Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to THE ADVOCATES, the PBS Fight of the Week. Tonight's debate is coming to you from Boston's historic Faneuil Hall.

Ladies and gentlemen, may I have your attention, please.

Moderator Evan Semerjian has just called tonight's meeting to order.

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to THE ADVOCATES. Tonight we debate a change in U.S. nuclear strategy proposed by the Secretary of Defense, and our specific question is this: Should we develop highly accurate missiles and emphasize military targets rather than cities? Advocate Robert Ellsworth says, "Yes."

A strategy of targeting cities and innocent civilians is a strategy based on the threat of genocide, an immoral policy. It's a dangerous bluff; it's a policy that must be rejected. To argue for accurate missiles aimed at military targets, I have with me tonight Professor Harry Rowen, former President of the RAND Corporation, and Professor Geoffrey Kemp of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Thank you. Advocate Barry Carter says, "No."

We oppose this dangerous proposal because we do not want to see nuclear war made more likely, because the last thing we need now is an escalation of the arms race with the Soviet Union. With me tonight are Herbert Scoville, former Deputy Director of the CIA, and Morton Halperin, former member of Dr. Henry Kissinger's staff.

We welcome tonight two new advocates. Robert Ellsworth was a Congressman from Kansas from 1961 to 1967, a special assistant to President Nixon and United States Ambassador to NATO. Barry Carter is a Washington attorney, who was formerly a member of Henry Kissinger's staff. We'll be back to these gentlemen for their cases in a moment, but first a word of background on tonight's question. For the past decade our strategic policy with respect to the Soviet Union has been one of deterrence through what is known as assured retaliation, or mutual assured destruction, or MAD, as you will hear it referred to tonight. The idea is that enough of our nuclear warheads are aimed at Soviet cities and enough of theirs at our cities, to make a first strike by either country an act of suicide. An act of suicide because neither side has the capacity to launch a first strike that will destroy the other side's ability to retaliate. The destruction of both sides is therefore assured if either side attacks. Now, this policy of nuclear deterrence is under review, and recently Defense Secretary Schlesinger has suggested a new strategy. He's asked Congress for money for research on highly accurate missiles which could be used against such targets as power dams, military bases and missile silos. And he has indicated that while the United States has always targeted some Soviet military sites as well as cities, we have recently changed the emphasis toward military targets and away from their cities. In explaining the need for this, Mr. Schlesinger has appealed for an alternative to a policy providing suicide or surrender as its only options. In debating these specific proposals for research on new weapons and a shift in targeting emphasis, we're taking up as well some basic policy questions. Is our past policy of mutual destruction inadequate or obsolete as a deterrent for nuclear war? Would this new strategy increase the deterrent or weaken it? And finally, what effect would such a shift in our strategy have on the arms race and the future of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union? And now to the cases, Mr. Ellsworth, why should we develop highly accurate missiles and emphasize military targets rather than cities?

Our case tonight rests on three main points. First, a strategy of nuclear deterrence which emphasizes the deliberate targeting of cities is a strategy which is based on the threat of genocide. That strategy is immoral, and it is a continuing source of fear and hostility. It must be rejected. Second, the strategy of deterrence which emphasizes military targets rather than cities is not only more effective as a deterrent and less objectionable as a policy, it's also a strategy which fully preserves the stability of the American-Soviet nuclear balance. And third, we will show that more accurate missiles will permit fewer and smaller nuclear weapons on both sides and will therefore permit greater discrimination between threats to innocent, blameless people on the one hand and military targets on the other hand. To testify to the importance of more accurate missiles and an emphasis on military targets instead of cities, I call Professor Henry S. Rowen.

Professor Rowen, welcome to THE ADVOCATES.

Thank you.

Mr. Rowen served in the Defense Department in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. He was President of the RAND Corporation, and he's now Professor of Public Management at Stanford University. Professor Rowen, advocates of mutual assured destruction would have us respond to any nuclear attack by killing several hundred million Soviets and by destroying Soviet society. What do you think of that?

Well, it is a policy of genocide, there's no question about it. It's a policy that follows from the sort of reasoning that says killing people is good, killing weapons is bad. But it really means incinerating hundreds of millions of people in the United States or in the Soviet Union and Western Europe. It's a policy that could result in ... it would be worse than a thousand Hiroshimas.

But if that kind of a policy preserves the peace, then what's wrong with it?

Well, it's a policy based on bluff. We would never want to do that. It's a policy that assumes that the world is a rational place, but we know that the real world is not entirely rational, that accidents occur, mischance occurs, and there are going to be many countries—there are five today—with nuclear weapons. There will be others. In such a world we cannot have only a response, say to a nuclear attack or an accident which is suicidal or genocidal.

Actually, though, has mutual assured destruction—that is, targeting cities only—been official United States policy?

No, it hasn't been. We've long had an option to just attack military targets. While it hasn't received a great deal of publicity, that is, in fact, the case. What is not new is the plan. What is new is the technology, technology which permits much greater discrimination between attacking cities and attacking military targets.

But wouldn't more accurate missiles on our part create a fear on the part of the Soviet Union that we would be more likely to use them in case of a crisis and thereby make war more likely?

Well, presumably that fear would be based on the assumption that the United States could totally destroy the Russian strategic nuclear force. There's no real possibility of this happening. Much of the Soviet force is at sea—950 Russian missiles can be at sea according to agreement—which are untargetable even by the most accurate American missiles, so there is no real possibility of that. That's not a fear which has ground in reality.

Aren't we talking about a new arms race?

