THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE NP TREATY. HOW DID SOVIET UNION UNDERSTAND IT?

Um hm. Well first of all I am explaining not how the Soviet Union understands it but how... I as a Soviet do understand it. I think that it is a treaty of tremendous strategic importance because uh, in the what was called Great Debate of uh, late uh, late 1960s, early 1970s, it was agreed that defense in uh, the nuclear age is an element of offense and a really dangerous element of offense. And so, it is necessary to curtail defensive nuclear weapons as much as possible. And so they understand it was achieved and on the basis of this understanding, the treaty was created....That's a very important thing.

DID YOU KNOW SCHOLARS AND POLITICAL PEOPLE FOLLOWED THE DEBATE, ESPECIALLY THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ABOUT THE ISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES?

You mean at that time, 15 years ago, I would say that only followed but, to certain extent participated. Certainly not on such a, to such an extent that it is now, because uh, at that time, mostly the debate was American. Today it is mostly international because not only Americans but uh, uh, Soviet uh, experts uh, East and West European, Japanese and others participate actively in it. In the whole we started after the strategic defense initiani... initiative was invented in the United States. But certainly, certainly we tried to follow as much as possible the debate in the US conference. They're really important from my point of view.

APPARENTLY, THE MILITARY SOVIET CONCLUSION WERE DIFFERENT THAN THE AMERICAN AND SO ON TO THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM WHICH WERE ERECTED BY THE SOVIET UNION. HOW DO YOU SEE IT DIFFERENT?

You know uh, first of all, uh, there was certainly an evolution uh, all over the world, not only in the Soviet Union of approach to defense in the nuclear age. At the first stage in 1950s, even...even in ni, in mid-1960s, it was simply a prolongation of the old thinking of the period of the Second World War. But everything which is called defense, uh, should be considered a very good thing. But certainly, uh, people just not suddenly, but little by little, people discovered that in the nuclear age, that the timing is only half an hour, you know, for the missiles of one side to the other side. Then uh, the defense become an element in a very complex situation. That a certain side, let us not call which side, certainly because uh, though we are talking certainly about the United States. Uh, a certain, uh, a certain nation may attack the other side. And use defense as a shield against and destroy the whole strategic of this. And so, little by little the understanding started creeping in, started developing. Uh, it, it started developing in the United States, it started developing in the Soviet Union. So that is how in the beginning of 1970s there was a complete understanding. And uh, as I understand uh, majority of scholars all over the world uh, adhere to this understanding today. So there was certainly an evolution of approach to defense, but I think it is a positive...evolution. Now, you're seeing both what the Soviet Union uh, constructed here. Uh, in the treaty, in the treaties, which was uh, which was uh, uh, the treaty of 1972 and, and which was modified in '74. There is an understanding that each side has a, the United States understood that you now have the right uh, to uh, certain area. Uh, defense in the one very strictly limited area. The United States was frozen uh, their defense uh, around one missile base. The Soviet Union developed its uh, defenses around Moscow. Strictly, strictly within the limits uh, of the ABM Treaty. If the ABM Treaty in '74 if both sides agreed that there should be no defense, then the Soviet Union would have no defenses. And uh, uh, but what I wanted to stress that is strictly uh, within the limits. It's got nothing to do with the space defense. It is a very limited affair.

HOW MUCH OF IT FOLLOWS THE LOGIC MUTUALLY? HOW MUCH OF IT DEPENDS STRESSING THE CONCEPT OR STRESSING THE CONDITION OF THESE SUPPORT PEOPLE... CONDITION?

You know, uh, personally I think that the ABM Treaty on the one hand uh, made... the strength in this uh, this idea of mutual assured destruction. Uh, on the other hand, uh, it moved in, in another direction. How it strengthened uh, this uh, idea of mutual assured destruction. Because it eliminated for every side the capability to uh, shield itself against a weakened second strike of the other side. In this sense uh, technically it increases the uh, mutual assured destruction uh, concept so to say. On the other hand, the ABM Treaty actually was the beginning of the process which uh, unfortunately did not develop but which may develop in future. A real arms control limitations and reductions. And these arms con... ar...arms — not arms control, arms limitations and reductions. And these arms, arms limitations and reduction should lead to a c... completely new situation, which will be based not on a threat of a destruction of the other side through nuclear weapons, but which will be based on some understanding of uh, hm, some mutual, very balanced situation in which uh, uh, the use of uh, or the threat of use of nuclear weapons should be completely eliminated from the policies of any state. So in this sense, uh, it is in political or a military political sense, I think that ABM Treaty was and continues to be the beginning of a very important process.

IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SALT I AGREEMENT APPARENTLY USSR WAS NOT THAT INTERESTED IN THE OFFENSIVE PART OF THE AGREEMENT. IT WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN THE DEFENSIVE PART HOW DO YOU — WHAT'S YOUR ANSWER TO THAT?

