WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE - TAPES 009059-009061 ABDUL SATTAR

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

Interviewer:
WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE 1971 WAR? AND WHAT WERE PAKISTAN'S EXPERIENCES AND WHAT DID THEY LEARN FROM THAT WAR?
Sattar:
1971 was the most traumatic period in Pakistan's national history. Our country was cut into two. East Pakistan was proclaimed as Bangladesh. And while we in Pakistan were even then self-critical recognizing the mistakes that we had made in our internal political life, nevertheless one fact stood out glaring in the face, namely that a more powerful state, India, had been able militarily to impose a solution on the situation. And by intervention efforts armed forces proclaimed the eastern part of our country as a separate state. I myself happened to be serving in the Pakistan Embassy in New Delhi at that time. And we could see that the events were moving in the direction of use of force by India against Pakistan. But one felt rather powerless. The Indian media and the Indian government through skillful use of its media had been able to create a consensus India, in India in favor of the vivisection of Pakistan. There were Indian strategists who argued that the internal troubles in Pakistan had provided India the opportunity of a lifetime or the opportunity of a century to sort Pakistan out. So it was a period of great sadness and as I've said of trauma. And we in the Pakistan Embassy in New Delhi tried to promote some kind of better understanding of our viewpoint but with very little success. And then the war began on the third of December. In fact a week before that India had sent its armed forces into East Pakistan. And then on the third of December war also began on the border between West Pakistan and India. And we who were serving in the Embassy were incarcerated and we stayed there confined to the Embassy premises until the twenty-first of December, 1971... when through the intercession of the government of Switzerland the diplomatic personnel of the two countries were exchanged... and returned to Pakistan on the 21st of December, 1971. We felt more deeply the shock of the events because the people in Pakistan were completely stunned by the course of events. And well one shared the sadness and one shared the tragedy. And one hoped that internally Pakistan would seek to integrate our polity, that institutions would be established to prevent the repetition of such a trauma. And secondly that we needed to develop a new kind of relationship with India, a relationship that would move us away from conflict and confrontation. The word good neighborly relations. Even if we could not be immediately friends at least we should try through diplomacy to achieve peaceful coexistence with India on terms that would be honorable from the viewpoint, not only of the people of Pakistan but also of the people of India.
Interviewer:
WHAT KIND OF DEFENSE INITIATIVES WERE TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THAT 1971 LOSS?
Sattar:
Well we--the government of Pakistan was hardly in a position to take any initiatives in the field of defense because the country having been cut in size, the resources likewise dwindled and as a result we had to restructure the budget of the ministry of defense and cut down expenditures of the government in practically every field. So the realization that existed in Pakistan at that time and in fact I can say continues to exist is that relations between Pakistan and India have to be managed diplomatically because otherwise, India, which is so much bigger in size, which is nearly nine or ten times bigger than Pakistan in population, which is also more industrialized and has the military industry is just to powerful. And therefore Pakistan cannot in the defense field alone prepare itself or equip itself for any kind of confrontation. Hence the necessity as I've said of coming to a new course of policy and relations with India.
Interviewer:
IN 1974 INDIA EXPLODED THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVICE. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION AND RECOLLECTION OF THAT NEWS?
Sattar:
The first reaction in Pakistan to the May 1974 nuclear explosion by India was that India had made the bomb. The reaction was one of extreme apprehension in the country, in Pakistan. That now the threat to Pakistan's security was that much greater. So the immediate reaction in Pakistan was one of great concern and apprehension and we did not make any distinction on the basis -- a distinction that India liked the world to make, namely that it was a peaceful explosion. But the fact is that the explosion served no peaceful purpose whatsoever in 1974 or later on. It was an explosion of a nuclear device and the same explosion could be utilized for purposes of war. However, I should perhaps say that the immediate reaction needed to be reviewed, needed to be reconsidered with the object of moving on to the next stage.
Interviewer:
WHY DO YOU THINK THEY TESTED AT THAT PARTICULAR POINT?
Sattar:
Well according to published literature in India the decision that India should go in for a nuclear explosion, explosive device had been made as far back as 1969.
Interviewer:
PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION OF WHY THEY TESTED.
