GEORGE, WHEN DO YOU THINK PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES BECAME AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF PROLIFERATION?

Well, if you mean Presidents and their Secretaries of States, and their... officials, um, I think it's been a concern of... from the f...day we first exploded the bomb.

CAN WE JUST START WITH SAYING, "I THINK PROLIFERATION WAS A CONCERN FROM THE DAY..."

All right. All right. I think proliferation was a concern from the day of...from Hiroshima. Uh, the first statement about it... public statement was by, uh, three prime ministers, Britain, Canada and the US in 1945, uh, expressing concern about the spread of the bomb. And our US policy the Atomic Energies Act and so forth has... has been concerned about that ever since.

WHICH COUNTRIES WERE AMERICANS CONCERNED ABOUT?

Well, we were concerned originally about China getting the bomb before the Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated. We were concerned about India, and India has a... had an explosion. We've been concerned... about Germany and Japan. We've been concerned about Israel, uh, we would be concerned about any of the satellite countries to the Soviet Union, although there doesn't seem to be a problem there... at the moment. Uh, we've been concerned about the union as... about South Africa getting the bomb. A great many countries, because any time one country gets it, it's neighbors, it's rivals are likely to feel a need to... to do likewise.

CAN YOU SORT OF SUM UP WHAT THE AVERAGE AMERICAN, THE GENERAL PUBLIC FELT ABOUT CHINA? THIS IS BEFORE THE BOMB, BEFORE NPT. I MEAN, WHAT WOULD IT MEAN TO THE AVERAGE AMERICAN GETTING BOMBED BY THE CHINESE ARMY?

Well, the Chinese were extraordinarily hostile towards us. You remember this was after the Korean War, and uh, and...and... and Mao was very anti-American. Um, and everything he said. So, when the Chinese got the bomb, that was almost as scary as as when the Soviet's got the bomb, um, back in um, 194...9 I think the Soviet test was.

WHAT DO YOU THINK EISENHOWER CONTRIBUTED TO PROLIFERATION? IN A SENSE, WHAT DID ATOMS FOR PEACE SET OUT TO DO?

Well, Atoms for Peace set out to do two things. It...first of all was to promote the spread of a...the peaceful atom. A peaceful power plant. But secondly, to keep that within bounds so it wasn't diverted to a military use. I think he set out to set up an international control mechanism which would promote the spread of peaceful uses, but, prevent the peaceful uses being converted into nuclear weapons.

OK. WE'RE A LITTLE BIT OFF CAMERA. I WOULD PREFER IT IF I WAS A LITTLE CLOSER IF YOU DON'T MIND. DO YOU MIND?

You look terribly concerned. You go...

DO YOU THINK THAT AMERICA WAS TOO GENEROUS WITH ITS ATOMS FOR PEACE PROGRAM?

Well, in retrospect, it, one might...

SORRY. IF I CAN ASK YOU HOW YOU FELT AT THE TIME.

At the, oh, all right. At the time, no, I didn't feel that... to be the case. Um, and I think the peaceful uses were bound to spread anyway, and the knowledge of how to make the bomb was bound to spread. That was inevitable. No matter what we did. What was important was to try and set up an international inspection system and a norm which, which would prohibit from new countries from getting the bomb. An inspection system to enforce the norm.

WHAT PROMPTED NPT?

Um, concern about proliferation, basically. Um, the comprehensive test ban, which was a measure sought vigorously by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, uh, was the first step to prevent non-proliferation. Uh, prevent additional countries from getting the bomb. When...we've were successful only in getting a limited test ban treaty which didn't prohibited underground nuclear weapon tests, then um, having something else, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was what it became, seemed very important. So, I... it's been non-proliferation, the whole policy prevent the spread of nuclear weapons... precipitated it at the very beginning.

YOU'VE BEEN VERY MUCH INVOLVED IN THE TEST BAN. WERE YOU DISAPPOINTED NOT TO GET IT? DO YOU REMEMBER HOW YOU FELT?

Yes. Very disappointed. Yes. And, in many ways it seemed as if we came within a couple of inspections of getting a test ban, uh, because the US position was seven and the Soviets came up to three, and at the last meeting, uh, Director, Ambassador Foster said, "Well, how about..." even though that was...went beyond his instructions. And uh...but even the Soviets didn't buy it. But we came that close in terms of an...the numbers of inspection. Course, it wasn't clearly negotiated, agreed as to what each inspection would consist of. We had some general agreement, but, we h...would've had to have gone a lot further with that.

WHAT WERE YOU TRYING TO ACHIEVE?

We were trying to achieve an agreement in which the whole world would sign up not to conduct the weapon test. And the idea was, that nobody would rely on a nuclear weapon which, uh, hadn't been tested. So that even if someone developed a country developed a nuclear weapon, if they hadn't tested, didn't know for sure that it would go off, they'd never think about using it in war. They would...generals just wouldn't rely on untested weapons. So that was what we wanted to achieve.

WHAT DID THE TEST BAN TRY TO ACHIEVE?

