I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU FIRST ABOUT THE PERIOD THAT SHASTRI WAS A PRIME MINISTER, WHEN YOU WERE A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE DOMESTIC DEBATE IN INDIA OVER A NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY IN THE '64 PERIOD?

You see, during the early phase of Shastri's government and the debate underwent a change for two reasons. One, 1962 China had attacked India. And then almost on the eve of Nehru's death China exploded its first bomb. So over here it was the parliament obsessed with two basic compulsions. One, that there was security dangers from China and that China had become a nuclear power. So therefore, compared to Nehru's days there was a qualitative change in the debate itself. Shastri while replying to the debate in the parliament I recall, he said that he was unable to guarantee the nuclear passivism as Nehru had done. So therefore he said, "I will have to look at the situation as it develops." He did not make any final commitment to anything. But obviously he made it clear that the policy which Nehru had promised could be re-examined.

DURING THE TIME YOU WERE A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT IN THE SHASTRI PERIOD, WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE DEBATE GOING ON AT THE TIME ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

You know, I came to parliament almost on the eve of Nehru's death. And naturally I was there when Shastri took power. It was 1964. And all of us believed that Nehru's own death to a large extent was caused by the China attack because he felt very let down because he was co... his foreign policy was counting a great deal on India-China friendship. So he felt as if he had been betrayed. And that affected his health. And that affected his attitudes. By the time Shastri came to power one, that hangover was there that China had attacked India. Then in 1964, I think a few weeks before Shastri took over, China exploded the first bomb... and became a nuclear power. Now Indian parliament naturally was very worried on two counts. One that China was no more a friendly country. And secondly to become a nuclear power. So debate underwent a change. And Shastri while replying to the parliament debate I remember very clearly said that he could not really promise the nuclear passivism of Nehru. And he could at least say that he would review the whole thing as the situation develops. But that qualitatively changed the entire debate in India.

WHAT WERE THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF INDIA DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS? I UNDERSTAND THERE WERE SOME FIERCE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR.

You see, the main argument was security. Indian approach to the bomb, or the nuclear weapon, whatever it may be, have in condition more of a security consideration than anything else all along. So therefore as a security environment changes, the type of debate that goes on undergoes a change. At that time also as I said the main consideration of a security. And one did not know where to look for it. If a country which was next door to us on whom we had counted as a friendly country suddenly turns nuclear then it causes anxiety as it did at that time.

WHAT WERE THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST?

I don't think there's hardly any argument. I remember in the parliament hardly anybody spoke in favor of not reconsidering the whole approach. And Nehru when he was promising all the future governments for not making nuclear bomb, he was thinking more in terms of the international situation. You'll recall that he had taken three initiatives in the UN and in other international forums after the Soviet Union had become a...nuclear power. Every time it was frustration. But all the same the debate was all the time external. It didn't involve us internally. Now a qualitative change was there so therefore everybody who was concerned about India and its future, were bothered, those who I do not recall any argument against it in the parliament but outside there was a school which felt the...nuclear weapon by itself futile. Economic consideration. And whether it could be...or not. Please keep in mind the fact that that was a stage when we had not had made any breakthrough. We were at a very early stage of nuclear research.

WHERE DID THE ARMED FORCES FIT IN THIS ARGUMENT?

I don't recall the armed forces intervention at that time. M... Either for or against. This debate was primarily political. Therefore it was being discussed. Strategy consideration had come in. But I think all of us who were sitting in the parliament, I was one of the freshest so there were not a very major contributing factor. But the seniors were conscious of the fact that it is not so simple. One, to make it, to be able to divert resources from development to the weaponry and then to develop a whole system which could take China on. So therefore in a way there was an ambivalence also, but concern.

HOW DID THESE CONCERNS MANIFEST THEMSELVES IN SHASTRI'S POLICY? WAS THERE A SHIFT IN ACTUAL POLICY?

Well I think Shastri's tenure was too brief. And I, no particular initiatives could be taken. But I do know that Shastri continued the practice of Nehru, of keeping the portfolio of atomic energy under his direct charge. Bhabha was still there. How was he, you know, Bhabha... No, Bhabha was not there I think. But the nuclear energy program Shastri kept under his own charge. When Nehru had kept it then one could think that it was...and Nehru had a scientific mind also. But the fact that the Prime Minister continued to keep it in charge meant that he was giving importance to this.

