THIS IS THE FIRST REEL OF INTERVIEW WITH FRANCOIS DE ROSE, NUMBER C06023. MR. DE ROSE, THE DECISIONS THAT WERE TAKEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE 1950S, IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC WHICH LED TO THE FRENCH BOMB PROGRAM, TO WHAT EXTENT WERE THEY TAKEN BY THE POLITICIANS AND TO WHAT EXTENT WERE THEY TAKEN BY THE TECHNOCRATS, AS IT WERE?

Well, they had to be taken by both because they would need the politicians group to provide the money. But certainly the technicians, the and also the hierarchy in the Ministry for Defense were interested in the program. So there, they, when we first started with the plutonium producing reactors, they were not officially designed either way. I mean, but they actually were useful as the first experiment for electricity producing, power producing, but at the same time, they were producing plutonium and the plutonium that was produced there was produced at weapons grade.

SO DO YOU THINK THAT THE POLITICIANS WERE THE MAIN DRIVING FORCE TOWARDS PRODUCING THE BOMB, OR WAS IT MORE THE PEOPLE IN THE THE MILITARY?

I think the positions were divided. You cannot see the British and , because certainly the, the Socialist in the day, in those days, and several other influential individuals were against it. They felt that it was useless. That it would cost a lot of money and that we wouldn't, have such a few numbers of bombs that it would not really have a military significance. Ah, but others were of a different idea, and I think, among the technicians and the military, some scientists were against it. Ah, many scientists were against it for philosophical and moral reasons. But the technician in the were maybe not really motivated by political inspirations but they were technically, they were technically interested by the challenge.

HOW INFLUENTIAL WAS THE LOBBYING OF THE PEOPLE AT (?) AROUND THIS PERIOD, WAS THAT PARTICULARLY INFLUENTIAL?

Oh yes. There's no doubt that General was probably the most vocal in explaining the strategy which he I think he was the first one to define as a strategy or the weak to the strong (?). And explaining that with nuclear weapons the question of balance of forces was no longer as important as it was with conventional forces, far from it. So I think he was very influential in that respect.

AND HIS IDEAS WERE QUITE WIDELY RESPECTED?

I think he convinced some politicians certainly. And the political, people who were responsible in , he went around explaining his ideas and he was very convincing... his arguments.

LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT A FEW INDIVIDUAL EXTERNAL EVENTS THAT WERE HAPPENING IN THE WORLD AT THIS TIME AND ASK YOU WHAT EFFECT IF ANY, YOU THINK THEY HAD ON THE COURSE OF THE FRENCH BOMB PROGRAM AND ON DECISIONS THAT PEOPLE WERE MAKING. DID THE DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THINGS?

I think generally, the fact that France suffered that terrible defeat in 1940 provoked an aspect of French life, reaction which was one of how could we regain self-confidence and prestige. And in that sense, in military field, having the bomb was one of the probably, certainly the most important decision that could restore among the French people that feeling of self-confidence and of responsibility for their security and defense. But it's not only in that field you see, because France is probably the country that has changed the most in Europe between pre-war and after-war, because in 1938 France was a nation of 39 million, predominantly agricultural, but highly protectionist and colonial. Twenty years later, France was a nation of 55 million people, had entered the common market, could support competition with Germany and the United Kingdom later, predominantly industrial and no longer protectionist and no longer a colonial power that's part of the whole change which took place in France which, I think, in which the possession of nuclear of a nuclear force was a part and an important one.

DID THE DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA IN 1954, DID THAT HAVE A PARTICULAR EFFECT?

Well, I think the defeat in Indochina sealed the end of the colonial period because Algeria was not considered as a colony for such (?)... in those days was considered as part of France. But I think the defeat in Indochina certainly sealed the end of the colonial period, and therefore returning to, returning to, the French army returned to France and, and North Africa and certainly in those days it, it was felt that our part in the defense of Europe would be growing, but that possession of nuclear weapons would be add considerably to our weight in the alliance, because in those days, it was not yet felt that we would leave the military, the military of the alliance.