The comprehensive test ban tried to achieve, Ready? The comprehensive, the comprehensive test ban sought to achieve a world-wide agreement, every possible country, agreeing not to test nuclear weapons. The idea was that even if someone developed a nuclear weapon, no general would rely upon it for use in war if it hadn't been tested. And, so it was a non-proliferation mechanism. The idea was that... you simply would prevent the technology knowing how to use nuclear... to... to make nuclear weapons from spreading if you could prohibit all tests of nuclear weapons.

WERE DISAPPOINTED BY ITS FAILURE?

Oh, certainly. I wo... no I should... I was disappointed by its failure. Very disappointed.

CAN YOU JUST REPEAT WHY?

I was very disappointed by the failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban... Yes, it was a great disappointment to me when we were unable to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

WHY?

Because that seemed to us, at the time, as the most effective mechanism, uh, to get everybody to agree not to get the bomb. And it was non-discriminatory. The Indians were... were... would have been very willing to sign they said, a comprehensive test ban. All countries would have been treated the same. It would have stopped weapons developments in the US and the Soviet Union, other nuclear powers, but also, it would have prevented other countries from getting the bomb. So in a... many ways it would have been than the Non-Proliferation Treaty which we... were able ultimately to achieve.

IN WHAT WAY DID THAT PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY PAVE THE WAY FOR OPENING UP NEGOTIATIONS ON NPT AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE SOVIETS? HOW DID IT PAVE THE WAY?

Well, it showed that agreement with the Soviets was possible, was useful...uh, it showed that they both had common interests in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and in limiting their testing to some degree, their own developments. Um... Khrushchev said that... the um... uh... journey of a thousand steps begins with a... of a thousand miles begins with a single step. And that's what the test ban was... All right, Khrushchev said, that, a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. The test ban was the first step. And it showed the pathway towards other things, non-proliferation was... Non-Proliferation Treaty was a... another step along the way.

WHAT WERE YOU FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF YOUR FELLOW NEGOTIATORS AT GENEVA, AND THE METHODS OF NEGOTIATING?

Well, when I first came to Geneva in 1962, the Cold War seemed to be still on. Uh, the Soviet negotiators were very a... challenging, hostile, belligerent um, even in a cocktail party, th...they seemed to be trying to make points against you. Uh, by the end of my period there in... in '68, I had learned how to drive a Volga automobile, and drunk a good deal of vodka with a...fellow Soviet negotiators. There was a... just a complete change in the attitudes and relationships between the two delegations, starting really with the Cuban missile crisis.

CAN YOU TELL ME ANYTHING MORE ABOUT PERSONAL... DELEGATES YOU HEARD ME NAME BEFORE...

Oh, uh, the delegate... the chief delegate when uh...uh...I first went to the conference was... The chief delegate to the conference... The chief delegate to the conference in, um, the days when I first went was named Suratkin. And, as I understand it, that means "scratchy, in Russian. Um, in any event, we referred to him behind his back as "Scratchy." I think he knew that.

I WONDER IF THEY HAD ANY NICKNAMES FOR YOU.

Oh, I'm sure they did, but I don't know them.

IN THESE DAYS THERE WERE A LOT OF OBSTACLES TO THE NPT. WHAT SEEMED TO BE THE MAJOR OBSTACLE?

At the beginning, the major... All right. At the beginning, the major obstacle to the negotiation of the, in the beginning, the major obstacle, obstacle, all right? In the beginning the, the, the major obstacle to the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty seemed to be the Multilateral Force that the NATO was proposing to protect European countries from Soviet missiles... European missile, uh.... Soviet missiles aimed at Europe. And the Soviets made it the main obstacle, as perceived by Americans, it didn't need to be the main obstacle... most of the Americans working on the Multilateral Force thought it, in itself, was an effective non-proliferation, uh, technique, because all the countries that didn't have the bomb that joined the Multilateral Force would have reduced incentives to get the bomb. But the Soviets, uh, were very much concerned, uh, about the Multilateral Force, perceived it as a way of Germans getting their fingers on a nuclear trigger, and so that became, in the early days of the negotiations, the principal obstacle.

CAN YOU JUST TELL ME SIMPLY WHAT MLF WAS?

MLF was, uh, a number of things, but the most commonly understood was a multi-, was a surface, surface vessels, um... armed with Polaris missiles, and owned jointly by a number of NATO nations, Not into Europe, but on, into the ocean.

OKAY, JUST...

Okay, all right, all right, real simple, okay. The Multilateral Force was a way to counter Soviet missiles aimed at Europe. The, the force was to be a seagoing force -- American nuclear missiles would be on surface vessels, on ships at sea, but... available to respond to any Soviet attack on Europe with nuclear missiles.

GREAT. WHY DID THIS UPSET THE SOVIETS SO MUCH?

