LET'S START TALKING ABOUT AMERICAN CHARACTER, ABOUT AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN HISTORY AND THE HISTORIC SENSE OF ISOLATION, WHAT THAT'S DONE.

One must understand that the United States is unique amongst modern nations. It developed here on the North American continent with no local resistance other than the Indians, to the lesser extent the Canadians and Mexicans. And after the War of 1812 the United States was utterly secure, utterly invulnerable. European states had never had that experience of invulnerability since they were repeatedly overrun by their neighbors. But the United States was invulnerable and has a sense of invulnerability as a special American right, if not a God-given privilege. And it is that sense of invulnerability that gives us our self-confidence and to other nations our belief that we cannot fail.

CAN YOU MENTION GEOGRAPHIC ISOLATION...

Okay. In contrast to the European states, the United States was alone more or less on this continent except for weak neighbors. The European states were repeatedly overrun by their neighbors but the United States has been invulnerable and consequently we have a sense of our own invulnerability.

AND WHAT EFFECT HAS AMERICAN SENSE OF INVULNERABILITY HAD ON OUR SENSE OF PLACE IN THE WORLD?

American sense of invulnerability has had the effect that we do not look for narrow calculations of national advantage. We have assumed that when we put ourselves to a cause such as the defeat of Germany in two world wars, or the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, that the United States, because it was embarked on a righteous cause, was going to win. And it has given us also a sense that the United States will remain invulnerable or should remain invulnerable.

WE IN FACT ARE DREADFULLY VULNERABLE. CAN YOU TALK ABOUT HOW THE IMPACT OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES HAS CHANGED— OR SHOULD HAVE INFORMED THE AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS?

Since, since the British burned Washington in 1812 the United States has essentially been invulnerable. We grew to great power and no nation would have dared to attack us. Uh. We have a sense of invulnerability and that has continued down to the present day, even though since the Soviet Union developed ballistic missiles, an accounted deterrent, the United States has been dreadfully vulnerable to the attack by the Soviet Union. We have had to rely upon Soviet self-restraint or a Soviet sense that the risks were greater than the possible benefits of attacking the United States. But we are no longer invulnerable. We are dreadfully vulnerable. Our cities, our people can be substantially destroyed in something less than an hour by the Soviet Union.

AND HOW DOES THIS CHANGE HOW AMERICANS HAVE TRADITIONALLY LOOKED AT THEIR NEED OR LACK OF NEED TO DEAL WITH THE WORLD AS A WHOLE?

Well, in the past, the United States has felt that it did not have to have truck with other nations if they were delinquent if they had moral deficiencies. At the present time there is no alternative for the United States but in some sense to co-exist with the Soviet Union even though we find the Soviet system of government morally repugnant. To coin a phrase: an evil empire. Nonetheless, we are obliged to deal with the Soviet Union. Many Americans find that quite disquieting. They prefer the older dispensation that if another society was notably evil that we either ignored it or ultimately as with Germany or Japan, destroyed the government of that society and made those people more like ourselves. We are unable to do that with the Soviet Union.

COULD YOU SAY THAT IDEA AND CONNECT IT WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

In the past, the United States had no need to deal with other nations if the, if it felt that they were morally repugnant. To borrow a phrase: an evil empire. But under present circumstances we must recognize that the Soviet Union is capable of destroying the United States in a... to a substantial degree in an hour's time. And as a consequence we are obliged to deal with the Soviet Union. We have no choice. The Soviet Union, since its development of ballistic missiles, has the kind of capability that we must take into account. In the past when we were determined to smite an evil foe... such as Nazi Germany we could decide to destroy it utterly, to demand unconditional surrender. But the Soviet Union has the power to reject such a demand on our part and we are going to have to go on coexisting with the Soviet Union as far as the eye can see.

SO HOW SHOULD THAT SHAPE OUR POLICY? THAT MEANS THAT WE HAVE TO DO WHAT WITH THEM?

The United States has to coexist with the Soviet Union. It will have to negotiate with the Soviet Union even though for many Americans that's a disquieting thought simply because the in the past we have not had to negotiate with those countries that we found morally repugnant. Now we have no choice.

WHY DON'T WE JUST GATHER OUR RESOURCES AND REGAIN THE POSITION OF AUTONOMY AND RELATIVE SUPERIORITY WE HAD BEFORE?

Well there is, there is a deep seated feeling in the American people, in this society that invulnerability is in the nature of things, that it is a God-given right, and that the American people deserve to be invulnerable. It is that which explains I think the popular appeal of the President's strategic defense initiative. This will restore invulnerability. We will be able to shed the incoming, re-entry bodies from Soviet missiles as we shed the rain by our roofs over our houses. That's what the President has said and that's the source of its appeal to the public. Then we don't have to negotiate with others if we find them morally repugnant. There is no need to have truck with an evil empire. It will restore American dominance. It will restore our position which we regard as right of being invulnerable.

[REPEATS QUESTION]

The United States, the American people has a deep desire to have that invulnerability restored and that is the explanation of former President Reagan's strategic defense initiative. By deploying strategic defenses that were near perfect we could shed incoming Soviet re-entry bodies from their missiles as the roof over our head sheds the rain. We would be invulnerable again. We would not have to have truck, to deal, to negotiate with those that we find morally repugnant, the evil empire. And that's its appeal. It is the restoration of the natural order of things.

