DR. MUNIR KHAN, COULD I ASK YOU FIRST TO DESCRIBE BRIEFLY YOUR SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND?

Well, I studied in Pakistan where I got my first degree in engineering. And I went to the United States as a Rotary Scholar with a Fulbright travel grant. Went to school in North Carolina. And then I studied at Illinois Institute of Technology followed by Argonne National Laboratory.

TELL ME ABOUT THE ATOMS FOR PEACE SPEECH, BECAUSE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WERE A RECIPIENT OF THAT IN A VERY PERSONAL WAY. CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT EXACTLY YOUR EXPERIENCE WAS?

I participated in the Atoms for Peace Program in 1956... no, this program started in '55 and a few Pakistanis were trained under that program at Argonne National Lab. I was one of them. And we were a part of a larger group coming from in our case 35 countries and we received one years training at Argonne.

COULD YOU REPEAT THAT BECAUSE THIS TRAFFIC IS REALLY BAD. LET'S JUST GO OVER THAT. IN WHAT WAY DID YOU PERSONALLY TAKE PART IN THE ATOMS FOR PEACE PROGRAM?

You see the Atoms for Peace Program was announced by General Eisenhower in December 1953. It got started in 1955 and then this program, a large number of scientists from all over the world were brought to the United States and trained at Argonne National Laboratory. I participated in this program starting 1956 and I was at the International Institute of Nuclear Science and Engineering at Argonne for a period of one year..

FOR THE BENEFIT OF PEOPLE WHO DON'T KNOW WHAT ARGONNE IS PERHAPS YOU COULD JUST EXPLAIN WHAT YOU ACTUALLY DID THERE.

At Argonne National Laboratory we were given an overview of nuclear technology and the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in various fields. And I specialized in nuclear power reactors.

NOW WHAT WERE THE GOALS OF THE EARLY ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION IN PAKISTAN? WHAT WAS THE PROGRAM ABOUT IN THE EARLY DAYS?

You see following the Atoms for Peace program announced by the United States, Pakistan set up a committee on atomic energy in 1955. Now this committee selected people for going to the United States. In 1956, this was elevated to a commission and in 1959 this commission was made into an autonomous body.

WHAT DID THE COMMISSION SET OUT TO DO?

The Commission was asked to develop a program for peaceful applications of atomic energy so that Pakistan could benefit from this new technology in all fields economically, in the field of health, power generation and so on.

CAN YOU DESCRIBE FOR ME WHAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS IN THESE EARLY DAYS. I KNOW ABOUT THE GENEVA CONFERENCES AND SO ON. BERTRAND GOLDSCHMIDT CALLED IT A PERIOD OF NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE. IS THIS HOW IT FELT TO YOU?

You see it was an era of great expectations, because for the first time the United States came forward to share its know-how which reflected tremendous potential of atomic energy, all fields. We thought we could transform the world. We could have cheap electricity we could change the agriculture, we could solve the problems of health. So this was an era of tremendous euphoria. And the sky was the limit. So from... starting from 1955, for a whole decade the expectations were almost limitless.

CAN YOU RECALL ANY PERSONAL CONVERSATIONS WITH ANY OF THE OTHER SCIENTISTS AT GENEVA OR — I REALIZE YOU WEREN'T AT THE FIRST ONE BUT THE SECOND CONFERENCE, CAN YOU RECALL FOR EXAMPLE THE INDIAN SCIENTIST, HOMI BHABHA'S SPEECHES OR BERTRAND GOLDSCHMIDT'S SPEECHES?

I did not attend the 1955 Geneva Conference. You remember in that conference it was predicted that in 20 years time we would harness fusion energy for power generation. And that was very, very optimistic. And it will of course take us many more decades to finish that. But in that atmosphere such expectations were perhaps justified. Now I participated in the 1958 Geneva Conference and '64 one and the '71 one

ARE THERE ANY SORT OF ANECDOTES YOU CAN TELL ME ABOUT THE 1958 ONE?

I'm afraid I cannot offer and tell you any anecdote.

OR ANYTHING ABOUT THE OTHER PEOPLE. I UNDERSTAND THERE WAS AN ATOMIC REACTOR ON DISPLAY, OR ANYTHING.

In 1958, the United States organized an exhibition in Geneva which had an operating research reactor which of course one wouldn't do now, because you do not transport a whole reactor for the purposes of exhibition because the safety considerations at that time were quite different. We were not aware of the potential hazards or implications of having even a small research reactor operating. I remember in my university in North Carolina in 1952 they started building a research reactor right on the campus, surrounded by various laboratories and so on. And this reactor later on had to be dismantled because this was not the right location for an operating research reactor.