Well, what do we mean by a new arms race? Let me show you some figures. There's an arms race going on—a budgetary arms race. The United States isn't a runner. We must be in the stands watching it. This chart shows what has happened to the United States budget for strategic forces, offensive and defensive, since 1961 through 1974, both in current dollars and constant dollars—that is, corrected for price changes. As you can see, this budget has gone down really very remarkably since 1961, down by 60 percent in constant dollars. There's a slight increase proposed by the administration for 1975. Yet this is a period in which there have been revolutionary changes in weapons, many new types of weapons, ICBMs, Polaris submarines and many others. We have managed—and this new technology has managed—to permit, has been consistent with a reduction in our strategic budget, and I see no reason why the technology we're discussing tonight of accuracy and small warheads is going to drive this curve upward. I believe that it will not.

But actually, even if lower yield warheads and more accurate warheads did cost more, would they be desirable in themselves?

I believe that they would be. They would permit substituting small nuclear warheads for large ones, and in some instances, non-nuclear warheads for nuclear ones. That means that we would become—I believe we'll be less dependent on nuclear weapons, that we can raise the nuclear threshold, but most importantly, the moral position is important, the moral aspect is crucial, and that is that we would become—it would make it possible for us to make this discrimination between attacking people and attacking military targets.

All right, thank you, Mr. Ellsworth, Let's go to Mr. Carter, who is eager to ask you some questions. Wait a minute. Professor Rowen. He's got some questions for you.

Mr. Rowen, it seems, then, that we all agree that the President now has a number of targeting options available and could easily have more, including the tax on military targets, so he's not faced with the option of genocide or surrender, is he?

The weapons that we have had have been largely very large warheads and have been rather inaccurate so that many attacks on military targets would have spill-over effects from radioactive fallout which could cause enormous civil damage.

You say that the missiles today are relatively inaccurate. Public sources indicate that the Minuteman missile at least has an accuracy of approximately one quarter nautical mile or less, where it will land within 1,500 feet of its target or less. Isn't that fairly close to the target?

Missile accuracy has been improving, and it's still true—and I believe that this is widely accepted—that a major attack could produce very great civil damage. This seems to be a very undesirable consequence.

Let's try to clarify the issues, though. We agree, then, the President already has a number of options, so the issues seem to be one, what should the U.S. say publicly about keeping the devastation of nuclear war limited; and secondly, should the U.S. develop these highly accurate missiles? Let's discuss limited war first. Do you believe we should only target military targets and not target cities at all?

I think it is undesirable for us to target cities. I see no way for either side to have the capability of causing enormous damage to cities eliminated, but I think that that—I cannot conceive of the circumstances in which it would be to our interest, or for that matter, to the Russian interest, to cause vast civil damage to the other.

But isn't it true that a lot of military targets are very close to cities the Pentagon, the Kremlin, Air Force bases—and that, in fact, most military targets are very close to cities?

I wouldn't say most, but there are obviously some important military targets that are close to cities.

Would you target those targets?

I think this is a matter of detailed planning that would have to be looked at on a case by case basis.

Well, let's not call it detailed planning. If you're going to target those, then you're eventually going to also be targeting cities. It doesn't matter to a Soviet civilian whether you're attacking the military command center in the Kremlin or whether you're attacking the civilian command center in the Kremlin, does it?

I don't think the Kremlin is exactly the most interesting target to plan on destroying. We ought to have somebody we can negotiate with in a crisis and in a conflict. The point is that with greater accuracy it is possible to make this distinction which you regard as important, and that is precisely because some important military targets, some military bases, including even some missile sites, in some cases are near cities.

So you are going to be targeting these targets right close to cities. If we don't want to attack the Pentagon or the Kremlin, what about Logan Airport which is right in the middle of Boston's suburbs? Would you target Logan Airport, which B-52s can land at, F-4s can land at, and the rest?

There are many, many types of targets, there are many, of course, in a battlefield, there are many conceivably at sea. It seems to me that one would have to get down to rather specific cases in order to identify ... I don't know the circumstances which Logan Airport might be a plausible target.

So you made a strong policy against attacking cities and avoiding civilian fatalities, but you're not willing to say whether or not you're going to target military bases smack-dab in the middle of cities, or whether you're going to not target them at all.

Oh, it's conceivable. It's conceivable under some circumstances if the technology, if the technology would permit this without causing vast civilian damage in which that might make sense. I would not reject that possibility.

Fine. Let's consider your table here for a second. Is it not true that there are three things that this table seems to mislead us on. Number one, it doesn't include all strategic forces cost—for instance, communication, support, intelligence and the rest. The Brookings would put the cost of our strategic forces up in the $15 to $20 billion category. Number two, that it includes defensive forces which we know were limited under SALT, so what this shows is the benefit of SALT agreements, not new programs. And number three, that in fact we ought to show the line going up today because Secretary Schlesinger just asked for a $700 million increase.

First, with respect to the SALT, for one thing, just to happen, was signed in 1972. As you can see, most of the decrease took place before that.

And since SALT, is it not true that the budget appropriations for offensive forces, which is what we're talking about tonight, has gone up, and Secretary Schlesinger wants to increase those?

I said that the budget for 1975 was a request for increase, a slight increase, in the historic scale very minor.

Right.

There are various ways of measuring the size of the strategic budget, all of the ways I'm aware of, including Brookings way, they would show a sizeable decrease. All of them.

In offensive forces?

The budget for offensive forces, absolutely.

All right, let's go back to Mr. Ellsworth.