WHAT ABOUT THE REAGAN DOCTRINE. YOU WERE CONNECTING THAT WITH A SENSE OF MORAL RIGHTEOUSNESS. IS THERE A SENSE OF LIMITS ON WHAT AMERICA CAN DO IN THE WORLD NOW?

Well, one must understand that the American society has always felt that when it took action that that was righteous action. Indeed, that's captured in the national anthem. Well, for conquer we must when our cause it is just. One notices that if our cause is unjust we will not win. And that is one of the reasons that this society is ambivalent about covert operations. The... American society recognizes that it's necessary from time to time to have such covert operations but it is uneasy about such operations. And if we have too many of them simultaneously as has sometimes been suggested in the so-called Reagan doctrine, then we are going to tap that root of unease in the American people. If the American society feels that we are not doing things in a righteous cause, public support will I... begin to slack off and we will be unable to sustain our position. That has happened repeatedly. It has happened to— in Korea to some extent, quite visibly in Vietnam.

CAN YOU TALK ABOUT WHAT KIND OF LEADERSHIP WE NEED AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION?

This is a society which is, that lacks a social structure to a large extent, the kind of social structure that one finds in Japan or Europe. This is a true democracy. The democracy of democracies. And in this society any man's opinion is as good as anybody else's. And as a consequence of that public opinion rules in the United States. Unless a foreign policy is supported by public opinion it will not sustain— have the basis for sustaining itself. Unless the public supports the President's position in an important matter, ultimately it will fail. And therefore the role for leadership in our society is to cultivate consensus, to bring the public along to support wise policy, steady policy. Where public opinion rules public opinion can be fitful, but in foreign policy we need above at all else continuity. And it is the role, it seems to me, of our national leadership to provide the degree of continuity that is not natural in our political system.

AMERICA WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION AFTER WORLD WAR II AND WE'VE WATCHED OUR POWER DECLINE. THERE'S A CHANGING REALITY OUT THERE. HOW MUST WE ACCEPT THAT?

Sometimes... we get nostalgic about the position that the United States had after World War II. It was a glorious position in a sense. The United States had sixty percent of the world's manufacturing capacity, fifty percent of the world's output. It had a monopoly of nuclear weapons. Our power position was supreme. And we look, back on those days, we find that there is something not entirely unattractive about that position. But the thing to recognize is that it was unsustainable. In fact, we did not even try to sustain that position. We immediately set to work attempting to restore production for our allies, for defeated foes. We later began to provide assistance to the underdeveloped world. We even offered to help the Soviet Union in its satellites, a generous act that was rebuffed by Stalin. But we cannot help others to improve their position without causing a relative to decline in the American position. And the simple fact is that since the immediate post-war period the United States has been declining relative to others. It had to decline in that way. We may have accelerated it in recent years by self-indulgent habits but it had to decline and the United States today remains the world's most powerful nation. It will continue to be the world's leading power. We will no longer be dominant. There will not be the simple pox Americana of the post-war period. But we will continue to be the leading nation in the world. Others will have to pay attention to our views. They will have to pay attention to what we do with our economy. And there is probably too much crepe hanging at the present time about the decline of American power. We are going to remain the principal power in the world, even though we are no longer dominant.

CAN YOU CONNECT THE IDEA THAT OUR POWER IS DECLINING RELATIVE TO THE POSITION THAT WE ENJOY BUT THERE IS A LOT OF STUFF ABOUT HOW WE HELPED OTHER PEOPLE IN BETWEEN AND I'D LIKE THOSE IDEAS CLOSER TOGETHER...

The extraordinary position that the United States had after World War II was unsustainable. Oh, we emerged from the war with sixty percent of the world's manufacturing capacity, and fifty percent of its total output. But that was due to extraordinary conditions. Europe had essentially been destroyed in terms of its productive capacity. Germany clearly so. Even Britain one of the nominal victors had been substantially crippled, economically speaking, by the war. Japan had been s... destroyed. As these countries revived our relative position in total world output had to decline. In fact, we're tempted to encourage it to decline by extending extraordinary and generous assistance to others. But the point to bear in mind is that that relative decline was in the cards; there was no way to avoid it, and it is false nostalgia to think back about those days and believe that somehow or other it could have been sustained.

SO AMERICA CAN NO LONGER SORT OF DICTATE TO THE REST OF THE WORLD SUBSTANTIALLY UNILATERALLY WHAT IT WOULD LIKE TO SEE DONE. WHAT MUST WE ACCEPT...

Well the United States... can no longer issue its fiats and expect that other countries will follow them. At the present time we can only provide leadership. We can point to the need for others to cooperate with us in their own self-interest. And if they fail to do so it will be costly to them in terms of their self-interest, not necessarily so much to the United States. But the United States is now in the position of a leader that must persuade others to join it. We can no longer establish unilaterally limits that other powers must accept.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF MILITARY POWER IN THAT CONTEXT?