WELL THAT BRINGS US TO THE IAEA WHICH YOU HAD, YOU WERE VERY CLOSELY ASSOCIATED. HOW DID THE IAEA SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS AND THE INSPECTIONS APPLY TO PAKISTAN'S EARLY PROGRAM?

Well, Pakistan in the early years got a number of facilities through the IAEA. That included our research reactor for one and our power reactor at KANUPP, the second one. And these facilities were put under agency control and inspection. These have been regularly visited by IAEA inspectors and we have had no problem with regard to application of safeguards on both of them.

HOW DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WAS PAKISTAN IN THESE EARLY DAYS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM?

You see, our program started with the Atoms for Peace program in the United States and first batch of about 20 or 30 people were trained in... under that program.

YES, START AGAIN.

You see, Pakistan's program in atomic energy started with the Atoms for Peace Program of the United States. We started sending our people for training and I think we must have trained about 20 or 25 people under that program until about the mid-'60s when that program was terminated. But this provided the impetus for the program, and also we received in the early years our research reactor which is operating at PINSTECH (Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology) under the same program. So that got us started in the field of atomic energy.

YOU WERE ONE OF THE ACTUAL RECIPIENTS. YOU WERE ONE OF THOSE STUDENTS. CAN YOU JUST REPEAT FOR ME WHAT THAT INVOLVED?

Yes, I was one of the participants in the Atoms for Peace program. And I received one year's training at Argonne National Laboratory in 1956. And in my class there were 40 students from about 30 countries who later on went back to their respective country and became leaders of the programs in those countries.

I THINK WE COVERED EVERYTHING IN THAT EARLY PERIOD THAT WE TALKED ABOUT UNLESS THERE'S SOMETHING ELSE YOU WANT TO ADD. I THINK WE'RE THERE. OK, NOW WHEN WE GET INTO THE PERIOD WHERE PEOPLE ARE BECOMING A LITTLE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT PROLIFERATION AS A PROBLEM AREA YOU WERE TELLING ME EARLIER ABOUT THE CHINESE TEST AS BEING A TURNING POINT. CAN YOU DESCRIBE FOR ME YOUR REACTIONS TO THE CHINESE TEST AT THE TIME? COULD YOU EVEN SAY THAT IT WAS A TURNING POINT?

Well, I think I'll speak about that in the context of the NPT. Early years of the...NPT was negotiated and so on.

THAT'S FINE. OK, CAN YOU DESCRIBE FOR ME THAT TURNING POINT IN SORT OF HOW PEOPLE FELT ABOUT ATOMIC ENERGY?

Well, starting with '55 for the first ten years it was an age of great euphoria about atomic energy. There were great expectations about how it could transform the world, solve all our problems of energy, health and agriculture. There was free exchange of information and technology but something happened in the mid-'60s. I think it was perhaps the Chinese nuclear test of 1964 which brought the two superpowers together. And they started talking about the problem of spread of nuclear weapons. And...

I WANT TO KEEP IT PERSONAL. DID YOU THINK AT THIS POINT THAT THERE WAS A PROLIFERATION PROBLEM IN THE WORLD? THAT THERE WAS A DANGER OF THIS, WHAT PEOPLE ALWAYS CALLED HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION WHICH I REALIZE WAS --?

I think in the early '60s people were not talking so much about proliferation. Because the impression was that manufacture of nuclear weapons was very difficult. And you might recall that at that time I believe that even France was struggling to enter the club, and it was not so easy. And therefore the problems of proliferation were not in the forefront. However, in 1964 after the Chinese nuclear test there was a realization among the nuclear weapons states and particularly the two superpowers that something had to be done. And that persuaded them to talk about limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and gave birth to the idea of the NPT.

I WANT TO JUST GO OVER THAT AND IF I CAN ASK YOU TO REPEAT THAT IT DIDN'T SEEM POSSIBLE AT THAT STAGE. NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT SEEMED TOO COMPLICATED OR SECRET OR WHATEVER YOU WANT TO SAY. BUT COULD WE JUST GO OVER IT A LITTLE MORE BRIEFLY JUST BECAUSE IT'S A VERY GOOD WAY OF SETTING THE SCENE FOR NPT. COULD YOU DESCRIBE THE TURNING POINT IN THE EARLY '60S ON THIS ISSUE OF PROLIFERATION?

You see the first ten years in atomic energy represented a period of great expectation when there was a great deal of cooperation, free exchange of information about technology between the advanced and of course the recipient countries. There was no great concern about the possibility of spread of nuclear weapon because it was considered something which was too complicated, too sophisticated and too difficult. However, after the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964 it was realized that nuclear weapons were not beyond the reach of other countries. And the two superpowers became concerned for political and security reasons about the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons.