WE'VE TALKED TO SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY. HOW TYPICAL WERE HIS VIEWS? COULD YOU PUT THEM IN SOME CONTEXT?

Subramanian Swamy came on the scene much later. Uh —

THERE WAS A PETITION. AND I JUST WANT TO PUT HIS VIEWS... WERE THEY VERY EXTREME? COULD YOU PUT THEM IN CONTEXT OF THE PERIOD?

No, as Subramanian Swamy is concerned...parliament much later, and also he belonged to a party of opposition. He was not in the government side. Subramanian Swamy's entry in debate if I recall correctly came in Mrs. Gandhi's era, later part of Mrs. Gandhi's era. And I think he was pleading against the bomb... against the nuclear weapon. You see nobody in India ever wanted the bomb or the nuclear weapon for the sake of it... none of us. Those even on the government side. But we can, could not be oblivious of the security reality that was, it was changing around us. So therefore in a way we were reacting to a changing realities rather than taking the decision per se that was the... That is why you have seen that for the last more than two decades now the debate has been, continues. And this debate has been very intensive. Many times one doesn't know. And from Prime Minister to Prime Minister the dimension of the debate has... undergone a change primarily because of the situation. Mrs. Gandhi's era was in a different orientation. Mrs. Gandhi's era witnessed two things. She came to power in 1966. Now in the late years of her era China had gone one step ahead and had not only tested the weapon but also some of our early stages of a delivery system was also developing. Then came the situation regarding, war regarding Bangladesh. Now in that a new factor came in, the threat of the Seventh fleet. I recall the nuclear gunboat diplomacy pressurizing us. So this also changed. Early stages of Mrs. Gandhi also the Non-Proliferation Treaty came in. Well these were the compulsions, which changed, or the end of the change when Moraji Desai came to power.

COULD YOU SUMMARIZE HOW POLICY SHIFTED? ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT POLICY OR ATTITUDE?

I would put it more as a policy emanating attitudes emanating from policy. Policy not in the sense of...but generally in the security environment I would word it differently. Not either policy nor attitude but I would say reaction to the security perceptions and how security environment was changing.

LET'S STOP THERE.

Well as I was saying that the... Here we have been reacting more to the security environment particularly in the neighboring countries. Now Mrs. Gandhi's era you have seen the, three significant things in Mrs. Gandhi's era were... I might as well say the milestones. One were the NPT. Now NPT came in the early phases. Now Mrs. Gandhi could not sign it and I think she had the backing of the country for this from all sides. Similarly when she accepted the Sarabhai profile of a decade for development of nuclear energy and space program, it was motivated by two things. One of course, the need for energy, cheap energy. We are not primarily a... producers of oil so therefore we need some alternative source of energy. And secondly the security perception. And then came...also primarily motivated by the energy needs.

IF YOU CAN KEEP THE EVENTS IN ISOLATION A LITTLE BIT. THE SARABHAI PROFILE, WHY DID SHE ACCEPT IT?

Because reacting to two things. One, China.

IF YOU COULD SAY...

Because China factor was still hanging on. China...

STOP A SECOND.

You see, Mrs. Gandhi's era as I said was conditioned by security considerations on one.

LET ME START WITH THE QUESTION AGAIN. HOW DID THE SARABHAI PROFILE AFFECT MRS. GANDHI'S POLICIES AND THINKING?

The Sarabhai Profile promised two things. It was not primarily conditioned for creation of a nuclear weapon. It was primarily for peaceful uses of the nuclear energy. And India was in desperate need of alternative energy sources. Now we are producing about three million tons of our own crude. But that stage we were not even one million ton. And our needs for development were coming so therefore search for alternative needs. So therefore if you look at the profile of Sarabhai it was thinking in terms of setting four nuclear power stations. We have set, I think, three by now and we are now working the fourth and the fifth. Secondly the profile also took us to the space age. And space age also we were thinking in terms of our peace time needs. I would not say that this was not conditioned also by the security perceptions. China as I said just now had emerged as a nuclear power. It had also endangered our security in 1962. So therefore these things together made... induced Mrs. Gandhi to accept Sarabhai Profile.

WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO THE NEWS THAT INDIA HAD A PNE IN 1974?

I was Minister of Information at that time. I think I shared the reaction of the country as a whole, that the government had done the correct thing. Because we felt that we had responded both ways. One, to our peace time uses of the nuclear power and secondly that if need be we could go ahead towards our, safeguarding our security.

WHAT DO YOU THINK MRS. GANDHI'S INTENTION WAS WITH THAT EXPLOSION?

Well it is in retrospective I think Mrs. Gandhi as the Prime Minister knew her responsibilities. She could not make the mistake of her father. Repeat the mistake I mean. Her father had taken China at its face value. Mrs. Gandhi could not afford it anymore. So therefore her sense of sense of responsibility for security was sharper. Secondly of course she knew that if she was entering into fifth and sixth plan and fourth plan and fifth plan then the needs for the energy were very dominant in her thinking.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE REASONS WHY THE PNE WENT AHEAD AND HOW THE DECISION WAS ACTUALLY TAKEN?

You see the decision in Indian context was on two levels. Whereas Sarabhai Profile was available in public so therefore the media and the public reaction to it was available. And by enlarge it was positive. Secondly the actual decision which ultimately led to the Pokhran...

JUST TALK ABOUT POKHRAN.

Regarding Pokhran I would say that it was a...discussion in the country. Now how decision was taken was not known. I think Mrs. Gandhi kept it in a very closed circuit of herself and maybe her secretary, and also the leading two or three scientists. That is why secrecy could be preserved. But surely Mrs. Gandhi was correctly conscious of the fact that was she was doing would get the backing of her cabinet and her country. Which which was correct assessment.

YOU WERE A MEMBER OF HER 'KITCHEN CABINET.' CAN YOU TELL US YOUR ROLE AT THE TIME?

You see well... Mrs. Gandhi had in her closer circle of ministers who she consulted more of on various things but not on this matter. This matter I think was confined primarily to the individuals I've indicated.

WHY DO YOU THINK THERE WERE NO FOLLOW UP TESTS?

Follow up in the sense was there, in the sense ...if Pokhran was a product of the Sarabhai Profile. And Sarabhai Profile has been pursued. The present stage of our space development and the present stage of our nuclear energy program is an offshoot of follow up. And the follow up in the terms of weapon was never needed nor desired... because we had never and the country had never committed itself to make a nuclear weapon. The only thing was that to establish the capability. And I think that...position was a main ob... scientific objective.

LET'S REPEAT THE SARABHAI PROFILE. WHY DID MRS. GANDHI ACCEPT THE SARABHAI PROFILE?

For two reasons. One, it was a... as I said needs for energy, The Sarabhai Profile promised three things. One, to meet the nuclear energy needs for peaceful purposes. Secondly, it took us to the space era. And thirdly, it took us to a stage where if ever need be we could get into a nuclear weapon stage. So Mrs. Gandhi, I think, kept in mind all these three realities.

SO REALLY ALL THE WAY ALONG INDIA IS REALLY KEEPING HER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION OPEN IN THIS PERIOD.

Well I would say that from China... experience onwards the public opinion in this country has been conscious that as a deterrent we must reach that stage where this option can be exercised realistically.

AFTER THE EXPLOSION THE PAKISTANIS SUGGESTED A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE. WHY WAS THIS SO UNACCEPTABLE TO INDIA?

I don't think Pakistan took it as a decision after Pokhran. If you carefully read Bhutto's autobiography which he wrote from jail that dates it prior to Pokhran. So therefore our perception has been that Pakistan did not take its decision to go nuclear because what we were doing. In that autobiography Bhutto talks of Islamic bomb. He talks of collaboration with Libya. He talks of giving the first bomb to the Islamic world in context of Israel. So therefore it is a, it is a very much politically motivated feel... thing when its date is changed. I'm not one of those who believes that Pakistan took the decision after Pokhran. I think it took much before that.

WHAT WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE NPT DEBATE?

