Interviewer: OK, NOW, LET'S GO BACK TO AND START REASONABLY FROM THE BEGINNING.
Interviewer: FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE IN TERMS OF THE GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT WHAT EVENT OR WHAT, WHAT ONE EVENT WOULD YOU SAY ACTUALLY TRIGGERED THE GROWTH OF, OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN GERMANY?
Kelly: Well it was triggered off of course by the decision of 12 December 1979, the deployment to, the deployment decision to deploy first-strike missile strike Pershings IIs and cruise missiles in Europe and from then on it grew very much from that point on.
Interviewer: You can make the answer slightly longer...
Kelly: ...One of the reasons was of course that the European peace movement felt that the deployment of these missiles on European soil, on German soil would be a very great danger towards the Soviet Union in that those missiles could reach the Soviet Union, make it vulnerable within five to six minutes, that it could surgical strikes, strikes into the military infrastructure and that a strike into the military infrastructure could cause in fact World War III, an atomic world war and that this could also be used for first strike, for surgical search, first strike into the Soviet Union.
Kelly: Another reason was of course that we felt that we have enough, that we have enough tactical weapons, inter-continent weapons, weapons on uboats, weapons on the planes that we do not need whatsoever these medium-range missile which has been called a kind of gap of vulnerability by Helmut Schmidt.
Interviewer: A LOT OF PEOPLE WOULD SAY TO THAT THOUGH THAT ACTUALLY YOU MISUNDERSTOOD THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DETENTE AND THE NEED FOR SECURITY.
Kelly: Well the peace movement has been told for the last several months that they have in fact failed very much.
Kelly: I don't think we have failed.
Kelly: I think that the consciousness-raising in the public was done by the peace movement, was done by the Greenham Common women, by the people in Mutland, by the people in Hassel, it was done by them, the people in Comiso.
Kelly: On the other hand the idea of deterrence which is being claimed that it works, I don't believe it works.
Kelly: I believe that the decision now to count in the Pershing Is, the German, and systems with American warheads shows that we have been correct because we have always stated if you want to negotiate these middle-range weapons you must include all medium-range weapons including also the Pershing I.
Kelly: Mr. Kohl gave in on that argument so I feel that the peace movement has had a very big victory in fact, which goes unnoticed or seemingly unnoticed.
Kelly: I also believe that we have shown, or I believe that we have been able to show that we need to open up Europe and make it a non-ally and...for Europe.
Kelly: We have to start talking to each other and Gorbachev's signs of Glastnost do mean that but Mr. Schultz and Mr. Reagan walk away saying that they can speak with the Russian for the first time in a long time it means there is something opening up and I believe we have helped open that up through our own contacts from the Western European peace movement to the Eastern European peace movement.
Interviewer: OK , BUT LET ME TAKE, YOU KNOW, WHAT'S HAPPENING IN, GO BACK A LITTLE BIT AFTER 1979 AND WHILE THE DEBATE ABOUT DEPLOYMENT WAS STILL GOING ON A LOT OF PEOPLE WOULD MAKE THE CRITICISM OF, OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN GERMANY AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT EUROPE IN FACT AND INDEED IN, IN, IN THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WAS NEVER REALLY ADDRESSED AS WELL TO THE SOVIET BUILD-UP WITH THE SS-20S, I MEAN WHAT..?
Kelly: That's, that's of course also I think very wrong.
Kelly: I belong to the initiators of the...
Kelly: and we had repeatedly also asked the dismantling of the SS-20 but we did not connect them - that was the difference.
Kelly: We didn't connect them because we felt that this was a step taken, an unnecessary step by the American side and added to by the NATO member countries.
Kelly: We want to have a unilateral withdrawing of Pershings and cruise.
Kelly: I'm still...
Kelly: even if the talks would fail now in the winter.
Kelly: On the other hand we felt that SS-20s were far too many, had to be dismantled but we also felt, and this is where we didn't get anything now proven, that the British and French potentials which are increasing all the time, must also be reduced and of course that meant for us that that would be the package put on the table.
