GENERAL FARRAR-HOCKLEY, CAN WE START OFF BY TALKING A LITTLE BIT ABOUT NATO STRATEGY IN YOUR DAY, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS? COULD YOU TALK US THROUGH THE SCENARIO AT THE TIME? AS I UNDERSTAND IT THE WORKING ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE WARSAW PACT WOULD ATTACK WITH SUPERIOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES. COULD YOU SORT OF TALK US ON FROM THAT POINT?

The very superior conventional forces of the Soviet Union enabled them to carry out a surprise attack at relatively short notice. When I say conventional I include chemical weapons in an attack of that nature, as they make no distinction between conventional and chemical as we tend to do. Now the situation would rapidly arise because those forces are superior. When our losses became insupportable while they retained the potential to go on attacking. How long a period would that take? Perhaps seven days. It might go on for ten. But you come to the point where the number of casualties on your own side cannot be replaced by reinforcements beyond a certain point where the amount of conventional shells, and other munitions on your own side, are beginning to run low on stocks. Now, at that stage, the danger occurs, however valiantly people have thought, to permit a breach. That...sees that a major breach is going to open at one or more points, that the armored forces of the Soviet Union will come through of course working closely with their tactical aircraft and... Western Europe will be overrun and all its forces would be completely destroyed. He then goes to the NATO heads of government and says within the next 48 hours, 72 hours my forces will no longer be able to maintain a conventional defense. The only way that we can now continue to maintain a joint defensive line and a cohesive defense is by using nuclear weapons. If that is your decision he was telling me I would advise you what we should do. If not I take it you accept the consequences. Assuming that they go for nuclear weapons, you then stop to put a foot on the ladder of escalation. Now, in theory, that would begin with a 155 millimeter atomic shell for example. And much has been made of this in the past about how dangerous it is that in the hands of some battery commander you're going to start lobbing atomic shells all over the place. It's, it's... That's an absurd and uninformed argument. The problem with firing a 155 millimeter shell is that it has to be fired at an observed target. It will be, by the very nature of the range of the weapon, relatively close to own forces and therefore it will take on a fleeting target which you can control by your own eye and you can tell your own people to go to ground for a brief time. So it's very unlikely that will happen. There won't be a fleeting target. There'll have to be a big dense target to make it worthwhile and therefore we expect to see an aircraft or short-range missile delivering the atomic weapon. Now that dense target we've got to be sure is going to be there while SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) gets permission while all the information is fed to the air crew who are going to deliver the weapon or the missile who are going to... the missile crew who are going to dispatch it. And that takes a number of hours. It's a rather cumbersome system because of all the safeguards. But anyway, it can be done. So you don't probably put your foot on the very bottom of rung of the ladder. You put it perhaps two or three up in terms of weapon scale but it's within theatre nuclear forces. And it may only be one weapon. The feeling has been that the delivery of one weapon might miss efficient show. The attacking force is that we were serious a new dimension had been put upon the war and therefore it should be brought to an end. But if not in theory, there would be an expanding exchange, perhaps within the theatre, on the theatre basis. But again, in theory, it could go up all the way to the strategic intercontinental missiles.

CAN WE TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE STUDIES WHICH WERE CONDUCTED IN THE LATE SIXTIES AND EARLY SEVENTIES, AND AS I UNDERSTAND, IT'S STILL GOING ON, WHICH HAVE ATTEMPTED TO LOOK IN DETAIL AT THE REALITY OF HOW THIS MIGHT GO. TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT HOW YOU WERE INVOLVED IN THAT AND THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH YOU SAW EMERGING.