The Soviets were afraid of a German finger on the trigger, at least that's what they said; they had visions of the, one of these ships, uh, coming into the Vladivostok or, more likely Leningrad or Murmansk, and, uh, and, and threatening, with a German captain... now, it may be that what they were more afraid of, in the long run, was what... was a political unification of Europe, and one of the ideas behind the Multilateral Force was that if the countries of Europe, the western Europe, could join together for their defense... with nuclear weapons, and not have to rely on American nuclear weapons, that that would assist towards the unification of western Europe, that they would have a common defense department, ultimately, and, and, uh, that that would... move, uh, toward a day of a unified Europe, instead of a France fighting Germany and France fighting England, as, as was historically, had been the case for centuries.

COULD YOU REPEAT THE STORY YOU TOLD ME YESTERDAY ABOUT TIMERBAEV AND LENINGRAD...?

Okay, Uh... my opposite number on the Soviet delegation, Roland Timerbaev, I remember saying... "How would you feel if you were a Soviet and a surface ship with nuclear missiles on it stood off the port of Leningrad with a German captain and made threatening gestures," or, or... suggested, uh, just by its very presence, that nuclear weapons might be used on, on Leningrad. That was certainly one of their concerns, I believe.

WHAT IMPACT DID THE CHINESE EXPLOSION HAVE ON AMERICANS... ON THE NEGOTIATIONS?

Well, let me start with... the Chinese explosion had a major impact on US, uh, policy, and moving towards a, uh, non-proliferation treaty. Um, we had been working within the government, that is, the arms-control agency had been, to try and get agreement on, uh, non-proliferation ideas to put to the Soviet Union. Um, we were worried about the Chinese bomb; the Soviets were worried about the Chinese bomb, but everybody expected that to happen. When it happened, uh, the, the, the, the same week... Khrushchev fell, and, uh, uh, Prime Minister Wilson won an election to office in England, um, and that, the three events together had a very significant impact. Uh, many of us who were working on non-proliferation felt, uh, that that showed we had to work even harder, that if the Chinese had the bomb, the Indians would feel threatened, and maybe the Japanese would feel threatened, and if we weren't able to get a non-proliferation treaty soon, uh, both those countries might pursue nuclear weapons, probably not the Japanese... very soon, but one day. Uh, indeed, I can remember Secretary Rusk saying that perhaps we should... would not even pursue a non-proliferation... policy; wasn't it the right of the Indians or the Japanese... or maybe they needed nuclear weapons for their defense if the Chinese had the bomb. And there was... some debate within the government, but he was in a very small minority on that; other people felt very strongly that that would be a, just terrible thing to have happen, and the bomb would just spread... over the world if that happened, and that we had to work much harder on non-proliferation. But there was a debate within the government, and the net result was, to pursue a non-proliferation policy more vigorously. Uh....

WHAT IMPACT DID THE CHINESE EXPLOSION HAVE ON NEGOTIATIONS?

The Ch... the explosion uh, had a, quite a significant impact on what the US did... uh...and there was very much concern about the Chinese explosion in the United States. Um, and some people thought that we should harder on non-proliferation. Others...uh, pulled back a little. Uh, I can remember Dean Rusk being concerned that the Chinese uh, explosion might certainly mean that the... would want to get the bomb and perhaps even the Japanese might want to get the bomb. And um, he asks sort of rhetorically, "Well, isn't that inevitable? How...how can we stomp that sort of thing?" Others felt very strongly that we had to do the very best that we could, was real worried about the Indians, probably not for a generation about the Japanese. Uh, but if... if the Indians got the bomb, for example, the Pakistanis would get the bomb. And then, maybe, other um...uh, countries in the Middle East would have to have the bomb. Uh the... the...rivals, neighbors immediately got concerned that would themselves have to have a nuclear program. So, in any event, the net result was to um, have a... major... greater interest in the United States on uh, pursuing the Test Ban Treaty. The same time, we were talking about the Multilateral Force, and it was soon after that, that the two things came to a resolution, as it were, in um, by President Johnson... to... I better stop there.

YEAH. THAT'S FINE. UM, WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL BELIEF, THOUGH?

About the...my, oh. My personal belief about the Chinese explosion was uh, that it was very danger...

JUST START THAT AGAIN.

My personal belief about the Chinese explosion. Ok. My personal belief about the Chinese explosion was that it would certainly seem very threatening to India. And that, India would want to go and get it's own bomb as a result and that that would... might precipitate uh, the spread of nuclear weapons. If India had the bomb, would Japan be far behind? So... would Pakistan be far behind? How about the Germans? Uh, how about Israel? How about other, how about Arab countries in the Middle East? There were just all kinds of problems that would be precipitated by an Indian bomb.

BY AN INDIAN BOMB FOLLOWING THE CHINESE BOMB.

Yeah.

WHY WOULD JAPAN BE A PROBLEM? WHY WOULD THEY BE INTERESTED? DID YOU REALLY FEEL THAT WAS THE...

