HOW DID THE SOVIET UNION... AND YOU PERSONALLY VIEW THE CANDIDACY, THE RUNNING OF JIMMY CARTER? WHAT WERE THE EXPECTATIONS? WHAT KIND OF EXPECTATIONS THE USSR HAD FROM THE CANDIDATE CARTER?

If you don't mind...

(TRANSLATES)

Ah, you mean candidate Carter?

(TRANSLATES)

We in the Soviet Union were watching with great interest the personality and political attitudes of the candidate from the Democratic party Jimmy Carter. We wondered what kind of president would he make, if, of course, he entered the White House. We were interested in knowing his political philosophy. After Vietnam, after the Watergate affair we expected a person in the White House able to learn lessons from recent events that happened to the US. As one should admit, our expectations to some extent came true. At the beginning, both the political platform and the practical actions of President Carter seemed to us well considered and reasonable. Yet, some sort of pressure felt to be always on him. It was a pressure of old superstitions, old habits, old attitudes. I recall now March 1977, when the first visit of the new State Secretary of the United States, Vance... Cyrus Vance took place in Moscow. Earlier (that year) the Vladivostok Summit had already happened — a meeting of two leaders, President Ford of the United States and the Soviet leader. During that meeting in Vladivostok basic accords were reached, which cleared the way to a conclusion of the agreement on strategic arms limitations. So, we in Moscow were looking forward to the arrival of the State Secretary to resume talks; we expected him to bring some proposals, further developing the Vladivostok arrangements. However, when State Secretary Cyrus Vance arrived in Moscow and started his negotiations with our Minister of Foreign Affairs, it turned out that the American side's intentions were actually to step forward from the positions discussed in Vladivostok. In fact, the American side retreated from all positions. I also recall how later, after his resignation, Cyrus Vance was recollecting and evaluating from his own point of view those Moscow events of March 1977. He was, I think, very unhappy by the nature of his Moscow mission. More than that, he was displeased by the nature of the mission he was sent to Moscow with. He wanted something different. However, some circles within Carter's administration seemed to choose this particular way of policy. In a word, the first March debut of the US administration in Moscow turned out to be unsuccessful. It did not contribute to creating an atmosphere that would hasten the progress toward the strategic armaments limitation. Aren't we making too long dialogues?

IT'S NOT TOO LONG AT ALL...

Well, that's probably correct. Perhaps, during his election campaign the Democratic Party candidate was actually criticizing the Vladivostok agreement. We got used to the fact that during the elections, er, the election campaigns candidates are usually picking different aspects of the Soviet-American relationship as targets of their criticism, as objects of their disapproval. That was also the case in Carter's attitude toward the Vladivostok Summit. Jumping ahead four years, we could see that after all, Carter came to agree in Vienna with the results of the Vladivostok Summit. Thus, from the angle of 1979, one could say that Carter's criticism of the Vladivostok agreements, --in particular, of the limits of strategic armaments, their quotas agreed in Vladivostok,-- had the nature of a tactical maneuver and was merely a political gimmick by nature. The further development of events just proved it.

AT THAT TIME (?)... WE ARE TALKING ABOUT CORRELATION OF FORCES... THAT WERE WORKING... IN THE GLOBAL TERMS... IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET UNION. CAN YOU EXPLAIN IT? DO YOU REMEMBER THAT... TO ME IT WAS A NEW TERM, CORRELATION OF FORCES, BUT WHAT WAS THE CORRELATION OF FORCES OF THAT TIME. THAT WERE PERCEIVED AS...TO THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION?