Professor Rowen, what would be the effect of deploying highly accurate warheads, the effect of doing that on the Strategic Arms Talks, which are now in session in Vienna between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Well, I doubt very much that it would have a major effect on those discussions. But I do think that it offers one possibility, and the possibility is this: that we say to the Russians that our own missile force is becoming a more accurate one, and this renders obsolete—this will render obsolete—the Russian fixed force in silos. It's just very clear that this would happen, that they should consider retiring that force, that we have the same prospect, the same problem: we should consider retiring our missile force and perhaps our land-based fixed missile force, that we should possibly do this by agreement. This might be a positive development within SALT then.

All right, Mr. Carter, back to you.

Isn't the present accuracy of our missiles such that today we can attack cities, power plants, dams, all the things that you mentioned except for large numbers of Soviet missile silos, and isn't that what you're really planning to do, to develop accuracy to attack large numbers of Soviet missile silos?

I think we should have a silo retirement program, not a silo attack program. The fact is that there are many targets which, if attacked with the weapons that now exist, the civil damage would really be quite sizeable, and that seems to me something that should be reduced and eliminated.

Mr. Rowen, I don't think that's responsive. Aren't the missiles that you're talking about going to be very effective for attacking large numbers of Soviet silos?

They may be, in which case I believe that the Russians and we should sit down and agree that we will do away with and retard these forces which are inevitably going to become vulnerable forces. There's no way that that can be prevented.

But that's the only thing that they really can do that your other forces can't do, the present forces can't do.

Oh, on the contrary, on the contrary, on the contrary. What these other forces, these existing forces do, is to kill millions of innocent civilians if they were ever to be used.

All right. Professor Rowen, I want to thank you very much for being with us tonight. Thank you.

The importance of our nuclear strategy from an international point of view is something our next witness understands very well. He was a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Mr. Geoffrey Kemp.

Mr. Kemp, welcome to THE ADVOCATES.

Thank you.

Mr. Kemp is an Associate Professor now of International Politics at the Fletcher School here in Boston and has been Executive Secretary of the Harvard-M.I.T. Arms Control Seminar. Professor Kemp, how do most countries view the United States-Soviet nuclear relationship?

Well, I think they feel that the United States is beginning to fall behind.

Why is that?

They look at trends, not just trends in strategic budgets and weapon systems, but overall trends in terms of military capabilities and political capabilities. In particular, they look at the trends in Soviet defense expenditure, which have gone steadily up since 1965. They look at the trends in the Soviet expenditure on strategic forces, which have been consistently higher than the United States equivalent since 1965. They look at the whole array of weapon systems the Soviet Union will have the capacity to deploy in the mid-1980s which will have a very effective capability against the land-based U.S. forces. And I think it's important at this stage to stress and reverse a myth that's sometimes put about, namely that the Soviet Union follows meekly behind the United States, responding to programs that the United States has adopted. The Soviet Union has been the innovator in many of the advanced technologies we're talking about. It was the Soviet Union that first developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium range ballistic missiles, intermediate range ballistic missiles, anti-ballistic missile systems, and fractional orbital bombardment systems. Similarly, I think if we look at the recent Middle East war, it's perfectly clear that the Soviet Union has developed a very effective and very sophisticated array of non-nuclear weapons that can be used in real conflict areas where real wars occur.

Professor Kemp, if the Soviet Union has and will continue to develop this powerful and sophisticated strategic capability, what is the military doctrine, the Soviet military doctrine, that might guide its use?

I think it's very important to stress that the Soviet strategic doctrine is seen as part and parcel of an overall political strategy. They do not plan their strategic forces in a vacuum. These forces, together with their non-nuclear forces, are designed to serve political, military, and economic goals. They're very sensitive to the fact that they can use military power for political uses in areas of vital interest to the West. Furthermore, if you go into the writings on Soviet military doctrine, and particularly their strategic doctrine, they talk about the possibility that nuclear war could occur. This doesn't mean to say that they want it or they'd like it, but they believe it could happen. After all, they're sitting there faced by not just the United States but China and Britain and France, who they regard as possible hostile adversaries. And in this set of circumstances they plan in their doctrine a war-waging capability. This distinction, and the important point to make, is that part of the Soviet overall strategic deterrence posture includes the capacity to engage in a war-waging fight.

If, as you say, our allies and neutral countries view the U.S. as falling behind, what would be the political consequences of this?

Well, I think that if the United States does not adopt some of the programs that Secretary Schlesinger has suggested and if it were to fix itself upon a counter-city strategy, then the credibility in the United States overall political presence and its nuclear guarantee would continue to diminish. This could have two very important implications which I think we should bear in mind. First, it might encourage those countries, such as Japan, or countries in Western Europe, to, in the case of Europe, beef up, or in the case of Japan, begin to develop a serious nuclear capability. Or second, and perhaps more worrying from the United States perspective, it might force countries of vital interest to the United States to reach individual accommodation with the Soviet Union, and this could only erode not only the United States interest but the interests of those powers themselves.

All right, Mr. Ellsworth. Let's go to Mr. Carter for some questions.

Dr. Kemp, as I understand it, you're supporting the Schlesinger proposal for large yield, high accuracy missiles.

I'm supporting the proposals that suggest increasing accuracy on United States missile systems and the various back-up programs that go along with that, yes.

Those programs which, as defined by Richard Nixon in two different statements, budget statements, include larger yield warheads. Now, I understand that there have been a lot of inoperative statements out of the White House, but as of January of this year the talk by President Nixon and in every budget statement by Secretary Schlesinger is for larger yield. That's what you're supporting.

I am supporting an overall strengthening in the United States strategic forces, including the capability to more accurately target counter-force options.