The role of military power continues to be what it has been in the past in the sense that it is the necessary backstopping to the deterrence of Soviet power. Only the United States can serve as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. None of the powers of Europe, the former great powers of Europe, are in a position to offset Soviet power. The Europeans therefore need the backstopping by the United States if they are to remain truly independent of the Soviet Union which is in our national interest to sustain. A military power is necessary to deter major actions by the Soviet Union on the possibility that the Soviets might intend such major action which is something that we cannot discount. Military power is also necessary to sustain our position elsewhere in the world. And most notably in the third world which becomes somewhat more chaotic with the passage of time And the removal of the stabilizing role that the United States once played around the world in the wake of World War II.

WHY WE CAN'T REGAIN THAT MARGIN OF SUPERIORITY THAT ALLOWED US TO DO WHAT WE WILL IN THE WORLD.

The American society to a large extent believes that invulnerability is in the nature of things. And we seek to restore it. That is the basis of the popular appeal of President Reagan's strategic defense initiative which... promised that it would shed incoming Soviet warheads as the roof above our head sheds the rain. We would be invulnerable. And once again, we would be a dominant power. We would not have to negotiate with the Soviet Union, a system that we find morally repugnant, the Evil Empire. We would be free to condemn. We would not have to deal with the Soviets.

WHAT IN FACT IS WRONG WITH THAT VISION...

It is clear that that for the next thirty years, let us say, that we will not be able to achieve a strategic defense that can prevent the Soviet Union from destroying American cities if the Soviet Union should desire to do so. And we're going to have to get through the next thirty years. At best, perhaps in the longer run this collection of hopes and technical experiments that we call the strategic defense initiative may produce an airtight defense. But that is many, many years in the future. And for the foreseeable future, as a consequence, we are going to have to accept the fact that we will have to co-exist on this planet with the Soviet Union which means dealing with them. It means negotiating with them. It means that we have to accept the fact that a system that we regard as morally repugnant has sufficient power to menace us and sufficient power that we must deal with them.

WHAT IS THE CONFLICT ABOUT BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIET UNION?

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has two aspects. The first aspect is ideological. We cannot avoid it. They have a different view of the world from the United States. The Soviet Union is a totalitarian power. By and large, the Soviet Union, as Russia before it, has repudiated the notion of individual freedom. The only freedoms that individuals have are those allowed, however temporarily, by the state. For the United States, freedom is at the very core of the American creed. Individual freedom. And we insist that the liberties that we possess be sustained here, and in so far as we are able, sustained elsewhere in the world. It is for that reason that we have provided a degree of international stabilization since World War II and we have provided in particular assistance to those democracies such as the ones in western Europe that cannot sustain themselves against Soviet power, the threat of a Soviet state, without outside aid from the other superpower, the United States.

YOU STARTED OUT SAYING THE CONFLICT HAS TWO DIMENSIONS. WHAT I'M GOING TO ASK FOR IS A MORE CONCISE STATEMENT OF WHAT THE TWO DIMENSIONS ARE. WHAT IS THE CONFLICT ABOUT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION?

The conflict is about two things. First, it is about ideology. The—

CAN YOU SAY "THE CONFLICT BETWEEN..."

The, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is first of all about ideology. The United States, at the very core of its existence, believes in the freedom of individuals. By contrast, the Soviet Union as Russia before it does not believe in individual freedom. The only rights its citizens have are those allowed by the states. We do not accept such a notion. And we are bound to protect our people and their liberties and we seek to protect the liberties of other democracies around the world, notably those in western Europe which require the outside support of a sustaining superpower, the United States, because they themselves cannot stand up against Soviet pressure. The other element is the old-fashioned geostrategic element. We do not want to see the Soviet Union dominate certain areas that would increase its economic strength, its potential for war, its strategic position vis-a-vis the United States. This is in a sense the old-fashioned clash of national power. But that is not the totality because if it were not for the ideological element, to a large extent we could compose our differences with the Soviet Union.

WHEN YOU SAY TWO THINGS, IF YOU COULD JUST SAY THE TWO UP FRONT AND THEN MAYBE ONE SENTENCE OF EXPLANATION FOR EACH...

The United States differs from the Soviet Union...

LET'S TALK ABOUT THE CONFLICT THOUGH.

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has two sources. The first is ideological. The American people, the American society is based upon individual liberty, personal freedoms, and they are a right of individuals. The Soviet Union by contrast, as Russia before it, does not believe that rights exist, save those allowed by the state. And as a consequence we have an ideological conflict. We will not allow the Soviet Union to determine the social rules by which the United States or other democracies exist. The second element is the element of traditional national power conflicts, the geostrategic element. And that element implies that the United States does not wish the Soviets to acquire additional area or additional influence that would improve its strategic position relative to the United States and thus, endanger us. Is that it?

NO. WE EITHER HAVE TO NOT SAY FIRST AND SECOND OR SAY THE TWO MAJOR THINGS UP FRONT...

The conflict between the United States has two elements. The first—

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has two elements. The first is ideological. The second is geostrategic. The ideological element is quite simple. We believe in this country in personal liberty. The Soviet Union, as Russia before it, there is a belief that individuals have rights only so far as they are granted by the state. We cannot allow that view to determine the social order in the United States or indeed elsewhere in the democracies. The second element of course is the traditional element of national power. We do not want to see Soviet aggrandizement of additional land areas such that those additional resources and territory would improve their strategic position relative to the United States and thus endanger us, or endanger our lives. Those two elements fit together.