The study which took place in the '60s and the '70s was the follow-up to the rather rigid doctrine that had gone before. It was beginning to become apparent that there had to be some degree of flexibility. First of all, there was the question of how much warning we would have of a conventional attack, and to what extent it would be possible to reinforce forward and to deploy. It became apparent that warning times of attack were improving. We were able to spot earlier the essential process of the Soviet Union in getting itself ready for war. For example it does not carry its live ammunition around with it. That would be far too expensive. It had to break it out. It has to break out fuel stocks. It has to begin redeployment in true concentrations from peace time to a full war tactical basis. Uh. On that basis it was then argued that they might actually begin by attacking with everything, not simply conventional and chemical. Chemical being incidentally a very important and deadly weapon against us because we've got very little reply with them. We haven't got a full range of passive defense measures. But they might also use some tactical nuclear missiles. This was argued out. The general run of the winds runs eastward towards the Soviet Union and would carry a fallout in that direction. And not only that; they've got such considerable strength conventionally in relation to ours that there'd be no point in it. An attack with conventional and chemical weapons first out would have a very high chance of success or they would have judged it to be that, otherwise they wouldn't have attacked. And so we then began to develop this view of how the Soviets would attack us where the weakest points would be, how long we would be able to resist those thrusts and at what point thereafter the atomic weapon would have to be called in. It therefore became very important for people such as myself in the early '70s, then commanding an armored division in Germany, to be able to give an accurate estimate the division commanders and the corps commanders as to how long they were going to be able to hold conventionally and what their situation was. That was essential news for SACEUR in the European struggle. A problem however was the maintenance of cohesion of the front and the maintenance of communications. That has been sufficiently improved to make it probably that divisional and corps commanders can make and cross back their assessments. But at the end of the day it is the commander-in-chief in the place, in the, in the question of central Europe, commander-in-chief of the center NATO... general who is the... decision-maker as to whether to cross back a request for atomic strike to SACEUR. And it is then for SACEUR to make his decision and to go to governments. Once atomic weapons were released to be used it was expected that there would be a speeding up in the process of release. In order to ensure that if more than one was required in series to prevent the break-in time would be of the essence. But even with that we never overcame the problem of the time lag between a request or proposal and the response by the heads of government agreeing to nuclear release.

LET ME TALK ABOUT ONE OTHER ASPECT OF THAT. WHAT WAS THE THINKING IN TERMS OF THE FUNCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Now, the object of a nuclear strike, whether it was with aircraft or was by missile in the short range, was to damage the field forces of the Soviet Union engaged. When I say engaged I don't necessarily mean actually fighting as it were in the contact area of the battle but engaged in the commitment either being used or immediately next ready back to and including the so-called second echelon, moving forward in bounds behind the first echelon as it made its advance. That was the theory, that it would be used then to strike at those forces which were menacing and indeed possibly coming to the point of destroying the NATO forces. There were arguments of course given that instead of simply striking at the military forces, one should drop something onto a Soviet town. This is the basis after all for the theme of Sir John Hackett's famous book, The Third World War. A Soviet city is selected and or a... part of the Soviet empire is selected to drop a weapon on to bring people to their senses. In the studies which affected SACEUR, that argument was discussed but it ten... that tended to be an argument discussed at a high level. SACEUR's studies those he did for NATO tended to be related principally to striking the enemy who was engaged.

WHAT ABOUT THE RESPONSE OF THE OTHER SIDE? WHAT WAS THE FEELING ABOUT THAT IN TERMS OF THESE STUDIES? HOW WERE THE RUSSIANS EXPECTED TO RESPOND?

Well, of course, the worst case was taken... the worst case was taken that there would be atomic strikes by the Soviet Union, but it's not quite the same for them. If they'd got a very considerable advantage at any given time, such as they would have been expected to enjoy because the crisis had arisen for ourselves, the first problem for them would be striking at targets that were worthwhile. We would not have large concentrations of forces. Very much the opposite would be considerably dispersed. Striking at airfields might be a good thing to do from their point of view, but to some extent they would be wanting to seize at least a number of the air fields and bring them immediately to use. I think for example that the airfields in Jutland in the Schleswig-Holstein, and certain other ones, relatively close to the front. Striking at bases like Antwerp was considered something that they might find more advantageous to take on. But of course, many of these targets might already have been knocked out by the use of chemical weapons. And although it may seem strange that I keep mentioning these in relation to nuclear war, the fact is that it's... an aspect which one simply cannot set aside. Early strikes with chemical weapons might have achieved very much more for them than they would ever wish to achieve by atomic response. And therefore it was felt that the Soviet Union might indeed, to stop us bombing their troops, begin the bombing or the striking with atomic weapons of our population centers.

BUT IT WAS NATO'S ASSUMPTION, IF I MAY USE THAT TERM, THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD AUTOMATICALLY THROW IN EVERY INGREDIENT IN THEIR NUCLEAR ARMAMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, IT WAS FELT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD, IF THEY RESPONDED IN A NUCLEAR WAY, WOULD RESPOND IN A LIMITED AND CALCULATED WAY JUST AS NATO HAVE.