CAN YOU GIVE ME SOME BACKGROUND AS TO HOW YOU BECAME APPOINTED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION? JUST PERSONAL BACKGROUND, HOW IT CAME, WHERE YOU WERE AT THE TIME AND HOW IT ALL HAPPENED?

I served in the International Atomic Energy Agency as a nuclear power engineer for a period of 14 years from 1958 to 1972. In 1972 President Bhutto took over...

IF YOU COULD SAY THAT YOU MOVED FROM THE IAEA TO, PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO ASKED YOU TO MOVE —

I was working in the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1958 to 1972. When I was asked by the then President, Mr. Bhutto to return to Pakistan and take over as Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.

NOW ALL THIS DISCUSSION IN THE WEST ABOUT THE MULTAN MEETING AND WE TALKED ABOUT IT A LITTLE EARLIER. CAN YOU DESCRIBE TO ME YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF WHAT HAPPENED AT MULTAN? WAS IT A TURNING POINT FOR PAKISTAN, THAT MEETING? WHAT HAPPENED?

Mr. Bhutto was very much interested in modernizing Pakistan. Being a young man and very dynamic, he thought that atomic energy could play a very important part. So he convened a meeting of the scientists at Multan in January 1972. And I was asked to participate in that meeting. In that meeting he made two important decisions. He ordered that the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission should start an expanded program of atomic energy, and he also created a separate ministry of science and technology. He also directed that the Atomic Energy Commission should report directly to him which meant that Atomic Energy Commission received access to the chief executive, the patronage, the financial support and the necessary backing for implementing its program.

CAN YOU JUST SUMMARIZE ALL THAT, SORT OF JUST WHAT IT MEANT IN TERMS OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM? WE DON'T NEED ALL THE DETAIL, OK.

In January 1972, Prime Minister...

WHAT HAPPENED, IN WHAT WAY WAS MULTAN A TURNING POINT IN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY?

Multan meeting of January 1972 constituted a turning point in our Atomic Energy program. The then president Mr. Bhutto decided that from then on the commission would report directly to him as the chief executive and would receive all the necessary economic and technical support from his government for implementing a broad-based program for the application of atomic energy.

ONCE YOU TOOK OVER AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WHAT WAS THE POLICY OF THE COUNTRY AT THAT TIME?

Well our first priority was to harness nuclear energy for public development and on the political side we wanted to ensure that nuclear weapon did not enter the subcontinent.

LET'S GO OVER THAT. INSTEAD OF SAYING ONE AND TWO... WHEN YOU TOOK OVER AS CHAIRMAN HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY AT THAT STAGE?

Our nuclear policy was to harness atomic energy as quickly as possible for our development. And at the same to ensure that it was used for peaceful purposes. That is why in November of 1972 while inaugurating the Karachi nuclear power plant the then President Mr. Bhutto announced that Pakistan wanted to establish a nuclear free zone in South Asia to debar the entry of nuclear weapons in the sub-continent.

LET ME ASK YOU THAT AGAIN IN A DIFFERENT WAY. COULD YOU DESCRIBE FOR ME WHAT MR. BHUTTO'S VIEWS WERE ON THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT THAT STAGE? IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT THE POLICY WAS WITH REGARDS TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.

The... the policy regarding use of nuclear energy.

AND ALSO HIS VIEWS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR WEAPONS. WHAT WAS YOUR COMMITMENT AT THAT TIME?

Our nuclear policy in 1972 was to focus on its use for our development domestically and regionally. We wanted the area to be free of nuclear weapons. That is why at the inauguration of the Karachi nuclear power plant the President of Pakistan at that time made a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in South Asia.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION IN 1974 WHEN THE INDIANS TESTED A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVICE?

Our reaction was that of shock... but not complete surprise because we knew of the growing capability of India and also the pronouncements of various Indian leaders with regard to acquiring capability and developing nuclear weapon. I'll go with that again. I'll go that again. Our reaction to the India nuclear explosion was that of complete shock but not surprise because judging from the pronouncement in the sixties we felt that India would explode a nuclear device because at the 1971 Geneva Conference it was announced by the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission that India was interested in peaceful nuclear explosions. This public announcement was ignored by the super powers and if they had taken it seriously they could have done something to forestall it. The impact of that explosion was tremendous, both internationally and regionally. The nuclear energy world was in a state of shock from which it has not recovered so far. It was a tremendous setback for nuclear energy throughout the world. It was considered as a breach of faith and trust because India had received assistance from Canada on the understanding that it would not be used for exploding a nuclear device. So an era of mistrust began after that explosion.

MAKE IT A LITTLE BRIEFER. HOW DID THE INDIAN EXPLOSION AFFECT THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAMS AS A WHOLE, AND IN PARTICULAR PAKISTAN?

I think I'll keep my ears to there so that...

