HOW DID HE BECOME AWARE OF THE PLANS FOR MX?

Well I heard about it as a member of Congress when the idea was to develop not only the MX with the counterforce or first-strike capability but also the rail, rail basing mode in the, in the West. And I heard about it as a member of Congress as one would expect. My opposition was not so much frankly the running of the missile around the tracks of the sands of Utah and Nevada, the Western states, because frankly that probably makes the best sense of all of the basing modes that have been proposed. But rather my opposition was against the doctrine of counterstrike or counterforce, or a first-strike capability. And I've been an adamant opponent of that doctrine from the beginning.

ASKS ABOUT COUNTERFORCE AND FIRST-STRIKE, HOW THEY ARE DIFFERENT.

Well you know I've heard that too and I'm amused by that, having served on the defense appropriations committee for some three terms. On the one hand the Pentagon will tell you, don't worry about the capability of counterforce and distinguish that from first-strike. In other words, what they're saying is, even though counterforce has the capability for first-strike, don't assign it that motive. Well they say that on the one hand, but General Vessey responded to one of my questions on the same subject, in committee, in testimony. And he said, "Congressman, I'm a general. All I can deal with is capability and all I can see on the part of the enemy's arsenal is what their capability is. And as a military planner, I have to assume that if the enemy gets a certain kind of capability, then he's apt to use it." Now question: Isn't there a Soviet planner somewhere in the Kremlin, somewhere in Moscow, looking at our capability, counterforce capability and saying to themselves, "That's first-strike, it's potentially first-strike." Now possibly there is somebody in the Kremlin that's saying, "Well the Americans are so moral that they would never use their counterforce to first-strike us." And if such a person, such an adviser ever gave that kind of advice to a high-ranking Kremlin official, I guarantee that would be the end that off...that adviser's career. Because you can't trust—the Soviets can't trust us to be good and not to use a capability, nor could we. The key things is to keep counterforce, first-strike, sneak attack, Pearl Harbor, nuclear technology out of the Soviet's hands, and the only way to do that is to restrain ourselves and not develop that same capability here. Because the arms race is monkey-see, monkey-do. If we develop it, they're going to develop it. What we need is a treaty to keep it out of the hands of both sides.

HOW COULD WE NOT END UP IN AN INFERIOR POSITION IF WE WERE GOING TO RESTRAIN OURSELVES FROM THIS?

The Soviets don't have today a full first-strike counterforce capability and the debate I'm fighting and am joined in by my colleagues, is to deny them that capability. Why? Because that will make America more secure, that is real defense for the United States of America. What, what the Weinbergers and the Richard Perles and the Administration and their allies in Congress don't understand is that if we allow the Soviets to go forward and develop an arsenal of this sort, by refusing any restraint on the part of ourselves in developing such an arsenal, that provides an open invitation for them to do that and, monkey-see, monkey-do, they will. I guarantee you. It's been the history of the arms race. By denying them that we will be more secure and that's, that's the important issue.

WHAT IF WE RESTRAINED OURSELVES AND THEY WENT AHEAD?

What I want to see is an administration that is willing to sit down at the negotiating table and negotiate meaningful treaties that keep out of the hands of both sides this kind of capability. We have not seen that on the part of the Reagan administration and so it's been up to those of us in Congress to try to put pressure on them to negotiate such a treaty, to appeal to public opinion, to support a public...create a public atmosphere in which the political imperative becomes to seek such a treaty. And in the absence of that to understand that America still will be secure if we put out investments with our budget resources being as limited and constrained as they are, in survivable retaliatory weapon systems. Now this gets into the whole question of, of terms that, that the public finds, I think, some difficulty in following, you know. Sometimes I think that the public ought to have a dictionary to understand the terms that are being bandied about here in Washington, DC. For example, accuracy. You know, counterforce requires a higher degree of accuracy. Often in the debate here in Washington you will then hear people say, "Well then America must have greater accuracy in our offensive weapons systems, our missiles and so forth." Well those of us who were against this added measure of accuracy aren't arguing for inaccuracy on our side. We're saying, as long as we have survivable retaliatory weapons systems that are accurate enough to survive an incoming attack and then retaliate and inflict maximum damage on any the, on any adversary, that's sufficient. To go beyond that means borrowing billions of extra dollars that the United States Treasury doesn't have, putting it into weapons systems that reach a degree of accuracy needed not to retaliate and to ruin the adversary's day if he should sneak attack us, but instead to have enough accuracy to lob a warhead down the throat of an enemy silo. Well question: Why do we need, as America who will never launch or Pearl Harbor, that kind of accuracy? American warheads, dropped down the throat of an enemy silo, in a time of war are going to be dropped down the throat of an empty silo. Because it's our adversary that will go first. The United States of America will never go first. Why then should we develop that kind of weapons system? So I'm not talking about, nor are my colleagues, about inaccuracy, I mean the weapons we will shoot in retaliation won't fly off the planet. They'll land but they won't be so highly accurate as to go down the throat of the enemy silo. Now there's another important thing here. To go on our own in the absence of seeking a treaty trying to forswear the Soviets to deny that kind of capability to themselves because we're willing to do some too, in the absence of moving in that direction and just trying to beat the Soviets by, by developing a first-strike of this kind, sure it could be used in a retaliatory way but it's far more than we need in a., for a retaliatory response. And just as General Vessey, our Chief of Staff, told me, that he has to look at the adversary's capability, someone in the Kremlin would look at our capability and, and have to ascribe the motives to that capability that that capability is capable of doing. And that is to launch a Pearl Harbor. And so we have one other danger then. We invite the Soviets to, to hasten their attempt rather than to pull back from their attempt to move to a counterforce posture. Now, what I tell my constituents that's so dangerous about that is that it's like pulling a gun at point blank range and aiming it straight at the heart of somebody, two people in an alley, each with guns, pistols, hammers cocked, fully loaded, surprising each other right in an alley. Point blank range. That's what it would be like if both sides get a counterforce capability. And I have to ask you, what, how do you defend yourself if you were in that situation? You don't know what the motives of your, of the person aiming his pistol at you are, and he doesn't know what your motives are. What are you going to do to defend yourself? You know your chances are pretty bleak. The only chance you have is to shoot and get your shot off before he gets his off against you. Now where's deterrence in that kind of a situation? This thing we call deterrence. The thing that's kept the peace. You don't have deterrence any more. Instead you have an invitation for either your perceived adversary or you to shoot before you're shot. Reagan has never been able to understand this. Weinberger has never been able to understand this. Perle has never been able to understand this. None of their colleagues in Congress have been able to understand that. So what the American people need is a dictionary of terms. Greater accuracy if it means buying this kind of pistol-aimed-at-pistol, first-strike invitation to shoot, doesn't buy you defense at all. It buys you a guarantee that one side or the other is going to launch and then it's over, and that's not defense.