Well not directly at all. NPT as you know from the country's point of view... NPT was negotiated in the late era of Mrs. Gandhi's time. We were worried about it ourselves because China factor was there. And we were hoping that in the discussions of the eighteen nations something worthwhile would emerge which would give a security feeling to non-nuclear powers. When the ultimated draft of NPT emerged we saw all that was absent. And it was only discriminatory. And it was only promising to keep it a closed door club. And it was so discriminatory that it neither was possible even to develop the use the, user nuclear power for development purpose. So therefore on three grounds we thought that we could not the treaty. One was discriminatory factor and its nonavailability of a nuclear power for development purpose. It questioned the sovereignty of a nation. It discriminated against those who did not have the power and those who had, they wanted to keep it to themselves. And thirdly, it exposed the non-nuclear powers to a great deal of possibility of a blackmail by those who had the power.

DO YOU THINK AT THE TIME OF THE PNE, WAS THE INTERNAL UNREST IN THE COUNTRY...FACTOR DO YOU THINK?

No. Not, not really because '64 there was no internal factor,

IN '74.

'74 internal factors were not of that type because India had just won the war. Mrs. Gandhi had emerged as a powerful leader with a big backing in the parliament. The decision primarily therefore was not conditioned by anything internal. It was I think primarily to exhibit that it, we had the capability. And also to convince the country per se that we had reached that stage when we could use it, nuclear power effectively for peaceful purposes.

PEOPLE HAVE TOLD US THAT THE PNE WAS A POLITICAL PLOY. DO YOU THINK THIS IS POSSIBLE?

I don't think Mrs. Gandhi needed any political ploying at that time. Mrs. Gandhi's difficulties began slightly later. The type of education that was in India had not reached that stage which could, where Mrs. Gandhi could feel insecure. Later on it did. But not at that stage. Therefore I do not think Mrs. Gandhi took the decision from that angle. I think the profile of Sarabhai was leading towards this stage when at one stage or the other an explosion of this type was needed to prove the capability. A capability not in the terms of weaponry but in terms of the, what nuclear energy could achieve. How do you do it without an explosion?

HOW WOULD SUMMARIZE MRS. GANDHI'S PHILOSOPHY VIS-A-VIS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY?

You see Mrs. Gandhi was a pragmatist. And I think Mrs. Gandhi was very conscious of India's security. And she I think was in a personal sense very much conditioned by the last phase of her father. The glory of Nehru was rubbed off because of China. Mrs. Gandhi also was conscious of the fact that during her... lifetime Pakistan had attacked India three times. In 1965 war she was a cabinet minister herself. So all these things happening around. And the type of response she was getting from USA I think conditioned her thinking a great deal. Mrs. Gandhi I think again, I had known her reasonably well was also aware that development was a part of security. So therefore she was not a chauvinist. Nor she was a war monger. Mrs. Gandhi basically knew that in her instinct that India could be developed only by development. And development of energy was very important.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THAT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND INDIA IN THIS FIRST PERIOD OF MRS. GANDHI'S, WHEN SHE WAS IN OFFICE. YOU IMPLIED THAT IT WAS A DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND INDIA AT THIS POINT.

You see USA unfortunately ever since India was partitioned has looked at India as differently than we would like it to. It has, it has never appreciated India's non-aligned policy. And as a hangover of our own freedom struggle we are unwilling to or we were unwilling and correctly to compromise our own independence and sovereignty. Nehru was very correct when he felt that alignment meant compromising of sovereignty. And he was not willing to do it. Unfortunately the American policy makers never perceived it that way. You remember that famous Dulles saying that "non-aligned bears a dishonesty." Now this is something which was non-acceptable to us. Therefore... And secondly, I think in context of its reliability with Soviet Union the Americans were looking all the time at Pakistan as a strategic part of their own overall strategic outlook and therefore whether you do bomber flew from...base, well, those factors were there. So we could see the strategic alliance emerging.

HOW DID THIS CHANGE? AND WHAT DOES 1971 MEAN IN TERMS OF SECURITY PERCEPTIONS, INDIA'S IN PARTICULAR?

1971 for the first time...

START AGAIN.