Yes. The response of the Soviet Union was certainly expected to be in kind as it were. But it was not expected that there would be a massive strike by the Soviet Union in response. And this is why there has been all the time a feeling that there would be a gradual escalation up the ladder at which point it was felt a halt might come about. Those people who say once the first atomic bomb has been exchanged, or atomic weapon a holocaust will immediately ensue, are talking through their hats. It might be so, but it is not necessarily so. And in fact, on the basis of what is reasonable if one could use reason in such a matter it might indeed at the o— on the other end of the spectrum by the exchange of one weapon by either side bring both to a halt.

SO YOU ARE NOT VERY IMPRESSED BY THOSE WHO SAY... ROBERT MCNAMARA, FIELD MARSHALL CARVER AND SO ON... THAT NATO WOULDN'T GAIN ANYTHING BY GOING NUCLEAR?

No. And even more so, they wouldn't gain anything but getting rid of all their nuclear weapons. They have that as a deterrent. It's very difficult to prove that. But the very fact that we've had weak forces backed by a nuclear weapon, which we've said we will use and which I believe we mean we would use it in certain circumstances, must have contributed to deterrence, particularly during Stalin's time and oh, once or twice since his time.

[QUESTION INAUDIBLE].

The studies embraced / the whole range of options by the Soviet Union, including those which, again, are often argued by anti- nuclear lobbies that they might be impelled out of expectation that we would loose off atomic weapons, start with an all-out nuclear strike. This is very unlikely. It's, it's not impossible but unlikely because it would be to their detriment. They wouldn't be able to use their conventional forces to best effect. Those forces would be immediately threatened by counter strikes by us. The effect of their chemical weapons would be very greatly reduced and above all, they'd be creating devastation in areas which they wanted to march through. And so though looked at in the studies, these ideas were accounted as being less likely and we came out with the sort of scenario of the gradual escalation which I mentioned.

IN THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE WHICH HAS GONE ON IN THE LAST TEN YEARS OVER THESE QUESTIONS THERE HAS ARISEN A POSITION WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE GANG OF FOUR... AMERICA, BUT WITH .... NOW, YOU HAVE QUITE COGENTLY BEEN INVOLVED WITH THOSE WHO BELIEVE IT'S NOT THE ATTAINABLE POSITION. CAN YOU JUST QUICKLY TELL US WHY NO FIRST USE IS A BAD IDEA FOR NATO?

No, first use is a bad idea for NATO because we may well use them first. We may be driven to it because of our weakness in conventional forces. If you say no first use in any circumstances whatsoever, if you bind that by a form of protocol, the NATO nations, the Russians are then in a situation where they say "This is absolutely splendid. We shall use our conventional forces" in their, all their superiority. "We shall use our chemical weapons. And they're never going to use these against us. We will meantime restrain our own atomic weapons unless and until it suits us to let them go." So what is the object of no first use? All it does is to sap the policy, and indeed the philosophy of deterrence to no advantage to one self.

WHILE WE WERE CHANGING TAPES YOU BEGAN TALKING ABOUT SOME OF THE ANXIETIES AT THE MOMENT ABOUT THE CURRENT DEAL. CAN YOU TELL US QUICKLY WHAT THOSE ARE?

Until the latest negotiations and success in the INF Treaty, there has been a feeling that we have relative stability. Bear in mind that in the '60s even into the early '70s seminars on arms control. It was popular for one or more speakers to get up and say "We have to face the fact that having got these weapons at some stage they're going to be used. There's never been a time when weapons have been withheld indefinitely as a deterrent." Well, that's turned out to be false. And a matter of fact you don't hear people saying that now. A relative balance has been preserved, although we've gone to an absurd extent of proliferation in all the various levels of atomic capability. Now, if you start to remove some of those levels either thoroughly or largely you begin to threaten that stability. And if you follow down that road so far as atomic weapons are concerned and say, "Right. Now we've got rid of the intermediate range. Uh. Now we can tackle the strategic, the intercontinental range," and you gradually whittle those down to... various volumes of applause. You end up with a situation in which the Soviet Union and its satellites have in Europe a very large conventional force, and we have a modest conventional force. They have chemical weapons. We do not. Uh. It is to be hoped that chemical weapons will be got rid of. Uh. I am not so sure the argument will carry all the way through if all atomic weapons are disposed of. But anyway, let us suppose that they are. They will still have preponderance of fighting vehicles of artillery, of conventional munitions and a very large number of men. An argument has been made that once we got rid of the expense of our atomic weapons, we shall in the West begin to build up our conventional forces. I doubt that very much. Uh. All the evidence shows that when we have savings in under one head the declarations by politicians of all parties that they're going to apply them to others tends to whither away very rapidly. There is a finite sum that the western peoples are prepared to spend on defense.

