But the way in which this was organized was that there was a quadro-partite committee, consisting of--of Foy Kohler, who was our assistant secretary for European affairs and including the French ambassador, the British ambassador, the German ambassador, and then under that there were two committees, one a contingency committee which dealt with these contingencies and how to respond to them. And then a military committee which dealt with what would be the basic military posture of the alliance in the event these, the--the ultimatum really came to be and in other words they did in fact turn over the excess routes to East Germany.

KAUFMANN SAYS HE RECOMMENDED THREE CONVENTIONAL OPTIONS IN THE LIMITED NUCLEAR OPTIONS. ARE YOU AWARE OF THAT?

He may have, but I don't remember that we took them very seriously. We had examined all the various options that were possible doing in this military committee. They have--each one of the countries had a senior military man from--from the NATO, and military committee which in those days was stationed in Washington and we had senior people from their, from their governments as well, and we worked almost continuously for several months on the various options of what to do with them.

CARL KAYSEN IN MAC BUNDY'S OFFICE, SAID HE PROPOSED TO DO THE FIRST-STRIKE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, DID YOU AGREE WITH THIS?

No, I did not. I don't--I don't even remember its taking place. He may have proposed it but I don't remember that he proposed it to our military committee.

DURING THE TRANSITION FROM THE EISENHOWER TO THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, DO YOU CARE TO RE-EVALUATE OUR SECURITY POLICY, WHAT WERE YOUR CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AT THAT TIME?

One of our principal concerns was had to do with what kind of a nuclear strategic policy we wanted to adopt. Did we really want to set for ourselves the objective of maintaining or achieving and maintaining nuclear superiority as a foundation for our policy more or less to the idea that Foster Dulles's doctrine had implied. Or did we rather want to adopt a policy which would try to negate any possibility that the Soviet's might have of themselves achieving, of the Soviet's achieving nuclear superiority. And in essence the decision that was made was that we would do the second not the first. That we were really trying to deter the Soviets, not achieve the usable nuclear superiority ourselves. The second batch of problems we dealt with were the various crisis spots that we could see arising around the world in--including in the Middle East and Vietnam and Laos in particular but with Vietnam behind that and in Latin America and in other parts of the world. And then there were some-questions having to do with the organization of our defense establishment, that we should go for a unification of the arms services or not. We recommended against unification of the arms services.

DID YOU RECOMMEND OF CONVENTIONAL BUILD UP?

We did indeed. I'd chaired a committee earlier--earlier than that which dealt with a committee, the advisory committee of the Democratic National Advisory Com--Committee, there was a sub-committee of that dealing with foreign policy and defense policy and we'd prepared a paper titled The Nuclear Forces we Need and How to Get Them. And in that we'd recommended a build-up that increased the defense budget of approximately 5 billion dollars, some 3 billion as I remembered should be for conventional forces, and 2 billion to cure some of the defects in our nuclear posture, and that's more or less what we did when the--when we took office when the Kennedy administration took office.

I THOUGHT THAT THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ALWAYS WAS AT THE WARSAW PACT, THE STRENGTH WAS OVERWHELMING, BUT WHAT CONFIDENCE DID YOU HAVE THAT A BUILD-UP IN NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES COULD MATCH THE WARSAW PACT?

We didn't really think it needed to match one for one the Warsaw Pact. We thought it sh--should be serious enough to--to be able to resist and contain the Warsaw Pact and that Warsaw Pact attacked for some time. And that in the long run, the Soviets wouldn't really want to attack Europe if it involved a serious conventional first stage and if we maintained the possibility to deny them clear nuclear superiority in any subsequent stage.

MCNAMARA ANNOUNCED HIS STRATEGY AT THE ANN ARBOR--ANN ARBOR SPEECH OF 1962, AVOIDING SOVIET CITIES AND HOPES OF LIMITING DAMAGE TO OUR CIVILIAN POPULATION. WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT WAS HE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?

This was in part my recommendation to him that we adopt a no-cities policy. I was strongly in favor of it and I'm still as strongly in favor of it. Like anybody who contemplates a nuclear war in which one goes after the other fellow's cities doesn't know what he's doing.

HE SHORTLY GAVE UP ON THE... THIS STIRRED UP THE AIR FORCE, I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WANTED, IF WE'RE GOING TO COUNTER FORCES IF THEY WANTED MORE FORCES, AS THE SOVIETS BUILD UP MORE FORCES AND SO HE MOVED AWAY FROM THE RHETORIC OF THIS, BUT DID HE MOVE AWAY FROM IT WHEN HE BEGAN TO TALK ABOUT ASSURED DESTRUCTION. WHAT DID THAT MEAN TO YOU?