RECALL SEVERAL PAST SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS -- FROM MCNAMARA THROUGH KISSINGER, SCHLESINGER AND HAROLD BROWN -- HAVE HELD TO A GUARANTEE IN EUROPE OF NUCLEAR OFFICE IF THERE IS A CONVENTIONAL INVASION BY THE SOVIET UNION. HOW CAN WE MAKE THAT DEFENSE CREDIBLE IF WE CAN ONLY LOB MISSILES AT CITIES IN RUSSIA. THEY THINK WE NEED A CREDIBLE COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY.

Well I just have to respectfully disagree. If anybody, Republican or Democrat in anyone's cabinet honestly thinks that a surgical nuclear strike can be made and not trigger a full-scale spending of both sides' arsenals, I would have to say that they are living in a world that, that just simply doesn't exist. You cannot, the use of a counterforce weapon in that way would assume that you could make a surgical strike. And the other side is going to just simply sit back and not - set loose their entire arsenal. That will never happen. Can you imagine somebody, if I were President of the United States, Commander in Chief of our armed forces and I had a, had a military reservation or a command post, sensitive command post hit with a surgical strike, first-strike type highly accurate barrage of missiles, and taken out, I'm not going to sit back and say, "Well they took that one out. That was a bad day for them." The imperatives are going to be to calibrate this thing up and I don't see how you start once you, once the chain reaction begins.

THE OTHER ARGUMENT AT THAT TIME WAS THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY...

Well we pretty much took care...

...MANY PEOPLE WERE SAYING, PAUL NITZE AND OTHERS, THAT WE MIGHT BE VULNERABLE IF THE SOVIETS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ACCURATE LAND-BASED ICBMs THAT COULD TAKE OUT OUR ICBM FORCE, THEN WE WOULD BE FACED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH WE WOULD EITHER CAPITULATE OR RESPOND WITH A CITY-STRIKE STRATEGY, WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY INCUR A SIMILAR RESPONSE, THEREFORE WE WOULD BE BLACKMAILED INTO SURRENDER BECAUSE THEY HAD COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY AND WE DID NOT.

Well with all due respect to Mr. Nitze, the man who I think helped invent the word window of vulnerability, it was the Scowcroft Commission which pretty much put to rest the idea of a window of vulnerability existing for our, for our ICBM silos. The Scowcroft Commission ended up recommending putting the MX, which was being proposed because of this perceived window of vulnerability, guess where? In the same silos as the Minuteman missiles which were supposed to be vulnerable in this window of vulnerability. Now if those silos are vulnerable with Minuteman missiles sitting in them, why aren't they equally vulnerable with MX missiles sitting in them? So this window of vulnerability has been a term that's been thrown around to argue for and to provide an excuse for the advancing counterforce. And I reject the idea of counterforce although I recognize that those who've, who have argued about the window of vulnerability disagree with me on this. But unfortunately they don't have a national defense doctrine. They only have a national offense doctrine. And the trouble with a national offensive doctrine is that monkey-see, monkey-do, it invites the Soviets to get an offensive doctrine with the quote Pearl Harbor type capability. And frankly that capability, Pearl Harbor, sneak attack, counterforce capability, you have to ask yourself who is it, who is at a disadvantage most, an aggressor or a, or a country that has no aggressive intentions. It's useful only for an aggressor. It's the aggressor whose sneak attack will catch the, catch his victim's silos with weaponry in them, because that's the nature of a surprise attack. That's not the United States, if anyone, it's the Soviet Union. I don't understand why the Perles, the Weinbergers, the Nitzes, have never comprehended this.

ASK IF WE DO HAVE A FIRST USE POLICY.