Sattar:
Our-- Pakistan's perception at that time was that India had waited until it acquired the indigenous capability for the continuation of its nuclear program before it actually conducted the test. In other words, India had developed an autarchic self-reliant nuclear program before it conducted the test. So that the cut-off of foreign aid in the nuclear field to India would not have any meaningful consequence. So in a strategic sense the timing of the explosion was determined by the calculation that India by that time had become autarchic. But there were perhaps also some momentary considerations relating to the political situation inside India and the perception on the part of the leadership that an explosion at that time would serve to shore-up the popularity of the government in power.
Interviewer:
DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS YOU COULD MAKE ABOUT MRS. GANDHI'S POLICIES IN TERMS OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IN INDIA?
Sattar:
The policy of the government of India on the nuclear issue does not really start with the late Mrs. Indira Gandhi's assumption of power or election as Prime Minister in 1966. It has to be traced back two decades when India decided in the forties soon after its independence that India must acquire a nuclear industry. And the Bhabha atomic research center in Bomb...
Interviewer:
COULD YOU COMPARE MRS. GANDHI'S VIEWS ON THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH HER FATHER'S? OR NUCLEAR POLICY IN GENERAL?
Sattar:
No, I think the — there has there has been a remarkable continuity in India's policy on the nuclear issue. There is a period of exception about which I could perhaps talk later. But the continuity is characterized by statements of policy India did not wish to develop nuclear weapons on the one hand. And preparations for the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability throughout this period. So I think there is — I do not see any break between the policy of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru or Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in that sense.

Pakistan's Nuclear Energy Program

Interviewer:
WHILE YOU WERE AT VIENNA IN '78 WHAT WERE YOUR DEALINGS IN TERMS OF THE PAKISTAN PROGRAM? HOW DID YOU CONTRIBUTE TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM DURING THAT PERIOD?
Sattar:
In the early 1970s the International Atomic Energy Agency had conducted a survey in cooperation with the government of Pakistan which established that Pakistan's resources of petroleum, coal, and hydroelectric energy were very limited. And that the end of the century there would be a big gap between indigenous production of energy through these conventional means and the requirements of our economy. And hence, Pakistan should move forward to establish nuclear generation capacity in the country. So my brief, as representative of Pakistan on the International Atomic Energy Agency was to acquire sympathy and support for Pakistan's energy program to acquire assistance in that field and then in the year 1976 Pakistan had negotiated a bilateral agreement with France.
Interviewer:
WHAT WAS YOUR FIRSTHAND EXPERIENCE IN THAT PARTICULAR CONTRACT?
Sattar:
Actually my involvement on behalf of Pakistan in the IAEA negotiations was to the extent of obtaining the endorsement and the approval of the Board of Governors of the IAEA for the safeguards agreement that Pakistan had concluded with the IAEA in respect of the plant that Pakistan was going to establish in cooperation with France. And in the negotiations between Pakistan and the IAEA the IAEA and we ensured that this plant to be established in Pakistan would be subject to the controls and the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency against any possible diversion of the nuclear material processed in this plant to non-peaceful uses. The agreement that was concluded with the IAEA, safeguards agreement with the IAEA was the most vigorous and up-to-date in the context of the various concepts of controls and safeguards. And the Board gave unanimous approval to that agreement which was a source of gratification for the people like me who were involved. Firstly in negotiating with the IAEA and then in securing the approval of the Board of Governors for the agreement.
Interviewer:
DO YOU REMEMBER WHEN THE NEWS CAME THROUGH THAT YOU HAD GOT APPROVAL? WAS IT A MOMENT THAT'S ALWAYS DEPICTED AS A MOMENT OF GREAT JUBILATION?
Sattar:
Well I think in Pakistan particularly there was a segment of opinion at that time which did not fully understand the implications of the safeguards agreement. That ignorant segment of opinion might have felt that the acquisition of this plant would launch Pakistan on the road to possible acquisition of capability. But this was a total mis-perception for the simple reason that the plant was going to be subject to the most rigorous controls of the IAEA. And I think I'm right in saying today that there is not a single instance of cheating on the safeguards negotiated with the IAEA. IAEA is considered rightly to be one of the most efficient international organizations that exists today. And all the agreements that it has concluded with the member states for the application of controls and safeguards have been scrupulously honored in the letter by the member states. In fact they dare not do otherwise for the simple reason that any violation of these agreements would confront the member state with the Security Council. The Security Council has a role to ensure that the controls and the safeguards are actually applied and implemented.
Interviewer:
WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION WHEN THE FRENCH WITHDREW FROM THAT CONTRACT?