Over the long pool, certainly. I'm...I uh, was in World War II. Uh, how could one, an American, not be concerned that Japa...Japan might one day uh, want to secure nuclear weapons. Certainly at that time that didn't seem likely. But if you looked ahead a generation or so, it seemed quite possible. And the Japanese would be threatened, might be threatened by a Chinese bomb. China was very hostile uh, towards um, towards the west, towards Japan, towards its neighbors, uh, even was beginning to be hostile towards the Soviet Union in 1964.

NOW FRANCE WASN'T A PART OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. CAN YOU JUST EXPLAIN WHY?

Ah, France was not a part of the negotiations because General de Gaulle didn't believe that negotiations of this type were useful. He thought that only the... the powers with nuclear weapons should negotiate with each other... and that would have made... put France on the same level as the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and so forth. Um, and he thought a conference such as was proposed at Geneva, uh, which had the US and the Soviet Union, US allies, Soviet allies and then non-allied was not the way to go. It didn't give enough status to France. Indeed as it turned out, the US and the Soviet Union became co-chairmen of the conference for a while which only meant that they negotiated the agenda. Uh, m...but France didn't like that added prestige that was given to the... the two super powers as it... would... might have... for... the Indians referred to.

WHAT WAS THE TURNING POINT IN THE NPT NEGOTIATIONS? WHAT WAS THE KEY TURNING POINT?

There were several turning points. Um, in you... do you mean in US decision... uh...

IN THE WHOLE...

In the whole negotiations? Uh, the first turning point in the NPT negotiations uh, was the decision by the United States and the United Kingdom and the other allies of the United States who were interested in the Multilateral Force...the nuclear European force...uh, that they would give that idea up and pursue a Non-Proliferation Treaty instead. Uh, once that agreement... that consensus within the alliance was achieved, um, the first step of securing a... a non-proliferation treaty, the agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons, ah, was easy to achieve. Uh, there were... was a second major barrier, uh...

LET'S JUST WAIT A SECOND. WAS MLF, WAS IT AN EITHER/OR SITUATION? MLF OR NPT.

It became that. When we started the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we did not think that it would be an either/or situation. We thought it possible to have a Multilateral Force and a Non-Proliferation Treaty. Uh, the... the Multilateral Force itself was a useful non-proliferation effort. Um, because no country in the Multilateral Force that didn't itself have the bomb would then get the bomb. But as it turned out, the Russians made the two mutually exclusive. You couldn't have both. And when President Johnson finally came to that conclusion and uh, when the... the British and the Germans particularly came to that conclusion, uh, then a decision was made to pursue the um, NPT. Uh, France had a major role in that decision... because it told, de Gaulle told the Germans "If you go for the Multilateral Force, y...you can forget about the 1963 agreement with us...on cooperation. You can forget about our support in reunification of Germany." And that...those were very harsh words to the German...Germans and, uh, th...I think that made a major impact on their decision not to push for a Multilateral Force... any further.

CAN I JUST ASK YOU TO REALLY BRIEFLY, HOW THE MLF DECISION WAS RECONCILED... HOW THAT PROBLEM WAS RECONCILED... REALLY BRIEF...

Um, the decision to... put the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a higher priority than the Multilateral Force...uh, was reconciled when the United States, Germany and Britain all concluded that there was no way to have both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a Multilateral Force. Um, and that France was adamantly against the Multilateral Force, not just the Soviet Union. And that it would be very difficult to get amendment of American legislation which would be necessary to... a Multilateral Force. All those things were important.

AND THERE WERE OTHER OBSTACLES THAT CAME UP LATER, THE INDIANS AND SOME NON-ALLYING COUNTRIES TALKED ABOUT THE TREATY THAT WAS BEING NEGOTIATED AS BEING DISCRIMINATORY. DO YOU THINK IT WAS DISCRIMINATORY?

Well, in a sense, it was. Uh, if you think about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, everybody would stop testing nuclear weapons. In the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear powers could go on testing nuclear weapons and owning nuclear weapons. But the non-nuclear comprie...countries were agreeing not to get nuclear weapons, not to test nuclear weapons ...not to ah, have them um, and...in that sense, it was non-discriminatory. There was an attempt to remove the discrimination in later provisions of the treaty, when the nuclear powers agreed to pursue negotiations in good faith, to stop the nuclear arms race and to reduce nuclear arms.

DO YOU REMEMBER ANY OF TRIVEDI'S SPEECHES?

A; I remember one uh, th...Trivedi...I remember one speech by the Indian Ambassador... to the Geneva conference which was striking ...uh, he said that in the sixteenth century, there was an emperor of India who was himself an alcoholic but who adopted laws prohibiting, um, alcohol...consumption, uh, or possession in...in his...his provinces. And that there was a word for that in Indian an unjust fiat, it means in English. Uh, a discriminatory fiat, “Do what I say, not what I do.”

CAN I JUST ASK YOU TO REPEAT THAT, JUST A LITTLE--

... more concisely?

YEAH.