Well our policy has been to never forswear first use of nuclear weapons in Europe, that's because basically of the overwhelming conventional advantage that Soviet forces have in Europe, and forswearing it would leave them at advantage. In... my own feeling is that first use would not be a wise thing in that we ought to address the conventional force imbalance by negotiations and bring them, bring both forces down which would require an asymmetrical reduction, a greater reduction on the part of the Soviets that have the advantage than us. But failing that to build up to meet the conventional threat. But not to have first use. Because first use clearly is going to trigger a second use, a response and once you get that going I think it calibrates up till again both nuclear arsenals are fully spent.

ASKS HOW HISTORY OF BASING MODES LOOKED FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW

Well it appeared pretty comical to be truthful with you. I think we've gone through 35, 40, 45, maybe 50 of the most ridiculous basing modes that you can imagine. I can remember Dense Pack. Boy that was a lulu. Dense pack was, the idea was that you just center all of our MX missiles, all clustered together so that any incoming rounds from the Soviets that would try to take them out would bump into each other and explode on their way in. I can remember on the floor when Dense Pack was voted on, I joined in the debate even though I wasn't yet on the Defense Committee, and it happened to be on Pearl Harbor day and somebody said, who was advocating Dense Pack, was saying, "And never let it be forgotten that today we're debating this on Pearl Harbor Day." Whereupon I jumped up and said, "That's very appropriate because the last Dense Pack we encountered in warfare was at Pearl Harbor when all of our military equipment, ships, planes and so forth, were clustered together on a runway and the Japanese obliterated them. Let's not invite the same kind of response here." So it's been, if it weren't for the seriousness of the thing, which almost wants, it makes you want to cry. It's been almost laughable to watch this sequence of basing modes, one after another, each more ludicrous than the next. Trying to make the, the MX missile survivable. And they still haven't solved it. And you know, what amazes me is with all of these expensive schemes that they're talking about to try to protect our ICBMs, our land-based missiles...rail garrison basing for the MX, it's going to cost $15 billion of borrowed money over the next 12 years. Other kinds of schemes. With all of this talk about basing modes, no one in the administration has considered the one thing that would truly make our land-based missiles survivable, and protect them, give them the protection that they're seeking. And that would be a flight-test ban on ballistic missiles, negotiated by treaty with verification procedures which would be easy to verify because our satellites can catch missile tests, it's the easiest thing in the world to verify. We have, if a Soviet attack were to be launched today, we would, our estimates are, have about 600 surviving warheads that we could use to retaliate against the Soviets and they know that. But that number is going to be constantly reduced unless something is done to protect survivability. Unfortunately nothing except for a flight-test ban keeps that number at 600. A flight-test ban would. You would not, because it would be mutual and imposed on the Soviets, you would not allow through that kind of a treaty, the Soviets to develop the kind of accuracy that would take out anything more than those 600 warheads which are more than enough to retaliate. And because they are more than enough to retaliate, they then reach the only target that counts in advance. And that's the mind of the Soviet military leader. If that mind understands that if he should ever dare launch a sneak nuclear attack, we have the retaliatory capacity to go back and obliterate his entire society. Then that mind is going to conclude, that may not be the wisest thing for me to do. And he's not going to do it. And that's real deterrence. A flight-test ban on ballistic missiles insures that kind of survivability on our arsenal for retaliatory purposes alone. And you know something else? Rather than $15 billion for a rail garrison basing mode or for even dollar one, a flight-test ban is absolutely free. It doesn't cost the taxpayers a cent. And we actually will be more secure under that than we would be by going off into these half-baked basing schemes, trying to make our land-based missiles safe. It's... that's why I say again, I wish it would be possible to have a dictionary of terms, nuclear terms, in the hands of every American voter. Because I am convinced some of this hogwash and hot air that has been blown around this city during these debates over these years would, would really fall on deaf ears and the voters would apply the kind of pressure to get practical treaties that really buy security, rather than being diverted sometimes to schemes that buy insecurity and risk, instead of the defense we really want for our country.

BACK TO DENSE PACK FOR A MINUTE, WERE YOU AWARE OF THE LETTER THAT DR. TOWNES SENT TO CAP WEINBERGER THAT WAS MADE PUBLIC? DO YOU REMEMBER THAT?

No, I don't recall the details of it.

WERE YOU AWARE THAT THE AIR FORCE AND THE JOINT CHIEFS HAD SOME SKEPTICISM THEMSELVES THAT THERE WAS A LACK OF WHOLEHEARTEDNESS IN THE PRESENTING OF THAT IDEA?

There was some considerable lack of wholeheartedness in the Weinberger Dense Pack idea by the Joint Chiefs, by members of the Joint Chiefs, by others. There are also I must say there has been considerable heartburn among thoughtful senior military planners in the United States about the zeal with which the administration wants to abandon the SALT II limits. The Joint Chiefs have historically and our most thoughtful military planners have historically understood that limits on SALT II are extremely important for the security of the United States and that we will end up buying real security rather than creating any superiority on the part of the Soviet Union. So this, this Dense Pack reservation that military officials felt certainly didn't create any precedent. There has been thoughtful military opposition to a lot of the half baked ideas that the, some of the Cabinet level officials in the last few years.