Kelly: Now in fact a compromise has been that the British and French are not being collared in so we did not get proven right on this point but the Soviet Union had stationed the other SS missiles in Czechoslovakia and East Germany which were for them first strike weapons for us.
Kelly: They can reach us and this means that they're now being dismantled.
Kelly: Also the shorter-range weapons so in that sense we were able to get through at least in the public our idea that it must be a package on the table, that you cannot compare pears and apples.
Kelly: What is happening now I think is a very good sign but it's only four or five per cent of the total number of nuclear weapons being removed.
Kelly: So it's just a small beginning.
Interviewer: CAN WE CUT THERE? CAN I JUST, I MEAN I...
Interviewer: I MEAN PEOPLE HAVE SAID THAT HAGUE AND WEINBERGER AND REAGAN WERE PROBABLY THE BEST RECRUIT: AGENTS FOR THE PEACE MOVEMENT THAT EVER EXISTED.
Interviewer: WHAT, WOULD YOU AGREE WITH THAT OR WHAT?
Kelly: Well I think that in many issues it recruited us.
Kelly: On the one hand the very war-like talk that Mr. Reagan had for, when he said in one program as a kind of joke, I'll begin bombing in five minutes the Soviet Union was a kind of rhetoric that Mr. Hague had and that the others had of course recruited us.
Kelly: Many people were also recruited by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and others were recruited by Central America.
Kelly: So it was a multi-faceted recruitment of the peace movement and many of us like myself were also recruited because of human rights questions in all areas.
Kelly: But I think the most important point was the aspect of a possible limited nuclear wear in Europe making Europe a battlefield for Central Europe, and also having the feeling that the United States is in fact through all its other programs of weapons beginning to want to become invulnerable, making itself fully invulnerable and being able to cut out the military and political infrastructure through Pershing II missiles from German soil and thereby laming as we have said or paralyzing the Soviet Union.
Kelly: That was the arguments we had used and we have more or less been proven right in our trying to analyze what kind of weapons were being deployed.
Interviewer: I MEAN A LOT OF THE PEOPLE THAT WE HAVE INTERVIEWED ALREADY AND ARE GOING TO INTERVIEW WILL SAY ALL THIS TALK ABOUT STARTING A WAR IN EUROPE AND CONTAINING A WAR IN EUROPE IS COMPLETE NONSENSE, THAT THERE WAS NEVER ANY POSSIBILITY OF THAT HAPPENING.
Interviewer: BUT I MEAN CLEARLY A LOT OF PEOPLE IN EUROPE ACTUALLY THOUGHT IT WAS A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY.
Interviewer: I MEAN CAN YOU JUST DESCRIBE FOR US WHAT MADE YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS, MAKES YOU THINK THAT IT WAS A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY.
Kelly: Well it was a serious possibility and it still is because the type of nuclear weapons which are becoming more minimalized, more smaller, more precise, more precision-oriented is being able to hit a target very precisely make the step at which you use nuclear weapons more and more possible, that means you don't, you're not frightened away by the vast and terrible devastation by large nuclear weapons like the SS-20.
Kelly: We were frightened, and many were frightened including the Catholic bishops, the Protestant church, the peace movement, many other people, scientists were frightened by the fact that you could within six/seven minutes paralyze the political and military infrastructure of the Soviet Union through missiles which in fact do not make an all-out war in the world but which do it very precisely by striking out and by making first strikes, that meant for us that we ask the question does Americans, do they want us to sacrifice Hamburg and Stuttgart for New York and of course they would return the question by saying we won't sacrifice New York for you, but that was a very real question.Is Europe being sacrificed while the two superpowers then maybe call it off after first strike, maybe decide we won't make an all-out war after all.
Kelly: But I do believe according to the strategies in the Pentagon there was a true belief that you can have a limited nuclear strike and in fact NATO's idea to use nuclear weapons first in a case of a conventional attack saying that they will use nuclear weapons first shows to us they still have not learned, that they're still believing that we can be the battlefield on which you can exercise this kind of nuclear first strike or other nuclear exchange of weapons and that includes of course also the hundreds and thousands of small tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe which also make a conventional war turning into a nuclear war very possible, very quickly.