Ok. Ok. I think it's the seventeenth century, too. All right... it doesn't, it doesn't matter. Um, the Indian Ambassador to the Geneva Conference, uh, s...told us that in the seventeenth century, there was an am...emperor in India who was an alcoholic and prohibited all his subjects from drinking or owning alcohol. And that, said the Indian, was what the nuclear powers were attempting to do with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION AT THE TIME TO WHAT HE WAS SAYING?

Anger. I was...I was angry at this response, uh, but there is something in what he said. Uh, however, it... we found in all the disarmament efforts that it's always much easier to get countries to stop doing to... what they've started out to do, than to get them to give up weapons that they already have, or turn back, in a sense. So, I believe you should...y...you know, w...when you start off the car, you need to bring it to a stop before you can put it in reverse. And uh, t...that's what we tried to do in the NPT, and the...there is a provision in which the nuclear powers promise to pursue ar... negotiations to halt the uh, nuclear arms race and to reduce arms.

LET'S JUST DO THAT ONE MORE TIME. ONE SHOT. WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL REACTION TO THE INDIAN POSITION...AT THE TIME?

Well, I was angry and disappointed... at the Indian position at that time. Um, because... India was very important to our whole efforts to secure a Non-Proliferation Treaty. Uh, and while there was some merit in the non-discriminatory aspects, we tried to cure that by promising to reduce nuclear arms in the future, or... attempting to. In all the arms control efforts have been, that dealt with uh, stopping uh, rather than getting rid of what you had seemed to be more successful.

NOW, THERE WAS A CONCERN, SECURITY CONCERNS IN SOME CASES... CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THOSE?

Yes. Um, if you're India, and the Chinese have the bomb, and you're told, "Don't get the bomb," you say, "Well, supposing they threaten me with nuclear weapons, what then?" And, one of the efforts that Americans made early on, indeed the very week of the Chinese explosion, President Johnson made a speech saying, "Those countries who are threatened by countries with nuclear weapons and don't themselves have nuclear weapons, can be sure that we'll be there to help them." It was a very broad statement, not exactly clear what it meant, but the idea was to reassure India or other countries who might be threatened by the Chinese bomb that we would come to their assistance. And that became a part of the Non-Proliferation uh, negotiations. The Soviets wanted to have a prohibition against the first use of nuclear weapons, in the treaty. Uh, we didn't want that. We ended up with a... uh, a resolution and declaration saying something uh, what Johnson had said earlier, that if a country was threatened... if a country took the pledge not to get nuclear weapons, and was threatened by a country which did have nuclear weapons, that the US and the Soviet Union would come to its assistance in some manner...through the security council of the UN

THE OTHER OBSTACLE, ONE OF THE BIGGEST OBSTACLES, WAS THE SAFEGUARDS ISSUE, AND I WONDERED IF YOU COULD JUST TELL ME, FIRST OF ALL, WHAT COUNTRIES... FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND BELGIUM FELT ABOUT SAFEGUARDS. WHAT WERE THE EUROPEAN PROBLEMS WITH THE SAFEGUARDS?

The safeguards issue was a major obstacle to the conclusion of the treaty. Uh, the... the treaty prohibits nuclear w... non-nuclear countries from a... acquiring nuclear weapons and the way of uh, verifying that was to have s... safeguards by the international atomic energy agency on their peaceful nuclear reactors. Um, now, there were countries, the...the Euratom countries, the six common market countries they were then, who had their own safeguard system called Euratom. And they didn't see any reason why they should have to have new safeguards from a different international organization. Uh, and it... they were worried about Soviet inspectors coming to look at their reactors. They were worried ah, uh...a...about loss of industrial secrets. Sometimes I thought they were more concerned about a John, an inspector named John Johnson, than one named Ivan Yvanovitch. But in any event, they were very much concerned. In fact, it became a... to such an extent that uh, Prime Minister Kiesinger of Germany told us, uh, that the single greatest irritant to US-German relations was the m...safeguards provision that we were m...in...in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was during the negotiations. Uh, there were other Euratom countries that were also concerned about the safeguards provisions. Um, that's probably enough.

OK. HOW ARE WE ON TIME ON THE TAPE? HOW SUPPORTIVE WAS THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHEN IT CAME TO THE QUESTION OF EUROPE AND EUROPEAN SAFEGUARDS?

Well, the State Department's principal job, I suppose, is to have the best relations possible with the various countries of the world w...with whom we're allied. Ah, and particularly those with whom we're allied. And um, it's clear that...the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in particularly the safeguards provision was an irritant to relations with the West Germans, with other Euratom common-market countries. So the safeguard on the wh... the State Department on the whole, uh, was not helpful in getting IAEA safeguards. Um, and uh, but the... and the Atomic Energy Commission were strong proponents of IAEA safeguards. And um, the defense department was intersted in th... the notion of a worldwide safeguard system. Um, and it seemed to us in the arms control agency, that we had a common interest with the Soviet Union in having a worldwide safeguard system. So it was important to work out some system, even for the Euratom countries that uh, would... would have IAEA safeguards.