The question of the correlation of forces is a question for both sides concern, the Soviet Union's as well as, I understand, the United States. Our approach to this question can be summarized as follows: we take the global arena, the arena of our entire planet, of world's policy and, then, we look at the development of events, both in general, as well as in particular parts of the world. And our analysis shows that the general tendency of events is directed towards a bigger and bigger number of countries liberating themselves from dependency on different superpowers... from the dependency of their past. More and more countries are embarking on a path of independent and self-sufficient development. It is definitely not damaging to the interests of the Soviet Union, right opposite, it strengthens the positions of the Soviet Union in the world arena, inasmuch as we are in alignment with these national liberation movements. This is one side (of the problem.) On the other side, speaking in purely military-strategic terms, starting from the launching of the first Soviet Sputnik in October 1957, the correlation of powers in the military-strategic area began gradually straightening out; and this fact was also recognized by the American analysts. We achieved great successes in the military area. Although, our mood was such, that we would have preferred a competition... er... we would have preferred a race not of arms, but in some peaceful areas. Well, anyway, we've been dragged into military competition, into the arms race; we've been challenged. This challenge was set upon us right after the end of the Second World War, and we had no choice but to accept this challenge. The American analysts assess, that after the end of the Second World War, the overwhelming military superiority was on the side of the United States.(among the experts) It was agreed that the United States possessed a monopoly on nuclear weapons. In 1949 the American monopoly was liquidated; the Soviet Union created its own nuclear weapons. The American researchers, as well as the politicians were also convinced that at that time the United States possessed a monopoly on the means of delivery of nuclear weapons to the targets. The United States had a fleet of strategic bombers; they had SAC, the Strategic Air Command which was created in 1947, if my memory serves me well. The Soviet Union as of yet, did not have the means of delivery of mighty nuclear weapons to American territory. I recall a book — I'm not sure that many Americans remember the name of its author — by Drew Pearson, Drew Pearson. He wrote it, if I'm not mistaken, along with Andersen, a book named "The United States - A Second-rate Power." He describes there the emergence in the Soviet Union, during the May Day Parade in 1954, of the first Soviet heavy intercontinental bomber capable of crossing ocean expanses and reaching the territory of the United States. Hence, one can consider that somewhere around the early '50s or — as Pearson claims, in 1954, — the second monopoly of the United States was liquidated, i.e. the monopoly on the means of delivery of nuclear arms to a target. So, the monopoly of invulnerability of the United States was, in general terms, liquidated. Well, when in August 1957 the Soviet Union tested it's first intercontinental ballistic missile; when in October of the same year of 1957, the first Soviet Sputnik was launched, it became obvious to everybody that the strategic situation in the world had changed drastically. Nothing was left of the United States* monopoly of invulnerability. The expanse of the oceans was no longer able to protect the United States. So, the United States found itself in a situation as vulnerable as the Soviet Union's had been. And this tendency toward the equalization of the military capacities, of the military potentials between the United States and the Soviet Union was continued during the sixties; it was continued also during the early seventies. Thus, somewhere around the early seventies — though, I'm not that positive about the dates; perhaps, these dates are arguable, — but anyway, somewhere toward the beginning of the seventies, the situation which today is called strategic equality, the strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, was established. So, by the time Jimmy Carter entered the White House, there was absolute political equality, an absolute military-strategic parity established between our countries. Therefore, the new American administration, headed by Jimmy Carter, that came to power in January 1977, had to base a policy of its relations with the Soviet Union on these already established facts. And these facts, whether they wanted them in the White House or not, were dictating the objective necessity to the United States to move toward negotiations with the Soviet Union, and to attempt to work out an agreement on strategic offensive arms which would guarantee the security of the United States. CUT. The military-strategic parity was achieved through regretfully hard efforts of the Soviet people, of the Soviet state. I'd like to emphasize again that it was not our choice. We would prefer competing in some other field, in peaceful terms. But inasmuch as we have been forced upon this path, we created our own atomic bomb, we created our ballistic missiles, we created our own strategic aviation. Though, our main objective concerning the Soviet-American always relationship was striving toward an agreement, the agreement on limiting the strategic armaments, the agreement on reduction and (eventually) complete liquidation of nuclear or any other type of weapons of mass destruction. You see, the farther the events developed, the more complicated the situation became. If you allow me, I'll give you a little example from my personal experience. My first visit abroad or, as we call it, my official sending out was to Geneva, to the 1960 disarmament talks. Then, according to the decision of the United Nations, the 10 Countries' Committee on Disarmament was established. There were five Western states and five Socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States. At that time, the Committee of Ten — which unfortunately had only two sessions: it started its work in March 1960, and the second session took place in June 1960 — an that time this Committee was discussing the issue of ballistic weapons liquidation, the liquidation of missiles. So, my strong belief is that as early as then, in the early sixties, it was quite possible, quite real to reach an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the Socialist countries and Western countries; it was quite achievable to reach an agreement on the liquidation of all ballistic weapons, inasmuch as then in 1960 the quantity of ballistic weapons was very, very small. There was a certain number of ballistic arms in the Soviet Union as well as a certain number of ballistic arms in the United States; and it was quite possible to agree to ban these types of weapons and to liquidate the existing reserves of them. At that time, what you call in English, "the point of no return" had not yet been reached. We had not yet crossed the point of no return, and it was possible then to agree. Though, eventually, for several reasons — and we think that these reasons were the politics of the United States — both of us through mutual efforts had crossed this point of no return and...the race of rocket arms had begun. Up to a certain period it was possible to contain the qualitative increase of ballistic weapons. It was before the emergence of, say, missiles with multiple warheads, before the emergence of MIRVs. At that time we had not yet crossed the point of no return (in that field) and (again) it was possible to agree. Though, this also didn't work out. At the very beginning of the post-war period the same situation also existed in regard to atomic weapons, when the United States possessed this weapon, while we made our first steps toward creating a nuclear...an atomic weapon. It was quite possible to agree to ban an atomic weapon. So, our proposal of 1946 to the United Nations was directed exactly toward this goal, but our counterparts from the Western side didn't want to go for it, and the atomic arms race had begun. Right now, by the way, I would like to call your attention to the fact of a real possibility of the banning of space weapons. Neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union have yet reached the no-return level. Neither United States, nor the Soviet Union have not yet reached "the point of no return" in the area of space weapons. We appeal to you now — let's agree to not let nuclear arms in space. Not to... to do... — To close all the doors for the entrance of weapons of mass destruction into space. So far, we have not received any positive or constructive response from your side, but we, nonetheless, hope that in the space area common sense will prevail. It will prevail, we hope...