Sattar:
The French decision under whatever pressures that France might have experienced was a source of great surprise to Pakistan because we thought that the both, that both sides had taken into account the pressures that would be generated. And after having ensured that the plant would be subject to the IAEA control we felt there was no reason whatsoever for France to go back on a solemn commitment that France had made in a bilateral international treaty with Pakistan. So we were disappointed, deeply disappointed by the French decision and secondly let me add that the French decision to cancel the — unilaterally withdraw from that obligation entailed very heavy losses to Pakistan because we had paid monies. We had started building. And in fact have, had built some of the instructs... infrastructure for the establishment of that plant. Na... That however is a separate matter because we still have a continuing dispute between Pakistan and France in respect of our claim for compensation for the unilateral violation of the agreement by France.
[END OF TAPE 009059]

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Interviewer:
THIS IS THE PERIOD WHEN WE HAD THE CRITICISM ABOUT REPROCESSING. IT WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ENRICHMENT PLANT. WHEN YOU WERE POSTED TO INDIA, COULD YOU TELL ME THE STORY OF HOW ALL THE FINGERS WERE POINTED AT YOU, THAT THE PAKISTAN BOMB BECAME A NEWS ISSUE?
Sattar:
In 1979 suddenly the international press and in particular the Indian press was full of stories predicting that Pakistan would conduct a nuclear explosion test by the October of that year. Well you know, eight years have passed. Pakistan has not conducted any tests for the simple reason we do not have the capability. But at that time there were a number of friends in India who were even prepared to take a bet with me predicting that Pakistan would conduct the test and I had to decline that and that's for the simple reason that it would be unfair to accept a bet which I knew I would win.
Interviewer:
WHILE YOU WERE IN THE EMBASSY THERE WAS THE PROBLEM OF CARTER'S NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT BEING APPLIED WORLDWIDE AND I UNDERSTAND THAT THE INDIANS MANAGED TO SECURE THEIR SHIPMENT TO THE TARAPUR REACTOR WHICH AT THE TIME MUST HAVE UPSET PAKISTAN IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE REPROCESSING DEAL HAD BEEN HELD UP VERY MUCH BY AMERICAN LEGISLATION. WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THAT PERIOD?
Sattar:
Well our perception — My perception then and now is that the non-p... the American —
Interviewer:
KEEP TO THAT PERIOD.
Sattar:
At that time also that the Non-Proliferation Act of the United States was applied only to one country.
Interviewer:
THIS IS THE CARTER NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.
Sattar:
When President Carter's Nuclear Proliferation Act was applied to the disadvantage of Pakistan. I do not think it has been applied to any other country. Under that act and under the Symington and Glenn Amendments aid to Pakistan was cut off. But no aid has, was ever cut off to any other country. And in the case of India the government of the United States at that time sabotaged its own legislation and decided to provide nuclear fuel and later on nuclear spare parts to India in spite of, and I will say, in the letter in violation of that act.
Interviewer:
WHAT WAS PAKISTAN'S REACTION TO THAT?
Sattar:
Pakistan's reaction was one of disillusion, disbelief that the United States — a country which has been our friend for so long a period of time should have acted so vigorously to cut off aid to Pakistan because it thought Pakistan was violating the act whereas it did not take the appropriate required measures in respect of India.
Interviewer:
THERE HAVE BEEN MANY ACCUSATIONS IN THIS PERIOD OF TIME THAT PAKISTAN WAS TAKING EVERY CLANDESTINE MEANS POSSIBLE TO ACQUIRE TECHNOLOGY TO PRODUCE THE BOMB. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THAT?
Sattar:
Pakistan has not been shown anywhere to have committed any violation of any law existing in the world, in the international organizations. But unfortunately through media reports a perception was generated as if Pakistan was engaged in some clandestine activity. For instance, it was said that in 1979 Pakistan would conduct some kind of a test. After eight years the world opinion should be able to see that that propaganda was false and baseless. And the propaganda that continues even today every now in then in headlines in the newspapers that Pakistan had clandestinely acquired something — If you probe each one of those incidents you would find that there was no proof of the allegations that were made in those stories.
Interviewer:
THERE WERE ALLEGATIONS THAT PAKISTAN WAS EXPLOITING ALL THE LOOPHOLES IN THE SYSTEM, THE SYSTEM MEANING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE REGIME. COULD YOU COMMENT ON THAT ACCUSATION?