THERE WAS A FEELING DURING THIS PERIOD THAT FRANCE WAS CONTRIBUTING AS MUCH OR MORE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST IN GENERAL BY IT'S COLONIAL WARS AND THE WAR IN ALGERIA, THAT THERE WAS A COMMUNIST, THE COMMUNIST THREAT WAS IN THE THIRD WORLD AS WE NOW CALL IT, MORE THAN IN EUROPE AND THAT SHE DIDN'T GET ENOUGH RECOGNITION...?

Well, that was certainly, that was certainly the argument that was put at the time of Indochina, because we were involved in a war with Communists and the United States, because then the United States was itself engaged in the Vietnam War, so that feeling was strong. Ah, I don't think that it got many a lot of recognition from our, much recognition from our allies, and the had already pulled out of India and Britain had decolonized, so it was showed by the example of Britain that a nation could ah....and that, the argument of fighting against Communism overseas was not really listened to, to the point where we would have received help. That in order to, because we wouldn't have finished the Indochina War, and look at what happened in the United States.

WHAT, WHAT...

And then, and then the when De Gaulle came to power, that was in '58, he then ah embarked in the policy of massive de-colonization, mostly in Africa.

WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF SUEZ. DID THAT HAVE AN EFFECT ESPECIALLY ON THE FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS?

Well, I, I don't know. I don't think that reliability of the United States' commitment to Europe, in case there was an oppression in Europe was really put into question. What happened was that who was then the head of the Soviet state threatened France and, and England saying well, what would you think if a major power would or threaten you, and then Mr. (?), who was the French President of the Council said, "I now know why we need nuclear weapons."

SO IF YOU COULD TELL US AGAIN.

Ah, well, is, I don't think what happened at the time of the Suez crisis really, ah put in the minds of the French a question as to whether the commitment of the United States for, in Europe, for the defense of Europe in case of an aggression in Europe was raised. Certainly what was raised, what was of use to the French was that we had received a threat, a threat by, of the Soviet and Mr. (?), who was then the President of the Council of the French government said, "Now I know why we need nuclear weapons." Ah, certainly this had something to do in the, in the political world in, among the politicians. They realized that they could be threatened…

BUT DIDN'T, WASN'T THAT THREAT AN EMPTY ONE BECAUSE IT WAS CLEAR THAT IF THEY HAD USED ATOMIC WEAPONS AGAINST FRANCE, THEN AMERICA WOULD HAVE RESPONDED?

Yes, it was but at the same time, it was it was resented as a threat. No, I don't think the commitment of the United States to Europe... but the fact that there was a pressure by the United States and the Soviet Union together, certainly gave the, the political, the politicians in France the feeling that it was necessary, useful to have something of one's own.

DO YOU REMEMBER THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER IN 1957, AND THE BRITISH H-BOMB WHICH COINCIDED WITH THAT, DID THAT HAVE AN EFFECT ON FRENCH THINKING?

Well, the fact that Britain was a nuclear power certainly had a fact in on the French mind. It was certainly something that we felt was an element of the situation in Europe where it was needed to have, for France to have also nuclear weapons. You must remember that before the war, I mean France was abreast with all other nations in the development of nuclear energy. We had our Nobel prizers and so on. And those men were still alive and still influential and still at work, so the idea that Britain would have a very special situation in Europe by having, and not, having nuclear weapons, and not France, also was influential. And we didn't want to be reduced simply to the conditions of being limited to conventional weapons. We felt that it would give us more influence, not only more independence, but more influence over the affairs of Europe. But of, England, of course, mentioning the '57 Paper, that was the days when I think the Americans revised the McMahon Act in a way which was absolutely tailored to fit the British case, and exclude France because the conditions that were imposed so that help would be given by the United States to an ally only met the British case in those days. And that, of course, stimulated the impetus of the French to work and not necessarily to get American help, but to do, to do it by ourselves, the necessary efforts so that we would reach that status of nuclear power.

OVERALL COULD YOU SUM UP THE OVERALL REASONS FOR THE DECISION TO GO FOR A BOMB IN THE EARLY FIFTIES.

I think self-confidence, the need to assume, in Europe special status, and asserting ourselves in various fields of that are required to perform, and prestige.

WERE YOU INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WENT ON AT THIS TIME... IN THE IDEA OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION?

I, I knew of it. But that was carried at the government level, and ah...