THERE ARE... THERE ARE... AMERICAN COMMENTATORS AND SCHOLARS THAT FEEL THAT INDEED, UNTIL THE SIXTIES THERE WERE THE AMERICAN QUANTITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS THAT WERE EH... DICTATION OF THE RATE OF THE ARMS RACE; THAT IN THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES IT WAS THE RATE OF SOVIET OPPOSITIONAL FORCES THAT WERE DICTATING THE RATE OF ARMS RACE...CAN YOU RESPOND TO THAT?

I can give a very short answer to this question. The Soviet Union has never initiated the race of any kind of arms. The race of atomic arms was initiated by the United States. The race of ballistic armaments was developed by the United States. The improvement of new types of ballistic weapons was started by the United States, and today the United States is beginning a race of space arms. Therefore, the United States was the initiator of every new round of the arms race. The only choice the Soviet Union had was to be involved in this arms race, to muster efforts to catch up with the United States; that's how it was in the '40s, in the early postwar years. That's that's how it was during the whole '50s. That's how it was in the '60s and '70s and also now in the '80s. We never ever initiated an arms race in any direction whatsoever.

BUT THE THING THAT...I'M TALKING (ABOUT) IS I THINK...THAT AGREED UPON, THAT THE NUMBERS...IN TERMS OF THE NUMBERS...IN THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES, THE SOVIETS WERE CONTINUING TO BUILD WHEN AMERICAN DIDN'T. NOT IN TERMS OF INITIATING BUT JUST IN TERMS OF THE ACQUISITION OF NUMBERS.

"You know, if we apply arithmetic to military areas it would not be of course to the advantage of the United States. It depends on how and what to count. If we count only the warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles, we get one picture, one arithmetic; but if we also take into account submarine-based missiles, if we take into account strategic bombers which the United States possesses much more than the Soviet Union; if we take into account aircraft carrier forces — the Soviet Union doesn't have any aircraft carriers at all, while the United States as far as I know, has 12-13-14-15... I'm not that sure, but they have approximately 15 bombers and these, mind you, are offensive strike weapons. Now, the United States has — and it plays a very serious role in terms of our security — the United States has a vast network of bases...military bases which encircle the borders of the Soviet Union. There is not a single base within the proximity of the American borders, I mean not a single Soviet base. Now, the United States in addition to the notorious triad — intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarine based missiles--starting with the December 1979 decision of the NATO council--began to deploy on West European territory, in fact, the fourth type of strategic offensive arms. These are: Pershing missiles and cruise missiles. Thus, I think, we could say that the American strategic triad has now turned into a quartet... into a quartet. There are now four spearheads. Four spearheads now pointed toward the Soviet Union. Moreover, these armaments, now being deployed on West European territory are of especially dangerous kind to our security. For example, the Pershing 2 has a range of 2, 5 thousand kilometers and its flying time is equal to, I'm not exactly sure, 5 or 6 -- let's say 10 minutes. That means this weapon is an extraordinary threat to our national interests. Therefore, arithmetic becomes very complicated when applied to national security interests, to national strategic parameters of each country. At such point arithmetic seems to turn into higher mathematics: into algebra, into geometry, I don't know into what else. Into cybernetics maybe. Here one needs very accurate counting. However, even my counting, no matter how approximate, can show that the American side always had a greater quantity of arms directed against us, against the Soviet Union.