Interviewer: WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE, I MEAN YOU'VE SAID WHY, THE REASONS WHY PEOPLE JOINED THE PEACE MOVEMENT.
Interviewer: HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE PEOPLE THAT WERE MEMBERS OF IT?
Kelly: I think that the spectrum has never been so broad as in the Western European peace movement, though we of course had much closer relations obviously with the American peace movement, very strong relationships but it has been made up of many, many caring Christian people, very deep religious people.
Kelly: It has been made up of Communists, of Social Democrats, of some Christian Democrats, for instance like Dr. Franz Allenz.
Kelly: It's been made up of people in the Greens, people who have been on violent draft resistance, who have been non-violent activists, who have been against nuclear power plants and against nuclear weapons.
Kelly: It included also a segment of society which I had never seen so active before including doctors, lawyers, judges, all kinds of professions, and these professions began organizing themselves against nuclear war and from that you had the very big group of doctors which received the Nobel Prize, so it was a very strong and a very large movement in fact based everywhere in society.
Kelly: It was not in any way a one-eyed movement.
Interviewer: DID, I WANT TO DEAL NOW WITH QUITE A SPECIFIC INCIDENT IN, IN THE HISTORY OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND THAT WAS IN 1983 THERE WAS A MASSIVE RALLY IN EASTER, AT THE TIME OF EASTER AGAINST THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND PERSHING.
Interviewer: DID YOU FEEL AT THAT PARTICULAR POINT THAT IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE TO STOP THE DEPLOYMENT?
Kelly: Well I myself personally had always said that I don't really feel it possible.
Kelly: In fact people were very angry with me for being so pessimistic.
Kelly: I felt that it was something we cannot change because I was one of those who tried to lead the Green into the parliament to try to change it and I realized we could not change the majorities if the Social Democrats had not change their minds.
Kelly: They only changed their mind very late.
Kelly: Had they changed their mind during the election of '83 I think we would have changed it but they didn't change their mind in time and I think that the society, the population was up to 75 percent against the deployment.
Kelly: So in that sense the parliament took a decision which was not reflective at all of the position in society.
Kelly: I think that there was a will there, a political will but it was stopped by the elect: and which Mr. Kohl wanted on the grounds of being economic and doing other kinds of programs.
Kelly: It was not a, a campaign round the missile issue and if it had been on the missile issue we would have probably won the issue but I myself I must say I felt very, very pessimistic.
Interviewer: AND THEN LATER ON IN THAT YEAR THE DEPLOYMENT ACTUALLY ...
Kelly: The deployment decision was taken in fact in 1983- At the height of demonstrations where we had over 300, sometimes even 500,000 people, it was then made in November, at the end of November and again I think contrary to the popular; belief of the people outside that should not, there should not be any deployment.
Interviewer: BUT HOW DID YOU FEEL AND HOW DO YOU THINK THAT AFFECTED THE, THE PEACE MOVEMENT GENERALLY?
Kelly: Well on the one hand I was a very bad disappointment.
Kelly: On the other hand there was still enough pressure and enough mobilization for people to go on in their activities.
Kelly: We're still a very strong in '83, very, very strong because there took place prominent blockades, the group Generals for Peace and Disarmament was formed a group of NATO generals...was a much activity.
Kelly: In fact even the armed forces, single soldiers were beginning to...even the soldiers became critical, a few but at least that was something in Germany and we ended up having much more activity.
Kelly: On the other hand people felt that if they had already worked since 1979 that hard and that they weren't getting across to the politicians, they began mistrusting very much also the Social Democrats because they felt they had the most responsibility.
Kelly: Mr. Helmut Schmidt had brought these missiles through his speech in London and here was the SDP suddenly at the moment of deployment turning against these missiles but Mr. Kohl deploying them, so the situation was quite ironic.