WHAT WAS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EXPLOSION?

India's nuclear explosion had a tremendous negative impact on the development of nuclear energy throughout the world. It spoiled the relationship of trust that existed between the supplier and the recipient states. It resulted in mutual suspicion and the supplier states started, embarked on a policy that did not, I'll do that over again...

India's nuclear explosion was a tremendous setback for international cooperation in nuclear energy and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The world was shocked to see that India broke the trust of a supplier state like Canada. And then the supplier states started on a policy of denial and non-cooperation which made the recipient country feel insecure.

AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AT THE TIME, HOW DID YOU RECEIVE THE NEWS OF THAT INDIAN TEST? WHAT DID YOU THINK ABOUT THAT IN TERMS OF YOUR OWN PROGRAM? WHAT AFFECT DID IT HAVE?

As the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission I was shocked to get the news of the Indian nuclear test. As the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission I was shocked at the news of the Indian nuclear test. We knew that India could explode a nuclear device but we thought India would never go that far. It was a tremendous setback for nuclear energy throughout the world. And also it had far reaching impact regionally.

HOW DID IT AFFECT YOUR ACTUAL PROGRAM IN PAKISTAN?

The Indian nuclear test had a strong negative impact on our program... because the supplier states thereafter reneged on existing agreements, cut off nuclear supplies even for our safeguarded nuclear facilities and our program slowed down.

DID YOU FEEL SUSPICIOUS AT ALL ABOUT — THEY DID MAKE A STATEMENT THAT IT WAS A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVICE. IS THAT WHAT YOU UNDERSTOOD? HOW DID YOU REACT TO THAT?

India said that it was a peaceful nuclear explosion, but the message that we received was that it was a demonstration of India's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. And that altered the situation as far as this region was concerned. We felt very insecure. That's the kind of answer you want.

IN THE EARLY '70s, I THINK YOU WERE RATHER PREOCCUPIED AT THAT TIME WITH TRYING TO ACQUIRE REPROCESSING. COULD YOU DESCRIBE WHY AND HOW PAKISTAN NEEDED REPROCESSING FACILITIES?

Yeah. I think I'll start with the need for... In 1972 we invited the International Atomic Energy Agency to analyze the requirements for nuclear power in Pakistan and prepare a master plan for us. This was completed in two years and it indicated that Pakistan, being very short of conventional energy resources, needed more than 10,000 megawatts of nuclear power capacity by the year 2000. So we had to get prepared for that, not only in terms of building or acquiring nuclear power plants but also basic capability in the nuclear field cycle. So our motivation in negotiating for a reprocessing plant was to have a basic measure of self-sufficiency in the nuclear field cycle. This reprocessing plant was to be under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

AT THIS TIME I BELIEVE DR. KISSINGER WAS TRYING TO ENCOURAGE PAKISTAN TO GO AHEAD WITH THE MULTINATIONAL REPROCESSING CENTER. WHY WAS THIS...

No, no. He tried to stop it. In multinational... He, he didn't advocate that,

DIDN'T HE TRY TO...

No, no. That was a different move.

OKAY.

He said you stop the reprocessing plant.

WHAT DO YOU RECALL OF DR. KISSINGER'S REACTION TO —

Now first... How he concluded agreement and the reaction of the United States.

OKAY.

Okay. Just in one sentence. The project... Oh, no. I should begin again. The Franco-Pakistan project for the construction of a reprocessing plant in Pakistan was approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors in February 1976 when a trilateral agreement was concluded. Although the board supported it, the Agency approved it and the project was placed under full Agency safeguards, the United States did not approve of this project. In August 1976 Dr. Kissinger visited Pakistan and demanded that Pakistan abandon this project and warned us of dire consequences if it continued with it. Now this is the sort of thing you want?

WELL I'M PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE DOCTOR KISSINGER PART.

Okay. I'll, I'll make it very clear.

OKAY. THOUGH DESPITE ALL THESE THINGS...

Okay. ...The, the project for the construction of the reprocessing plant was approved by the International Atomic Agency in February 1976 and the safeguards agreement was concluded in March 1976. In spite of the fact that this plan was to be completely safeguarded by the IAEA the United States did not approve of this project. The United States felt that there was a proliferation risk involved. In August 1976 Dr. Kissinger visited Pakistan and demanded that we abandon this project and warned us of dire consequences if we persisted in the construction of this plant.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THAT?

The government of Pakistan rejected the demand made by Dr. Kissinger and decided to continue with the project. However, the pressures on France were equally great. In December 1976, President Ford asked President not to supply the plant to Pakistan. And that was a turning point as far as the Franco-Pakistan reprocessing plant project was concerned. Because soon thereafter France decided not to go ahead with the project.