1971 for the first time proved what we were suspecting earlier. We were suspecting that there were certain commitments on the part of Americans with Pakistan's defense. We were also feeling that the arms being given to Pakistan were necessarily meant for in, against India and not for anything else. 1971 proved both the things. Despite the fact that for one year Mrs. Gandhi was going around everywhere and we are media men, the world media particularly was bringing to light what was happening in Bangladesh. Despite that when ultimately the war came we got the threat of the nuclear gun diplomacy further again. Now we were faced with a new reality. We knew that an intervention on part of, on the side of Pakistan could come. Well it did not actually come for various other reasons. But this reality conditioned our thinking a great deal.

COULD YOU EXPLAIN THE CHINA-PAKISTAN-US AXIS?

China, Pakistan, American access is primarily a strategic access. And this is primarily conditioned by what they say about their attitude that was toward Soviet Union. The misfortune was that the Dulles approach continued to hang on in various regimes in Washington. So therefore even when the presidents changed the perception basically did not undergo a change. So therefore all the time they were thinking that who were not with them were against them. So therefore instead of looking at India's non-alignment as an assertion of her sovereignty and that while we were not joining one camp we were not joining the other also. It was viewed as a negative attitude. So therefore this type of a new alignment emerged between these three powers. It may have its implication of Soviet Union which were felicitous but it had very serious implications for our security.

LET'S STOP FOR A SECOND.

Let me begin with our becoming independent. You know there was a great deal of good will for America in this country and that continues in the sense on people to people level. And that is why Indian perception has always drawn a distinctive line between the Americans' public opinion. American people and what Washington does. If you go around India you would find a large majority of people who have personal friends in America and a large number of families whose one member or the other lives in America. Even my own son lives there. So that is a different perception. The misfortune began I think after the war, when Cold War, between the two super powers began. The first Cold War tried to divide the world in two parts. And therefore in that divided world it was difficult both for Stalin and for Americans to understand a thing called non-alignment... whereas Stalin suspected Nehru for becoming, for being a sort of a coward agent of imperialism. And he used a very harsh word by calling him the running dog of imperialism. The Americans felt that our non-alignment was in reality a cover for alignment with the Soviet side. And we were crypto-Communists. That is why Dulles used the unfortunate word of calling the non-aligned mass as dishonest. So therefore here we were standing between the two blocks. But Nehru's vision was that he felt non-alignment was only an extension of our own freedom. Alignment with one block or the other meant making others look after your foreign policy. And if your foreign policy is not free you are not a sovereign country. So therefore this non-alignment he repeatedly said is an extension of our liberation struggle. And that is why it continued. The super power liability took various shapes in various phases. In fifties the, there was a phase when SETO, SENTO and all these groupings were being formed by the Americans and the Warsaw Treaty by the other side. And we were outside both the camps. Also Americans were using at that time...as a base for flying the U-2 bombers from reconnaissance over the Soviet territory. So therefore here was a difference. So therefore our vital interests came politically, for instance, interest regarding Kashmir, interest regarding Goa. We found America unfortunately opposing us. And the Western block as per se opposing us. Also in 1954 Truman first time started giving arms aid to Pakistan. Nehru objected. And at that time categorically Truman said, "No, no. It is meant against Soviet Union." And there was a famous dictum of constrainment in the UN. He said "That gun has not yet been made which shoots only in one direction." We suspected it. And it went on. Then we found in '65 what we suspect in '54. Those weapons were used against us. Between '65 you will kindly see that some people accuse India for buying weapons from Soviet Union. We did not buy any weapons from Soviet Union till 1965. Before that our main source of arms acquisition, whatever it was, mainly Britain... partly American. After the China War in '62 our needs were enhanced. Till '65 till China War we were... still keeping our security needs at a low profile because we were attaching more importance to development. Now '62 opened new reality. We needed to modernize the army. Nehru and Shastri both tried with Americans but they drew a blank. Then for the first time in Shastri's time we bought first installment of weapons from Soviet Union. So this point has to be kept in mind. Then came 1971...

I WAS GOING TO SAY, WHY DID INDIA SIGN THE TREATY IN 1971 WITH THE SOVIETS?