JUST GOING TO BACKTRACK A LITTLE....THE CHINESE BOMB UNTIL ABOUT THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV DID YOU AT THE TIME OF KHRUSHCHEV HAVE ANY IDEAS ABOUT WHY HE WAS OPPOSED AND WHAT EFFECT THAT WOULD HAVE?

Not really.

NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

Uh, no. I mean, we knew about the me... that the Sino-Soviets, it was very much part of the Test Ban negotiations, but Khrushchev falling, nobody... speculated on that. And I don't know that even today that people think...

THE PEACEFUL TECHNOLOGY, THAT WAS ANOTHER THING WE DIDN'T TALK ABOUT. CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT PEACEFUL TECHNOLOGY AS BEING A WAY TO PAY OFF, AS IT WERE?

Well, pay off. No... not for assurances, but just for signing the treaty.

OH OK. THAT WAS A WAY OF DEALING WITH WHICH COUNTRIES?

Well, non-allying countries particularly. But, ah, even our allies. I mean, the Germans wanted to be reassured... the Euratom wanted to be reassured on supply of uh,...material from the United States if they signed this treaty.

SO HOW IS THIS SAFEGUARDS ISSUE RECONCILED?

The safeguards issue was reconciled, uh, by an agreement of the Euratom countries to sign the treaty as a group, as Euratom, rather than individually. And by an agreement to negotiate with the IAEA, s... some safeguards for Euratom...which might be somewhat different than those for a country that didn't have a Euratom. It's rather like the idea of a Price-Waterhouse certified public accountants, ah, checking the books of the bookkeeper for the local company. Um, and that idea was in... much assisted by um, a discussion I had...

IF YOU CAN JUST TELL ME THE STORY...

All right. Just the story is what you want to hear. Ok. Um, in 1967, we were working on ideas for um, the safeguards article of the treaty. Uh, one weekend, two Americans uh, Colvert (Holbrooke), Gleysteen and myself, and two Soviets, Roland Timerbaev and um...Shustov, Vladimir Shustov, went off on a trip up a mountain on a uh, uh, a cable car... cable railway car, and we walked around at the top of the mountain, and when we were coming down, I talked with Timerbaev about this problem. And he made a suggestion which I regard as brilliant, really. It seems simple in retrospect. But he said, "Let's have an agreement to agree, and to negotiate with uh, what the safeguards will really be, not try and decide all that now. Secondly, that the Euratom countries would sign not individually, but as a group. They could sign with the IAEA, so that Euratom would do the negotiations for all the countries together with the IAEA." As it worked out, the Euratom countries signed the treaty, and then, didn't ratify, didn't really become parties to the treaty, till the negotiation with the IAEA was all concluded and they could do th...do the negotiation. They didn't leave it to the Russians and the Americans to do the negotiation. And in the end it worked.

LET ME JUST ASK YOU IF YOU CAN TELL THAT STORY SHORTER. WE DON'T NEED TO KNOW ALL THE INDIVIDUALS, OR, BUT, LET ME ASK YOU, ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY WEREN'T NECESSARILY CARRIED OUT AT THE TABLE IN GENEVA, WERE THEY?

There were walks in the woods. No. I mean... this is... this is... this is a form of “what if” negotiations and as, exploratory negotiations. They... they weren't, I agree for my country and you agree for yours, that we're just, "Well, what if we could do this, and could you do that?" sort of negotiation. That's...that's...

COULD YOU GIVE ME AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF NEGOTIATIONS, IF YOU CAN REPEAT?

As an example of this. Can I start out by saying, "Let me give you an example of..."

NO, JUST SAY THAT NOT ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CARRIED OUT IN...

All right. All right. All right. Ok? Not all the negotiations were carried out o...over the tables at Geneva. Uh, to explore ideas, uh, we went off sometimes on the weekend ah, with the Soviet colleagues and...and uh, went hiking in the mountains. Uh, once coming back down from a hike up in the hills, uh, on a...on a rail... road... car, I talked with Timerbaev about the problem with respect to the... safeguards article. The Euratom IAEA problem. And he had a wonderful suggestion. He said, “Why don't the Euratom countries uh... agree to sign not as individual countries but as a group. They'll enter into agreements with the IAEA individually or... as a group. And the Euratom countries can do it as a group. Uh, and... and secondly, ah it'll be an agreement to agree. We won't decide everything in this treaty now." And that worked out...as a...very well. It seemed simple in retrospect. But it's also an eg...idea... an example of a sort of "what if" um... exploratory negotiation.

YESTERDAY YOU TOLD ME THOUGH, THAT YOU PRESENTED IT TO THE US...SOVIET AGREE...SUGGESTION...