Sattar:
Not a single provision of any international legal instrument has ever been sited in respect of which Pakistan committed a violation.

Pakistan's Current Relations with India

Interviewer:
WHAT EFFORTS HAS PAKISTAN MADE TO REDUCE NUCLEAR TENSIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN SINCE '74?
Sattar:
First of all we have indicated our willingness to accept that India does not intend to produce nuclear weapons. And we have therefore asked India now to join us in exploring ways and means of consolidating the intentions of India and the intentions of Pakistan not to produce nuclear weapons in the form of a global, regional or bilateral treaty that would — by which Pakistan and India would undertake solemn obligations not to produce nuclear weapons.
Interviewer:
WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THIS CURRENT PERIOD AS A PERIOD OF NUCLEAR STALEMATE? OR DO YOU FEEL WE'RE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?
Sattar:
I think in South Asia there is a good chance that we can prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but that chance needs to be seized because the — with the passage of time the chance will evaporate. And what, by that I mean that Pakistan and India and other countries of South Asia should join in concerted efforts to convert the declared intention into a solemn international obligation so that none of the countries in our region will go the nuclear route. Because quite clearly unless the country with the greatest nuclear capability joins in this exercise, this exercise gives no hope.
Interviewer:
WHAT DO YOU THINK OF INDIA'S CAPABILITIES AT THE PRESENT TIME INCLUDING HER DELIVERY CAPABILITIES? ARE THEY A REAL THREAT TO PAKISTAN SECURITY?
Sattar:
India has by now produced and set aside some hundreds of millions of kilograms of fissile plutonium. This Plutonium can be utilized by India at any time it wants, at very short notice. And according to statements in the Indian parliament at... at a notice of days for production of nuclear weapons.
Interviewer:
COMMENT ON THEIR DELIVERY CAPABILITIES?
Sattar:
Well in the South Asian context it is not necessary to have missiles with capability. As you know, the only time nuclear weapons were actually exploded in war. At that time it was not necessary to have missiles. Ordinary aircraft was used. And surely the aircraft available with India today have the capability to carry nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's Nuclear Capabilities

Interviewer:
BACK TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE CRITICISM FOR PAKISTAN IS THAT THE ENRICHMENT PLANT AND HER INTEREST IN REPROCESSING ARE WAY AND BEYOND HER ENERGY NEEDS. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THAT?
Sattar:
We have at this time an enrichment program which is experimental in nature and is on a relatively small scale. What we do hope is that we can acquire sufficient capability to be able to provide fuel for the next reactor that will use enriched fuel. We do not at this time have that power reactor. Unfortunately some of our friends including the United States have prevented the supply of a power reactor to Pakistan. But we do hope that we will get one in the near future, that our policies will be better understood. And that at that time the enrichment capability that we have will be available for the indigenous production of fuel for that reactor.
Interviewer:
DOES PAKISTAN HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO MANUFACTURE A BOMB, A NUCLEAR WEAPON?
Sattar:
Pakistan does not have either the plutonium or the enriched uranium, enriched to the level required for nuclear weapons. Therefore I can quite categorically that Pakistan does not possess the capability for nuclear explosions.
Interviewer:
AND I UNDERSTAND THERE ARE TWO WAYS OF MANUFACTURING A BOMB. COULD I ASK YOU ABOUT THE STOCKPILING OF PLUTONIUM?
Sattar:
Pakistan has at this time only one reactor — the Karachi nuclear power reactor which is subject to the latest safeguards and controls of the IAEA. That fuel cannot be processed also because we don't have a reprocessing plant. Therefore we cannot extract plutonium. So that route doesn't exist. The only plant that we have outside the safeguards is this nuclear fuel enrichment laboratory. And that is as I've said engaged in very low levels of enrichment.
Interviewer:
WHY KAHUTA ISN'T SAFEGUARDED AND WHY IT'S SO HEAVILY PROTECTED.
Sattar:
This plant is not safeguarded for the simple reason that this plant has been established by Pakistan through indigenous means. And according to the international law at present, only those plants which are established with foreign assistance under the safeguards of the IAEA have to be subject to the controls. But we have at the same time declared again and again that on a nondiscriminatory basis Pakistan is willing to accept full scope safeguards and bring even this laboratory under international control.
Interviewer:
COMMENT ON THE SECURITY ASPECT. THERE'S BEEN CRITICISM THAT KAHUTA IS SO HEAVILY GUARDED. WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO GUARD A CIVILIAN PLANT?