Fine. The accuracy... We've heard a lot about fatalities this evening. The accuracy of the Minuteman missile today is roughly 1,500 feet. The kind of accuracy we're talking about is about 600 feet, a savings of about 900 feet. If we talk about larger nuclear weapons, bombs at least eight to fifty times the power of Hiroshima, how much safer do you, as a civilian, feel being 600 feet away from ground zero of a bomb eight to fifty times the size of Hiroshima?

You know, you don't have to put these high yield warheads on these more accurate missiles.

Oh, you're not supporting the President's proposal.

I am supporting the proposal that the United States develop the technology to have high yield warheads, yes.

But not on accurate missiles?

But how we'll actually deploy those missiles, in what particular programs, has yet to be discussed.

Professor, let me ask you a question to see if I understand you. I take it that you are in favor of developing accurate missiles so that our target concentration would be on Soviet military targets rather than Soviet cities, is that right?

I, like Professor Rowen, would like to see more flexibility cranked into the United States war plan.

Well, is it for the purpose that I've just stated?

That is certainly a purpose, yes.

Well, if the Soviet Union, then, knows that to be our purpose because we would rather not destroy cities and would rather concentrate on targets, wouldn't the Soviet Union, then, have an incentive to move its military targets closer to their cities?

Not necessarily. It seems to me that the most likely emphasis would be to move their missile systems to sea, where they're much safer.

Go ahead, Mr. Carter.

Why, if we're talking of larger or even smaller yield warheads—we're not sure what, it seems, on the other side—if we're talking about them, why doesn't the United States just aim at military targets far away from cities? Aren't there missile silos a long way from a city? Aren't there Arctic air bases? Why do we have to try to take out a Logan air base, say, in Minsk or some other Soviet city?

Well, I'm saying that there are a whole series of contingencies which you could plan for if you had a large strategic inventory. I'm not here...

But can't you with our present forces with accuracies of 1,500 feet destroy every kind of target except large numbers of Soviet missile silos? What else can't you destroy?

That's perfectly correct. I think you can. The point that I'm stressing is that the ability to target some of these missile silos—I don't say all of them—is certainly an additional armor in the hands of the Presidents, but the point that I'm trying to stress is that what we're trying to discuss is the philosophy.

Oh no, but let's... I'm always confused by philosophy until I know the details, and the details that I understand is that first, if we're going to develop large bombs, they're fifty times the power of Hiroshima and I hope they don't land anyplace near a Soviet city. Secondly is what you said the only purpose of these weapons, except for saving lives somehow, is to destroy Soviet missile silos, something we can't do today. How wise of a policy is it to want to destroy large numbers of Soviet missile silos?

The capacity to threaten large numbers of Soviet missile silos certainly has advantages, if you are not totally threatening their entire force structure which, as Professor Rowen pointed out, we are not. We can't because they have so many missiles at sea.

According to the U.S. defense budget, we're spending $2.5 billion on anti-submarine warfare, and the number is estimated to go up to $5 billion. If you were in the Pentagon, and you saw the U.S. embarking on a program to take out your missile silos and spending $4 to $5 billion on anti-submarine warfare, wouldn't you begin to wonder just what U.S. intentions were, that maybe we were seeking a first strike, and as a result, that you would embark on your own programs to build up your forces?

I think the Soviet decision to embark on their own programs is not taken based on an assessment of what's going on in the Pentagon. That's one factor I'd agree with you. There are many other factors as well, and what we have to do this evening is put out on the table those other factors, these political factors.

Let's go back to Mr. Ellsworth.

Professor Kemp, if the Unites States actually deployed highly accurate missiles aimed at military targets, would that strengthen or weaken the deterrence of war?

I think it would strengthen the deterrent factor because it would provide the United States with a more credible capability from which to negotiate from a position of strength. This in turn would enhance the credibility of the United States strategic guarantee to its allies, which has broad-based political ramifications as well as very specific military ones.

All right, Mr. Carter, back to you.

I'm still confused. The threat to take out Soviet missile silos, along with an active program to get their submarines, is somehow going to not scare the Soviets into entering into new arms programs? It is not going to insist that they can accept limits in SALT because they need new programs to feel safe.

I would hope it would make the Soviet Union very serious about negotiating a SALT II settlement.

Oh, but can you limit accuracy and yield in SALT? I've heard that there's no way to limit them, so once we start down that road, it's something we can't limit, and therefore the Soviets need matching or compensating programs.

I don't know that we can't limit it. It seems to me that's something that the negotiators have currently been discussing and will continue to discuss. Of course it's complicated, I agree with you, but to say that it can't be done is to my mind a very sort of pessimistic outlook to take.

How can we tell what the accuracy of Soviet missiles are if we're going to limit them, when we're not sure what the targets are? If it lands in the middle of the ocean, do we know if they're right on target, or if they're a hundred yards off?

Because if you restrict the numbers of launches on either side and make restrictions on certain throw-weights, then by definition it follows that you can hold down the numbers of aiming points that would be highly accurate.

So the way to stop this is by having limits on number of launches, which means that we can't test our new missiles, they can't test any of their new missiles, we can't test our new warheads. That's a proposal that's never been proposed in SALT, never gotten anywhere as far as I know, according to John Newhouse.

Well, we already have a proposal to freeze launches in SALT I.

All right, thank you, Mr. Carter. Professor, I want to thank you very much for being with us tonight.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Now, our witnesses have shown why it's desirable to develop accurate missiles—that is, to reduce potential damage—and to he able to pose a believable threat which discriminates between innocent, blameless people, on the one hand, and military targets on the other. And we have shown exactly why strategic policy which emphasizes threats of the annihilation of millions and of innocent civilians is immoral. It is a throwback to the dark ages. It must be rejected.