WHAT WAS THE ATTITUDE IN CONGRESS BY THE TIME ALL THESE BASING MODES HAD BEEN...AND THEN THEY WERE PRESENTED WITH THIS DENSE PACK IDEA? WAS THERE A BUILD UP OF FRUSTRATION? THIS EVENTUALLY ENDED UP IN THE ADDABBO AMENDMENT. EXPLAIN WHAT CONGRESS BASICALLY SAID TO THE PRESIDENT AT THAT POINT.

Well Dense Pack was what passed the MX missile off the track. Congress passed the Addabbo Amendment. I was a member of the Defense Appropriations Committee and helped my dear friend Joe as his only other arms control advocate on his committee at the time. Passed the amendment and fenced off funds for the MX until the suitable basing mode could be found for the MX missile. It put the monkey on the administration's back to come up and tell us, how are you going to defend this? How is it going to survive? It was a sound amendment. Congress passed it. Out of this frustration that...that I've mentioned. Then a very smooth move was made by proponents of counterforce. And first-strike. People who have wanted to build the MX because they believe in counterforce. The Scowcroft Commission was, was created. We are told to believe that an exhaustive search for a safe, invulnerable basing mode would be, would be conducted and the Scowcroft Commission came back with a very peculiar report. It said, what we really need is a single warhead, highly mobile, land-based missile and we need to move away from MIRVed stationary missiles like the MX. And it gave a green light to what we call Midgetman, that's a single-warhead, highly mobile missile. But in the meantime, the years before such a system could be developed, funded, and deployed as a test of quote unquote national will, we need to fund MX, a certain number of MX missiles, just to show apparently the Soviets that we're capable of showing national will. I never could understand how, how it...really works, that building MX missiles and placing them as the Commission suggested in the same silos that Nitze and others said were vulnerable, showed any national will. It showed a... I think, a peculiar idea about cost effective defense. And I think ludicrous on the face of it. But that's what the Commission came up with. I warned at the time that, that the limited number of MX missiles that the Scowcroft Commission recommended would open a production line and that would be fully in place first, long before we ever got to a single warhead, mobile missile, the Midgetman. And that I worried that in the future years, as the budget picture tightened, that somebody was going to stand up and say, "Wait a minute, you can't go to a new land-based missile, you can't go to a Midgetman, even though it may have you say some non-first-strike capabilities. You've got a hot production line here. The MX missile is being produced on a per cost, per unit basis. You can produce those more cheaply." And I said that's what you're going to find. Instead of running that risk and having us move to counterforce because of budget squeezes, what we need to do is stop the MX now, notwithstanding what the Scowcroft Commission came up with in this peculiar recommendation, and move forthwith to develop or research the means to develop to deploy a Midgetman missile. And I think that was a sound warning. Mr. Carlucci within two weeks after taking over from Weinberger in the Senate, told the Senate that he thought the Midgetman ought to be, ought to be killed. Midgetman... ought to be killed, on a cost basis because of the budget squeeze.

ASKS ABOUT LOBBYING PROCESS FOR SCOWCROFT REPORT

I don't think there was a tactic known to man that wasn't used in this, in this fight --

You know, I have to be, I have to tell you, I don't think there's a lobbying tactic known to man that the administration didn't use, the White House didn't use, in this fight. And the other side was putting maximum pressure on too. It, without a doubt, is the, was the most titanic political struggle I've seen on Capitol Hill. But as for the White House, I can remember colleagues of mine calling the White House, wanting White House passes for constituents, and the first question they were being asked, "Do you support the MX?" For White House passes?! For constituents! I mean gimme a break. But it actually happened and there were enough presidential cufflinks handed out to woo votes over to the President's position that I think he's gone to, I'd be surprised if wouldn't, didn't go to button shirts. He virtually exhausted his whole inventory, I'm sure. But I remember colleagues of mine were part of that undecided block being flown up to Camp David, up to the rarefied atmosphere of Camp David where a colleague, and it's the nature of the political animal, susceptible I have to admit myself. He has his ego massaged by being in those kinds of surroundings. Flown up to Camp David? Place where the Camp David Accord was actually negotiated? FDR, Jack Kennedy, Nixon. No one has ever seen film footage of this place. I mean what a seductive environment. And I don't know how many members who actually made the trip ended up voting with the President. But I'm willing to wager that he got a majority, far more than a simple majority of my colleagues who made that trip up there. So everything was used. At the grassroots, people like, groups like Common Cause and the Freeze voter organizations, and SANE and others were working to get their networks bringing pressure on members as well. It was a titanic fight. It really was.

THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT YOU FELT WAS A SHAM, A FIG LEAF OVER A BANKRUPT POLICY, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT?