1971 treaty was primarily conditioned by the other super power posture. As you remember the entire situation was developing regarding Bangladesh for over a year. It was not a sudden development. And we had at our hand ten million refugees in India. And Mrs. Gandhi was going from one capital of the world to the other trying to persuade to tell them, "Please do something now. It'll be difficult otherwise." But it was happening. And...was in a very benevolent, I'm sorry. Very belligerent mood. Also we were seeing that the American strategy was adverse to us. And now we were trying to find, trying to see that not only that the Americans were giving arms to Pakistan, that if need be they were willing to confront India. Threats there had been given to us by Kissinger and others. And I can tell you in retrospect because I'm privy of this information that we really went into negotiation for a treaty with Soviet Union after we were convinced of the belligerency of the other super power. '71 proved it conclusively when we got a direct threat of seventh fleet intervention. So therefore this was a new situation. After that also if you think I can tell you the same situation is continued. You find sophisticated weapons being inducted into Pakistan. And we are being pushed into an arms race contrary to our wish and will. We are being hardly left with an option.

HOW DID YOU VIEW THE AMERICAN DECISION TO SEND THE USS ENTERPRISE TO...

In 196... '71

'71.

You see I think the intervention was stopped only because the treaty was there.

YOU SAID BEFORE THE ATOMIC GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY AND I WONDERED IF YOU COULD REPEAT THAT.

Prior to the gunboat diplomacy the indications are there. That is why the treaty came... —

The '71 situation brought a totally new situation so far as India's security was concerned. We were seeing that ten million refugees had landed on, were pushed onto India. And there was no end to... It could co-continue more also as the trustees of Pakistanis continued in Bangladesh. Mrs. Gandhi was going around to every capital of the world trying to explain the situation. Also the world media was seeing for itself what was happening in Bangladesh and how we were being pushed into a situation. At the same time we saw that the Kissinger Nixon regime was totally oblivious of the situation. As a matter of fact you will recall it was during that crisis that Kissinger and Carter went to China, or Carter and Kissinger went to China via Pakistan at that time. And they used the good offices of...to build bridges with China. During the height of the crisis...

JUST GO BACK. IT WAS KISSINGER AND NIXON.

You will recall that when the Bangladesh crisis was at its height Kissinger came here and we tried to explain to him what we were faced with. Kissinger went from here to Pakistan. And a day later we learned that he had gone to Pakistan to fly over to China secretly. Because all the time via...they were negotiating with China. So therefore that explained how strategically Pakistan was important to Washington despite whatever was happening in Bangladesh. Now we were faced with a new reality. We saw that a new alliance growing between the three once again. We also knew of the threats that were being given to us. And that really activated our talks for signing a treaty of friendship with Soviet Union. I think it helped our security at that critical moment.

NOW LET'S MOVE TO THE PERIOD WHEN YOU WERE AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE DISCUSSIONS OVER THE HEAVY WATER SUPPLIES?

Yes we purchased some heavy water from Soviet Union during my stay there. But there was nothing secret about it.

WHAT WERE THE DIFFICULTIES OVER THAT?

There was no difficulty at all because we signed international convent on this, the Soviet Union wanted to preserve its commitment to the international community regarding NPT. So therefore all the heavy water given to us was in the terms of the London Club Convention. And we signed that to, by bite with all the all the sort of what is called follow-up action of, for using it only for peaceful purposes. And this was a highly public discussion. There was nothing secret about it.

THEY WANTED TO PUT ALL THE NUCLEAR REACTORS IN INDIA UNDER SAFEGUARD. DID THAT PRESENT A PROBLEM FOR YOU?

No. There was no discussion on that because we did not want to buy for all the nuclear... stations. We only wanted to buy for those nuclear power stations where, which were already exposed to the terms of international agreements.

HOW DID YOU VIEW PRESIDENT CARTER'S EFFORTS TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION?

When Carter came here he was trying to pressurize Moraji Desai because by that time Moraji Desai come to power. He was trying to ask Moraji Desai to sign the NPT. Moraji Desai's objection were exactly the same as that of Mrs. Gandhi; that this was discriminatory and therefore he could not sign it. And he was very clear. He said, "I would sign it any day when you make all the terms applicable to every power. The moment it ceases to be non-discriminatory I will sign it." Although I must say that unilaterally Moraji Desai had announced that India would never make nuclear weapons but he refused to sign the NPT despite that declaration on his part. That neither he nor any government of India would make the nuclear weapons on the lines on which Nehru had talked.