IF THE SOVIET UNION WAS TO STOP BEING AGGRESSIVE GEOSTRATEGICALLY IN THE WORLD, SHOULD WE NOT WORRY ABOUT WHAT KIND OF SYSTEM THEY HAVE INTERNALLY FOR THEIR PEOPLE? SHOULD WE DROP CARING ABOUT THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT?

That is a difficult question to attempt to separate. Uh. Soviet ambitions in the world from the Soviet system, normally speaking we do not associate other democratic countries such as let us say our neighbor Canada with the kind of territorial ambition that the Soviet Union has had. And if the Soviet Union were to become a less overtly aggressive system then we would compose some of our differences. But as long as the ideological gulf remains we will feel somewhat, if latently, threatened by the Soviet Union and we will need to sustain our guard.

YOU HEAR A LOT OF PEOPLE TALKING ABOUT— YOU HEAR THIS FROM WESTERN EUROPEANS AND SOVIETS AND SO FORTH THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE...

In my judgment the call for co-existence is the correct call. The alternative to coexistence is not one that is acceptable. The— There is nothing wrong with the view that we should seek to live in some degree of harmony with the Soviet Union and to attempt to diminish the differences between ourselves and the Soviet Union. We must remember however that there is a substantial gulf, politically and ideologically, between the United States and other democracies, and the Soviet Union, and therefore we must always be wary until we have seen that the Soviet Union has changed. The wisest advocates in the West of such coexistence are not suggesting that we let down our guard on the hope that the Soviet Union will change.

IF GORBACHEV IS SUCCESSFUL IN HIS REFORMS, IS THAT GOOD FOR US?

The... Mr. Gorbachev is one of the most interesting political figures that we have seen in this century and he is clearly the ablest Soviet leader on foreign policy that we have seen since Lenin. In that respect, there's kind of a risk for the United States. The risks were less when the Soviet Union were led by, was led by sick and elderly men. Mr. Chernenko was the ideal Soviet leader. He was feeble and aged. He could not inspire his people. He could not lead the Soviet Union and thus he represented little threat. Uh. Gorbachev does not have that particular virtue. Gorbachev's success may make the Soviet Union amore humane society, one that we can live more comfortably with, and therefore we should welcome his attempts to take some of the more venomous aspects out of Soviet society. It is true that if he is successful the Soviet Union will become a stronger society, a better competitor to the United States and to the western world. And that provides a potential risk because we do not know what Mr. Gorbachev or his successors would do with that additional power. So we have, we are of a dual mind with regard to the success of Gorbachev. But I think on balance we hope that his reforms work and that the Soviet Union become a more humane or more precisely, a less intolerable society.

GORBACHEV AND HIS PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TALKING A LOT RECENTLY ABOUT A DECLINING UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER IN THE WORLD TO SOLVE POLITICAL PROBLEMS. DO YOU AGREE THAT'S THE CASE?

I think that I... Start again. I trust that the Soviet leaders fully believe what they say about the declining utility of military force. The Soviet Union is a society whose only great advantage, whose comparative advantage has lain in the area of military power. And as a consequence there it is the Soviets who have tended to stress the military instrument, largely because their political and ideological appeal has been so limited. If the Soviet Union does recognize that military power is of little use in solving political problems and if the Soviet Union proceeds to reduce its military power, as we've reduced our own, then we will be in a position to move on to other areas of competition: economic, technological, political, rather than the latent military rivalry between the two. But we must be careful not to accept Soviet words on this matter for Soviet actions because the Soviet Union as long as it does remain a powerful military state can use that military power either directly or diplomatically to obtain its ends. And until such time military power remains indispensable for the west to neutralize Soviet power.

WHAT ABOUT FOR US? HAVE WE SEEN IN OUR RECENT HISTORY A DECLINING VALUE OF MILITARY POWER IN ACHIEVING SOME OF WHAT WE THOUGHT WERE OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE WORLD, AND SINCE MAYBE VIETNAM WAS THE GREAT LESSON— IS THERE A CHANGING CONTEXT OF MILITARY POWER FOR US?

think that the, that there may be some small psychological change. There is not a real policy change for the United States. United States, one must recall, after World War II, totally disarmed. It assumed that the war was over and we could all go home. It was only what Stalin did that forced us to rearm and our purposes in redeveloping military power was essentially to contain what was seen to be Soviet aggression. And it was a limited purpose. Uh. Subsequently we be-became more enamored, as it were, of the military instrument and we were drawn in—I think regrettably, into Vietnam. We learned I think the limits of military power in Vietnam, that against a determined foe, unless one is prepared in effect to blow that foe away, that the determined foe, in this case the Lao Dung party, had more staying power than did the United States. We won the war of material attrition. But they won the war of psychological attrition. And that I think demonstrated to us that the use of the military instrument in the traditional American way just wasn't going to work necessarily.

BUT LET'S PICK UP FROM THERE. YOU'RE SAYING THAT VIETNAM DEMONSTRATED THE TRADITIONAL POLITICALS INSTRUMENT. AND WHAT DOES THAT SAY?

Military instrument.

THAT MILITARY FORCE IS A WAY TO SOLVE OR DO WE HAVE TO READJUST TO THESE OTHER MEANS OF THAT?