You know I wouldn't say so. You know the, the, the positions of both sides were different... uh, in the process of negotiations. You know, because when the negotiations uh, unfold... one started in Heel — actually the first round was in Helsinki uh, in 1969. Uh, you know, both sides were simply approaching each other you know. Because uh, uh, m, uh, uh, what they were talking about? They were talking about the most sensitive, sensitive and the most important elements of national security of national nuclear weapons. Certainly they were afraid of each other a little. They did not trust each other. There were lots of suspicions. And certainly, first positions were developing in this exact question I would say, by both sides, because each side was trying to understand what uh, the other side is thinking, what is. Uh, it was afraid that maybe the other side uh, is trying to deceive and uh, on the Soviet side, definitely there a was a feel that the Americans are trying to invent some maneuvers in order to mm, in order to deceive, so to say, the Soviet Union. But I think that very quickly in the process of uh, these talks uh, on Soviet side as well as lead to an American side, the understanding developed that first of all, defensive and offensive weapons are closely the connection, in the interconnected. And that uh, there should be uh, there should be agreement on both sides on defensive weapons that is ABM Treaty. And on offensive weapons which was uh, signed in the form of interim agreement on uh, limiting offensive uh, offensive nuclear weapons.

...ONE OF THE ELEMENTS THAT AMERICAN WONDERED ABOUT THE FACT... WAS THAT THE START WAS THAT IT WAS AMERICAN SIDE THAT PRESENTED PROPOSAL AND THE SOVIET SIDE RESPONDED TO IT?

Uh, you know uh, I don't know so much the actual, the details of the actual negotiations. And uh, uh, possibly there were periods when Americans were more active in presenting proposals, but at the same time, as I understand the Soviet side was uh, very active too. And even today, it is recognized where the American participants that, for instance, um, for instance, uh, uh, around the discussion uh, around uh, ABM Treaty uh, preparation of ABM Treaty was going on. That the Soviet side was very strict in proposing that no loopholes should be developed. Uh, no loopholes should be created. That if uh, there are, if some new types of weapons uh, should be invented, defensive weapons, or new distant physical principles, uh, uh, provisions should be developed which will limit, limit uh, or which uh, will uh, eliminate the danger that the treaty would be broken through some uh, inve... through some new technological uh, developments. So, uh, but possibly I'm uh, I'm ready to recognize that there were periods when the Soviet side was more active. There were periods when American side was more active. Uh, but uh, at the same time, uh, mm, you know, from my point of view, uh, uh, the most important thing is the outcome, uh, the real treaty. And uh, uh, judging from uh, what I know about the course of uh, these, uh, talks uh, there were hundreds and thousands of discussions of proposals that were initiated s... on both sides. On both sides. So I think that those who say that Americans were active in the very beginning may be simply the sometime period then Americans could be uh, could be more active.

I THINK THAT THE FEELING ON THE AMERICAN SIDE THAT IT MIGHT HAVE TO DO WITH THE SENSE OF SEPARATIVENESS... YOU KNOW, THAT YOU DON'T MAKE PROPOSAL BECAUSE YOU MIGHT INFORMATION. BUT ONLY AFTER —

Well possible uh, I think that it is quite possible that certainly, there was such, such cautiousness or on Soviet side. And uh, uh, some American authors say that uh, Americans put on the table very many figures in the beginning and that the Soviet side was reluctant. Not possibly, possibly it was so. But uh, the whole situations wasn't uh, much later than if you, for instance take uh, uh, the second half of SALT I discussions. If you take discussions at SALT uh, about SALT II Treaty, both sides were pre...presenting a lot of information, a lot of very detailed information. Uh, so I think that here, uh, in the talks both sides were equal.

ONE OF THE ISSUES BEING SUPPLIED WAS THE NOTION OF THE BASIC. CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE STRATEGIC CONSIDERATION THAT AFFECTED THE SOVIET...?

You know, first of all, certainly the uh, uh, American uh, forward based systems are all the to say, in, in, in Soviet minds whatever their official position in the Soviet Union. And their reasoning is very uh, very simple. Uh, Americans have their weapons which could reach Moscow and which could destroy very much part of the Soviet territory which are very near to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union does not have such weapons. ...in 19, in the uh, early 1960s when the Soviet Union started deploying some uh, medium range missiles in Cuba. It was uh, not uh, you know, our reasoning because they were deployed in order to prevent uh, what we considered eminent, eminent danger over American attack against uh, against Cuba. But you know, how uh, it was settled. In 1962 the Soviet Union withdrew, withdrew all the missiles and so since that time the Soviet Union .... So in this uh, sense, uh, in this sense, uh, every w…would say to you that uh, that situation is so to say. The Soviet Union does not have a, a shorter, not strategic range, but shorter than strategic range missiles that the United States the United States uh, do have, do have. In Western Europe uh, do have such weapons for instance and uh, uh, on uh, in some bases and the Far East and so on. And so for the sake of, of for the sake of an agreement, uh, the Soviet Union agreed not to include the, not to include these weapons in the Soviet as far as the Soviet proposals which were made at the of 50 percent reduction and further elimination. Uh, the uh, the thinking uh, or possible discussions about further eliminations of nuclear weapons. But nevertheless uh, it is in the minds. And uh, whatever the Soviet Union did here uh, while uh, taking out, taking out this uh, nn, this forward base American weapons, out of the whole inventory of weapons which may lead, reach Soviet territory. I think that that is a serious concession uh, from the side of the Soviet, from the Soviet Union and uh, it is a sign of the desire of the Soviet Union to have uh, an agreement. And making ag, uh, concessions in order to achieve agreement.