DO YOU THINK THERE WAS ANY INTENTION ON THE PART OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC POLITICIANS OR THE CEA TO HAVE SUCH COOPERATION AND WHAT DO YOU THINK STRAUSS' AMBITIONS WERE?

I don't know. I can't say what Strauss' ambitions were, but I know that Germany had signed the Western European Union Treaty, which forbade to go into military nuclear field. So the cooperation could have been on an industrial level. I don't think it would have gone as far as joint production of nuclear weapons because of the treaties that Germany had signed and which she showed no intention of not abiding to.

DO YOU RECALL WAS THERE ANY SUSPICION IN FRANCE OF STRAUSS AND HIS ENTHUSIASM?

I think that there would have been resistance in French public opinion if Germany had decided to become a military nuclear power, certainly. But the case really did not materialize because it was well known that the Germans themselves knew what were the obstacles and that certainly the Soviet Union would not have put up with Germany becoming a nuclear power.

LET ME MOVE ON TO THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AND DE GAULLE BECOMES PRESIDENT. WHAT DECISIONS DID HE TAKE IN THE EARLY MONTHS, AND WAS THERE A DIFFERENT EMPHASIS FROM THAT POINT ONWARDS?

Well, I think the first thing he did was a few months after taking over was to send, a well known to President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan, in which he said that it was, that the three nations, the United States, Britain, and France, had world-wide interests and therefore they needed to agree on a global strategy. And it was necessary for them to agree on, to come in agreement over the possible use, for such a decision to use nuclear weapons. And that is the first step. But he clearly said that if that was not agreed, then he would draw the consequences and that would limit from then on the participation of France to the overall of the defense of the West.

SO HE WAS EFFECTIVELY...

SO YOU SAID HE WROTE THE LETTER TO…

Yes. After, after he received no positive reply on that letter, and then he decided to accelerate our nuclear program, he, made available for that program, a decision to, build the plant, was also taken then, because that was needed in order to build a hydrogen bomb, and from then on the program and, from then on it was official that France was decided to have nuclear power, of their own, which was resented by the Americans. President Kennedy even went as far as to call it an "unfriendly act." And Mr. McNamara was very much against it saying it was at the same time useless and dangerous.

I'LL COME TO THAT IN A MINUTE... SO HE REALLY DID WANT A VETO OVER AMERICAN USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DIDN'T HE?

Well...

WASN'T THAT A SURPRISING CLAIM IN A SENSE?

In, what he really wanted is difficult to tell, whether he knew that the answer would be in the negative and he wanted to get a negative answer or whether he really hoped, nobody can tell. It's very difficult to ask De Gaulle, what he really wanted because he didn't say.

I MEAN IT'S DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE IF THE POSITION HAD BEEN REVERSED AND FRANCE HAD HAD A NUCLEAR MONOPOLY AND SOME OTHER COUNTRY HAD ASKED FOR A VETO OVER IT'S USE, THAT DE GAULLE WOULD HAVE GONE ALONG WITH THAT.

Very likely. Very likely. And when we had, when he had nuclear weapons, he didn't agree to any veto of the Americans or the British on their use. I think he was convinced that this was a decision an entirely one, and could not be, could not be shared.

WHAT WAS THE EFFECT, HOW DID DE GAULLE REACT TO THE INCREASING CLOSENESS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP AT THIS TIME?

Well, the reaction was in a way a very dignified one. I mean it's up to the Americans to know whether they want to have this ally or that ally and we are not going to beg their help. We'll go it alone if we have to go it alone. At the same time it did give him the impression that, that special relationship between Britain and France, between Britain and the United States which excluded France was in a way...you know he said once, 'States have no friends. They have interests.' And also he said, 'States are cold monsters.' So he was not surprised. He simply draw the conclusion. And when he and, one of the conclusions was that Britain through her association in the nuclear effort with the United States really had given the United States a sort of control over Britain policy in, in most fields. And this was so important to have cooperation in that field that Britain was really less independent from the United States that he certainly wanted France to be. In other words, I don't think he would have bought the kind of cooperation that Britain got from the United States if the place--price to be paid had been giving the United States a certain control over French decisions in foreign policy or defense policy.