Our military force has an essential role to play, even in third world comf... conflicts. But we must rec-recognize that the Am— interest of the American public in the third world has its limits. And the public's willingness to support engagements in the third world is more limited. And as a consequence, if a war drags on, if it proves to be very costly, the, it will lose the support of the public. It will lose the support of public opinion. And consequently we will be in trouble. The premier of Vietnam Pham Vam Dong indicated to Bernard Fall in 1965 that Vietnam was going to win that war. Why? Because the United States could not accept long indecisive wars and Vietnam intended to fight a long indecisive war and would win. That prophecy, regrettably, turned out to be correct.

...A QUESTION OF SHOULD WE BE TURNING TO SEEK A SUBSTITUTE FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FOR THE ASSURANCE OF PEACE, NOT RESORTING TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS, THROUGH THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR

You've asked the question then?

YEAH.

There is no complete substitute for nuclear weapons. We have opened Pandora's box. Nuclear weapons will be with us as far as the eye can see. What we can do is to seek a partial substitute for nuclear weapons so that we are less reliant on the threat of nuclear retaliation for deterrence. We should improve our conventional forces and our allies in Europe should improve theirs such that the conventional deterrent will probably be strong enough not to tempt the Soviet Union to test our forces. But we cannot ever get rid of nuclear weapons. If we were to do so, we would have no assurance that the other side would not violate the agreements. We must sustain a sufficient nuclear deterrent to deter any nuclear attacks even as we build, hopefully, our conventional forces to deter conventional attack.

NOW YOU SAID TO DETER NUCLEAR ATTACK. MANY PEOPLE SUGGEST THAT WHAT WE NEED IS, OKAY, LET'S HAVE SUFFICIENT NUCLEAR FORCES TO DETER A NUCLEAR ATTACK. AND THAT WOULD BE A VERY SMALL NUMBER RELATIVELY, 200, 400,000 WHATEVER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHY NOT MOVE TO THAT LESS RISKY LEVEL?

The, most of those who talk about substantial disarmament, virtually total disarmament think in terms of protecting only the United States rather than our responsibilities around the world. The United States has provided extended deterrents, extended nuclear deterrents and that requires a forces as sophisticated as those of the major threat. If the Soviet Union has so large a force, we are obliged to maintain a sophisticated force to provide credibility for extended deterrence. If we fail to maintain a sufficient force the deterrent will be weaker. If the Soviet Union is prepared to reduce all of its forces including its conventional forces such that it no longer poses a threat against Western Europe, then we can correspondingly reduce our own forces. Not only nuclear but possibly conventional as well. But we must maintain an overall deterrent capability including a nuclear arsenal that is equal to that of the Soviet Union if we are to protect our interests around the world. How'd that come through?

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN, I MEAN HOW CAN WE, CAN WE REALLY PLAN TO FIGHT A WAR WITH THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS? HOW CAN WE USE THEM TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS AROUND THE WORLD?

The United States has no alternative but to have plans for the employment of nuclear weapons with the intent that those plans for employment are sufficiently persuasive that they will not need to be implemented. And what we plan to do is to use nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet breakthrough in Western Europe with conventional forces to right the balance and the Soviet recognition that we are prepared to do so will presumably deter them from using the conventional forces that at the moment are superior to those of NATO.

MANY PEOPLE SAY THAT THIS IS A VERY RISKY COURSE, THAT BY IMPLEMENTING THE PLANS TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST THAT WE HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO OUR COMMANDERS AND DEPLOYMENTS AND SUCH THAT IT COULD GO OUT OF CONTROL IN THE FOG OF WAR AND THAT IN ORDER TO BACK UP THIS DETERRENT THAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT WE HAVE TO RUN VERY CLOSE TO THE RISK THAT SHOWED WARS START OR CRISIS DEVELOP THAT WE COULD FIND OURSELVES UNINTENTIONALLY IN A MAJOR NUCLEAR WAR?

Those who say that that the cost of using the threat of nuclear retaliation is risky are correct. There is always an element of risk. It is that element of risk that makes deterrence credible. If there were no risk, then the deterrent itself would not be credible. They are failing to recognize that unless they have a credible deterrent there is also a risk that the United States will then, the United States and her Western European allies, will then be subject to intimidation and indeed that Soviet shadow will fall over the democracies of Western Europe. That is the risk that we seek to avoid and we accept the minimal risks of relying upon a nuclear strategy because we... regard those risks as very low in light of the Soviet prudence and the Soviet unwillingness to test us. We cannot do without some risk if we are to secure our... position. Those who believe that somehow or other by a magic wave of the wand the world can be made riskless are, regrettably, in error.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE MADE THE ARGUMENT THAT IT IS POSSIBLY IMMORAL,...STRONGEST SENSE BUT MAYBE NOT IN A MORE WEAK SENSE, TOTHREATEN THE WORLD WITH OBLITERATION AS THE WAY, THAT THE ONLY WAY TO KEEP OURSELVES FROM GOING TO WAR WITH EACH OTHER IS TO THREATEN THE WORLD WITH OBLITERATION?

There is a kind of hyperbole that the, those who favor some degree or perhaps total unilaterally disarmament tend to indulge in. They talk about we are threatening the world with obliteration. We are not. The American strategy is deter war. It has successfully deterred war and by having a, an appropriate response, we have insured that the Soviets not indulge in aggression against the American alliance system. That is all that we want. If they indulge in this kind of... hyperbole they are misleading the public. The Soviet Union retains the capacity to obliterate the United States and we must persuade them, in part by having a similar capacity, not to either use it or to threaten to use it with the prospect of intimidation.