Thank you. For those of you who may have joined us late, Mr. Ellsworth and his witnesses have just presented the case in favor of developing highly accurate missiles and emphasizing military targets rather than cities. And now for the case against, Mr. Carter the floor is yours.

The whole idea of our strategic policy is to avoid nuclear war with its millions of fatalities. The backbone of this deterrence is assured retaliation, the ability of either side to make a major attack or to make the attack by the other an act of suicide. We can do that. Only five to ten percent of our warheads can literally wipe out the Soviet Union today. We've heard it proposed tonight that the United States should develop new, highly accurate missiles. Ironically enough, this proposal in the name of humanity and flexibility would make nuclear holocaust much more likely. First, it puts our strategic policy squarely behind the myth that nuclear war can be fought neatly and cleanly on a limited scale. Second, by presenting the threat of destroying large numbers of Soviet missile silos, these missiles would feed the paranoia of hard-liners in the Kremlin, increasing the chance that in a crisis the Soviets would decide that the best course would be to launch a first strike against us as their way to survive. If increasing the likelihood of nuclear war weren't enough, developing these missiles will also stimulate an arms race and make it more difficult to negotiate further limits in SALT. In short, this proposal is not only unnecessary but it's downright dangerous. With me tonight, as my first witness, is Dr. Herbert Scoville.

Dr. Scoville, welcome to THE ADVOCATES.

Thank you.

Dr. Scoville is a former Pentagon atomic scientist and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Dr. Scoville, what should be the primary objective of our strategic policy?

The overriding objective of our strategic policy should be to avoid nuclear war. Even a limited nuclear war is so dangerous and can create such great damage, and it also has a risk of escalating into a full-scale conflagration that we must avoid it at all cost. What we should be doing is not learning how to fight nuclear wars better, but how to avoid them more surely.

We've heard a lot this evening about the inhumanity of attacking cities. Why do we target cities at all?

Well, we target cities because the only way we know now to avoid nuclear war is to deter its occurrence, and we need to have the capability to attack cities to deter an all-out aggression on the part of the Soviet Union. We can't risk the situation that some irrational person—and in this I disagree with Professor Rowen—we can't risk that an irrational person could think that he could get away with a nuclear strike just by the fact that we might retaliate by firing a missile at one of his silos, which probably would be empty anyway.

We're bombarded today by Pentagon press releases about a growing Soviet strategic build-up. Just what is a strategic balance today?

Well, the strategic balance unfortunately is that we are very equal, but both sides in the post-SALT atmosphere have continued to build up and add to their strategic forces as if there had been no SALT agreement whatsoever. However, Mr. Kemp would lead us to believe that the Soviets were the only ones that were doing this and that it was just?--and this is what the Pentagon puts out all the time in order to increase their budget. The actual facts are that in 1972 when the SALT agreement was reached, we had about 5,000 to 6,000 warheads which could be fired at the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union had about 2,200. Now, two years later, we have increased that number to 7,100, while the Soviets still have only 2,300. in 1977—and even by official Pentagon figures—we will have increased our number to about 10,000, and the Soviets will still be less than 4,000. In other words, our lead is still increasing and will increase through 1977.

About a rate of three a day we're deploying these warheads, it seems. Let's talk about developing highly accurate missiles. What could they possibly do that we can't do now?

The only thing that a more accurate missile than what we have today can do is it can threaten to be able to knock out a very large proportion of the Soviet ICBM force, and this is, of course, a very dangerous thing.

Well, does it make any sense to want to attack large numbers of silos?

No, in fact, it is extremely dangerous to have this capability for two reasons. One, it will look to the Soviet Union as if we were trying to get a capability for striking first at their force and knocking it out before it can attack us. Furthermore, because our missiles will have this capability, it provides us tremendous incentive for the Soviets to beat us to the gun and try to knock out our missiles first, so by having this capability we are increasing the likelihood that the Soviets will attack us first.

Scary words. If we did deploy this program which is going to destabilize things and all, somehow it was suggested that our budget was going to go down. What would be the cost of developing and deploying such missiles like this?

Well, the cost would be astronomical if we really followed through on all of these programs. The Minuteman III program, which is now nearing completion, involved a changing of 550 missiles, about half the force. This cost about $6 billion. If we went through with these programs on the entire Minuteman force, it would probably be a minimum of $10 or more billion, and if we started on the Poseidon as well and the submarine missiles, which are incidentally now being proposed to do this by Secretary Schlesinger, maybe another $10 billion, then we'll never know where it's going to end.

All right, thank you, Mr. Carter. Mr. Ellsworth, your witness.

Dr. Scoville, I have to agree with you that the horror of a nuclear exchange where cities are involved is a very powerful deterrent. This deterrent is based on the proposition that rational men do not lightly contemplate suicide, don't you agree?

That's right.

Well, isn't it true...

Irrational ones too probably.

But isn't it true that there are powerful people in the world who are irrational?

Yes.

And that some day there might be some of them in positions of actual power in the Kremlin.

Yes.

Or that in some other way deterrence might fail.

That's absolutely right, but I have a feeling that if an irrational leader would be more likely to launch an attack if he thought he could get away by having our retaliation limited to a strike against his missile sites than if he thought his whole society might be destroyed.

Well, Dr. Scoville, let me ask you this question, see if I understand you. I take it you're against the idea of our developing more accurate missiles. Is that right?

That's right.

Now, what if you learned tonight that the Soviet Union was doing just that? Would you change your mind?

No, I don't believe our getting more accurate missiles is the answer to the Soviets achieving this capability. Both of us having this capability is far worse than one of us having it. By our having accurate missiles we're not protecting our missiles. We're just making them a more attractive target to the Soviets' accurate missiles.