FINE. WHAT WAS THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE IN DE GAULLE'S MIND BETWEEN THE STRICTLY STRATEGIC MILITARY REASONS FOR DEVELOPING THE BOMB... AND THE MORE REASONS OF HIGH POLICY?

A reason of high policy for the going into the nuclear field was the need for France to have a nuclear weapon and then to be more independent from the from the United States. That I think was was paramount. Ah, and also connected with that was eventually the withdrawing from the integrated military structure of NATO. That I think, which he already more or less announced in the 1958 letter and which he probably always had in mind because of the of that control which the which the Americans had over the policy of other, of other European nations and that he didn't want the Americans to, to enjoy. And then withdrawing from the military structure of NATO was explained by the fact, he said, that that structure created a danger of being automatically involved in a conflict that would not be within the interest or commitment of France. In other words he felt that there could be a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union for non-European reasons in which through integration France might be involved. I think there were also other reasons. I think there was one political reason, which was on an international field. He wanted to start the policy of détente with the Soviet Union. And France was then the center of the whole American posture in Europe. And he felt that this did not give him the necessary freedom of action in talking to the Soviet Union. And finally, there were some internal policy reasons that the need for the French to feel responsible for their security and defense. And the feeling that as long as the French forces were inside the integrated military structure, there was a great danger that the French would like, several other European people feel that after all, their security was an American responsibility. That it was for the Americans to provide for the security of, of Europe. He had the feeling that especially after the defeat we had suffered in 1940, there was that danger, that we would feel after all, we're not, the Americans are there to defend ourselves. He felt that the French had the need to feel responsible for that being less integrated, integrated to have nuclear weapons of their own, to have their own strategy and be able to cooperate with the alliance in case there was an aggression in Europe. Ah, but not being automatically involved in conflicts that might be, have their origin outside Europe.

BUT HE WAS A VERY GREAT SOLDIER... HE MUST HAVE KNOWN THAT TO EXCLUDE THE AMERICANS FROM FRANCE PHYSICALLY, LEFT NATO WITH MUCH LESS STRONG MILITARY POSITION. HE MUST HAVE KNOWN THERE WAS A MILITARY COST TO THIS?

I think you're right as far as the logistics concerned. Certainly, France was a great help and lines of communication, and all that. At the same time, for the cooperation of the French forces with the allied forces, at the time when the French forces were withdrawn, an agreement was signed immediately by the chief of French forces and General (?), who was then the... arranged for the cooperation of the French forces to the defense of Europe in case there was an aggression in Europe, and those agreements, I think, are also, cover the logistical support that France would give. So, clearly there are no storage of American weapons, no, no permanent facilities, but in case there would be a crisis, then those agreements, which had been signed would come into operation. Remember that at the time of the Cuban crisis and of the Berlin crisis, De Gaulle was the first and the most strongly in favor of American firmness and supporting the Americans. So he was a man who really was could be relied upon in times of crisis and who, I think we can say, was considered to be difficult in normal times.

WHAT WAS THE WAS THERE A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION TO THAT OF EISENHOWER TO DE GAULLE?

Ah, I think Kennedy resented the nuclear effort of France very strongly. Ah, I don't know that General Eisenhower did did resent it. But then, of course, Kennedy was no longer there when France withdrew from the integrated military system. But, certainly that was resented very strongly in the United States and throughout Europe. And it's interesting to see how things have settled down now. Because as you see, take a comparison... in '61, I think, Kennedy said that the nuclear effort France was an unfriendly act. And in '75, the American government signed the Ottawa Declaration which recognized that both British and French nuclear forces contribute to the global deterrent posture of the alliance. So, you, in, in twelve, thirteen years you have a complete change in the, in the attitude.

BUT DO YOU REMEMBER ANY FEELING OF HOSTILITY THAT EXISTED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE DURING THOSE EARLY YEARS OF THE SIXTIES?

No, not really. There were, there were things that were not mentioned. I think France resented certainly the, the refusal of selling a nuclear reactor for a submarine. But we were sold some enriched uranium which allowed us to conduct work and produce our own... on the whole, I would think that in spite of the misgiving, ill feelings that were created, France probably benefited by being excluded from American help because we had to go it alone, as the Americans say, but we did do it. I think the Americans were felt that we probably wouldn't be able to do it, and we did. So that established our position. Later on I think it was a good investment.