MAYBE YOU COULD EXPLAIN, THERE'S A SORT OF ASYMMETRIC USE OF DETERRENTS BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WHICH ENABLES THEM TO SAY, OH WE THINK THERE SHOULD BE NO FIRST USE IN EUROPE AND WE'RE WILLING TO DISARM EUROPE. CAN YOU TALK ABOUT THAT. YOU KNOW HOW WE NEED TO BE ABLE TO THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST.

The western world which depends upon its publics to provide the resources for its military establishment, its military establishments, let me start again. The western world, which depends upon its public... to provide the where with all to sustain its military establishments, has never been willing to put up sufficient resources to match Soviet conventional power. Since 1945 the Soviets have retained a conventional threat that may well dominate the conventional... defenses of the western alliance. For many years that did not matter because the Soviets had either no nuclear weapons or a very weak nuclear threat. But more recently as the nuclear capabilities on both sides have become more even, the Soviet advantages in terms of conventional forces have become more of a problem for us. We are more dependent than the Soviets on nuclear weapons because we use nuclear weapons to counterbalance those Soviet advantages in conventional forces. It's that, for that reason that the Soviets, including Mr. Gorbachev, can lightly talk about getting rid of all nuclear weapons. If they were to do so, it would leave the world free for intimidation by that power that has the best placed, largest conventional forces. That power happens to be the Soviet Union....Soviet Union is free to make these promises but we would be wise not to believe either the promises or indeed, the world which they hold out to us as beckoning.

NOW MANY PEOPLE SAY THAT SINCE WE ARE THE ONES WHO ARE MORE COMMITTED TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THAT REASON, THAT IT'S INCUMBENT UPON US TO, BECAUSE OF THE TERRIBLE RISK THAT THEY POSE TO THE WORLD THAT WE SHOULD GATHER UP OUR RESOURCES AND MAKE OURSELVES FIND SAFER WAYS OF DETERRING THE SOVIET UNION. AND EITHER THAT OR FIND SOME WAYS TO ENGAGE WITH THEM IN DISCUSSIONS THAT WILL ASYMMETRICALLY REDUCE THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT.

There is, in the views of the critics, a very important point. The United States and its allies should gird up its loins or gather up its resources and create the conventional forces so that we are less dependent upon nuclear weapons. I myself have been arguing that way for some 30 years. I must say, express some frustration because none of the western allies have ever been prepared to provide those resources and indeed nuclear weapons has been, perhaps regrettably, the glue that has held the alliance together. The allies do not want to make the budgetary sacrifices that are necessary and until such time as we have a conventional capability in place, it's better not to talk about getting rid of nuclear weapons. Indeed, those who criticize depending upon the nuclear threat and who say rather blithely let's buildup our conventional forces. I've not noticed them to be particularly forward when it... comes time to increasing the defense budget, to increasing the forces that we have in being, so as better able to achieve that goal. Words are cheap. The actions of creating a conventional establishment that will be the match of the Soviet Union is very costly and until all of us are prepared to pay those costs we should be careful about the cheap words that we use.

ANOTHER THING THAT COMES UP IS THAT PEOPLE SAY WELL, COME ON, IT'S BEEN 45 YEARS SINCE THE WAR, THE COLD WAR IS ENDING. DO WE REALLY THINK THE SOVIET UNION WANTS TO MARCH ACROSS WESTERN EUROPE? WHY WOULD IT? MAYBE WE JUST NEED A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS AND MORE OPENNESS BETWEEN EACH OTHER AND PURSUE THESE FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS AND SO FORTH.

For those who have hopes for a better future, there is once again an element of truth. We should be prepared to pursue force reduction discussions with the Soviet Union as long as the reductions on both sides are verifiable and leave us in a position which is more stable and in which we feel more secure. We should not shed our weapons, nuclear or conventional, as a way of following some ideal when that may leave us in a more risky position. And the thing that these critics do not recognize I think is that the Soviet Union may or may not have an intent to dominate Western Europe. It may or may not be prepared to move militarily. It may or may not be prepared to use intimidation as a way of dealing with Western Europe. We certainly have seen evidence in the past that the Soviets are prepared to use intimidation against Western Europe. When Mr. Khrushchev in 19 56 said that he was going to rain missiles down on London and Paris. It was the United States that had to back him off. Mr. Gorbachev will, may well say that that's the bad old Russia and that of course you couldn't think that we would do such a thing as, again. But even as recently as 1983 the Soviet Union broke off discussions with the western world and refused to negotiate on nuclear weapons because the West was doing what the Soviet Union had long had, intermediate range nuclear weapons. So one cannot rely upon Soviet generosity. We must out of a sense of... prudence protect ourselves by sustaining military forces that give us confidence that the Soviets will not use military intimidation or move militarily. We do not want to test whether they may or may not be prepared to do such things.

DO YOU HAVE ANY SENSE THAT THERE COULD BE ALTERNATIVES TO RELYING SOLELY ON FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, THAT SOME OF THESE IDEAS THAT PEOPLE COME UP WITH FOR DEFENSE ORIENTED FORCES OR COMMON SECURITY IDEAS COULD SUBSTITUTE?