...ON THE TERMS OF THE STRATEGIC WEAPON, THE TERMS OF THE SOVIET THINKING...

You know, I think that uh, the term "strategic weapon" was uh, described very clearly, very clearly in SALT II Treaty. And it was a so to say, description that it was agreed in computation. And it is ta...illustrated that all weapons uh, all weapons beyond the, beyond the range of five thousand kilometers, beyond the range of ...Uh, you know, the definition of the strategic weapon was given in the SALT II Treaty and it was agreed in the, so that both the United States and the Soviet Union do abide to it. It is a weapon which is uh, uh, beyond uh, with the range uh, which is beyond five thousand kilometers. Be it a missile, uh, be it, uh, be it uh, uh, uh, a bomb. And uh, and the Soviet Union does adhere to this interpretation. But at the same time, during the talks of uh, uh, uh, for oh, for SALT II Treaty uh, before that and after that, certainly uh, the Soviet side uh, uh was reminding that their are also other weapons uh, which may reach Soviet territory but which are not uh, not uh, not uh, um, not which to have, not so big range, be we should have the range less than five thousand kilometers. Usually it is 200 uh, uh, two thousand five hundred or 3,000 kilometers like uh, some medium range missiles. But uh, as I said uh, it is all still be in our minds, but at the same time, uh, the Soviet position today is quite clear, that the Soviet Union is ready to look into the strategic weapons as they are described by the SALT II Treaty. Having in mind that if the process were of further elimination of nuclear weapons will continue. Then eventually also this medium range and smaller range weapons also will be eliminated. And certainly on a... balanced basis. Certainly with a — in such a way that it should not uh, one side should not get any preponderance abo... above the other side.

THE DECISION TO REACH EQUAL LEVELS FOR SOBMs AND ICBMs WAS SOMEWHAT TROUBLESOME TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION. CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

The decision to reach equal levels... I wouldn't say, uh, in what sense, uh, equal levels?

THE SOVIET SUBMARINES WERE NOT COUNTED. DO YOU REMEMBER?

No, you know , this, uh, Soviet submarines were al-, uh, always counted. But, um, uh, with one difference. You know, when uh, when, uh, the discussion was going on about SALT I treaty...uh, it was agreed that, uh, the Soviet Union, because of, uh, very serious preponderances, preponderance of the United States in other areas, the Soviet Union, uh, would have, uh, a little more launches, uh, a little more launches on, uh, the submarines. But later, when, uh, potentials were, became more or less equal on both sides in the SALT II treaty... this equality wasn't reduced into SALT, uh, equality, or parity, thus I think it is better to talk about parity because there is really no exact numerical equality. This parity was introduced into SALT II, into SALT II treaty. And the basis of the SALT, uh, II treaty is, uh, is that there should be equal numbers, equal numbers of, uh, launches on both sides. And, uh, the later Soviet proposals, and some of the latest American proposals, moved forward and established, uh, established certain lev-, levels also in the number of uh, uh uh, the same levels, uh, for the number of warheads, which is certainly for the development of this, uh, strategic arms limitations, uh, and the reductions process.

MIRV'S. WHAT WERE YOUR VIEWS, THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS, OF MIRVING?

First of all, I think that it was great, uh, mistake, to start MIRVings of weapons. And, uh, it was, this is the mistake which was committed the United States, because, uh, as you well know, the United States started MIRVing five or seven years, uh, before the Soviet Union. The United States, uh, MIRVed, uh, their ICBMs and the SLBMs in the end of 1960s; the Soviet Union started MIRVing ICBMs only in '75, and the sta-, the Soviet Union started MIRVing, uh, SLBMs, uh, only in 1977. So five, the five comparatively in seven years later. And, uh, uh, and, uh, certainly MIRV- ing, uh, uh, MIRVing was a very great jump ahead in the creation of, uh, uh, destructive, uh, dest-, uh, destructive nuclear weapons. And, uh, I must stress that e-, during SALT I talks, the Soviet Union proposed several times that both sides should not stop MIRVing. And and, uh, it was very strict Soviet proposals. Now, some American authors say, yes, uh, the Soviet, they agree that it was the Soviet idea that no MIRVing, that there should not be MIRVed missiles. And by the way it is very easy to verify, because, uh, through verification of testing, one can easily see whether this missile is one-warheaded, or whether it is MIRVed. And... they say yes, but the Soviet Union did it without great enthusiasm, and that it was, uh, it was like a political propagandistic maneuver. First of all, how it could be propagandistic maneuver if it was done in secret? Nobody knew. Only many years after that, the world found out that Soviet Union was against MIRVing. At that time, the Soviet Union did not leak any information. What kind of propaganda... is it if you do it in closed room and secret? It is not a propaganda. Secondly, about enthusiasm, no, it is again wrong. The Soviet Union proposed very strongly not to develop MlRVed missiles. But, Americans were against, so the Soviet Union was facing a dilemma. Either the talks will be broken on this MIRV problem, or it is necessary to abide, uh, to continue to find some other ways for, for, uh, some other ways of limitations and reductions. So, from American side it was, uh, like an ultimatum, that MIRVing should continue, and that is why the Soviet Union really, uh , really agreed, uh, agreed, very reluctantly agreed with this position. So, uh, in this sense, I think that, uh, strategically MIRVing was, uh, very destabilizing, maybe, I said at the beginning mistake, maybe mistake is not a proper world, it w-, word. It was, it was, uh, rather destabilizing, because whenever you radically increase the number of nuclear warheads, warheads, uh, it already in itself contains, contains, uh, some destabilizing element. Though you may have, uh, in the sense that if you have one thousand warheads from each side, uh, uh, on each side, uh, uh, certainly it is parity. If you have ten thousand warheads, certainly it is parity. But it is much more stabilizing to have one thousand and not ten thousand, because, uh, the bigger is the number, maybe other factors, destabilizing factors, uh, appeared. And, uh, from this point of view, I think that MIRVing, MIRVING... was, uh, actually a very bad phenomena in the arms race, very bad phenomena in the arms race. Possibly the Americans said it would, that the Soviet Union would be a, it is a continuous American mistake that the Soviet Union will be 15 or 20... years, uh, uh, uh, lagging behind, and, uh, usually it is, uh, three, five, seven years, and so mistake was done by, uh, Americans in appraising possible, uh, possibility of a Soviet re-, reaction. But nevertheless, MIRVing, which I think was the most destabilizing fact in the history, history of arms race in 1970, in, of this decade of 1970. And definitely one of the most, most destabilizing fact, facts.