At the time the Scowcroft Commission report was unveiled I felt very suspicious. These are people who I don't think are unpatriotic or anything like this, but I do think that he majority of the members of that commission believed and still do believe in the doctrine of counterforce and the idea of MX missiles and would far prefer to see MIRVed land-based missiles that carry counterforce first-strike capability than they would a small single warhead non-first-strike retaliatory weapon which could only be used for retaliation. It could never be used for a first-strike. And so I thought it was peculiar that if this were the stated long-term goal, i.e., to build single warhead retaliatory weapons, why should we open a production line to quote unquote show national will for the MX missile? To get a hot production line going where the MX missile stops becoming a defense concept and becomes someone's job instead, and then to put those missiles in the same silos that, that they said were vulnerable. I mean it was bound to raise the suspicion of those of us who have felt that the Administration wanted one thing above all and that was counterforce, the capability with their land-based missiles to go along with their submarine-launched ballistic missiles. So yes, I was very, very suspicious and particularly suspicious as a member of the appropriations committee where we handled the money, watching, looking out into the years ahead and seeing the budget squeeze coming because of the need to bring in these structural deficits that were created in part by this massive, unprecedented peacetime military buildup. The budget squeeze causing somebody in the future to say, "Hey we can build more MX missiles at a cheaper cost than we can a Midgetman. Why start a Midgetman missile?" And having that whole argument about well, what kind of capabilities these two systems represent, being lost in the fervor of the budget dilemma that we would be in in the future. And sure enough Carlucci within two weeks started making budget arguments against not the MX missile, which is totally useless, it's a total waste of money, but against the Midgetman which, if it were deployed, coupled with a ballistic missile flight-test ban, would represent a larger number of survivable missiles today, in the future than we have today. You see, what the Administration and its allies in Congress have simply been unable to understand, is that as I said before, not only do we have 600 missiles that would survive today if we had a Soviet attack and that's enough to counterattack and counterpunch them massively that a surprise attack would be ruled out, but their doctrine, which allows the Soviets to increase their accuracy, will pull that number of 600 down closer and closer to zero. Zero survivability. Whereas a flight-test ban would preserve that number at 600. And if you had a flight-test ban with a singular tightly crafted exemption for a single warhead Midgetman mobile missile, you would probably have something like 1100 survivable warheads on land, and that's real security. And the interesting thing is that, that, that...people in the Administration who I have argued with on this try to come across in the public debate as the ones who are tough on defense. Really strong of defense of the United States. I don't accuse them of, of anything else but foggy vision. But they do have foggy vision because they are not tough at all. What they are doing is setting us up to improved Soviet accuracy, so that we will have zero survivability on our land-based missiles, and therefore no capability to retaliate by allowing the Soviets to complete…to steadily, step after step, improve their, their accuracy. Now to me that means weakness of defense. And that's how we intend to fight the battle in the years to come, to show how that doctrine, their doctrine spells weakness, and how our doctrine spells security.

ASKS ABOUT ARGUMENT THAT REAGAN NEEDS BARGAINING CHIPS FOR ARMS CONTROL

Well I know that's been the argument that my friend Norm Dicks and, and Les Aspin have used. Others have used it too. I would just say that now what I said when they first used that argument. You have to have a... you have to have a will to negotiate a treaty in order to make effective use of a bargaining chip. And I did not see then, do not see now, the willingness of the Administration to simply use this as a bargaining chip. Instead I fear that, feared then, fear now, that the MX missile, like, like MIRV technology before it, will foe a bargaining chip that ends up in our arsenal. And our arsenal is full of bargaining chips that once were bargaining chips and today they're weapons systems. And I've felt, feel that Dicks and Aspins were flatly wrong on that and we still have not worked out this political argument in Washington. There are going to be those who are going to say, forget the Midgetman, build the MX missile and we're, we've got that fight to work out. It hasn't been used as a bargaining chip yet.

ASPIN AND DICKS FEEL THEY HAVE FORCED THE ADMINISTRATION TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION

Well, I can't call it a great victory if over the President of the United States, if the President of the United States own new Secretary of Defense goes to the Senate and says to the Senate, "We shouldn't be building a Midgetman missile. A single warhead mobile missile, because we can't afford it." And an Administration that after this great agreement requests of Congress the down payment for a $15 billion rail garrison basing mode for the MX missile, which clearly presages and becomes a harbinger for the full development of far more than 50 MX missiles. This Administration from all I can see still wants to build MX missiles in greater numbers than 50, wants to put them in these highly-vulnerable garages and then send them out on railroad tracks, hoping that the Soviets will be charitable enough to give us three hours warning so we can get them out of the garages in order to, in order to save them, for ultimate use. I don't think the Soviets are very charitable, nor do I think the Administration has had arms control imposed on them with all due respect to Mr. Dicks and Mr. Aspin, through Mr. Dicks' and Mr. Aspin's efforts. I haven't seen it yet, quite to the contrary, I've seen the reverse.

WHAT ARE THEY RESPONSIBLE FOR?

Well they played a very significant role, if, I think it's safe to say if it hadn't been for Al Gore who's now a Senator and Les Aspin and Norm Dicks leading the fight, I don't think the MX would have, would have been built. They essentially accepted the Scowcroft Commission's report and, and then with their support brining along moderate, some moderate Democrats, gave the President a majority in the House and in the Senate. And so we get for the time being, 50 MXs. But proposals for $15 billion for a basing mode that will invite even more MXs and probably the demise of the very thing they stated at the time that they led this debate that they wanted most, and that's, that's a single warhead non-first-strike, mobile, Midgetman missile.

DOES HE SEE IT AS EITHER/OR: RAIL GARRISON FOR MXS, OR MIDGETMEN?