There are many possibilities to reduce reliance on the nuclear threat. And by and large, I believe, we should pursue them all including increasing expenditures on conventional forces. But there are other things that can be done. We can proceed with confidence building measures. If the Soviet Union will allow us to watch the... capacity that they have for building up their attack forces and reduce the direct threat of tank attack against Western Europe. That would improve our position and make us feel more secure and reduce reliance upon the nuclear threat by the West. Many of these things can be done. The thing that must always be borne in mind is that we cannot reduce our security based upon the hope that the Soviet Union may be prepared to do certain things.

SHOULD WE ALWAYS MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO HAVE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE TO DEFEND AGAINST SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES?

We will be obliged to have a mix of forces, conventional and nuclear, which overall will deter the Soviet Union. The Soviets will see those forces as having first use capability in the event that our conventional forces are overborne. And it is the overall deterrent that we must protect even as we seek to reduce reliance on the nuclear element in overall deterrents.

A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE BEEN QUESTIONING RECENTLY THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR GUARANTEE TO EUROPE. EUROPEANS THEMSELVES PERIODICALLY QUESTION IT AND PEOPLE HERE QUESTION IT AND SAY, WELL ISN'T IT REALLY JUST A CHARADE, A MYTH THAT WE UPHOLD BECAUSE WHAT EUROPEAN LEADER, WHAT SOVIET GENERAL, WHAT AMERICAN PRESIDENT IS REALLY GOING TO BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD RISK AN ATTACK ON ONE OF OUR CITIES TO DEFEND WESTERN EUROPE? THAT WE WOULD MAKE THAT CHOICE?

Well I think that the answer to that is that we are prepared to run risks as we have done to secure liberty in the world including Western Europe. That we run a risk does not mean that there's a high probability of something taking place. The strategy of the United States is not to attack Soviet cities. We will reserve our forces to continue to deter Soviet attacks against American and allied cities. If it comes to the necessity, we will use nuclear weapons selectively. Now is there any guarantee that these, those weapons will be used? No. But in the eyes of the Soviet Union a risk of even 10 percent or 5% that the Americans will be prepared to use nuclear weapons is enough to counsel prudence. Unfortunately, many Europeans insist that there be a 100 percent certainty. And that can never be forthcoming. The degree of probability of American reaction is sufficiently high, substantially high to keep the Soviet Union deterred. And that is all that we want.

...SORT OF THE THREAT AND TRENDS THAT YOU SEE HAPPENING IN EUROPE THESE DAYS. I MEAN IS THERE AN IMPLICIT THREAT IN WHAT'S GOING ON OVER THERE?

We, we have a serious problem with our European allies stemming in part from Mr. Gorbachev. Mr. Gorbachev does not indulge in blatant threats of the sort that, of Brezhnev or Khrushchev or a Stalin indulged in. He sounds reasonable and the Europeans are sufficiently eager to find a reasonable Soviet leader that no longer represents a threat to them that they may believe prematurely in the apparent promises that he is holding out. A second problem is that the Europeans have lost confidence in the steadiness and wisdom of their American... ally. They, that in part comes from Reykjavik when the United States in total disregard of the... of the alliance strategy for many years and without consultation with our European allies let alone the Joint Chiefs or the Congress stated that it was prepared to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons. And the President wanted to get rid of, agreed to getting rid of all strategic weapons. Now, that, shook European confidence in our understanding of the alliance and our willingness to back them up. That was followed by the INF Treaty which mistakenly caused further concern in Europe and the Europeans are sufficiently worried about where the United States is going and sufficiently eager that the Soviet Union has ceased to be a threat, that the alliance can begin to fragment. That's our problem in Europe.

WHY WOULD THAT BE BAD FOR US?

Because the United States wants to sustain a world in which the American people feel comfortable, feel that there are like-minded societies. It is the, it is Western Europe that is the primary bastion of democracy outside of the United States. Only the Europeans at large have the same kind of liberties that we have here in the United States. Indeed the United States as DeGalle once said, is the daughter of Europe. We have European institutions and if the Europeans become like Eastern Europe, then the United States will be culturally... isolated, politically isolated, and we would be a much more mean spirited people under those circumstances than we are today.

SO WOULD YOU SAY THAT IF WE WITHDREW OUR NUCLEAR UMBRELLA FROM EUROPE, WE MIGHT START TO HEAD DOWN THE ROAD WHERE WE WOULD LOSE THE SENSE OF CONTROL AND IDENTITY?

We we cannot withdraw our nuclear umbrella from Europe until such time as there is an alternative deterrent in place. And that will be many many years, probably decades in the future, if ever. Meanwhile if the United States were to do so, the effect would be that Europe would be lost to the island of freedom in the world and that is why we cannot afford to withdraw our nuclear umbrella.

GORBACHEV AND OTHER RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT IT IS THE ARMS RACE THAT STANDS IN THE WAY OF GOOD RELATIONS. THAT WE REALLY DON'T HAVE A CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER EXCEPT FOR THE ARMS RACE AND THAT WE SHOULD BE DEVOTING OUR RESOURCES TO OTHER PRESSING PROBLEMS IN THE WORLD, HUNGER POVERTY, DEVELOPMENT AND SO FORTH.