WERE HIS VIEWS TOTALLY CONSISTENT WITH MRS. GANDHI'S THEN?

Ms... There was definitely a degree of difference between Mrs. Gandhi's line and Moraji Desai's line whereas Mrs. Gandhi's line and Shastri's line. And now in the present day —

JUST THOSE TWO.

...and Mrs. Gandhi, the basic difference was that whereas Moraji Desai, like Nehru wanted to make a commitment for all future governments Mrs. Gandhi was not willing to make any commitment. She was pragmatic and she said that all these options are subservient to the security environment Moraji Desai said, "No. I would not make it under any circumstances."

WHAT ARE YOUR RECOLLECTIONS OF THE DEBATE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN INDIA FOLLOWING INCREASING EVIDENCE OF A PAKISTAN PROGRAM?

Well this debate has been going on for quite some time now. But now particularly for the last few years, three or four years particularly it has become very intensified. The American, their source, sources particularly...

AT THE BEGINNING WHEN THE INFORMATION STARTED FILTERING THROUGH THE MEDIA DID YOU TAKE IT VERY SERIOUSLY?

Yes. Because the evidence given by the information, CIA and others was so credible, and so clear and there was no credible contradiction from Pakistan's side. And now time has proved that that information was correct. Even three days ago you will have seen what the US Ambassador in Pakistan said. He has categorically said that he thinks that Pakistan is about to make a bomb. Some, some of the observers feel that perhaps they've already made it.

WHAT DO YOU THINK?

Very difficult for me to say categorically in this context because I don't see any credible evidence that Pakistan is not interested in making it. You know the militaristic regimes are far more inclined to do these things than a democratic regime.

WHAT DO YOU THINK INDIA WOULD DO IF PAKISTAN DID GO AHEAD WITH A BOMB?

Well if Pakistan makes a bomb and Paki... there's a credible evidence of it Indian perception will undergo a major qualitative change. Because Indian security perceptions are very much conditioned by what happens in Pakistan, It this was conditioned by China as well. But it, the Pakistan factor is a very important factor in our security perception.

WHAT DO YOU THINK?

Well it may be very difficult for me to say categorically but I think the public opinion in this country will be so much pressing to go nuclear if Pakistan does it. But if Pakistan does not do it and if Americans in particular the Symington Amendment is able to stop them I don't think India would on its own be interested in going nuclear.

DOES INDIA HAVE THE CAPABILITY?

Well again difficult for me to say that India has the capability or not but because I'm not privy of any inside information. But whatever I know from public documentation, well I think if m... India has to do it I don't think it is difficult for India to do it.

HOW DO YOU ENVISION THE NEXT TEN YEARS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE?

Well I feel, one is wish and one is how I look at it. My wish is that we should not go nuclear. My wish is that this region should not go nuclear because our development compulsions are far stronger and our development needs are far stronger, far more we need far more funds and money for eradication of poverty and other things. And diversion of resources is a very major strain which I would like to avoid if I could. But if security compulsions are such that we can't help it then I don't know. I'm not very sure if we can restrain also. Next ten years primarily depends I think on what happens between the two super powers. The type of initiatives as Gorbachev is taking today. If they're responded to by the other side, that is Reagan, and a new world environment emerges in which all the smaller powers also fall in line there is hope in that.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE US HAS MADE ENOUGH EFFORTS TO IMPEDE THE PAKISTAN PROGRAM?

I don't think so. Because if the pressure is sufficient I don't see the evidence of it. Despite the commitment to the Congress, despite the fact that one of the, Washington has been telling the world that Pakistan is going ahead with it, the other wing, that is the State Department, keeps on certifying to the Congress that Pakistan is not doing it. It is a stained type of thing. The Pakis... Soviet, I'm sorry. The American Ambassador himself says that Pakistan is doing it. And yet the aid of $4.2 billion and the F-16 supplies and all those things are coming. How should... General Zia-ul-Haq feel that he, that Washington is serious about stopping him?