That, that was an attack not necessarily directed against cities, but directed against industry supporting resources and where the destruction involved would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and therefore it would be adequate for deterrence.

WERE YOU COMFORTABLE WITH THAT?

I thought it--I thought the priority should be given to c--counter force not to that kind of an attack. So I was not comfortable with his decision.

COULD YOU ACCEPT IT? DID YOU APPRECIATE HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE AIR FORCE WANTING MORE AND MORE HARDWARE AND THE CONCERN OF TRYING TO PUT A LID ON THE BUDGET.

I did indeed. You always- have to live with budgetary problems after all the-I was became McNamara's deputy, and then when he was given the job of head of the World Bank, why I really had to run the--that part of the Pentagon, which dealt with the budget and I certainly had to meet budgetary targets too. So that certainly I was involved in the--in the budgetary allocations and those are very real but that's a different thing than saying that's a desirable thing that your doing to--to limit yourself so that you have only the option of going after cities. It's a wholly undesirable thing which you might be forced to by virtue of the fact that you didn't--couldn't get enough support in order to have a more intelligent nuclear policy.

WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE PREFERRED WITHIN THE SAME BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE PREFERRED THAT HE DO IN THE MID-'60S?

Well there were a number of things which I differed with him on, on the details of the budget. But

IN TERMS OF STRATEGY?

I'm talking about strategy. And there I'm saying I didn't think that he should of changed, walked away from the Ann Arbor doctrine which I thought was the correct doctrine.

WHEN HE BEGAN TO FORESEE A SITUATION OF--WHERE EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE THE, AN ASSURED DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY, THIS CONDITION THAT CAME TO BE KNOWN AS MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION OR MAD, WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT?

Well, that became much more pertinent during the early days of the--of the SALT I negotiations in '69 after the years when McNamara was in office. And there in negotiating with the Soviets was perfectly clear that they were not had no use at all for the idea of their assuring that they would be vulnerable, they were not going--there wasn't going to be any mutually assured destruction. They said in fact we're going to see to it that you'll be deterred by our capability to destroy you. But if you want to have any--have a comparable capability--that's up to you, we're not going to help you.

DID YOU DISAGREE WITH MCNAMARA WHEN HE SORT OF MOVED AGAINST ABM IN THE MID 60S?

He didn't move against ABM after all he was the one who proposed the safeguard sentinel system. And I supported him in that.

BUT HE WANTED TO BARGAIN IN A WAY DIDN'T HE? HE WAS HOPING THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD, WOULD...

I also wanted to bargain in a way.

YOU DID. YOU WERE IN AGREEMENT ON THAT?

Yes indeed.

HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THEN YOUR DISAGREEMENT WITH MCNAMARA ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY?

Exactly what I've said. That I thought that what should up to the point that one could afford it, that people would support you in it, have a counter-force strategy rather than a city-destruction strategy, you want to avoid cities if you possible could... Which was--I don't think he really disagreed with me. I think he was locked into the doctrine that the U.S. could afford whatever forces it needed. And my view was we ought to separate out what it would be that would be desirable and then what it is you could afford and these were not the same thing. But he thought they were the same thing. And that's where I really disagreed with him.

HARRY ROWEN AND WOHLSTETTER THINK THAT HE BY NOT MAKING R and D COMMITMENTS AT THE END OF THE 60S PRESIDED OVER A DECADE OF NEGLECT IN OUR NUCLEAR POSTURE? DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT?

Well, we had a real problem and that was the Vietnamese War, 'cause the Vietnamese was--was a--you know we were putting a tremendous effort in the Vietnamese War and that's where the--all the political pressure in the United States was, is with respect to whether or not we were going to be able to succeed or not succeed or whether that was the right war to be in. And while we were putting these resources in the Vietnamese War, we did not put the resources into the strategic part of our budget which would be necessary in order to keep anything resembling equality with the Soviet Union.

SO YOU SAW A SLIPPING IN THE LATE '60S?

I did indeed.

COULD YOU SAY THAT...

I did indeed in the late '60s, see a slipping in our relative nuclear posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

DID YOU TELL MCNAMARA THIS?

Certainly, it wasn't hard to see. I'm not sure that he didn't--he didn't agree with it too. But the question at issue, what do you do?

WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE WANTED TO DO?

He and I both agreed on the general posture that we really wanted to get out of the Vietnamese War if we could and...