SOME PEOPLE REASONED THAT IN FACT THE EVOLUTION HAD TO DO WITH THE SOVIET DEFENSE SYSTEMS. THAT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR WAS A BYPRODUCT OF AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME...

Yes, I heard about it, uh, I heard about it too. But, you know, uh, possibly it is very difficult, you know, we don't know, we don't have all confidential documents, uh, to judge seriously what was American reasoning. But possibly, uh, uh, it is quite, uh, possible to admit that, uh, the reasoning, uh, behind, uh, the American ideas for MIRVing was Soviet defense system. But defense systems were curtailed by ABM Treaty, so if they are curtailed, wh-, uh, why, why, why, why continue MIRVing? You know, their reason for MIRVing was eliminated. Then why to adhere to MIRVing? I do strongly believe that it was still possible in '71, in '72, to conclude some agreement, which was, would either restrict MIRVing very seriously, or possibly even eliminate MIRVing, eliminate MIRVing... of both ICBMs and both SLBMs. And later, later sharpened it to the, uh, there's another ending story. When the Soviet, when Americans MIRVed, it was considered okay in the United States; when the Soviet Union MIRVed its missiles, immediately the talk started agai-, uh, the, about tremendous Soviet threat and so on and so forth, but, uh, it was provoked, uh, the action was provoked by the United States, because after the United States started MIRVing their missiles, uh, on a large scale, the Soviet Union could not stand still because of it, uh, so it considered it a great danger for the security.

KISSINGER RECENTLY SAID THAT HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THAT MIRV WAS GOING TO BE SUCH A BIG PROBLEM...AMERICA WAS FAR AHEAD, AND THE SOVIETS KNEW THEY NEEDED TO CATCH UP.

Well, it was, it was, it was a continuous, it was a continuous American belief, especially of American military but, uh, may-, maybe even more of American political figures, that the United States are so well ahead technologically, that, uh, that, uh, in one way or the other they will very greatly jump ahead. Today we see, uh, lately we saw the same story with cruise missiles. Uh, the Soviet Union has, uh, you know, a thousand times...repeated that it is necessary not to develop cruise missiles. The Americans considered that the Soviet Union will not be able to create this miniature war heads, miniature -focus, uh, missiles, have continued to develop them. Later the Soviet Union developed cruise missiles. Now, the discussion opened the latest report, uh, on Soviet military power by the Department of Defense. What is the greatest danger there? Soviet cruise missiles, certainly, because... they, uh, because the Soviet Union developed cruise missiles, and suddenly, uh, the American side found out that it is a great danger for the United States. Uh, so it is, so it is very much like MIRV, uh, um, uh, systems. Uh, I... I believe that even the United States really start deploying, deploying something like the SDI, the Soviet Union will exercise some countermeasures, and the story will simply repeat itself, the story will simply repeat itself, because the Soviet Union, in this, uh, uh, certainly, there are very big areas in which technologically the United States are ahead of the Soviet Union, no question here, but on the matter of the national security, the Soviet Union will never allow the United States to be ahead, you know? They will never allow the United States to be ahead.... And, uh, but there were sacrifices I needed for it, uh, the Soviet Union and the Soviet people will support it, because, uh, because it is natural that, uh, that, uh, the Soviet Union should continue to be equal militarily to the United States. So this, uh, continuation of this arms race action by the United States and counter-action by the Soviet Union does not lead us anywhere; it will be simply repetition of the old cycles, simply, um, uh, in the area of new technology, and that is that.

THE RUSSIAN REACTION THEORY OF ARMS RACE QUOTES GROUNDS... VERY WELL THROUGH THE MIDDLE '60'S, AND THEN PRESUMABLY THE RUSSIAN REACTION CAN BE SEEN REVERSING ITSELF. THE ACTION PART IS TAKEN OVER BY THE SOVIETS.