Kelly: You couldn't really blame Kohl.
Kelly: You had to blame the Social Democrats and yet they said now, now we're against them, now we're on your side and that is when of course the Social Democrats joined the peace movement, where Willy Brandt made his first speech, I think it was in 1984, a year later, to the peace movement, which to me was very tragic because had he made the speech two years ago there might have been a way to stop the deployment.
Interviewer: ALRIGHT.
Interviewer: NOW, I MEAN TO GET ONTO WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING AT THE MOMENT.
Interviewer: THEY'RE NOW SAYING, I MEAN AS, WITH THE PROSPECT OF AN INF TREATY PERHAPS IN A FEW MONTHS TIME, I MEAN EVERYBODY IS NOW SAYING YOU SEE, WE WERE RIGHT ALL ALONG.
Interviewer: THE DEPLOYMENT DECISION WAS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT BECAUSE WE'VE NEGOTIATED THEM ALL THE WAY ...
Kelly: Right, that's of course the argument that we've been meeting for the last few months very strongly this negotiating from strength.
Kelly: In fact there are some Green unfortunately, including my colleague Mr. Schinny and others who believe it almost nearly and believe saying that it was Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev's goodwill that brought this about.
Kelly: I think that Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan could never have brought about if there had not been the climate; the climate that has been created by the peace movement.
Kelly: That is first of all I think very clear.
Kelly: Second of all, I think the Soviet Union has made many compromises, including on SDI, which were compromise I did not believe they would make, including on the French and British missiles.
Kelly: So I feel that it's not alone in any way a victory of Mr. Reagan to say that this zero option that he offered has now worked because when he offered that zero option the Russians had not yet deploys in Czechoslovakia and DDR, in East Germany.
Kelly: Now the Russians are taking out more missiles that in fact the United States has, has to sacrifice, so I find it has been really ideal for the new thinking taking place slowly as ...in the Soviet Union that has helped us bring about this very big I think ...success but again I stress we are still not happy with that decision alone.
Kelly: We feel that we must do everything possible to find other ways to remove the other missiles because you find 4%, 2,000 missiles being removed very little but we do feel that we have proven correct when the United States admits openly that these missiles are the most dangerous at the moment deployed in Europe and at least in that sense they have begun understanding our argument that we have said all along these missiles are quite destabilizing, quite destabilizing even if they're deploy in times of peace, and of course either from a position of strength, the peace movement does not believe that.
Kelly: We don't believe in deterrence and I can sit here and say that till I'm blue in my face but I believe that deterrence thinking will lead us into further conflicts and to further proliferation.
Kelly: I believe that the whole idea of doing it through strength is wrong and that I believe also and this I think should be watched that the German Government and NATO is looking for every way possible to compensate for this deployment through tactical short-range weapons, through a new deployment on uboats, through new deployment of very intelligent conventional weapons that are now being created and through many, many other forms of nuclear planning which frightens me.
Kelly: If I hear Mr. General Gauden, the new successor of Mr. Rogers talking about a new...a new further re-arming, nuclear re-arming then he's talking about compensating for the, the missiles being now removed and I find that very, very dangerous.
Interviewer: REALLY, I MEAN THE EVENTS THAT ARE HAPPENING NOW, WE'RE, WE'RE SEEING TO SOME EXTENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ACTUALLY DOING WHAT YOU ORIGINALLY SAID ...
Kelly: Yes.
Interviewer: … DON'T YOU THINK THAT, THAT IS WHAT THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE WAS ABOUT IN ANY EVENT?
Kelly: That was in any event.
Kelly: Yes, the message was always a way of demonstrating in Geneva.
Kelly: Also many times the message was always we would like them to sit down and start disarming.
Kelly: We would like them to look each other into their face.
Kelly: Reykjavik was a sign of hope too at that time and we thought they were finally going to do that.
Kelly: We realized it was failing because of Mr. Reagan at the very last moment pulling out but what we have always said was the two super powers must get and sit down together but we also felt that all other nuclear powers, including the two others in NATO because we have three nuclear powers and NATO should also sit down and that disappoints me in a way that the others are more or less watching what the two super powers are doing and are in fact modernizing.