Sattar:
It's necessary to guard this plant because of the recurrent reports of possible attack or sabotage of this plant. These threats have been talked about in the international media. And I can say there are reports appearing the US press as far back as 1979 to the effect that this plant could be attacked and destroyed. So it is necessary that the government of Pakistan should take appropriate steps to safeguard this plant... against possible attack or against aggression, sabotage.
Interviewer:
IN 1984 I BELIEVE IT WAS, PAKISTAN WAS WARNED ABOUT AT PREEMPTIVE STRIKE FROM INDIA. WHAT WOULD PAKISTAN HAVE DONE IN SUCH AN INCIDENT?
Sattar:
Well I think the government of Pakistan has made its position very clear over these last six or seven years, to the effect that any attack on any part of Pakistan or any facility in Pakistan would be tantamount to war. And therefore Pakistan would have to take all measures in accordance with international law to safeguard itself — to defend itself in the event of such a war being imposed on Pakistan.
Interviewer:
ARE THERE OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD THAT PAKISTAN'S CONCERNED ABOUT IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
Sattar:
Pakistan wholeheartedly subscribes to the concept of non-proliferation, that there should be no further spread of nuclear weapons. We annually support and even sponsor resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly for the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones, not only in South Asia but in Africa, in the Middle East and anywhere else. Pakistan has been supporting and Pakistan continues to support all efforts to prevent proliferation on the basis of equity, on the basis of justice, on the basis of balance and non-discrimination.
Interviewer:
DO YOU FORESEE A DAY WHEN PAKISTAN WILL JOIN THE NPT?
Sattar:
Pakistan is ready even today on a non-discriminatory basis to accept the global non-proliferation system.
Interviewer:
COMING BACK TO US INTELLIGENCE AND THE PRESS REPORTS — DISCUSSION OF A TEST HAVING BEEN CARRIED OUT AND TEST SITES BEING PREPARED IN BALUCHISTAN. WHAT IS YOUR COMMENT ON THESE REPORTS? HAS THERE BEEN A TEST?
Sattar:
A test?
Interviewer:
A TEST. A NUCLEAR TEST... THIS BUSINESS OF THE TRIGGERING DEVICE...
Sattar:
Let me say that the United States and some other countries have satellite means of verification in regard to explosions, particularly nuclear test explosions. And I think it is well known that no foreign power has ever accused Pakistan of having conducted a nuclear test. Then there are stories about Pakistan having tested the trigger device. You can see those stories and you can also see the refutations that the government of Pakistan has issued. Unfortunately the refutations never catch up with the accusations. Newspaper readers learn about the accusations and the newspapers just hide away the refutations by Pakistan somewhere in the inside pages and these are not read.
Interviewer:
CAN YOU FORECAST WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN NEXT IN SOUTH ASIA IN TERMS OF THE NUCLEAR STORY?
Sattar:
I think South Asia has reached a very critical stage. And that is that in one country of South Asia there is a capability to manufacture today dozens and perhaps scores of nuclear weapons, nuclear bombs. And if this march is not arrested through voluntary restraints to be assumed by India, then the moral basis of non-proliferation in South Asia would collapse. And hence, Pakistan has over these last couple of years intensified our efforts for safeguarding the non-proliferation regime in this region — for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in this region. And I, myself, and I'm sure I'm speaking in the name of the government of Pakistan on this matter; we hope and pray that we can succeed in ensuring for our region a nuclear non-proliferation regime.
[END OF TAPE 009060]
Interviewer:
YOU WERE BEGINNING TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT HOW PAKISTAN WAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST, THAT PEOPLE ABOUT PAKISTAN BUT NOT ABOUT INDIA.
Sattar:
Unfortunately there is a certain —
Interviewer:
LOOK AT ME.
Sattar:
There is a very strange asymmetry in the public reaction to Pakistan and India and the reports about the capability of the two. For some reason the statement that India conducted a peaceful nuclear test has been taken at its face value. And even though Pakistan has conducted no such tests the public perception if of a Pakistan moving toward nuclear weapons. The fact is Pakistan has not even gone to, through the preliminary stage of acquiring the capability in terms of nuclear materials necessary for the production of an explosive device. And secondly Pakistan has conducted no such tests. So we would like to appeal to friends particularly the viewers of this program to make a more objective assessment of the situation.