CUT.

Let me also remind you of the aircraft carrier forces of the United States. As far as I know, there are 14 or 15 aircraft carriers in the United States. The Soviet Union doesn't have them at all. However, it is a weapon very dangerous to us. Apart...

(DISCUSSION)

Let me also remind you of such type of weapon as aircraft carriers, the aircraft carrier forces. The United States has acquired 14 or 15 aircraft carriers. Each of these gigantic ships has on board 90 bombers. So, try to count how many weapons are directed against the Soviet Union. And that's not the end. Don't forget the so-called forward basing of the United States... Encircling the territory of...the entire perimeter of the Soviet borders, there are dozens, perhaps even hundreds of American military bases, many of which are equipped with nuclear weapons. As for the American borders, there is not a single Soviet base within their proximity. And there cannot be any. There are no bases placed within proximity to American shores, nor military installations that could threaten the United States.

CUT.

When we examine the policy of any particular government, we are trying not to pay too much attention to the individual traits or platforms of members of the administration or the government. We assume that the political attitude, be it the one of Washington, London or Paris, reflects the basic interests of those groups that led this or that particular president or premier-minister to power. Thus, the Carter administration also represented interests of the circles that secured Carter's victory in elections. Well, at the same time, we of course, never exclude a possibility of different opinions different attitudes being expressed within the team. As for Cyrus Vance, we already mentioned his name. There happened to be inside the Carter's administration also a gentleman named Zbigniew Brzezinski. You Americans are the ones to judge what he brought to American politics, good or bad. Though, considering his statements, his words he made, while in Carter's administration, as well as the books he writes today, including his last book, recently published,-- I think, its name is "Rules of the Game" in Russian — so, this... politico tried hard in order to push the American policy to the right, away from a direction of common sense. To start with, he produced a system of considerations, according to which Soviet-American relations were allegedly not basic to the American politics. He even invented something like a scale of importance, according to which first priorities were given to some other problems, while the Soviet-American relationship was, according to him placed at third or fourth place. Understandably, it was an incorrect, it was wrong and unrealistic approach, an unrealistic evaluation of the international relations of that period. It's clear, of course, that then as now, Soviet-American relations drew a line through the center of world (political) life. And... Pushing Soviet-American relations aside, trying trying hard, as Brzezinski was, to convince everybody that Soviet-American relations were not of first priority to American policy -- the words still remain only words. It's clear that, as far as the world's policy and its future are concerned, the key question is and always has been: How would the relations between the USSR and the United States develop in different areas of world politics? We are not supporters of the concept of two superpowers. This is not our our concept, this not our theory. More than that, we think it is propagated and employed by those who dream to overshadow the significance of Soviet-American relations. Though, the fact is that in every international issue, both in regional and disarmament areas, the Soviet platform is always opposed by the American platform. In all questions the soviet attitude always crosses the American attitude. As a rule, we are acting from opposite sides, but anyway, Soviet-American relations are pivotal in terms of the world's policy. So, this pivot and its significance were attempted to be diminished, consciously or subconsciously, by Brzezinski, who did a lot to... not to improve, to say the least, our relations in some particular aspects... I wouldn't like to use a verb "to spoil", but anyway, he did not... try to let Soviet-American relations be improved, especially in their main area, in the sphere of strategic offensive armaments. Therefore, looking then years back -- time is running fast--we are convinced that this person played... did not play a positive role, in... in Carter's administration; more than that, as it's becoming clear today from the memoirs being published in the United States, including memoirs by Cyrus Vance, as well as by Brzezinski... Brzezinski himself — it becomes clear that Brzezinski did a lot to strengthen the positions of the right wing of the American policy within the Carter administration, thus making the American policy somehow more — I don't want to use a word "aggressive" — somehow more stern in terms of both disarmament issues and regional ones, the issues of Africa and Latin America included. In a word, this politician didn't — I express my personal opinion — this politician did not contribute any good to the American policy of the period.