I can't, can't conceive of Congress today, with the budget deficits that we're faced with, shaking the world financial structure, possibly funding two... land-based missile systems. It's just inconceivable to me. The money is not there. The...the fantasy, the sleepwalking is over. We can't do both. We already have three penetrators of Soviet air space, the B-1 bomber, the Stealth bomber and certain kinds of cruise missile technology. That's redundancy in spades. To think that we can invest in two land-based intercontinental rocket systems is just beyond my belief, and I think it's beyond the belief of the American taxpayer. So it's going to be one or the other and I fear that, that that great what I call the Treaty of Pennsylvania Avenue...here we had members of Congress negotiating with people down at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, on arms control! What I wanted to see was the Administration going to Geneva and negotiating on strategic arms control. All we've gotten is a Kewpie doll with arms control on intermediate force missiles in Europe. But those, that deals with about two percent of the world's warheads. The superpowers' warheads. And it's insignificant in terms of any military utility. It does create a good precedent for more sweeping arms control. We don't have it nor do I see the will to achieve it at this point.

DOES HE FEEL REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DID NOT LIVE UP TO ITS SIDE OF THE BARGAIN?

...And the Air Force sitting back and lusting in its heart for the MX missile all the way. Let's face it the Midgetman missile is not the Air Force's little pride and joy. If the Midgetman would just kind of walk away and get off the radar screen, that would be great with the Air Force. The Air Force is interested in one thing, that's MIRVed missiles, MX missiles with counterforce capability. Now there may be some dissent in some quarters of the Air Force, but the basic Air Force position is MX missiles and counterforce. They don't want to be bothered with itty-bitty little roaming single warhead missiles, they want the big stuff. Unfortunately, they don't have to deal with the taxpayers burden. Nor do they have to think through the nuances of what this does in terms of the monkey-see, monkey-do aspects of arms control. If we build those kinds of things, like the Air Force wants us to, there will be irresistible pressure in the Kremlin for them to do the same thing. Then we're right back at the pistol aimed in the face on both sides at each other and that means you're on a hair-trigger basis and one side surely will go first. In order to protect themselves.

AIR FORCE SAYS THEY MAKE THE SAME ARGUMENT ABOUT MIDGETMAN —COST INEFFECTIVE. IT DOESN'T MAKE SENSE TO PAY FOR IT.

Well I would say to the Air Force, my friends in the Air Force, if cost is what their concern is, finding a cost effective way to ensure survivability of our land-based ICBMs or land-based ballistic missiles. Then support me fellows on a ballistic missile flight-test ban. Because if we, by treaty, on a verifiable basis, we can get the Soviet Union to ban flight testing of ballistic missiles and we do to then their land-based missiles will be currently, which won't be able to be improved but the ones that are current, will be secure. We'll have enough if attacked to wipe out the other side and that's all we need. And the price tag is the best price tag of all. It's free! Free! So if that's their concern, cost is their concern, come over and join AuCoin. We welcome you.

THAT WOULD WORK BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT INCREASE ACCURACY?

That's right. You have to test ballistic missiles... One has to test ballistic missiles in order to improve accuracy so the beauty of a flight-test ban on ballistic missiles is that neither side can improve their accuracy beyond the incredible accuracy they already have, to the point where they can literally represent this missile warhead down the throat of an enemy silo type of accuracy. And we don't need it, for reasons I've mentioned.

ASKS ABOUT OTHER BASING MODES. WAS SCOWCROFT COMMISSION STACKED WITH PRO-MX PEOPLE? A WAY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO GET MORE MXS?

There is no question that the people who were on the Scowcroft Commission had previously staked out a position in favor of the MX. I mean it's a well known documented fact, based on previous writings, utterings, statements and so forth. So, there was the majority and they crafted, they crafted in consultation with those in Congress who ended up carrying the debate for them, they crafted a package that guaranteed that the MX would go forward. First we were told only on that limited basis, only until we could get to the Midgetman, but unfortunately once you... you know, the history of defense spending is such that once, once you make a production line hot, you start producing product. Then it does become somebody's job, some community's economic infrastructure. And it's awfully hard to shut down. And that's what we're finding right now.

ASKS ABOUT 50 CUT-OFF.

I think ultimately there came a point where the...the absence of arms control results in Geneva on strategic systems, peoples' uneasiness about the survivability of the MX, and budget pressures, together resulted in a majority in both houses capping the MX missile at 50. But I, while I welcome that, and welcomed it at the time, my concern was that it might be only a momentary victory. And I'm concerned still that it might be because I see Carlucci saying that we can't afford the Midgetman, I see the Administration adamantly oppose the idea of flight-test bans, of flight-test ban treaty on the part of the Soviets and our part. And that to me then means one thing: They will turn to the MX in greater numbers with other basing schemes. And I think the rail garrison basing mode is the one they've chosen to, to be the land base of our Triad. And unfortunately that's about $15 billion in the basing mode alone of useless weaponry because it's absolutely vulnerable to improved Soviet accuracy. Which no one in the Administration is negotiating limits on.

WHAT WILL CONGRESS DO?

Oh they'll fight like hell to...to see that Congress doesn't approve the other 50, but I'm predicting that the next big fight on strategic weapons will be over the question of limiting, of lifting the limit on 50 MXs and going to a larger number for budget reasons and because the Administration really, and the Air Force has never really wanted the Midgetman in the first place.