AND SOME OF THE CRITICISM LEVEL THAT PAKISTAN... HAS TO DO WITH THE SIZE OF THIS COMMERCIAL... IT WAS A COMMERCIAL SCALE REPROCESSING PLANT. AND I THINK PEOPLE HAVE SAID BASICALLY THAT PAKISTAN COULD MAKE BOMBS FROM THE REPROCESSED PLUTONIUM. COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHY THAT WASN'T IN YOUR MINDS AT THE TIME?

This reprocessing plant could not have been misused for non-peaceful purposes because this was under full IAEA safeguards. So were the Karachi nuclear power plant. And so were the other power reactors planned to be erected in Pakistan. So the contention that this constituted a proliferation risk is untenable.

COULD I GET YOU TO REPEAT AGAIN THE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS FOR PAKISTAN WITH DETAILS? WHY DID YOU NEED SUCH A LARGE REPROCESSING PLANT?

This was a small reprocessing plant capable of reprocessing fuel from four power reactors. And we were planning a number of power reactors at that time with one reactor in operation and other reactors on the drawing board.

HOW DID CANADA'S DECISION FOLLOWING THE INDIAN EXPLOSION TO WITHDRAW ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN AFFECT YOUR PROGRAM? WHAT WERE YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT THAT AT THE TIME?

... Another turning point in our program was the unilateral decision by Canada to abrogate the bilateral cooperation agreement with Pakistan. This decision was announced by Canada in December... I'll go...

JUST START WITH HOW IT AFFECTED YOU.

Shall I combine these two, three things?

SURE.

For instance...

THE ATMOSPHERE.

The atmosphere in seventy... seven, let's say. Seven-six. The atmosphere in '76.

CAN YOU SUMMARIZE THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE TIME?

You see, India's nuclear explosion had a tremendous impact on Pakistan. India staged the explosion and we paid the price because the supplier states decided to go back on the supply agreements with Pakistan and abrogate unilaterally the existing bilateral agreements. I'll go over that again. India's nuclear explosion had a tremendous technical impact on our program. India staged the explosion. We ended up paying the price. The supplier states decided to go back on their contracts and unilaterally abrogate their agreements with Pakistan. To begin with, Canada in December 1976, decided to cut off all supplies for KANUPP, a reactor which was under IAEA safeguards. Then France decided not to honor the agreement for the reprocessing plant... Pakistan had to pay a very heavy price for India's nuclear explosion. The supplier states decided to cut off nuclear supplies to Pakistan and unilaterally abrogated their agreements. Canada decided to cut of supplies for KANUPP. Soon thereafter France decided not to honor the agreement for the supply of the reprocessing plant. And from these things we concluded that Pakistan had to be on its own. We had to be self-reliant and we could not depend upon outside supplies.

ONE LAST TIME WITHOUT CANADIAN AND FRENCH.

Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for the Indian nuclear explosion. The supplier states decided not to honor their agreements for... with Pakistan. Again. I'll do that again. Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for the Indian nuclear explosion. The supplier states like Canada and France decided not to honor their bilateral agreements with Pakistan. So we concluded that Pakistan had no other option but to seek self-sufficiency in nuclear technology.

DID YOU EXPERIENCE SOME DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE REACTION OF THE SUPER POWERS TO THAT EXPLOSION, THE TEST?

We were disappointed at the reaction of the nuclear weapon states to the Indian nuclear explosion. As you may recall France sent a congratulatory message to India. USSR acquiesced in that test. The United States government did not launch any official protest. It was only the press and the public opinion throughout the world which condemned the test. We concluded therefore that the nuclear weapon states were tolerating India's entry into the nuclear club.

THE LONDON SUPPLIER'S GROUP, DID YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO WHAT THEY — AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME THEY WERE DISCUSSING RESTRICTING NUCLEAR EXPORTS. THIS WAS A SORT OF US BACKED THING.

The London Supplier's Group were —

YOUR REACTION TO THAT DISCUSSION ABOUT EXPORTS...

Well...

YOU WEREN'T DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THAT?

But we were affected.

HOW?

The London Supplier's Group was formed as a reaction to India's nuclear test. We were very much affected by the rules of the London Supplier's Group restricting the supply of equipment and technology. Those restrictions slowed down our program. Even though we were ready to accept safeguards on all the facilities and the supplies, yet those were denied to us.

WHY DID YOU THINK THEY WERE?

Because of the suspicion that these supplies could be used for other than peaceful purposes.

WHAT DO YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE INFCE MEETINGS, INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION GROUP, DID YOU FEEL THEY ACCOMPLISHED ANYTHING?

You see, the INFCE meeting in my opinion was a great idea at the initiative of the United States. INFCE was designed to determine what was the optimum strategy for the nuclear field cycle. However, the United States did not wait for the outcome of INFCE and passed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in March of 1978, preempting the conclusions of INFCE.