CUT. DO YOU REMEMBER DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE MX? ER... AND THE... THE NEW... THERE WAS A PRESSURE FROM THE RIGHTS WITH ARGUMENTS OF THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY... ER... HOW WAS IT SEEN FORM MOSCOW? WHAT DID... THE DISCUSSION ABOUT INTRODUCTION OF A NEW, MORE ACCURATE WEAPON, ER, MEET OR... HOW IT WAS INTERPRETED HERE?

Our evaluations were quite definite. We've been learning the American side that the introduction, the creation of the qualitatively new ballistic weapon, one of higher accuracy and a higher level of invulnerability, could seriously complicate the strategic situation between the Soviet Union and the United States. (It could) seriously complicate it, make it incontrollable, (could) strengthen the elements of chaos, of unpredictability, unforseeability in the strategic situation between two countries. It created a serious threat to... to the entire situation in the world. Accordingly, we were bringing this fact to the attention of the American side. We also pointed out that working on the creation of such a type of weapon, would naturally force us to resort to creating an analogous type of weapon. Thus, the arms race would go up, would start yet another round, not only in terms of quantitative parameters, but now also of qualitative... parameters, which is a very, very dangerous thing. Unfortunately, our warnings didn't find any response from the American side and, to our regret, the new types of ballistic weapons were created; and as a result of strategic instability our relations were damaged yet more.

WHAT KIND OF... WHAT KIND OF IMPACT ON THE DÉTENTE HAD, OR... WHAT KIND OF IMPACT HAD THE COMPETITION IN AFRICA?

Well, I wouldn't start focusing the question of the future of improvement, the future of détente on some particular region, on some particular issue. We reckon, that starting in the early '70s, especially after the first Soviet-American Summit of May 1972, when the American President arrived in Moscow, the primary impulse was made to détente, and a wholesome and fruitful process had begun in both Soviet-American relations, and European situation, as well as in general, the entire world's situation. Of course, this process was hard going. That was not a straight, smooth road. It was going on, though...and, eventually, was crowned with... this process of mitigation of tension, this process of détente was crowned with...of course, with the meeting in Helsinki in August 1975, where leaders of 35 countries signed the Helsinki Act, which, in my opinion, was the most important international document... agreement of our times, and which we in the Soviet Union still observe solemnly. As you know, the principles of the Helsinki Concluding Act are included in the Constitution of the Soviet Union. In a word, this process was going on, though with great difficulties... this process of improvement, this process of détente... As it seems, though, there were some circles that were unhappy with the direction and tempo of this process. Moreover, they were not "some", they were very influential, powerful circles... on the opposite side... and it is possible to give an exact address of these very influential forces. The exact address of these forces was given by Dwight Eisenhower who, leaving the White House in January 1960, mentioned these forces in his farewell speech — I think, it was on January 19 or 20, 1961 — and called them the military-industrial complex of the United States. So, the military-industrial complex of the USA, as well as those circles that concentrated around it, as if around some epicenter, responded to (the success of) détente with "bayonets ready". They didn't accept it at all. Those were quite powerful ...political circles that had a considerable influence on President Carter among others, and... the story ended with (submitting) the fact that the development of détente policy seemed to deviate from the interests, from the goals, from the attitudes of those very circles, including the military-industrial complex... The end of the story was that in one of his speeches, President Carter declared that from then on he would exclude the word "détente" from his political lexicon... and that was much before (the) Afghanistan (affair), let me bring it to your attention, much before Afghanistan. In the White House they crossed the word "détente" out of their political vocabulary, and began a full-speed return to a policy of power. Again, I bring it to your attention, it all happened after the Vienna Summit of Carter and the Soviet leader in June 1979, and before Afghanistan.

BUT CARTER SAID AFTER THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN THAT HE HAS LEARNED—

(IN ENGLISH:) I protest.

HOW DO YOU WANT ME TO CALL THE ACTION? SOVIET'S... WHAT?