Go ahead, Mr. Ellsworth.

Now, Dr. Scoville, if, for any reason, there should be, say, a one missile strike on a minor target in the United States—and that's only for the purposes of discussion because of course I don't concede that there is a minor target in the United states from that standpoint—but if, for any reason, deterrence has failed and there should be, say, a one missile strike on a minor target in the United States, what should the United States do? Should we retaliate massively by blasting their cities?

Of course not, and we don't have that requirement today. We have a capability to retaliate in any number of a wide variety of forms. Frankly, I hope we wouldn't retaliate directly with a nuclear strike. I would hope we try to avoid further nuclear weapons, but certainly we don't have to retaliate by striking at all our cities, at all the Russian cities.

Welcome to our side. Beautiful. In light of what you have just said, what is the use of talking about targeting cities?

The use of targeting cities is that the Soviet strike might not be such a limited strike, and there might be—there is a real need to deter an all out strike against the U.S. If we had said we would not target Soviet cities, what is there to prevent the Soviets from threatening to destroy our cities? Certainly not aiming at another missile.

So that what you're saying is that in any case below an all-out attack by the Soviet Union on American cities and on American societies, in any Soviet attack short of that, why, a cities-targeting strategy on the part of the United States is simply a bluff. Is that correct? Do I understand you correctly?

No, it's not a bluff, it's an attempt to deter them from initiating this action. What we would do in any circumstances, I don't know, but the Soviets have to assume, if we have that capability, that that's what might happen and therefore they would hesitate very strongly to take such action.

But in light of what you have said, that we wouldn't do that, then it is a bluff to threaten cities.

No, you've gone way beyond what I said. You mentioned one missile being fired at a target in this country, and I said that I didn't think that was the kind of thing that the Soviets would ever think we would retaliate by hitting all their cities.

Let me see if I understand you. I did say one missile, and at the other end of the spectrum, you said an all-out Soviet attack on the United states. Where would you draw the line in between those two at the point at which you would not retaliate with an all-out spasm attack against the Soviet society?

I have no idea at what point—under what circumstances—we would ever initiate such an attack, but the threat that that attack could occur should deter the other side from ever contemplating such an action.

An all-out attack.

Yes.

But military targeting, under your doctrine that you've just spelled out under cross-examination, is important.

I think we have sufficient ability today to target military targets, and I'm not for throwing that capability away.

But you can see that it is important. But it is important for us to have.

To have some capability, yes, but we do not need the additional capability which Secretary Schlesinger is seeking by getting more accurate missiles.

All right, that to one side for the moment.

All right, let's go back to Mr. Carter, you'll have, another chance at him, Mr. Ellsworth.

Dr. Scoville, if we didn't keep as one of our options the ability to attack Soviet cities, isn't there a danger that if we only said we're going to take out military targets, and ones not near cities, that the Soviets might think certain measures were ones they might take? For instance, weren't they willing to give up whole armies to attack Hitler? Weren't the United States willing to give up armies and fleets to take on the Japanese and the Germans in World War II? Military targets are expendable, aren't they?

Yes, exactly, and I don't see how the threat that we might fire a missile at a Soviet ICBM site is much of a deterrent. I don't see how that deters either a rational or an irrational person. I think you have to have something much stronger than just attacking a missile site.

All right, back to you, Mr. Ellsworth, for one question.

Isn't the alleged Soviet fear that silo killers would constitute a capability to knock out their nuclear force ridiculous in view of the fact that they have so many submarines which we can't even target?

No, I don't think it's ridiculous. I grant you that I think that it's very unlikely that one would ever visualize that kind of an attack. I find these scenarios very silly, but we are spending billions of dollars, as has been mentioned, on anti-submarine warfare, and we worry about the Soviets doing just this very thing to us. I don't see why the Soviets shouldn't worry about our doing it.

All right. Dr. Scoville, I want to thank you very much for being with us tonight. Mr. Carter, your next witness, please.

My next witness is Morton Halperin.

Mr. Halperin, welcome to THE ADVOCATES.

Mr. Halperin was former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon under Robert McNamara and former senior staff member and Assistant for Planning to Dr. Henry Kissinger's National Security Council staff. Dr. Halperin, we've heard a lot tonight about the argument that highly accurate missiles would save a lot of lives. Do you agree?

No, I don't. I think the only way to really save lives is to avoid a nuclear war. If there is to be any kind of a limited nuclear exchange, then the key element in how many people are killed will be whether targets near cities are hit. With the current warheads which we have and the current accuracies, if both sides only target only targets far away from cities, there would be relatively little damage. If both sides target military targets near cities, there would be very great damage. Increases in the accuracies of our missiles would not change that fact. There would still be very large civilian damage if we attacked targets near cities, and relatively little if we did not. And increasing warheads, which is what the administration proposes to do, increasing the size of warheads, would of course increase civilian casualties whatever targets we attacked.

Well, I can't help thinking that maybe the proponents' position tonight is somewhat like the proverbial ostrich with its head in the sand. Even if we could design a targeting strategy which would keep Soviet fatalities low by staying away from cities, are we sure that the Soviets would also stay away from cities?

Of course we cannot. The Soviet military doctrine talks about hitting cities as well as hitting military targets, but I think we cannot be sure that our strategy would be that. We simply do not know what the political leadership on either side would do, confronted with a major crisis or the beginning of the use of nuclear weapons.

Do you feel that we need these high accuracy missiles to meet the alleged Soviet build-up in their ability to take out our missiles?