WHAT DO YOU SAY TO THOSE WHO WOULD CRITICIZE DE GAULLE FOR EMPHASIZING THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR GUARANTEE FOR EUROPE?

I don't think he was so committed in saying that we couldn't rely on the Americans. Ah, I think he said there was a doubt. What I think he felt was that there, it was incredible that in case there was a war in Europe, the United States would use strategic weapons at the price of having a number of American cities destroyed and millions of Americans being killed. But I think states being cold monsters, as he said, he didn't believe that would take place. But he knew that the fact that American forces were in Europe first was in the interests of the Europeans, but also in the interests of the Americans. And I think he was perfectly sure that the Americans would not leave Europe. And that therefore, the Soviets would not attack Europe because of the risk involved in the conflict. So, I think, he, his argument that we cannot, couldn't rely on the Americans to use strategic weapons and so on was more directed at convincing the French that they needed to have those strategic weapons of their own, rather than shedding doubt on the fact that the Americans would remain committed to the defense of Europe, but being, ah being probably cynical, he felt that since there was no danger that the Americans would leave Europe, because that was against interests, he could play safe on using the argument that after all, they couldn't be relied upon to risk their own life for the defense, for the defense of their allies.

HE WASN'T CONCERNED THAT MAYBE THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BELIEVE IT?

No, I think he, I think he felt that the, the Russians knew what American power was and that they would not risk confrontation, which they didn't.

DO YOU THINK THAT IF AMERICAN BEHAVIOR AND TO A LESSOR EXTENT BRITISH BEHAVIOR DURING THAT PERIOD OF 1958 to '62 HAD BEEN DIFFERENT, IF A TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE HAD BEEN SET UP, IF NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND FRANCE, OR BRITAIN AND FRANCE HAD BEEN CLOSER. WOULD THAT HAVE ULTIMATELY CHANGED THE SITUATION? THAT FRANCE MIGHT NOT HAVE DEVELOPED A NUCLEAR FORCE AT ALL?

It's so difficult to tell. It depends on who would have been in power...

ASSUMING THAT DE GAULLE WAS STILL THERE.

Assuming that De Gaulle was still there... if he had, had an agreement by General Eisenhower to have global planification of defense, that might have changed things. That might have changed things. But it was so unlikely. And why, why should the United States who were then the only superpower, the power, accept to be hand strung in any way by commitments to another power, friendly as the relations have always been between these two powers.

DO YOU THINK THAT DE GAULLE HAD A DOUBLE STANDARD. THAT HE DEMANDED THINGS OF OTHER POWERS THAT HE NEVER WOULD HAVE CONCEDED HAD HE BEEN IN THE SAME POSITION?

I wouldn't risk an answer on that. I think he was a very astute politician, extraordinarily well aware of the affairs of the world and the relationship between nations. He was without illusion. He was pragmatic and went for effective results.

WHAT WAS THE REACTION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO THE INITIATIVES BY NIXON AND ESPECIALLY BY DR. KISSINGER IN THE LATE SIXTIES TOWARDS DÉTENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WAS THAT SOMETHING THAT FRANCE ENCOURAGED OR WAS PLEASED TO SEE?

Well, France had embarked on the policy of detente herself first, so that was, no that, there was no, no misgivings about that. Of course, considered to be perfectly normal and hopes were expressed that it would amount to positive results. Now over the, the question of part of détente, really, between the United States and what détente was between the United States and the Soviet Union was over strategic weapons. Ah, over the SALT negotiation. But France had nothing against it because that was over the strategic weapons, not the weapons deployed in Europe which were needed for the defense of Europe, the tactical weapons. And France didn't feel concerned herself and really neither British nor French forces were then considered, Ah, one thing which was considered to be very positive in France was the ABM Treaty because limiting the defenses of the superpowers against each other's strategic forces could only work to the benefit of the smaller nuclear forces because the fact that there would be limited defenses made the penetration capacity of the smaller forces more credible. So the SALT, SALT I agreement was considered to be on the whole, on both counts beneficial.