(IN ENGLISH:) It's up to you... but I protest. (LAUGHTERS)

WHATEVER... THE ENTRANCE OF SOVIET FORCES INTO AFGHANISTAN ...OR WHATEVER--

(IN ENGLISH:) By the invitation of the Afghan... the Afghan government.

YOU KNOW... YOU KNOW, THERE WAS A CARTOON, WHEN I WAS A STUDENT, IN THE NEW YORKER WHICH SHOWED TWO AMERICAN PILOTS SITTING UNDER A TREE IN VIETNAM, AND ONE OF THEM SAYING TO ANOTHER: TELL ME AGAIN; WHICH WAS THE GOVERNMENT WHICH INVITED US TO THEIR COUNTRY?

(IN ENGLISH:) Let us, er let us say just, "Afghanistan".

CARTER SAID THAT HE HAS LEARNED MORE FROM AFGHANISTAN, FROM THE AFGHANISTAN EVENT... IN ONE DAY, THAN HE HAS LEARNED PREVIOUSLY ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION FOR 2 1/2 YEARS OF HIS PRESIDENCY. CAN YOU... AS A SOVIET, CAN YOU THINK WHAT HE LEARNED?

Well, if that's the case, it's a pity that during Carter's presidency--of how many, of three, or four years?--spending all his time dealing with Soviet policy, he failed to comprehend the basic principles of Soviet policy; the principles that have an exclusively positive nature. (He failed to understand) the core of Soviet policy, which was directed toward a development and deepening of constructive relations with the United States. (He failed to understand) the essence of the Soviet policy which was directed toward the achievement of an agreement with the United States on limitations and reductions of strategic armaments. For all of these years, it was the Soviet Union that was striving to achieve the SALT II Treaty. On the other hand, it was the United States that never ratified the SALT II agreement. It is the United States that now broke the SALT II agreement. By the way, if you feel like quoting President Jimmy Carter, I would also allow myself to use a quotation of his, that just came to mind. During the discussion of the SALT II agreement, -- it was, as far as I remember, in May 1979, -- Carter made a statement like this: "If we, after the conclusion of the SALT II Treaty, refuse to ratify it, the whole world will see us as instigators, who refuse to strive for a ban of the most destructive weapon ever known to mankind." So, I answer your quotation of Carter with another quotation of Carter.

TO WHAT EXTENT THE ATMOSPHERE OF THAT TIME, THE NEGOTIATIONS OF SALT II, AND THE GLOBAL CONDITIONS WERE AFFECTED BY BOTH THE SOVIET-CHINESE RIFT AND THE DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA?

Of course the Chinese factor had a certain, I could even say, a considerable significance for the international policy of the Soviet Union, as well as, I understand, for the international policy of the United States. Those years were not the best for Soviet-Chinese relations. These relations were then of an aggravated nature for different reasons. It's not the proper time, nor place to clarify who was wrong or right then. One can imagine, though, that in Washington, there were some politicians, as well as the administration itself, that seemed to rely on this Chinese factor, on this Chinese card, in order to play it against the Soviet Union. Ten years have since passed. It's clear now that this card, this Chinese card that American policy relied upon, didn't win. What I'd like to emphasize, is that today, in 1986, I mean, on the eve of 1987, Soviet-Chinese relations have already passed through their most difficult and trying times. Today the relationship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China is developing well, to the benefit of both nations, both countries. So, we hope that the development of Soviet-Chinese relations will be promising, will get a good chance. Therefore, it would be a great mistake to try to abuse Soviet-American... (I mean) Soviet-Chinese relations for some certain purposes alien to the interests of détente, for the purposes of aggravating the world situation. It isn't worth to be done.

OK. CUT.

(IN ENGLISH:) More optimistic?...

...REALISTIC. WHAT WERE... WHAT WAS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SALT II? WHAT WAS THE PRINCIPAL ACHIEVEMENT OF SALT II?