No, I do not believe that we—either in terms of deterrence or for political reasons—need to match that Soviet capability. We have the capability to deter a Soviet attack by threatening the destruction of a wide range of different targets in the Soviet Union. We have more than enough destructive capacity now, and I do not believe there is any reason why, even if the Soviets begin to move towards an accurate missile capability, we need to do the same.

You know, speaking of the Soviets, if we deploy these highly accurate missiles, how do you think the Soviets will react?

I think they would react the way the United States reacted in 1969 when we conjured up the fact that the Soviets were moving in that direction. Secretary Laird, remember, said that the Soviets were going for a first strike capability and there's no doubt about it. This despite the fact that the Soviets showed no signs of being able to target our undersea missiles of which we had more than 650. It is, I think, the case that political leaders on both sides tend to be excessively paranoid about what the other side is doing, and I think it is very likely that the Soviets would react to our talking about developing accurate missiles with the belief that we were after their land-based missile force and that they would have to respond to that.

Okay, you've had extensive experience in the SALT negotiations. Based on your experience, how do you think the SALT negotiations will be affected by this Soviet build-up, excuse me, by U.S. build-up in high accuracy missiles?

Well, I think it's very unlikely that one can negotiate limitations on missile accuracy. What I think is dangerous about the new doctrine in relation to the SALT talks is the philosophy which says that the United States needs to have a flexible military capability for nuclear war and the ability to take out Soviet missile silos, because I believe that if you make that the criteria for an arms control agreement, then it will be impossible to get agreement in the American government on a sensible SALT position and impossible to negotiate such an agreement with the Soviet Union. Only if both sides are prepared to accept an agreement which simply assures the deterrent on each side do I think it is possible that one can negotiate limits on offensive forces.

Make this a brief question and answer.

All right. What do you think is the result of emphasizing a limited war?

I think the result is to make nuclear war seem more plausible, more reasonable, more humane, and hence to make it more likely.

All right, thank you, Mr. Carter. Mr. Ellsworth, your witness.

Mr. Halperin, if deterrence fails and war breaks out, isn't it desirable to be able to respond on a limited level and negotiate for termination?

I would hope that we would try to negotiate before we responded, but I certainly agree that we should have the capability for a wide range of different responses. I believe we have had that capability since the early 1960s and we should continue to have it.

And you believe that it is desirable?

I believe that it is desirable. I do not believe it depends on increasing the accuracy of our warheads, nor do I believe it depends on increasing the size of our warheads, both of which are recommended by Secretary Schlesinger.

Correct, but you don't insist on our renouncing any capability of targeting any target other than cities, is that correct?

On the contrary, I would insist that we should have such a capability...

You agree that we should emphasize military targets?

No, I believe that we should emphasize a full range of targets. We should emphasize to the Soviet Union, for the purpose of deterrence, our ability to attack whatever targets in the Soviet Union we would have to attack in the face of whatever attack...

But you don't object to our having other options, but you just object to our spending money on accuracy, is that correct?

I don't object so much to the money, I object to the accuracy because I think it stimulates the arms race, because it makes it harder to negotiate a SALT agreement, and because it makes nuclear war seem limited, makes the possibility of limiting nuclear war seem more likely, and I think that encourages military leaders on both sides to think about nuclear options.

But you said a moment ago that you found the range of options, including military targeting options, to be highly desirable, did you not?

That's right, but that's very different from emphasizing the fact that we're planning on fighting a limited nuclear war which very easily slips into saying that we believe that a nuclear war can be limited.

Nobody is urging the fighting of a limited nuclear war, but you do agree with us that it's appropriate and beneficial and desirable for the United States to have a range of targets including military targets to a substantial degree.

Absolutely.

Yes.

But I don't think he agrees with you, Mr. Ellsworth, that the targeting of cities should be abandoned. I think that's the difference.

I understand that, I understand that.

And I don't believe that we need either accurate warheads—more accurate warheads—or large warheads, which is the essence of what Secretary of Defense Schlesinger...

And your objection to accurate warheads runs to the accurate warheads whether they are linked with increased yield or with decreased yield. Is that correct?

If they were linked with decreased yield, which of course is not the proposal, they would be less objectionable.

That's Professor Rowen's proposal.

That's right, and I think that...

That's what I'm asking you about.

I find that less objectionable than the other, but I find accuracy unnecessary for this purpose because if we're going to attack military targets in a very limited strike, there are many military targets far away from cities.

On the question of accuracy linked with decreased yield, you concede that one of the classic aims of arms control is to limit damage in case war should break out, do you not?

Absolutely.

And don't you think that increased accuracy with decreased yields is desirable from that point of view?

But one has to weigh that against the danger that it stimulates the arms race and increases the likelihood of nuclear war, and in balancing those I would argue that it is undesirable.

Well, Mr. Halperin, what if tomorrow Leonid Brezhnev said, "I believe in a more humane Soviet policy, and from now on the Soviet Union will no longer target American cities. We will target only military targets with accurate missiles." Would you change your mind about what our policy should be?

I would still say we should have the capacities the Soviets would continue to have to not target cities, but I would be glad to respond to that by saying that we would not be the first to launch large attacks at the other side's cities, which I believe should be our policy. I cannot imagine any circumstances in which the United States should initiate military attacks on cities.

And then if you said that, Mr. Brezhnev would probably change his mind, right? Go ahead, Mr. Ellsworth.

But of course I think the point is that neither side can count on these guarantees sticking once nuclear weapons are used in a nuclear exchange.

Go ahead, Mr. Ellsworth.

But still you don't resist the idea of having the whole range of options available.

I resist the notion that accuracy and large warheads are a part of that, but I do not...

Didn't you write in 1963, "There is also a need for extremely accurate systems that can arrive at pre-targeted locations and hunt out targets and destroy them"? Did you write that or not?