ASKS ABOUT TACTICS USED BY ASPIN AND OTHERS IN CONGRESS.

Well here is another one of the several examples during this whole fight where if it weren't for the deadly stakes we were playing for one would either sit back in amusement or with admiration for some of the sense of timing and skill that was involved. The, it was clear that the Congressional supporters, the Aspin group, whether it was Les or not, wanted a vote on the MX missile after the Freeze. Because there is a phenomenon in the House, I think it exists in the Senate, where members who aren't really wholly and fully and intellectually in one camp or the other try, you know, they're the persuadables. Constant persuadable. And they're always the middle group that every winning side goes after. Well one of the phenomenon, phenomena, in the Congress is that people like to be able to not get too extreme one way or the other if you're in this particular group. So by scheduling a freeze vote where the guys and gals can cast a vote for arms control, and then scheduling the MX missile next, you give them a chance to then vote for a strong defense, a strong America. And you put them in an uncomfortable position of having to cast two arms control votes in a row which begins to make some people uncomfortable. They'd much rather, you know, balance one vote against the other. Timing wise? Beautiful. Policy wise? A terrible result because the result was a totally non-survivable, useless piece of military equipment and hundreds of millions of... of taxpayer dollars going to waste. But that was the timing and I have to take my hat off in a purely clinical sense to those who helped arrange the timing. They understood the behavioral characteristics of this place very well.

WAS FREEZE MOVEMENT AT THAT TIME?

Very powerful.

ISN'T THAT IRONIC?

Well there is an irony there, there is no doubt about it. But I'm, I'm not saying that everyone who supported the freeze ended up voting up for the MX. It just was, the way it worked, it was for that one critical group. For them, it was very convenient to throw us a vote... on the freeze, and then to set the stage for a pro-vote for the MX. There is irony there but the freeze shouldn't blame itself for the result. It's those weak-kneed members of Congress who have to balance votes against each other that ought to have the people of this country express their forceful opinion too.

DID YOU HAVE HARSH WORDS ABOUT IT?

Yeah. These were tough days, I mean, there were friends pitted against friends. And there were allies pitted against allies. And I'm no natural enemy of Les Aspin nor Norm Dicks nor for that matter Al Gore. Although we had differences before that and will in the future. But these were tough times, and I did feel a sense of betrayal when clearly we had an Administration that up to the point of the freeze had never advanced an arms control idea. And a grassroots movement swept this country calling for, demanding arms control on a very thoughtful basis. And anyone who says otherwise about the freeze doesn't know what they're talking about. When we never, because of these things, had a clearer distinction between parties, in terms of what they thought represented defense, as at that moment, the Reagan Administration that belittled the idea of arms control. The people I call the shooters and those of us who feel that we sure ought to have weapons systems but only weapons systems that deter rather than invite a first-strike. A very clear line, so that the people would have a clear choice. And so, was I disappointed or betrayed by my colleagues and my own party who worked a deal thinking they had the power of themselves to negotiate with the President of the United States to bring him around on something that he didn't take to naturally? Arms control? You bet I felt betrayed. And I remember when Al Gore stood up and, and said in return for these delicate negotiations... it just seemed so preposterous that these relatively young members of Congress could negotiate with a head of state, the President of the United States and get him to agree with arms control. But Al Gore said "He's promised us in return for the MX that he'll be serious in Geneva on arms control." I jumped to the floor and I asked for time and I said "Well I just have to say that's really a great bargain. This is the treaty of Pennsylvania Avenue. The President gives us, the Congress, a statement of sincerity on arms control, and we give him the MX missile." I said "I'm glad the gentleman from Tennessee is not negotiating in Geneva with the Soviets if that's his idea of a good bargain."

SUGGESTS THE MX BECAME A BARGAINING CHIP IN CONGRESS.

Exactly right. And the President in return gave us a statement of sincerity. How do you verify sincerity?

ASKS ROLE OF COMMON CAUSE

These grassroots organizations played a very important role because what they were able to do was to get the message out in an informed way at the grassroots to their own membership as well as beyond as to what it was that we were fighting over back here. And then to channel peoples' concerns into direct input to the members of Congress and members of the Senate who were considering these questions. And we can, I can remember weekly strategy sessions with all of these groups. 15 or 20 representatives sitting down with members, talking through the head counts and finding out who was undecided. And we'd start with a long list and then the members who had relationships with these undecided members would then go out and, and talk to them and try to get their commitments and win them over with the arguments. And then we'd report back the next week and we'd say, in the sessions, well we're having trouble with Congressman X, Y, or Z from Tennessee or Kentucky or Michigan. And the groups would in fact let their membership know in those states, in those districts that this person really needed to, to hear from their volunteers. And they turned the heat up on those members and if it hadn't been for their work, I don't think we would have even been on the playing field with the Administration which had all the cuff links to hand out. All we had were arguments.

ASKS FOR MORE SPECIFICS ABOUT RECEPTION OF COMMISSION REPORT.