DID FRANCE FEEL SUFFICIENTLY CONSULTED ON THESE ISSUES AT THE TIME AS THINGS WENT ON?

Well, the consultation really was more in the form of information that was given in the NATO council on the progress of the talks. Ah, of course, other allies could give their opinion on this or that, in support to this or that proposal, but I don't thin that there was really a consultation. I think that normally, if I remember well, those talks which took place in the NATO council were informative, very instructive, very positive, they clearly drew together the strategic thinking of the allies and the and the United States. It it did not involve directly the Europeans in the negotiation, which was clearly an American responsibility.

THERE WAS A SUGGESTION IN THE BEGINNING OF THOSE TALKS BY THE SOVIET UNION THAT FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THOSE STRATEGIC TALKS. DO YOU REMEMBER THE FRENCH REACTION TO THAT SUGGESTION?

Well, we of course refused. We said that we would not accept it. And there was also an attempt by the Soviet Union to involve the forward base systems. And that is one point on which the Europeans were very strongly supporting the negative of the United States because that was the tactical deployment in Europe which the Soviet wanted to get rid of and which would, of course, would have completely made the defense strategy of NATO a flexible response of any strategy, impossible to implement.

BUT FRANCE HAD OPPOSED FLEXIBLE RESPONSE VERY FIERCELY?

France had opposed flexible response, without proposing something to replace it, but at the same time we didn't want to see the sis—the American the tactical the American tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe to be withdrawn.

IN 1973 MR. KISSINGER ANNOUNCED IT WAS GOING TO BE THE YEAR OF EUROPE. WHAT WAS THE RESPONSE HERE TO THAT? DO YOU RECALL ANY PARTICULAR REACTION TO MR. KISSINGER...

Well the there was a reply on both counts. You see, it was studied how the European community and the United States could cooperate more. And that didn't, nothing came out of it, really. Mr. (?) was then the French Foreign Minister, and I remember he told me that he didn't believe that much would could take place in the field of the relationship between the European community and the United States. On the other hand, oddly enough, it was in the field of defense that a positive result was obtained through the Ottawa Declaration. And I think it is no secret that the first draft of the Ottawa Declaration was a French draft, which Mr. (?) had asked me to propose, and which was accepted by Henry Kissinger as a good draft so the Year of Europe really developed into the text which is, which is the most important text perhaps that the allies signed in those years for the cooperation and which France took complete participation.

WHAT DID THOSE SENTENCES SAY?

They say, they say that the Europeans cooperate with the, that the defenses are same to, for all. That the nuclear component of France and Britain cooperate to the global posture of the alliance. That the really I can't... I would have to refer to it...

IF YOU COULD START AND SAY THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULTS OF THE YEAR OF EUROPE WAS....

Yes, alright? Yes. Ah, I think oddly enough may be the most important result of the Year of Europe was the Ottawa Declaration in the military field. The Ottawa Declaration was the text of which was drafted from initially a French proposal which Mr. ...had asked me to draw. And the text is important because it to put it in a nutshell it is the first that recognizes that the situation at the level of the confrontation between the two superpowers had changed because of nuclear parity. That was a new fact. But that new fact made the defense of Europe more specific because from then on while the superpowers are only vulnerable to nuclear weapons, the Europeans are vulnerable to all kinds of... And therefore, there, the defense of Europe is becoming more specific. And that requires quite a reaffirmation of the United States commitment to defend Europe with whatever means were needed, but also it recognized that the Europeans were producing three-fourths of the forces of conventional forces air and land forces for the defense of the West in Europe. And also it recognized that there were two European nations which have nuclear, which have nuclear power and that nuclear power contributed to the global posture of the alliance. That I think was an important text and it got recognition.

SO IT WAS A RECONCILIATION IN A WAY OF THE CONFLICTS THAT HAD GONE ON IN THE 1960S?

In a way. In a way. Yes.

COULD YOU STATE THAT?

Yes. I think after the difficulties which had marred the days when France walked out of NATO and criticized the str—which are of the integrated military structure, not only NATO, but of the integrated military structure, and with the refusal of the strategy of flexible response, this was a text where the unity of the alliance on the broad lines of the defense was reasserted in a very very positive way.