HOW WOULD YOU SUMMARIZE CARTER'S NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY? HAS IT AFFECTED PAKISTAN?

I think Carter's nuclear non-proliferation policy was unbalanced counter productive. It was a policy of denial rather than cooperation. We could further the cause of non-proliferation through international cooperation under Agency safeguards. And not by the passage of domestic legislation which would undermine all existing international agreements. This policy of denial did not work. In fact, it convinced all the recipient states that the only way for them was to seek a measure of self-sufficiency in nuclear supplies, nuclear field cycle and nuclear technology. Since the passage of the NNPA, the non-nuclear proliferation act, more countries have become self-sufficient in nuclear technology than could have been anticipated. It provided the incentive, the political justification for the countries to go ahead.

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT AND WHAT THIS MEANT IN TERMS OF THE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES.

The nuclear non-proliferation act of March 1978 passed by the US Congress... In my view, President Carter's policy on non-proliferation was counterproductive. It was a policy based on denial and restrictions rather than cooperation. Instead of furthering the cause of non-proliferation, it convinced the recipient states that they had no other choice but to seek autonomy in nuclear technology and nuclear fuel cycle. It also isolated the United States. The United States withdrew and lost influence in the international nuclear trade. And the purpose of that act was not served.

WOULD YOU AGREE THAT IF A COUNTRY WANTS TO DEVELOP BOMBS IT'LL DO SO ANYWAY REGARDLESS?

You see, decision for a country to go nuclear is basically political. The technology for making a nuclear device is available and any country at intermediate level of development can acquire that technology if there is a political will to do so. So the way to further the cause of non-proliferation is not to stress on denial of technology but to create a political climate in which there is an understanding that nuclear weapons do not add to the security of countries.

I REALIZE I'M JUMPING AHEAD BUT THEY'VE BEEN CALLED THE CURRENCY OF POWER. WOULD YOU AGREE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE THE CURRENCY OF POWER?

Yes. I get that. At one stage it was thought that the acquisition of a nuclear weapon would confer special privileges and prestige on a country. But I think this is no longer so because nuclear weapons capability is within the reach of a number of countries. It is no longer something unique. What is becoming very clear now that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by small countries do not add to their security. It does not enhance their security. It poses enormous economic and political burden. Therefore, I do not think that today nuclear weapons capability is that much a symbol of prestige and achievement at it... as it was perhaps twenty years ago.

DON'T YOU THINK IT'S BEEN AN ADVANTAGE TO ISRAEL?

You want me to comment on that?

YEAH. MANY PEOPLE HAVE TALKED ABOUT PAKISTAN MOVING CLOSER TO LIBYA. WAS THERE ANY KIND OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN THIS EARLY PERIOD?

No, no. I just will say that Sum it up. As far as Libya is concerned Pakistan has never had any nuclear cooperation with Libya. And all the allegations in this regard are totally unfounded and misplaced.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT'S BEHIND THAT? WHY IT'S IMPOSSIBLE? WHY IT WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE, COUNTERPRODUCTIVE?

You see after 1971 war Pakistan wanted support at the international level and from other Muslim countries. This led to the 1974 summit conference of Muslim countries at Lahore. So at that time Pakistan felt close to a number of Islamic countries including Libya. However, we have never had any nuclear cooperation with Libya at that time or since then.

WAS THE NOTION OF AN ISLAMIC BOMB EVER SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED BY PAKISTAN? AND WHY NOT? WHY IS THIS AN IMPRACTICAL SUGGESTION?

I think the concept of an Islamic bomb was... No. Let me begin. I believe that the concept of an Islamic bomb is a pure fabrication. There has never been cooperation among the Muslim countries for such a venture or an idea. As far as Pakistan is concerned it has never had any collaboration with any other Muslim country for pursuing such an idea.

LET'S CUT.

I think that Islamic bomb has been coined to reflect the prejudices associated with the Crusades. To associate the name of a religion with a destructive weapon like a nuclear bomb is sacrilegious. I think it's outrageous because nobody has attached the name of religion to a bomb in the United States or the Soviet Union or elsewhere.

THE ONLY OTHER THING I WOULD SAY IS THAT MR. BHUTTO MADE A STATEMENT ABOUT HOW THE DIFFERENT CIVILIZATIONS —

But he did not say Hindu bomb....He did not say Hindu bomb. He did not say Communist bomb. No, no. I think he never used this word Islamic bomb. Perhaps I can make that clear.

PLEASE.

The word "Islamic bomb" is a fabrication of some journalist from the West. Nobody in Pakistan, much less Mr. Bhutto, used the word "Islamic bomb" or the need for making an Islamic bomb. Okay?