IS IT NOT THE CASE, PERHAPS IRONICALLY, THAT WHAT'S BEING REMOVED IN THE INF DEAL IS NOT ACTUALLY THE INGREDIENT WHICH, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PEOPLE LIKE YOURSELF, YOU WOULD IDEALLY WANT TO SEE REMOVED?

Uh. You mean within the...in the intermediate range?

Yes, we are, in removing the intermediate range, removing those which are of greatest value to us. If we'd been told "Well, we're going to reduce by a fixed percentage on intermediate range, it's up to you what you remove," we wouldn't have been taking away the Pershing IIs. But they have gone. And what we are left with now is... the less the less adequate weapon systems in the intermediate range. In particular the air delivered, aircraft delivered It would be fair to counter that by saying "Yes, but we are getting better at finding means of passing through enemy radars without detection or anyway, with a lower rate of detection." That is quite true. But it's just as likely that there will then be an upping in the radar capability and we shall be back to square one. So we have lost the best of our intermediate range, the most efficacious and that adds to disquiet about the way we are drifting towards scrapping of our nuclear deterrent capability.

IS THIS BECAUSE THE PERSHING II FULFILLED THE FUNCTION WHICH AS A RESULT OF THE STUDIES AND OTHER THINKING ABOUT THESE MATTERS IT CAME TO BE THOUGHT NEEDED TO BE PERFORMED. IN OTHER WORDS, IT WAS ABLE TO GET TO SOVIET TARGETS? IS THAT WHY?

Yes. It is absolutely a question of what is the most efficient way for us to get to the Soviet targets with accuracy and the most difficult for them to resist. Cruise and the Pershing II fulfilled both those requirements.

THERE ARE THOSE WHO TALK IN TERMS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND WHO EMBRACE ALMOST LIKE PANACEAS, NON-NUCLEAR NEW TECHNOLOGIES. IS IT YOUR VIEW THAT THESE WILL ACTUALLY SOLVE NATO'S PROBLEMS?

THERE ARE THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT THE WAY TECHNOLOGY IS PROGRESSING IN A VARIETY OF WAYS MAKES IT LIKELY THAT NATO, WHICH ULTIMATELY IS TECHNOLOGICALLY MORE THAN THE SOVIET UNION, WILL HAVE AN EDGE WHICH WILL ENABLE IT TO MOVE AWAY FROM DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT'S THE POINT THAT I'M TRYING TO GET ACROSS.

All right, I thought that's what you were saying. And as I don't agree with it.

[DISCUSSION].

Is there, within a foreseeable range of time, a point where we can say, enhance our conventional forces by technology, that we don't have to worry about the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union. Well, this is argued, we are, we're told about weapons systems that could be brought forward which a force multiplies, indeed, some are in service now. But I doubt very much that we are going to have such an outstanding lead that we are going to be able to shrug off their ability, at points of their selection, at a time of their selection, to fall in upon our land mass. That's what it really comes to at the end of the day. People might argue that we're going to have such excellent airfield strike weapons that, at the very outset, we're going to be able to penetrate with our systems, and knock out all their airfields. Well perhaps. The laser weapon, for example is one that is now, in theory coming to the point where we're going to be able to knock out war weapons, land and air with lasers. We've long known this, this is well known, that laser beams can do these things, but since you needed a power source the size of half London airport, it wasn't very feasible. Well, we've, we've progressed a long way from that. But these weapons are still a long way from getting down to being field equipment which can be put into operations and are going clearly to give us that sort of edge. We ought to be thinking about the critical period between now and the end of this century, or the first ten years of the next, and I do not myself see any signs that the promise of that technology is going to fill the gap, or, to put it another way, bolster the weakness that we have during that time frame.