Oh I remember when Scowcroft and Weinberger came to the Defense Appropriations Committee to sell us on that report. And I said to Weinberger, "Mr. Weinberger, Mr. Secretary, you're endorsing if I understand what you're saying today, a report that recommends putting these MX missiles that you value so highly in those same silos that you said were vulnerable. Now how can that be, Mr. Secretary. I'm concerned about your favorite missile system." And he looked at me and he blinked and then he just smiled. He couldn't stop. He just smiled from ear to ear and he said, "Well that statement is now inoperative."

WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE SCOWCROFT ARGUMENT ABOUT VULNERABILITY?

Well Scowcroft basically said that because of what they called synergism that you couldn't attack the, the, the silos where the MX missiles would be placed without alerting the other two legs of the triad. That therefore you don't have to worry about the perceived vulnerability of those silos. And the problem with that is that... that shoots down the whole idea of the window of vulnerability. The window of vulnerability argument by the Weinbergers of the world was that notwithstanding the other legs of the triad, their submarines, their bombers and so forth, those Minuteman missiles sitting in those silos were vulnerable. So we've got to build an MX. And those of us who said, "You don't need to build a counterforce weapon, you've got other ways, other ways to...to defend yourself. You have to look at the total arsenal, were dismissed. Our arguments were dismissed. Then Scowcroft comes along, Weinberger signs off on it and makes the same argument that those of us had made, about the so-called window of vulnerability for the Midgetman missiles. Those some Midgetman, Minuteman silos are the ones the MX is sitting in today, and they were supposed to be vulnerable. And at least Scowcroft showed that, showed that those of us who argued, who were arguing that this was just a spurious argument, were right. It was a spurious argument. Weinberger bought it and you ask, was I suspicious when Weinberger bought off on the Scowcroft report? Sure I was, I was very suspicious because I played his own words back at him about how vulnerable these old Minuteman silos were. And he just grinned from ear to ear because, you know, he was like a kid with his hand in a cookie jar and got caught by his dad. And he just couldn't stop grinning. And he said, "Well those words are now inoperative, Congressman." And I knew and he knew I knew that really what he was getting in the Scowcroft report was what he wanted most, because it was what the Air Force wanted most. And what was that? MX missiles. With the hope that any cap in the future would be removed and any move to build a Midgetman would be ignored. You'd get a production line and introduce the missiles in enough numbers that would satisfy them. That's what he wanted, that's why he was grinning. I know that and so does he.

ASKS ABOUT BIGGEST MISTAKE.

The biggest mistake my colleagues made and it's what made me mad at the time was that they took the steps that created the atmosphere for the MX production line to open up, to be a hot production line. The genie left the bottle because of them. And that's a problem we're still going to have to deal with. That is a destabilizing weapon and they let the genie out of the bottle.

AND NOW YOU FEEL THAT GETS IN THE WAY OF GOING AHEAD WITH THE MIDGETMAN, WHICH IS WHAT THEY WERE AFTER... AND THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN A BETTER WAY OF SHOWING NATIONAL RESOLVE?

You know the Scowcroft Report in its peculiar way said, well, and I think it was deceptive, it said, well, as for the MX missile, though really what we need is the Midgetman missile, as for the MX, we're going to build it because we're going to show national resolve. My feeling was you want to show national resolve to the Soviet Union or to the world, you do that by putting your money directly into the Midgetman and go forward full speed ahead, and perhaps couple that and definitely couple that with a ballistic missile flight-test ban in a treaty. But you don't show resolve by, by saying, but first we're going to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in this useless piece of military hardware that will be vulnerable to the Soviet Union and invites them to duplicate because of the monkey-see, monkey-do aspect of the arms race. The same kind of counterforce capability.

ASKS HIM TO GO THROUGH EARLIER ANALOGY.

Well the problem that people have who, who want the United States to have counterforce capability or first-strike capability, is that they fail to understand the one phrase that I think summarizes the arms race. Monkey-see, monkey-do. If we develop counterforce sneak attack, Pearl Harbor nuclear capability, monkey-see, monkey-do, the Soviets are going to do the same. And what does that mean? That means the Soviets and the United States ultimately then will find themselves like two men in an alley. Surprising each other and pulling a pistol, fully loaded and hammers cocked, aimed straight at each other point blank range. And then how do you defend yourself in a situation like that. Think about it? The only way you can defend yourself is to shoot before the other guy shoots you, and so deterrence stops, ends right there. Whenever you have that situation. And instead you have an invitation for one or the other to go first. And that's the absence, that's the destruction of deterrence. Then you have an offensive invitation for one side or the other to go first.

[BACKGROUND DISCUSSION]

Well there is incredible frustration because, on the part of members of Congress, because we're just not seeing the kind of activity on the part of the Administration for genuine treaty commitments that one would expect for the security interests of the United States on arms control. And that's why you've seen this phenomenon within Congress. Riders on appropriations bills that by the power of the purse strings provide legislative arms control. I can remember speaking in Europe and talking to parliamentarians over there and they were dumbfounded to hear about the fact that Congress, by passing my amendment that restricts funds, denies funds for flight testing on anti-satellite weapons, so long as the Soviets maintain their moratorium, and gives the President the authority to certify that the Soviets have tested, had actually passed the Congress. That Congress had legislated arms control. And what you're seeing now is a new phenomenon, unknown to the previous Congresses, where amendment after amendment is being offered, several have passed the House, mine for three years has passed the Congress and its signed into law. Where by legislation de facto arms control has been accomplished.