No, it is wrong, you know, it is wrong. If you take major actions, uh, it, if, take major actions, uh, uh, all of them, in 1970s, not, about '60s I shall not talk, but in 1970s, take cruise missiles, take this new technologies for strategic defense, your, uh, uh.... uh, and, uh, I may give you other examples. Usually, this reasoning is, is based on doing one fact, that the Soviet Union developed, uh, developed, uh, new medium-range missiles, SS-20s And, uh, uh, some American analysts say that the Soviet Union seizes the initiatives. But first of all, SS-20s do not reach American territory. It is a medium-range weapon. Secondly, the Soviet Union considered, and consider SS-20s as modification of the existing weapons, so in this sense, uh, in this sense I would not agree that we should continue it as, um, uh, attempt of the Soviet Union to seize initiative, so to say, in the arms race — especially because, uh, Pershing II's... in a sense comparable... American weapons were envisaged in ...early '70s, and the research of this, of this illustration, was going on.

IN THE MID-'60s, THAT'S WHAT INTERESTS ME...

Taken, take it from the very beginning. Uh, uh, the atom bomb was, uh, tested by Americans, hydrogen bomb was tested by Americans, uh, bomb, or strategic intercontinental bomb was... developed by Americans. There was, uh, one, uh, one example: when, uh, ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile, was first tested by the Soviet Union, it was in October, 1957, if I am not mistaken, and the American intercontinental ballistic missile was tested, tested only a year, uh, a year after that, in, uh, the autumn of 1958. But, uh, true, it happened so, here the Soviet Union was ahead. But one should stress, at the same time, the deployment of ICBMs was first started by the United States. You take any records which were published, and, uh, any American appraisals according to them, the United States started deploying ICBMs in...these underground silos in 1959, and the Soviet Union started doing it only in 1960s, one pair, in 1960, one year after that. That, though the testing of this single weapon was carried on be-, before by the Soviet Union, the deployment of this weapon was started by the United States. It, so, even, even here, uh, the measure element, the deployment, uh, was initiated by the United States, not by the Soviet Union. Take, uh, strategic submarines. Take, uh, uh, take, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, missiles, uh, SLBMs, uh, uh, submarines-launched ballistic missiles. First there were SLBMs which were launt-, launched from the surface, because technology was not developed, uh, for underwater... underwater, uh, start of the, uh, SLBMs. So, on the...surface it was first, uh, tested by the United States, underwater, underwater, uh, uh, SLBMs were developed first by the United States, and so it, uh, some people say, there are 15 major developments in the arms race — some say 23, some say 13, but all of them were, uh, first d-done by the United States... By the way, in the number, in the numbers of warheads, always there was not a single day in the arms, in the history of arms race, when the Soviet Union had more warheads than the United States. Always the United States had more, and today the United States has more. According to official American figures, uh, not according to Soviet interpretation. According, take any official American description; you will find that some of them say much more, some of them say less more, but, uh, the United States have more. Now about ICBMs, yes, the Soviet Union has more ICBMs, the Soviet Union has, uh, if I remember from the, 1300, 98 ICBMs in silo; it is the figure which was, uh, re-quoted, uh, uh, uh, in'79, when SALT II treaty was, uh, uh, was signed; and the United States has, uh, a little more than a thousand, but, for a long time, the United States had, uh, 1054, then, uh, Titan missiles were, uh, they are deployed, uh, some, some of them, uh, now some MXs are deployed, so I don't know what is the exact figure: probably this may be 1030, might, 1040, something like maybe 1050. But they are... what is definite, that the United States has more, has less, uh, ICBMs, and the United States, uh, have, uh, less warheads on ICBMs than the Soviet Union. But it is balanced by the other areas: SLBMs, heavy bombers, numbers of cruise missiles, so, but overall number is bigger in the United States, is bigger for the United States, but because... uh, the whole arsenals are so big, the Soviet Union is ready to consider, though it is big on the US side, is consid-, is ready to consider it, uh, uh, uh, parity. Though not strict numerical parity.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CRUISE MISSILES?