WHY AND HOW WAS THE DECISION TAKEN TO EMBARK ON THE URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAM?

The uranium enrichment program in Pakistan is a part of our nuclear power program to have a measure of self-sufficiency in the supply of nuclear fuel for our power reactors. After the unilateral stoppage of supplies of nuclear fuel for Karachi nuclear power plant we felt that we should not put ourselves in this position with regard to future nuclear power plants which may use slightly enriched uranium. So we have embarked upon this program so that we can have in the future capability to supply slightly enriched fuel for our future nuclear power reactors.

WHY WAS THE DECISION TAKEN NOT TO SAFEGUARD KAHUTA?

When our safeguarded facilities were denied nuclear materials and equipment how could you expect us to place those facilities under safeguard which we made on our own?

AND IF I COULD JUST ASK YOU, THE PLACE IS FAIRLY HEAVILY PROTECTED. AND I THINK IT'S MOST WESTERNERS WHO HAVE WATCHED THAT PROGRAM. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

The reason we have to protect our major nuclear installation is because of threats from terrorist attacks sponsored by terrorist groups or even other states.

TO WHAT EXTENT IS PAKISTAN DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL SOURCES FOR THE CURRENT NUCLEAR PROGRAM?

We are a developing country, not heavily industrialized. We are —We are a developing country not heavily industrialized. Therefore we are dependent upon supplies from outside for our program of power generation including nuclear power generation. However with the passage of time and following our current policy... Once again. As a developing country we are indeed dependent upon foreign supplies for certain aspects of our nuclear power program. However with the passage of time it'll become more and more self-reliant.

THE STATUS OF THE CURRENT PROGRAM, CAN I ASK YOU... WHAT ABOUT COOPERATION WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC?

Pakistan and China are close friends and political allies but China is not too advanced as yet in nuclear power generation or other major peaceful applications of atomic energy. Therefore, the... there has not been any cooperation between Pakistan and China in the nuclear field. We signed the agreement of cooperation only in September 1986 and we hope that in the future this will prove to be beneficial for both sides. China has not held Pakistan in any way in any program for military application of atomic energy. First of all, Pakistan does not have such a program. And secondly, it is not Chinese policy to assist other countries with regard to the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons. China has made this policy very clear. In fact there was a Chinese statement to that effect before the International Atomic Energy Agency.

COULD YOU DESCRIBE THE CAPABILITY THAT PAKISTAN HAS IN THE FIELD OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND WHY URANIUM ENRICHMENT DOESN'T EQUAL A BOMB?

There is a general impression that uranium enrichment equals nuclear weapon capability. However this is not true. There are at least fourteen or fifteen countries in the world, including the five nuclear weapon states which have the know-how for enrichment of uranium, but not all of them are making or seeking nuclear weapons capability. In fact, in order to produce highly...uranium which is necessary for nuclear weapon, you have to take the enrichment technology to a very highly sophisticated state. Pakistan is not engaged in making highly ...uranium. It does not have the need or the capability for producing such uranium. We do not have intentions to do so.

COULD YOU EXPLAIN HOW YOU MAKE A BOMB?

You see, manufacturer of nuclear weapons require sophisticated technology and backed by testing over a long period of time before you can have a reliable, dependable, deliverable nuclear weapon. The construction of a crude device does not make a country a nuclear weapon state. In fact, it is very dangerous to have unreliable nuclear devices and have the illusion that you have nuclear weapons.

YOU WERE TELLING ME EARLIER ABOUT A CRUDE BOMB...

As far as the technology for making a crude device is concerned the basic knowledge is contained in the published material from the United States and from elsewhere. It is no longer a secret. After all, this was demonstrated more than 42 years ago. This is an old technology. Therefore to consider that we could keep the know-how about making a simple, crude device as a complete secret was just an illusion. With the advance of technology this had become common knowledge. But what is not within the reach of most countries in the world is the know-how for making nuclear weapons. This is confined to the nuclear weapon states which have conducted hundreds of tests and to the industrialized countries which have the essential know-how. Or to those countries which have received data from nuclear tests conducted in the advanced countries.

DOES PAKISTAN HAVE PLANS TO TEST IN THE NEAR FUTURE?

Pakistan has no intention of making a nuclear device nor plans in this regard.

IS PAKISTAN PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH A NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IF THE NEED ARISES?

Pakistan has no plans to develop nuclear weapons and we don't think that a need will arise in the foreseeable future.

JUST SUMMING UP THE WHOLE HISTORY THAT WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT... DO YOU THINK THERE'S A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF IRREVERSIBILITY ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GENERAL, THAT WE'VE GONE SO FAR THAT THE GENIE IS OUT, THERE'S VERY LITTLE WE CAN DO?