WHERE ARE WE NOW IN SOUTH ASIA? WOULD YOU DESCRIBE IT AS A NUCLEAR STALEMATE?

Well you see basically I think South Asia's need is to use nuclear power for peaceful purpose. Security-wise also South Asia should have a shared security perception... because strategically it is a... it has a, it is a unit. The, the, South Asia is being pulled apart by the super power regulatories. And by the, particularly by the American strategy in the Gulf and in the Indian Ocean. Unfortunately these are... external factors... extraneous factors which if these extraneous factors were not there I think South Asia would sort out things much better.

YOU SAID THAT INDIA'S POLICY IS A REACTIVE POLICY. IF YOU COULD JUST EXPLAIN THAT.

If you look at the entire history of last two decades or so you'd see that the nuclear policy of India has been reacting to situation. China explodes and tests a bomb and goes into space technology; we are forced to react. And now you see the same thing happening regarding Pakistan. Look at the scene when Pakistan's nuclear intentions were not known. The scene in India was very pacifist. Now you find again a public opinion s... sort of worried about what happens if Pakistan becomes a nuclear power. So therefore we have been reactive to the situations in China and in Pakistan. If these two factors had different orientation India's attitude towards nuclear weaponry would be also very different.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN?

India and Pakistan. Well there's a long history. Unfortunately, the division which came was so unnatural. You know the two-nation theory based on religion is something which is a novelty in the world, which we, nobody had ever done it. The families were divided. There is large nu...

IS IT POSSIBLE TO ASK YOU, YOUR FAMILY.

Yes. I come from that part of —

BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE WHY THERE IS THIS DEEP ANTAGONISM BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

Yes. One is the history of it. The history of it was that the partition of India was unnatural but we had accepted it. We had wished at that time that India were not partitioned but after partition became effective I think Indian political leadership and Indian public opinion had accepted this as a reality. We want to live in peace with Pakistan. And that is my perception on the Pakistani people also. I have travelled in Pakistan recently as well. Everywhere I went people in, of Pakistan want to live in peace with India. It is the external factors which matter. From Bhutto days onwards Pakistan has been sucked particularly since Bhutto days, before that also has been sucked in, into the super power rivalry annexes. Now this syndrome has created problems for us. If Pakistan is to be used for the basis against So... another super power, if Pakistan's armies are to be used in the Gulf, if Pakistan's interventions are needed for Iran factors, well then the whole scenario changes. But if we too live in peace on the South Asian countries as good neighbors it is possible. Only if the Washington strategy were different.

COULD YOU EXPLAIN YOUR OWN FAMILY BACKGROUND?

Well my family, where I come from what is now part of Pakistan. I was born in small town called Jhelum. I was educated in Lahore. And I was living in Karachi when partition came. My father was a member of Pakistan parliament when partition came but then circumstances pushed out this side. Like me, many families went from here from Delhi and elsewhere to Pakistan. Since the migration was on a very large scale, particularly there are many Muslim families which were split. One brother is living in India. Another is living in Pakistan. The whole thing is so unnatural. Therefore, but also at the same time pull for living in peace is also very strong. People to people we all have very large number of friends. I have very large number of friends in Pakistan. And whenever we meet such a joy to spend time together and the same is the feeling of an average Pakistani. And I think left to ourselves both of our people can live in peace and in friendship.

LET ME JUST CHECK IF WE'VE GOT EVERYTHING HERE.

Mrs. Gandhi you will recall came to power in 1966. And the '65 war ended, you will recall Mrs. Gandhi came to power in 1966 because Lal Bahadur Shastri suddenly died at Tashkent with treaty between India and Pakistan for ending of '65 hostilities had been signed. So therefore there was a new scenario now. We had signed a treaty which was implemented by both sides. For some time relationship between India and Pakistan improved. Also the same time the super power rivalry had also in this region ebbed. That is why...treaty would be signed under the auspices of...and the Soviet Union and the Americans had no objection to this. So therefore when Mrs. Gandhi came to power the relationship between India and America were normal. And there were no tensions at that time.

WHEN DID IT CHANGE?

It gradually started changing when once again the ...Cold War came up again. If you look at the Indo-Sov... Indo-American relationship; to a large extent it is conditioned by the Cold War situations.