Um, uh, I think, uh, that, uh, that the, the development of cruise missiles, uh, or at least most types of cruise missiles, did not change the strategic situation, did not seriously change strategic, uh, situation. Personally I think that it is simply an additional accumulation of warheads. Uh... if to talk about strategic, uh, prac-, concrete strategic influence... first of all, it, uh, prolonged the life of strategic bombers, because if a bomber could fire a missile, uh, one thousand, two thousand five hundred kilometers from the border of the enemy against whom the missile is firing, certainly bomber is, uh, uh, is more survival, is a much more survival, survivable weapon. Uh, to a certain extent, certainly cruise missiles, uh, created problems for any side...because it is necessary to develop some countermeasures, some, some types of anti-cruise missile difference. Uh, here certainly... the Soviet Union is in a better position in the de-, for the developing of size defense, because Soviet Union traditionally says, uh serious anti-aviation, uh, anti-plane, uh, defense, and, uh, to a certain extent, uh, anti-cruise missile defense is alike, uh, this anti-plane defense. The United States certainly will have serious troubles, because it will be necessary to create, uh, uh, such defenses and, though the United States do have NORAD system, and the United States, uh, the, uh, do have, uh, do have, uh, anti-plane defense, but, uh, but it is not so well developed. And so, a lot of additional investments will be made. Needed, no; but it was the decision of the Amer-, American side that is, for the American side to settle this problem. Uh, there is, uh, an area... where cruise missiles do create very serious difficulty, 'cause, uh, the area of verification. And, uh, honestly, not so much, uh, verification of cruise missiles on the planes, because uh, practically all of them would be... nuclear, with nuclear warheads. But, uh, with the dispersal of, uh, the problem is, with the prolifera-, proliferation of, uh, so-called SLECOM's, that are sea-launch cruise missiles, because, uh, uh, according to American plans, some of them will have conventional warhems, warheads, and some of them will have nuclear warheads, and it is r-, really very difficult, very difficult to verify. Uh, it is possible to verify, but it will be necessary to create a very detailed system of verification on the ship, of, on operation of ships. And, uh, no, then it will be, the Soviet Union, position of the Soviet Union, uh, you know, uh, now this, uh, the Soviet Union is for very strict verifi-, verification of everything. If necessary, then it will be necessary to move in this area ahead, but certainly, uh, this, uh, addition of a thousand, or maybe two thousand, I don't know how many thousands of, uh of nuclear, uh, nuclear warheads, which will not change, uh, which will not change, uh, equilibrium at all, creates, uh, very, uh, really a very serious situation in the field of verification. And, uh, the American side recognizes it more and more, that it is a serious, uh, it is a, it, it creates a se-, uh, it creates serious problems. If to talk about, uh, about other strategic, uh, other strategic implications, personally, I think that, uh, comparably, cruise missiles is much more effective weapon against the United States than against the Soviet Union. First of all, uh, uh, especially, I mean, uh, sea-launched cruise missiles. Uh, they may be, uh, deployed at submarines, or they may be deployed on surface ships. Because, uh, you know, the Soviet Union is a continental power, and covered from the north by northern ocean, which is frozen, and territory is very big, so, uh, the United States has Atlantic Ocean, uh, in the east, Pacific Ocean in the west. Uh, the territory of the United States is much smaller, so, that means that comparatively, uh, comparatively America... American territory, is more vulnerable... is more vulnerable for, for cruise missiles. And honestly, even today, I cannot understand why the decision to deploy this, uh, uh, uh, sea-based cruise missiles was taken. I, at some conferences, uh, I asked American political figures, and they were military analysts, did anyone in the United States defer the decision to start, to go to, to go with cruise missiles? Did anyone make such an analysis, at the RAND Corporation, or maybe at some other military think-tank? Uh, ana-, analyze the situation: suppose, uh, uh, the United States and the Soviet Union has n number, certain number, several thousands of, uh, sea-launched cruise missiles. What would be strategic situation of the United States — better or worse in such situation? And all of them said that no, such, such analysis was never done. Uh, and, uh, I think wrongly it was not done, because, uh, uh, because, uh, eventually it was the decision which may make, uh, may make security of the United States much worse, much worse, in final count, and definitely not better. Certainly the security of the Soviet Union would not be improved. But, the, uh, the vulnerability of the United States will be bigger to cruise missiles eventually than vulnerability, vulnerability of the Soviet Union. So, from this point of view, I think that strategically it was a very unreasonable decision. And, possibly... I... spoke with many people — you know... there is, uh, there are, there was some feeling of, uh, of idea that a new weapon is developed, you know, very neat, very small, uh, very furtive, supposedly, and, uh, people, uh, were saying, "No, those clumsy Russians will never catch up with it, or will catch up after a long period, and make, uh, huge behemoths which will not fly," but the Soviet Union produced something like this very quickly, very effectively, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and...again, again the situation simply became worse, became...it became worse, and it will become much worse for the United States, it became worse for the Soviet Union, so it would, so nobody, nobody gained. And if you talk about, suppose there will be a proliferation of cruise missiles to smaller nations, especially to those nations which may think...in terms of creating nuclear weapons, or start creating nuclear weapons. Then for such smaller nuclear weapons, it will be a, um, ideal, uh, ideal weapon, ideal weapon for nuclear weap-, uh, for using nuclear, ideal launcher, ideal carrier for nuclear weapons, and it will make, uh, make proliferation more dangerous by degree, by degree, uh, I mean, the proliferation, especially of cruise, of cruise missiles.

IN THE MIDST OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALT II, THERE WAS THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SCHLESINGER PARTY. CAN YOU PRESENT BOTH THE SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OF HOW IT CAME ABOUT, AND YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF ITS IMPLICATIONS?