I'm convinced that SALT II or “OSV II” as we call it, is a document, an agreement of extraordinary importance, not only in terms of bilateral Soviet-American relations, but also in terms of world policy. Look, today the essence of the whole sphere of questions, regarding strategic arms limitations, is based on two pillars, on two foundations: these are an ABM agreement, the agreement on anti-ballistic defense, and until recently, the SALT II agreement. What is its significance, what is its essence? That was the agreement which set actual limits on the development of the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. It actually did this. It could be argued, of course, that these limits are too high,... or too low, but anyway, it did establish limits. Now, unfortunately, the United States of America is crossing this ceiling, this limit, and if they do so, that means the further increase of strategic arsenals, the further increase of the arms race. This is dangerous... this is dangerous. As it seems to me, we believe that SALT II is precisely calculated, I would even call it a mathematically precise balance of strategic interests of both countries. If we recall again the contents of this document, we notice that it established a ceiling of 2,400 launchers of different types of strategic weapons for the United States as well as for the Soviets. The ceiling was 2,400 launchers. There is a very important clause in SALT II, that establishes a sub-limit of 1,320 launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-based ballistic missiles, and for heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles. 1,320 units. This is the very sum limit that the United States has crossed with the deployment of their 131st strategic bomber equipped with cruise missiles. By deploying this bomber, the United States... By deploying this bomber, the United States violated one of the basic clauses of the SALT II agreement, thus in fact, nullifying the entire treaty. Therefore, one of the two foundations of strategic stability is now leaving forever the international political scene. As you know, the Soviet government made its statement concerning the violation of the SALT II agreement by the United States. The Soviet leadership after thorough consideration of the possible consequences, strategic, military, political, and moral alike, has stated that, as of yet, the Soviet Union is not surpassing the limits set by the SALT II agreement. So for now, the Soviet Union will continue to observe the limits of this agreement. A legitimate question is: what is the meaning of this "so far", for how long will the Soviet Union observe it? Despite everything, we hope that the United States will soberly review the situation. The United States has a choice of different options. They will either go the way of further violations of SALT II - today, and of the ABM agreement - tomorrow; or, despite all, they will undertake some compensating actions which would allow them to keep the SALT II agreement intact. In a word, the document was signed on June 18, 1979 by the Soviet and American leaders in Vienna, is a document, I would say, of historic importance; and as you remember — we all watched on TV the signing ceremony of this document in the Vienna Palace — the American President was seen with tears in his eyes. He approached the Soviet leader and hugged him warmly. And you know what, I empathized with the American president. A great deal of work was accomplished. The result achieved was of great historic importance and it was possible to let human feelings show. That's how Jimmy Carter felt. A great effort was concluded... which makes it all the more disappointing, all the more bitter, the fact that right after the signing of the agreement on June 18, 1941 there began in the United States a very energetic, very intensive campaign against this agreement. As a result of which... As a result of which it was never ratified, it was never activated. And you know what? There are people who still wonder how this could happen, that after long years of preparations, starting as early as 1972, the agreement — the international document which was thoroughly thought over from all aspects...

...START THE SENTENCE AGAIN...

You know... You know, I think that even today people can hardly understand how it happened that the agreement which was worked out over the long years, which was formulated with the participation of the White House, the State Department, the CIA, the Pentagon, and all other governmental agencies of the United States; the agreement which was lengthily discussed in the Capitol, as well as by political and scientific circles in the United States; the agreement that seemed to be seasoned to everyone's taste, and thus was supposed to answer the requirements of everybody, of all American political circles in Washington — how did it happen that this agreement was not ratified? Look, after all, this was not a business matter of concluding a sale of peanuts in... er... Georgia... yes? After all, that was not a matter of purchasing a truckload of peanuts from a farm in the state of Georgia. This was a matter, concerning a document of great international importance. So, why should the events develop this way, why did some forces begin to act why did some wheels start to turn around, why did some gigantic machine start moving against the agreement, preventing it from being ratified? Though, the United States and the Soviet Union both agreed to observe this agreement. When on December 31, 1985 the validity of the agreement expired, both sides agreed to continue observing it. However, December 1986 comes, and the American administration makes a regretful decision, which in fact nullifies this agreement... nullifies it. Thus a new situation emerges in the area of Soviet-American strategic relations. Among other terms, SALT II required the creation of a special body, an apparatus that included the Permanent Consulting Committee, during the sessions of which we exchanged data on the size and quality of our strategic forces. This body allowed us to be informed about your intentions, as well as you... about ours... As it turns out, though, this body which secured a strategic assurance, that prevented us from a chaotic strategy — as it turns out, this body is also today in danger. In a word, we have an impression that the American side made a very serious mistake, stepping rashly in the wrong direction... in the wrong direction.