Do you want that? That's... that's... that's a much longer story. That's a different story, but I can add that to it. All right. All right. All right. All right. Uh, ok. Let me see, now, where do I start. In 1967, in order to resolve the difficulty with the uh, safeguards, uh, the Euratom-IAEA difficulty, the two heads of delegation...um, um, Foster and Rosjyn, appointed an experts group. I was the... American expert with ah, Colver...Gleysteen and Timerbaev was the Soviet expert, but no I'm...I've got to start over. You don't want the names? You don't need the names. Ok. Let's see if I can shorten it. Ok. In order to resolve the IAEA-Euratom safeguards problem, the two heads of delegation appointed experts groups to...enter into sort of exploratory, "what if" kind of discussions. We had no instructions to make any changes in our position. But, we wanted to see if there were ways of getting out of the dispute that we could recommend to our governments. Um, as a result of those discussions, uh, we came to, within the delegations, uh, we... we... we came to agreement on what we thought would be a good idea to recommend back to our governments. But because we were instructed not to change, and we were told they were instructed not to change, we reported the draft back to the US government as a Soviet delegations proposal. And they, we understand reported back to their government, as an American delegations proposal. Each of us recommended it to our governments. We used the back channels, the scramble telephone to tell the Secretary of State what had really happened, and uh, I don't know what the Soviets did on that score, but I do know that when Ambassador Thompson saw Gromyko...in Moscow a month or so later, Thompson said, "Say, that's an interesting new...ah...Soviet delegations proposal." And Gromyko said, "What do you mean, Soviet delegation proposal? I thought that was an American delegation proposal." We were in trouble for a while in Washington, but because we had let the Secretary of State know exactly what we were doing, it ended up all right...in the end, and that's the way the...the controversy was ultimately resolved.

OK. LET'S JUST CUT THAT. THE QUESTION IS, HOW MUCH OF A JOINT EFFORT WAS IT? YOU KNOW, I MEAN, MAYBE...

Yeah, well, I'll just go on...start talking. They reached a, became a point in the negotiation of the safeguards provisions, where we were deadlocked, and... we were instructed not to change and I w... understand that the Soviet delegation was instructed not to change. And, we were just deadlocked. But, it seems that we had ideas which might result in a solution. Um, and one day when the...two Soviets and two Americans were off in the country on the weekend, um, I had a discussion with Timerbaev on the Soviet side. He suggested, "Look, the Euratom could negotiate with the IAEA as a group rather than agreeing in this treaty to accept IAEA safeguards, in so many words. Supposing they simply agree to negotiate as a group with the IAEA and it'll be an agreement to agree and they themselves can negotiate it." That sounded to us like a brilliant idea, and about um...some time later, the two delegation heads appointed some experts to try and work this idea out into detail...detailed form, but of course, we couldn't do it on instructions. It had to be "what if we did this, could you do that?" A "what if" kind of negotiation. And, ultimately, we reported back... a plan, an idea put in the treaty language, to the US, to the United States...as eh... the Soviet... suggestion, Soviet delegation suggestion. And the Soviet delegation reported back the same plan, the same idea, as an American delegation suggestion. We got on the scrambled telephone, the... and... explained what had actually happened to the Secretary of State, um... then, some month later, um, when Ambassador Thompson was in, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, saw Gromyko, he said, "That's an interesting new Soviet delegations proposal on the safeguards article." And Gromyko said, "What do you mean, a Soviet delegation proposal? That's an American delegation proposal, isn't it?" And when that conversation was reported back to Washington, we were in some trouble. However, because we had reported what we were doing to the Secretary of State, it worked out. It's an example of...um...representatives...negotiators...using a "what if" or exploratory kinds of negotiations, which is often essential to reach an agreement.

HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS NPT IN ACCOMPLISHING THE GOALS IT SET OUT TO ACHIEVE? IN YOUR PERSONAL OPINION.

In my personal opinion, it's been very successful. It may well be the...the most, or, certainly one of the most successful arms control treaties that's been achieved since World War II. Um, it has slowed the spread of nuclear weapons... significantly... I believe. Um, I...a norm of non-proliferation...has been established. Uh, sort of a worldwide norm. And even countries that don't... haven't signed the... Non-Proliferation Treaty or any equivalent... feel restrained from getting the bomb...now. Um... they are defensive about, they know that they'll be condemned by the world, if they secure nuclear weapons...if they test nuclear weapons. You may have noticed what the Israelis have done, uh, about the leaks, um, of...of the fact that they have uh, developed nuclear weapons.

LET ME TAKE YOU BACK. I WANT TO KNOW AT THE TIME HOW YOU FELT. BACK. WAY BACK. NOT NOW. HOW SUCCESSFUL YOU FELT IT WAS AT THE TIME.

At the time, I thought the treaty would be successful, um... in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons in the future. I also thought that it was very successful in establishing better relations with the Soviet Union. Um, and I believe that... one of the most important parts of arms control negotiations is simply to reduce tensions between... these two, uh, great countries, uh, who are rivals and threaten each other with nuclear weapons. Arms control has been ...has become very highly political and sort of the symbol of what uh, the... the level of relations, how good they are at any particular time. And uh, I thought that the uh, treaty was very useful in...in establishing better relations between the two countries.

IN WHAT WAY DID PREPARE THOSE COUNTRIES WITH THE SALT TALKS? HOW DID IT PAVE THE WAY FOR THOSE, FOR THAT...