Yes, it was presented, it was presented, uh, in 1974, and, uh, there was a president's decision... it is, uh, uh, it was in the form of national security decision memorandum, uh, 242, very well-known document uh, which was certainly leaked rather soon to the pre-, to the press, as it happens in the United States, and, uh, it was presented by Secretary Schlesing-, Schlesinger, Sle-, Schlesin-ger, and, uh, uh, it was put on the table as a proposal for, for having a neat, small, graceful, and nice, uh, nuclear wars, which will not destroy humanity, because only some nuclear weapons, uh, would be used. Uh, the Soviet attitude to this idea was negative from the very beginning. From the very beginning, and overwhelmingly negative, and very freshly negative, I would say, because... the first reaction was...that, uh, simply...um, uh, that, uh, uh...psychologically, adoption of such an idea may make a decision to use nuclear weapons easier, because if somebody, in a certain tense moment, thinks that somehow, uh, uh, people will survive, several millions will die, but otherwise, otherwise everyone will survive, who knows, may prompt the decision, may go to take such a decision, so we considered it on this very simple premise, dangerous from the very beginning. Then, secondly, secondly, uh, a lot of Soviet experts analyzed the situation. And, uh, the conclusion also was unanimous, that this, such type of war is...impossible. That, for instance, if you attack me with a certain number of nuclear weapons, then either I surrender, but how can I surrender, having huge nuclear potential? Certainly I will attack you with bigger numbers of you, nuclear weapons, and demand that you surrender. You will not do it because you will have huge potential. You will attack me with bigger numbers, certainly. So from our point of view, any type of limited nuclear weapons is simply the first step in the ladder of escalation, which will inevitably lead to nuclear holocaust. It, then it is, that it will not be possible to stop nuclear war. It is very difficult to imagine how it will be possible to stop, suppose, uh, there are two na-, nation A and nation B, which have destroyed each other: how can they, who will take the decision, you know, to stop, uh, to stop this madness. So, so, in this sense, uh, uh, uh, uh, the Soviet analysts considers, consider that it is simply, practically it is not possible that, uh, it is, we are hundred percent sure, if a certain number of nuclear weapons is used, then it will be, it will be unending, at, unending process. Uh, it will be what, uh, Herman Kahn called, uh, long ago, spasmodic nuclear war, or whatever, whatever else. So in this sense, in this sense in this sense it is very difficult to accept the idea of limited, of limited nuclear, of limited nuclear war. So, we were critical from the very beginning. Then, if, if we take the situation as I described to you, one side attacks with small number, the other side attacks with bigger number, that means, if you want to, if you plan to use, I don't know, 20 nuclear weapons against me, then in your mind, you should already take a decision to pass all this road to the very end. You should be ready, if necessary, to use thousands of nuclear weapons. In this sense, why should I follow your rules of the game? I should play according to my rules, and maybe retaliate massively. So there are, the, hundreds of scenarios may be created, and analyzed, but all of them lead in one direction: that limited nuclear war may be simply the beginning, the first stage, will inevitably, inevitably be the first stage of a big, of a big... total nuclear war. And here there is no hesitation, no hesitation on Soviet side.

DOES ANY PART OF THE SOVIET MILITARY FEEL THERE IS SOME UTILITY FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS OTHER THAN THE KIND WHICH DOES NOT...?

You know...you should judge from what the Soviet, the military have written, and the Soviet military, whatever the Soviet military have written was always negative attitude to the idea of limited, of a limited nuclear war. It does not mean that the Soviet, uh, military does, do not study how to use nuclear weapons, if the Soviet Union is a-, attacked. If it will...uh, the, if it is not the first use, because the Soviet Union took an obligation in 1980 to, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. And that...but, but, but, as far as limited nuclear war, uh, uh, hundred percent of the Soviet military who have written about limited nuclear war, were always critical and, uh, negative, uh, their attitude was negative to the ABMs.

ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH PD-59?

Yes, certainly.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN?

Uh... PD-59...Presidential Directive 59, which was adopted by President Carter, uh, uh, the Soviet, uh, the Soviet side was critical of this directive too, as well as of continuation of, uh, PD 59, that is, uh national security decision directive 13, which was adopted by President Reagan in, uh, uh, in, uh, '82, if I am not mistaken, which was elaboration of the PD, uh, 59. PD 59 is the, uh, directive on which the idea of countervailing, of countervailing is based. Uh, it isn't, uh, and what is can-, countervailing? I've described it already to you. You attack me with 10 weapons, I attack you with 15, you attack me with 20, I attack you with 25, and so on and so forth. Countervailing is the idea that, at every stage of nuclear exchanges the United States should be in their end of these exchanges stronger and send more nuclear weapons. It is impossible idea. No, impossible; let Americans worry about it, but it is a very dangerous idea. Because it also contains within itself the idea of a limited nuclear war. Uh, what the new administration, I mean, the Reagan Administration, added to it, the idea of a prolonged nuclear war. Uh, prolonged, uh, like a serious, series of nuclear war, which ex-, nuclear wars, limited nuclear wars, which expand either territorially, or be prolonged in time. But it is again, uh, it is a return to the same idea, that, uh, the nuclear weapons, uh, that, uh, I, I think that both PD-59 and, uh, President, uh, Reagan's, uh, directive number 15, which was supported by some other, uh, by some other directives, 32 and some others, uh, is, uh, in essence the idea of how to make nuclear weapons more usable in times of crisis. And I think that any idea which is, uh, aimed at making nuclear weapons more usable is tremendously dangerous idea. Because even if it increased the possibility of use of nuclear weapons, I don't know, by one thousandth of a percent, again, it is so dangerous, comparing with the danger of nuclear weapons. So it is, again, all attempt to, uh, to, to, to approach, to approach completely new situation which humanity is facing, situation with nuclear weapons, to try to, again and again, to approach it in the, in more or less traditional terms. But traditional terms should be abolished, as far as warfare is concerned. And, uh, but unfortunately, PD-59, I think, is simply application of traditional military concepts that one side may be superior at some stages, have some preponderance in nuclear weapons, all, from my point of view, it is so ..., its sense. At the time when we do have nuclear weapons. When everyone reduces their nuclear, potential to 20, or to 100 nuclear weapons, then maybe, again, it will be necessary to start thinking in traditional terms, but not today, you know, when humanity's sis-, sitting on 50,000 uh, nuclear warheads. Uh...which five nuclear, uh, nations have, mostly the United States and the Soviet Union.