Interviewer:
HOW DO YOU ACCOUNT FOR PEOPLE'S FEARS OF AN ISLAMIC BOMB?
Sattar:
Well unfortunately the title Islamic bomb is irrational. There's no such thing as a bomb of a particular religion. Bomb is destructive. Islam means peace. And putting together these two words appeals to prejudices that are perhaps engrained in readers of history who still think about crusades. It is an appeal to a narrow mind. I don't think any literate person will be mislead by such sloganeering.
Interviewer:
TO WHAT DEGREE HAS CHINA BEEN IMPORTANT IN THE CURRENT PAKISTAN PROGRAM?
Sattar:
Pakistan and China have only very recently signed an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And this agreement provides that any transfer of nuclear material and of the agreement would be subject to the application of IAEA controls and safeguards. Therefore the perception that China has somehow or another helped or encouraged Pakistan to — in the nuclear field is totally misperceived.
Interviewer:
WHAT DO YOU THINK NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACTUALLY PROVIDE FOR A COUNTRY? DO YOU THINK THEY ENHANCE A KIND OF SECURITY? DO YOU THINK THEY HAVE A CERTAIN CACHET ATTACHED TO THEM?
Sattar:
Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons that any nation can wield. They are indiscriminate in the imposition of that destruction. They can cause havoc not only for thousands but hundreds and thousands and millions of people. And in South Asia where densities of population are so large, so heavy, where we have a thousand million people squeezed in relatively small area nuclear weapons pose a very great danger. And therefore there is a perception, and I think rightly, that nuclear weapons are something to be terribly feared. And I can only hope that certainly we in South Asia would not acquire them.
Interviewer:
DO YOU SEE PROLIFERATION AS A TECHNICAL OR POLITICAL ISSUE? IF A COUNTRY WANTS TO BUILD A BOMB, IT'LL BUILD A BOMB. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT?
Sattar:
I think we have to address the reasons why countries acquire bombs... whether they are nuclear or conventional. I think the lesson of the last century's effort is that disarmament efforts by themselves will not succeed. And therefore the priority issue is that of promoting a sense of security. Only if nations are secure, only if they are confident that they will not be subjected to aggression and attacks, only then will they be less prone to react to the situation in such a way that they will give up other goals and go in for augmentation of their military power. So we have to, we have to address in the world community the issue of maintenance, consolidation, preservation, of security. And once we are on that road I think the inclination to go in for weapons will abate. I must say that we in South Asia are trying to embark on that road. We have established a... South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. We hope this association will lead to greater confidence in the region, to a decline in the perception of threats from one another and that in turn will inhibit the inclinations to acquire weapons whether conventional or nuclear.
Interviewer:
DOES PAKISTAN FEEL SECURE AT THIS PRESENT MOMENT?
Sattar:
You know, in the month of February of 1987 we have gone through a very great apprehension when the forces of India and Pakistan were massed and I must say they are still massed on the border between the two countries. I think it would be an exaggeration to say that already we have achieved a sense of mutual security in the South Asian region. But at the same time let us also derive confidence from the fact that representatives of the two countries — and I had the honor to represent Pakistan in these negotiations with India up to the 4th of February — that we have been able to work out a mutually satisfactory settlement for the prevention of further escalation and for measures to de-escalate the present tension between the two countries.
Interviewer:
ARE YOUR PRESENT DATE SECURITY CONCERNS JUST WITH INDIA OR ARE THERE OTHER FACTORS INVOLVED?
Sattar:
The security environment of Pakistan underwent a fundamental transformation in December 1979... when the Soviet Union marched in over a hundred thousand troops into our neighboring country, Afghanistan. And over these last seven years plus we have been basically preoccupied with the task of achieving a political settlement of the Afghanistan question. And we have tried to mobilize the support of the international community for a principal settlement of the Afghanistan question that will restore to the unfortunate people of Afghanistan their independence, their sovereignty and their right to conduct their own policies; economic, social and political, in the manner that they consider best for their country. So we have felt in these recent years that we have a very unfortunate security environment. And we have at the same time felt relieved and consoled by the fact that hundred and twenty one other nations have joined in support of Pakistan's proposal for a political settlement of the Afghanistan question and currently we are engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, with a view to finding a satisfactory political settlement leading to the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the restoration of peace in Afghanistan.
[END OF TAPE 009061 AND TRANSCRIPT]