Um, the Non-Proliferation Treaty paved the way for the SALT Talks. Indeed, a...as the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty were ending, uh, Johnson was exchanging uh, communications with the Soviet leaders about starting the SALT Talks. They would have been started in the summer of 1968, but for the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in August.

CAN YOU REMEMBER WHERE YOU WERE THE DAY THAT HAPPENENED?

I was the US representative, the US Ambassador to the Geneva conference in August of 1968...when the Soviet Union marched into Czechoslovakia. I was shocked. Uh, I think some of the people in the Soviet delegation were shocked. I know some of the... the Czech delegation were shocked. I remember that there was a uh, cocktail party, diplomatic cocktail party, given by the Poles that day. And they were terribly embarrassed. I decided I should go as a US representative and state my position and turn around and walk out. So I did go, and...and stated in great anger how shocked I was by the Soviet... invasion and...and left. And my...to my... hosts great discomfort. All of the Eastern Bloc countries were very uncomfortable that day.

DID IT SEEM LIKE NPT HAD BEEN A TOTAL WASTE OF TIME?

You mean... when the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred, I did not feel that the NPT effort had be a... waste of time. But it was obvious that the effort would have to be put on ice for the time being. Uh, I hoped there would be a day when uh, countries would... would get back to it, uh, and... treat it, give it the significance that I thought was...ah, was due. And that they did come.

THE INDIANS THOUGHT AND STILL THINK THE TREATY'S FLAWED. WHAT'S YOUR FEELING ABOUT THAT? WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING AT THE TIME, THAT THEY WENT AWAY DISGRUNTLED?

Well, I was angry and disappointed that the Indians took the position that they did with respect to the treaty. Uh, uh, I think it has had some impact on the Indians. They insisted the bomb that they tested as a peaceful one for peaceful a peaceful... device for digging canals and that sort of thing. A bomb is a bomb is a bomb, however, but I was very disappointed at the time that they...

WHAT ABOUT FRANCE AND CHINA NOT JOINING UH, SIGNING NPT. WHAT WAS YOUR FEELING AT THE TIME ABOUT THAT? DID THAT SEEM LIKE A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THEY WERE NOT INVOLVED?

Uh, France and China did not sign the treaty, uh, I was of course -- would have been happier if they did, but we didn't expect them to. By the time we were able to negotiate the treaty with the Soviets, we had no expectation that China or France would sign the Treaty.

DO YOU KNOW HOW THE SOVIETS PERCEIVED THE NPT, THE FINAL TREATY?

Uh, the Soviets perceived the NPT Treaty as a success for improving US-Soviet relations. Uh, and I think they have, I talked to a Soviet just the other day... um, Soviet official who continues to believe that it is one of the, it represents major efforts at co-operation and continuing co-operation since then, because in order to implement the treaty, a great many things need be...need to be done, and by and large, the US and the Soviet Union have worked well together to implement the treaty; to work...together in the...IAEA, uh, to improve safeguards, to work uh, in the suppliers group which attempts to keep countries that might get the bomb from getting the requisite materials or parts, um... in... great variety of ways, even to get together to put the pressure on South Africa not to test a bomb, uh, some years ago. Uh, and South Africa didn't test the bomb, at least on its own territory.

AS A NEGOTIATOR TO NPT, WHAT ARE YOUR PERSONAL OPINIONS ABOUT LESSONS LEARNED? ...FROM THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

Um, as a negotiator ah, the lessons with respect to negotiations with the Soviets, um, are several...

LESSONS LEARNED AS A NEGOTIATOR...

Well, certainly negotiations are more successful when you are ah, able to establish some kind of personal relationship with the people on the other side. Uh, when you're able to put themselves in their shoes as much as possible and see how it looks from their perspective. Uh, finally...the problems of a negotiator representing a...

SORRY. WHAT WAS IT THAT WAS SO SPECIAL ABOUT NPT THAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE? WHAT WAS SPECIAL ABOUT THIS JOINT COOPERATIVE EFFORT BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS? IT WAS THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP IN AND OUT OF THE TALKS. CAN YOU JUST SUMMARIZE THAT?

Um...ok. Um, I think one of the reasons the negotiations were successful was that over a period of years, we were able to establish close relations with the delegates on the other side. When I first went to Geneva we seemed to be sparring even at cocktail parties. Uh, at the end of my time at Geneva, we went off hiking in the woods together, or we... you... we... I drank too much vodka, I must confess. Um, but at least a personal relationship was established in which one could explore possibilities. And one could get information about what the problems were on the other side other than just reading speeches at each other.

HOW DID YOU FEEL WHEN THE INDIANS EXPLODED A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR DEVICE? WHAT WAS YOUR PERSONAL FEELING?

You've done that, befo...Yeah. All right. Um, I was very much disappointed... when the Indians exploded a... nuclear device. I was then uh... teaching law school, and the dean of the law school and ah, so I wasn't involved in this effort at all then. Uh... but I was terribly disappointed.