Your research is better than mine, I searched for that article and couldn't find it.

You did write that.

We have the kind of accuracy that I was talking about. When I wrote that article, our accuracies were much worse than they now are. We now have the capacity to attack Soviet missile silos in small numbers, we have the capacity to attack other Soviet targets, and I believe we have the kind of flexibility that I was suggesting then.

Let me ask you the question that I asked Dr. Scoville. Isn't the alleged Soviet fear that silo killers on our part would constitute a capability to knock out their nuclear force ridiculous in view of the fact that they have so many submarines which we can't even target?

Make this very brief.

It is a ridiculous fear which both sides have exhibited in the past and I think are likely to exhibit in the future.

All right, let's go to Mr. Carter.

Mr. Halperin, other than developing highly accurate missiles, do you have some proposals for what we might do today in the present strategic situation?

Yes, my proposal would be the one that has already been put forward by Professor Rowen: namely, I think the urgent task at SALT should be to try to negotiate very substantial reductions and perhaps the total elimination of fixed land-based missiles on both sides.

And is that helped or hurt by developing highly accurate missiles?

I think it's hurt insofar as the proposal that the Secretary of Defense puts forward encourages the military to believe that they can get what they would call war-fighting capability with those missiles and hence, I think, would be less likely to be willing to give them up in a negotiation.

All right, back to you, Mr. Ellsworth.

If we pursue—if the United States, as a policy, leans in the direction which you yourself have suggested and which our side strongly urges, that we veer away from the contemplation of targeting cities, then doesn't that increase our credibility, for example, of our nuclear guarantees to our allies, particularly Germany and Japan?

I don't believe that at all. I think that the basic credibility of our nuclear guarantees to the Germans and the Japanese in particular has to do with the nature of our political relationships with those countries, has to do with the presence of American military forces in Western Europe and in or around Japan. I don't believe that anybody but more than a handful of people in any of those countries pay attention to this kind of detail about nuclear weapons. I believe that, therefore, it is our political relationship with them and the credible guarantee and the credible perception in the Kremlin that we are concerned about their security which is what is the backbone of the deterrent.

So that our nuclear forces and our nuclear doctrine and our nuclear strategy and our strategy of deterrence in your opinion have virtually no—or at least an insignificant—effect on German and Japanese perceptions of our nuclear guarantee and therefore what it is on our part would have no effect on their tendency to develop nuclear weapons on their own.

Very quick answer.

I think that's true within very wide limits. As long as we have forces roughly comparable to the Soviet Union, I think the details just don't matter to them.

All right, Mr. Halperin, I want to thank you for appearing on THE ADVOCATES. Thank you, gentlemen. That completes the cases, and now it's time for each of you to present your closing arguments. Mr. Carter, could we have yours, please.

Our insurance policy against nuclear war is the fact that we have several times the destructive power we could conceivably use, and the Soviets know it. We could destroy military targets or population centers or both, and the Soviets know it. That's how deterrence works. We all agree we need to negotiate mutual reductions in arsenals; the last thing we need is new, high accuracy missiles. They do nothing for us except to allow us to threaten large numbers of Soviet missile silos. This is the one thing which could tempt the Soviets to consider striking first in a crisis, which will spur a new, expensive arms race and which will undermine the SALT negotiations. The proponents nave called our deterrent immoral. I can think of nothing more immoral than something which makes nuclear war sound effective, which makes nuclear war sound attractive, and that is what their proposal does. This country is not wealthy enough, nor are the risks of nuclear war remote enough, that we can afford to develop these high accuracy missiles. Vote no on tonight's proposal.

Thank you. Mr. Ellsworth.

All of us tonight have a common goal: to deter nuclear war. We all agree that the cost of war has to be so great as to prevent either side from embarking on it. This to Mr. Carter means it must be the threatened destruction of Soviet cities, and I say that it not only a genocidal policy but an unbelievable one. Both to the Soviets and to the rest of the world we contend that the risks of nuclear war are so great that the Soviets would be equally deterred by our ability to retaliate on military targets at a lesser, more humane level. More importantly, the two sides tonight differ on what to do if deterrence fails. The horrible event of an accidental or irrational outbreak of war, be it by an insane dictator, accident, or miscalculated escalation from conventional war, it is irresponsible for us not to do everything in our power to prepare for that event and to try to limit and minimize its damage in every possible way. For that purpose we advocate the targeting of military sites and the development of more accurate missiles.

Thank you, gentlemen. And now it's time for you in our audience to get involved. What do you think on tonight's question? Should we develop highly accurate missiles and emphasize military targets rather than cities? Send us your "yes" or "no" vote on a letter or postcard to THE ADVOCATES, Box 1974, Boston 02134. We'll tabulate your votes and make the results known to members of Congress and others interested in this topic. As much as it affects this country's ability to avoid a nuclear holocaust, we can say that no question THE ADVOCATES has debated is more important than this one. And for the same reason it's important that you help make your views known to the government. Now, remember the address: THE ADVOCATES, Box 1974, Boston 02134. Now, recently THE ADVOCATES debated the question, "Should the government institute coupon rationing of gasoline now?" Of the more than 11,000 viewers who sent in their votes, only 12 percent said yes, that rationing should be instituted now and that the price of gasoline should be controlled to assure no increase in profits for the oil companies, and a tremendous 88 percent said no, that letting prices rise freely is an equally effective and less complicated way of controlling demand than gas rationing. And now let's take a look ahead to next week's program. (PROMOTIONAL MESSAGE) And now, with thanks to our advocates and their very able and distinguished witnesses, we conclude tonight's debate.