DOES IT MEAN THAT USSR IS RESPONDING IN A TOTAL SPASMODIC MANNER OR DOES AN EXCHANGE —

The USSR, the USSR will decide. The USSR decide. Maybe, but uh, but uh, if uh, uh, American weapon is uh, exploded over Soviet troops, that means that the Soviet Union has legitimate right to explode it over Washington, D.C. You know? And uh, then Americans will explode it over Moscow. Uh, here uh, and that is merely to the unpolitical figures of the Soviet Union's trust, there, there could nuclear war cannot be a war which is created to and according to certain rules. Because it will, uh, sooner or later and most probably very soon, will go out of control, will go out of control.

HOW DID THE SOVIET UNION VIEW THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY ENGLAND? WHAT DID IT DEMAND OF THE SOVIET UNION?

You know, it was so long ago I, I really don't remember. I even don't remember.

...ENERGETIC ABOUT THE ACQUISITION OF BRITISH FORCES, THE FRENCH AND THE FORCES AND SUMS, OF THE GERMAN PARTICIPATION WAS A FINGER ON THE BUTTON.

No, first of all, first of all we have to talk about forces. No, the Soviet Union generally considers that increase of American pa... nuclear potential, increase of Soviet nuclear potential, increase of any nuclear potential, be it, be it the French, be it Chinese, uh, g... uh, ...nuclear proliferation. It will -- everything is bad, you know. And uh, it- should not be, it should not be developed. Neither the in, the uh, that the Soviet Union consider that the American nuclear potential should be reviewed, the Soviet nuclear potential should be reviewed in the balance way, certainly in order neither side would uh, get some uh, superiority in the process of distribution. And uh, certainly, eventually, the forces as well as the French, as well as Chinese forces should grow. But at later stages because uh, uh, we understand very well that uh, the Soviet Union and United States have uh, their hands uh, ninety or ninety five, I don't know, I never counted, uh, but their definitely larger part of the world nuclear potential and that is why that they should start uh, the process. That is why the Soviet proposal uh, at Reykjavik, that the United States and uh, Soviet Union should reduce the number uh, the number of their warheads and the number of their launchers and after it has been reduced, most probably the Soviet Union and the United States should uh, address to other nuclear nations with the proposals together, to sit together and decide how they will also step in uh, into this process. And some of these nations uh, settle the difference of the Chinese side, that they will participate in the arms uh, reduction process. But after the Soviet Union and the United States reduce their potential by 50 percent. Something like this was said also in uh, Western Europe by British and by French. But uh ...First, very big first steps should be done by the Soviet Union and the United States.

BEFORE WE TALK ABOUT THE REDUCTION, WHY DO YOU THINK THEY ACQUIRED?

Nuclear weapons. I don't know. Possibly there were many reasons. Uh, for the uh, uh, for the reasons of uh, uh, uh, maybe uh, great national self, self respect. For the reason of uh, certainly there were some military reasons before uh, uh, uh, for Great Britain and for France to acquire nuclear weapons. Uh, possibly it was simply inertia when the two big nations acquired uh, uh, nuclear weapons, then why don't we? Possibly there were some, some other reasons. I, I never studied this problem and certainly just trying to think aloud. I don't know what were, what were the re... the real reasons.

OK. LET'S STOP... DO YOU HAVE ANY KIND OF FORMAL FUNCTION WITHIN THE PROCESS THAT IS TAKING PLACE NOW?

I was as an expert, uh, I was uh, as an expert at the last three summit meetings. I was in Vienna during Brezhnev-Carter meeting as an uh, consultant for Soviet delegation. I was at Geneva last year and now at Reykjavik.

CAN YOU GIVE MAYBE JUST A PERSONAL IMPRESSION OF THE CARTER-BREZHNEV MEETING IN VIENNA?

You know, honestly I do not have uh, any personal impression because I was a, I was, even some who practically said no, you won't see it is time to create, to create uh, to create impression. It was uh, as you know, very well, uh, uh, uh, actually prepared meeting when the uh, uh, uh, SALT II agreement was already worked out up to practically almost every detail. And, but again, it is very difficult for me, na, I wasn't much freer in Geneva at the time in Vienna. ...You know. Really it is very difficult, it is very difficult to say. First of all, uh, nobody can say definitely how this uh, uh, or how about, how it will developed. And uh, really uh, uh, I think it is uh, not for the Soviet analyst to discuss ...of the United States and let them discuss it themselves. But uh, judging, and today they in the midst of uh, uh, uh, senatorial commissions are enrolled into it. Uh, pro...possibly a senate uh, senate house commissions are uh, studying it. The special investigator will be appointed. Possib... maybe i...when I lived in...was not appointed still. Possibly he will be appointed. You know, then the congress will meet in January. Uh, then there are many loopholes s...simply in the whole information, how it was, how it was done. Who gave orders, who, who, carries out responsibility. So in this sense, really it is, it is really, it is really difficult, it is very difficult to judge. Uh, it is very difficult to judge.