THANK YOU, THAT WAS AN EXCELLENT ANSWER. CAN I JUST FINALLY RETURN TO SORT OF THE GENERAL AREA THAT WE BEGAN TALKING ABOUT, AND I'D LIKE TO PUT A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT GLOSS ON IT, WHICH IS THAT OF TRAINING AND THAT OF EXERCISES. CAN YOU GIVE US SOME IDEA OF HOW IN YOUR TIME, HOW EASY IT WAS TO SIMULATE FOR IN TRAINING AND EXERCISES FOR THE TROOPS, SOME SORT OF VERSION OF WHAT A NUCLEAR BATTLEFIELD WOULD BE LIKE?

It's almost impossible to simulate realistically what a nuclear battlefield, or indeed any other battlefield will be like, Because of the need to preserve the fabric of our towns and cities and our farmlands. If you look at the exercises that take place in Germany, or in Denmark the requirements of damage limitation, because it's not necessarily that the farmers aren't willing to have their fields torn up but they have to be paid so much, if that happens, if people have their houses knocked down by a passing tank, not unreasonably they expect to have compensation for it. And so the sums of money that go out on exercises are already quite high enough it's impossible to pay more than that. Then there is the whole question of, simulation of danger from flash, from burn, from light, and from physical damage of other sorts to people. So, we have had to go in for very artificial means, at the field level, on our fields or on the battlefield, to try and, give some idea of what it might be like. Curiously enough the most effective way of bringing home to people how vulnerable they are if they don't take certain precautions, has been in the field of resistance to chemical attack, when we've had spray from the air with dye. And that has brought home to people their vulnerability in a way that no other simulation can do.

RIGHT, I'D JUST LIKE TO STOP THERE FOR A MOMENT. GENERAL FARRAH-HOCKLEY, CAN YOU GIVE US SOME IDEA OF THE COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE FOR THE MILITARY WHEN TRYING TO DEAL WITH A POSSIBLE NUCLEAR SCENARIO?

Communications during the '60s and '70s were a very considerable problem in terms of strategic weapons control, or rather intermediate range weapons control, within SACEUR's province. The radio, capability was in doubt, particularly when atomic exchanges had already taken place. The telephonic capability of a special nature was in doubt. And it was a well known fact that the commander of Northern Army Group, at one time ordered his ADC to have a pocketful of ten pfennig coins, because it was much better for him to go outside his headquarters, out into the road to the public telephone and telephone on the public telephone system, which is buried underground in part, and get through to his superiors, and some of his subordinates in that way. Well now, there have been major advances since then. A great deal of money has been put into communications, infrastructure, as well as into the technology of the systems. And, although it's not yet completed enormous strides have been taken, and I'm confident that the communications system will work, subject to one caveat. It needs to have reinforced in it, the ability of the high commanders to cut everybody else off the wire to give them time. We have had continually in periods of crisis, the radio and telephone channels clogged up with messages given by staffs higher and higher precedences in order to get in on the wire, till you come to the top precedence. And if all your messages are given the top precedence, then nobody can get in for up to 12 hours, and that has happened on exercises, and it is recognized ruefully by everyone, and the signals people and the staffs are told to sort the thing out. It's getting better, and technical means of clearing the line are getting better. And I believe that(45 54)that will be solved, it's just a mere matter of discipline and mechanics.

LET ME JUST GO BACK AND ASK YOU A FINAL GENERAL QUESTION. NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE ONLY BEEN USED TWICE IN HISTORY. SECONDLY, AN IMMENSE SUPERSTRUCTURE OF THEORETICAL DOCTRINE HAS BEEN ERECTED ON TOP IN WHICH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES AND BETWEEN LOTS OF PEOPLE. THE AMERICANS HAVE A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND ITS FUNCTIONS AS I UNDERSTAND IT FROM THE ONE THAT WE HAVE. BUT THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT ABOUT DETERRENCE IS THAT YOU'VE GOT TO PERSUADE THE OTHER SIDE THAT YOU KNOW HOW TO USE THESE WEAPONS, OTHERWISE THEY DON'T BELIEVE THAT YOU MIGHT. WHAT'S THE... IS IT NOT VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE PRACTICAL MILITARY MAN TO TAKE THE WHOLE THING SERIOUSLY WHEN IT IS SO ABSTRACT AND SO DIFFICULT TO GET TO GRIPS WITH.