Well this is a political problem. The — I can comment of the spread of nuclear weapon.

YES.

You see the further spread of nuclear weapons is essentially a political issue. If a country is determined to go ahead with nuclear weaponry, nothing can stop it. It requires political will. It requires investment and determination to go ahead. And of course it entails tremendous political risks. If a country's willing to do it, it can of course be successful. But I believe that acquisition of nuclear weapons by a country does not solve its security problem. And this is especially true of smaller countries which will never be able to have a credible nuclear deterrent.

WOULD YOU AGREE THAT IN MANY WAYS PAKISTAN IS HOLDING ALL THE CARDS IN HER HAND?

In what way?

IN TERMS OF THE FUTURE OF THE NUCLEAR STORY IN SOUTH ASIA IN PARTICULAR.

No, no.

WHAT HAPPENS IN PAKISTAN IS WHAT HAPPENS NEXT IN INDIA AND THEN IN ISRAEL... IT'S THE KEY.

No. I think — I don't know. No comment on that. I think it's very political question.

THERE'S ONLY ONE OTHER THING. COULD YOU MAKE ANY GENERAL COMMENT AT ALL ABOUT THE FUSS THAT WAS MADE ABOUT DR. AYUB KHAN?

You see Let me put it this way. I believe that the myth of stealing nuclear secrets from Holland by Dr. Ayub Khan has been created by Western media to justify the story behind the Islamic bomb. It is highly exaggerated. It is designed to malign our country. We are pursuing our entire program whether in enrichment or in nuclear power or other application entirely upon our own resources with the efforts of our own scientists. The story looks very good in the press and that's why they play it up. And I would say it is largely a creation of the imagination of a few journalists.

YOU MENTIONED EARLIER ABOUT ISRAEL AND THE FACT THAT YOU CONSIDER THEM A NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWER AND YET THEY HAVEN'T TESTED.

The reason why Israel is considered to be a virtual... The reason why Israel is considered to be a defector nuclear weapon state in possession of nuclear weapons without testing is that Israel has had access to nuclear weapons technology. Israel collaborated closely with France in the initial nuclear tests conducted by France and thereby received very valuable information. It is also well known that Israel has had access to the results of nuclear weapons tests and development in other countries also.

LET'S MAKE THAT QUICKER...

The reason we can assume that Israel has nuclear weapon is that it has operated un-safeguarded nuclear facilities for a number of years. It has collaborated with France in carrying out nuclear tests in Algeria and elsewhere. And finally, it has had access to advanced technology related to nuclear weapons development, and access to the results of nuclear tests in other countries.

DO YOU MEAN THE US?

I didn't say so. That reason is, that if I say US, it creates political problem... Pakistan is one of the poorest countries as far as the availability of conventional energy resources is concerned. Its energy base is very small. The total per capita reserves of fossil fuels in Pakistan amount to six month supply for an average American citizen. The energy consumption is one tenth of the world average. The electricity consumed by an average Pakistani is one fiftieth of that of an average US citizen every year. Over the next sixteen years or so we will need an additional 15,000 megawatts, and our resources of hydro and coal and gas and oil cannot meet more than one half of this requirement. So we anticipate a gap of at least 8,000 megawatts by the year 2000. This has to be met, either by importation of oil or coal, or by use of nuclear power. And we find that in our context nuclear power offers the cheapest solution. That is why we are interested in the development of nuclear power. The other aspects of our nuclear program include applications in agriculture and medicine. We operate in the commission three nuclear agricultural centers and we have been fairly successful in developing through radiation mutation new varieties of crops such as cotton, wheat, rice and so on. For instance, last year we had a bumper crop of cotton largely because the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission developed a new variety of cotton which has revolutionized our cotton growing. So we are getting the economic benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy in agriculture. In the field of medicine the Commission is operating eight nuclear medical centers where we treat about 125,000 patients every year. So this lends credibility, social credibility, to our nuclear energy program in the country. That is why this program is very much appreciated by the people at large.

CAN YOU CONFIRM FOR ME THAT MAKING A BOMB IS DIFFICULT AND PAKISTAN IS NOT INTERESTED?

There is a misconception that once a country has some enriched uranium or some plutonium it can easily make a nuclear weapon. People forget that the manufacture if... of a nuclear weapon which is reliable, deliverable and usable for military purpose requires tremendous amount of sophisticated and complex technology, something which Pakistan does not possess. And therefore Pakistan does not have the means or know-how to make nuclear weapons. The fact that a country can make a crude nuclear device does not make the country a nuclear weapon state. Having a crude device is a very dangerous thing because it can boomerang upon you. It can invite nuclear attack when you have really no nuclear weapons. It is really an invitation to disaster.