Kelly: In fact that must be the message coming across that we would like all of them to put down their nuclear weapons and I think psychologically the breakthrough at the INF is probably the biggest psychological success we can win because it actually means that the population is realizing that you can disarm, you can remove these Pershings and cruise and SS-20 and you can still live safely that's probably the best message we can get across.
Kelly: That was our message in 1979.
Kelly: Take out these missiles and we can live safely.
Kelly: Don't deploy them.
Kelly: We can live just as we have been living.
Kelly: We can live peacefully if there is such a thing as a cold peace that we have at the moment, but I also think that it could only be possible now under Mr. Gorbachev.
Kelly: I don't believe it was possible up to that time before him, so I think at least through his being able to think in a different manner and also questioning deterrence slowly and questioning military strategies that we can get to another area and I think that what is the most important now is all the discussions of military strategies, what kind of offensive potential do they have? So I believe this breakthrough is probably something that we have to celebrate that night.
Kelly: In fact last week we have discussed with many members of the peace movement that we should make a kind of vigil, a peace vigil to tell people we're here, don't forget us, we help this happen and that we have many other demands going beyond that.
Interviewer: FINAL QUESTION.
Interviewer: YOU SAID TO ME YOU HELPED TO MAKE THIS HAPPEN ...
Kelly: Yeah.
Interviewer: JUST TELL US HOW YOU FELT EARLIER THIS YEAR CHANCELLOR KOHL GAVE GRANTS FIRST OF ALL ON THE DOUBLE ZERO AND THEN ON THE PERSHING 10.
Interviewer: THIS IS THE CDU...
Kelly: Right.
Interviewer: ...ACCEPTING THE POSITION
Kelly: Yes, yes, yes.
Interviewer: ...IN A WAY WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN THOUGHT…HOW DO YOU, IN ENGLISH THE EXPRESSION IS HAVING YOUR CLOTHES BURNT ...
Kelly: Yes.
Interviewer: ...WOULD, IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT CHANCELLOR KOHL HAS .
Interviewer: .
Interviewer: .?
Kelly: No, in fact I think Chancellor Kohl learned very strongly from the pressure through the peace movement because if you had watched the debate in the parliament where the extreme right-wing under Mr. Drager, Mr. Totenhorfer, had gone to Washington pleading that there should be no double track zero decision and pleading for the Pershing Is to stay in Germany words were used like German nuclear weapons existing and of course the word German nuclear weapons does not exist.
Kelly: We have no German nuclear weapons and we had made clear over and over, including in June of this year with 100,000 people that we don't want any Pershing Is being, remaining behind.
Kelly: They have to be counted in because it's as American warheads and a German system, they are American nuclear missiles that are being used here and we do not want Mr. Kohl or Mr. Strauss to start getting ideas about nuclear co-operation.
Kelly: In Germany the word is called...meaning that the Germans are looking to have more influence in nuclear planning and I think that the decision of Mr. Kohl under pressure I believe also by the American Government by the way to no count in the Pershing Is, to give it up, is a very, very major victory for us because that was the demand in June in the...in Bonn of 120,000 people and I think that Mr. Kohl nearly, nearly made these talks fail if he had not given in but if you listen to the news in these few days now you will hear the CSU is still maintaining that they were correct, the Pershing Is should not be counted in, and that's to us of course the typical reaction of the right-wing, that they, do they -want to accept the double zero option.
Kelly: They are against the double zero option so I think it's worse in fact and I had believed that the Germans and in fact the German Government is in fact looking to have more and more voice in getting perhaps in the future nuclear weapons on their own, and I find that to be probably the worst situation is the deployment and the removal of the deployment leads to the Europeans becoming a third nuclear military super force themselves is not what we wanted, but that's a very big inherent danger, that the Europeans begin feeling insecure, the governments, and feel that they should re-arm nuclearly, and I think that would be a very, very bad development.