You mentioned the question of two weapons being, used only to date. And I would just like to say this in that, this respect. People wring their hands now. We were not wringing our hands, in those days. One has to remember that. Those people who were getting ready to go into the Japanese islands, and their families behind them, and those who were war weary were only too delighted that they were used. Now, insofar as the present time is concerned, the NATO staffs, commanders and staffs look at this matter as a means of defending their homelands. That's difficult to sustain, of course, if in the course of an exercise you exchange a hundred weapons either way. German officers, for example on the NATO staffs, seeing this happen, see the theoretical obliteration of much of their own homeland. Nonetheless by discussion of this matter I, for example as a commander in chief, every year, when we were doing these exercises in theory, made the point to my staff, if we have the weapons, we must know how to use them, that is part of control. It is also part of deterrence. If you've got the weapons but you don't know how to use them, they are not a deterrent. And so we had regular exercises, they are held still, in which a situation arise where conventional force is no longer capable of defense, and therefore you pass over onto the ladder of flexible atomic response. Now, it is difficult certainly to produce a scenario which is very realistic. Nonetheless, one's able to do sufficient, simply to go through all the procedures that have to be undertaken. And the idea that there are massive Dr. Strangeloves about is just absurd, because the system is meant to beat Dr. Strangelove, and it's effective. It's so effective that it is ponderous. And thank heaven it is. And it is very time consuming, as I have mentioned. But those exercises taken place, they keep staffs practiced in what has to be done. And the practice goes right the way down to the people who are the actual missile dispatchers, aircraft dispatchers, and armors and so on, all those things. And therefore the deterrence has weight because if we have to do it, we know how to do it.

GENERAL, LET ME NOW ASK MY FINAL QUESTION. IT IS THIS, THAT, ESSENTIALLY, THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT WARSAW PACT HAS SUPERIOR FORCES. THERE IS SOME DISAGREEMENT AS TO HOW ONE SHOULD EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIS SITUATION. THERE ARE THOSE WHO SAY THAT IT'S NOT WORTH GOING NUCLEAR WHEN YOU CAN'T PREDICT WHAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN. BUT YOU, I THINK, HAVE THE OPPOSITE VIEW. CAN YOU TELL US?

You can predict what's going to happen in this sense, that if you make a first use of nuclear weapon or weapons a select number and the enemy reply, you still have that initiative that you can cut it out and say, well, we bring this to an end. They may say it. You leave the options open as long as you can. That would be the argument for beginning to use them. And incidentally, when we exercise, we seek to get governments in part, to take part in these exercises, the prime minister or some representative administrator of the day, taking part in them, to realize that these are the sort of problems that have got to be faced. Some governments are better than others that facing up to them. The other option that we might expect the Soviets to use, if we go nuclear, and they decide they're not keen for a variety of reasons to immediately respond, is to respond with a shower of chemical weapons, not only the battlefield but on our cities, which would again have a devastating effect because we do not have anti-chemical weapons amongst our civil populaces. Now if you take the other argument that it's too terrible a thought and would get out of control I've heard it argued in the past, but it's rather forgotten now, in any case, even if the Soviet Union won a military victory, are we to suppose that they're going to hold down Europe and even the United States. Well, one can't give the exact answer to that, but we have to bear in mind that Hitler, with relatively small forces, and the Japanese, with relatively small forces, held down huge numbers of people for a long time and in appalling conditions in the sense that, at leisure, the Gestapo were able to go around in, say, a place like Norway, or in France, not looking for people who were Jews, but who were half-Jews, and then ultimately quarter-Jews and that the civilian populace were cowed into accepting this. Indeed, it was very difficult for them to resist. We think now of the great resistance movements. But they only sprang into being, after a very long time. So that is the sort of option that people have to look at if they say, no, we will not risk the atomic weapon. We'd rather go down and hope that in a hundred years time, all will be well. Well, I just hope they know what they're doing, if they take that course, if such a dreadful crisis ever occurs.