Gorbachev is quite right, that the arms competition diverts resources away from what in a sense would be better use of those resources. What Gorbachev chooses to ignore is that the United States disarmed after World War II. We didn't have to negotiate to disarm. Mr. Truman simply disbanded the armed forces, brought the boys home. And it was Stalin that then mounted a threat against Western Europe. It was not only the seizure of Eastern Europe, it was the Berlin Blockage, it was the subversive threats in France and Italy that led the United States against its inclinations to move its forces back to Western Europe. The Soviet Union may talk about the arms race as if it consists only of strategic weapons. The Soviet Union has never disbanded the immense conventional forces that they acquired during the course of World War II. They have maintained those conventional forces through thick and thin as a threat against Western Europe and if they are prepared to remove the threat against... Western Europe and I've seen no sign that the Soviets are prepared to do that, then of course, they will be doing more to reduce the arms competition than talking about the arms race in this vague way.

SOME PEOPLE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO WORK TOWARD A WORLD IN WHICH WE DON'T USE FORCE TO SETTLE CONFLICTS. THAT THE SUPERPOWERS SHOULD TRY TO FIRST STOP INTERVENING IN THE THIRD WORLD AND SUPPLYING ARMS AND WEAPONS AND ADVICE TO OTHER COUNTRIES THAT SPREAD WEAPONSTHROUGHOUT OUT THE WORLD. AND THAT THE TIME HASCOME FOR US TO TRY TO INSTITUTE OR DEVELOP INTERNATIONALLY THE KIND OF SYSTEMS OF RULES OF BEHAVIOR THAT WE HAVE INTERNALLY IN OUR NATIONCAUSE WE SEEM TO HAVE TWO MORALITIES, TWO DIFFERENT SETS OF VALUES ABOUT WHAT WE WOULD DO TO EACH OTHER HERE, TO BE GOVERNED BY LAW HERE WHEREAS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA IT'S SORT OF GOVERNED BY ANARCHY AND FORCE. DO YOU THINK THAT THERE IS A SUBSTITUTE FOR FORCE, OF POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA?

Those who advocate that we develop international rules that are the equivalent of the internal rules in the United States miss one essential point. That in the United States those rules are backed up by force. It is the force of law that provides support for them. Externally there is no international law, there is no set of rules. If there were such a set and we should work toward them, we have encouraged the Soviets to work towards them, that too will require being backed up with force. It is that last element, the essential ingredient of force, that those who make these kinds of statements miss that point. And if we look at what they say, they fail to understand...

I'LL ASK AGAIN.

I missed part of your question.

I'LL ASK FROM ANOTHER ANGLE. SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT NATIONS WILL COME TO SEE THAT IT'S ACTUALLYIN OUR SELF INTEREST TO CO-EXIST PEACEFULLY, TO NOT RESORT TO FORCE BECAUSE IT ACTUALLY DESTABILIZES, AND... PART OF THE LAWS OF THE SEA, AND OTHER KINDS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WHERE NATIONS FIND IT IN THEIR SELF INTEREST AND SO FORTH AND THE UN PERHAPS COULD BE BEEFED UP. I KNOW THAT GORBACHEV'S BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE UN AND SO FORTH. SHOULD I JUST ASK PART OF THAT?

Well, those say that if we establish rules of the game, that it is in our self-interest to co-exist are absolutely right. But they must have rules of the game that work and that will require the threat of some kind of sanction to make them work. Until such time these people would like us to return to the Garden of Eden. Unfortunately, that is not the sort of world in which we live. The world in which we live requires power to be opposed to power. And by holding out this dream world they create false hopes in our societies and in other democracies.

WHAT IS THE ROLE THEN FOR AMERICAN MILITARY POWER AND NUCLEAR FORCES THEN IN MAINTAINING STABILITY IN THE WORLD?

American military power including its nuclear elements serves two purposes. First to assure that the Soviet Union will not indulge in major aggression by deterring any hypothetical major Soviet action. Secondly, below that threshold, to have the capability of stabilizing other parts of the world including such parts of the world as the Persian Gulf which the United States is pledged to protect against external threat and in which are most of the world's oil resources, on which the free world depends. So we will need these military... forces in order to provide stability, whether through deterrents or through actual employment.

A LOT OF PEOPLE WORRY ABOUT THE DISPERSAL OF NUCLEAR FORCES ON SHIPBOARDS, ON SHIPS AROUND THE WORLD. MY QUESTION IS WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT ARE DISPERSED WITH OUR FLEETS AROUND THE WORLD? WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?

That means I can... neither confirm nor deny,

OH, THAT'S CLASSIFIED, THAT WE HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON SHIPBOARD, OKAY.

Now you want to talk about submarines?

NO, I WANT TO TALK ABOUT SURFACE SHIPS. WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BE WILLING TO GO TO WAR AND POSSIBLY NUCLEAR TO DEFEND?

I think that the United States should be prepared to threaten or if need be, nuclear weapons in response to an attack upon the NATO alliance including North America, and alternatively in the Middle East if it is necessary to secure the energy resources of the United States. United States is also pledged to protect Japan against a nuclear threat but I think that that is an even more hypothetical condition than an attack against Western Europe.

YOU DON'T MEAN AGAINST A NUCLEAR... DON'T YOU MEAN AGAINST A CONVENTIONAL...

United States is, actually the United States is on paper in the Non-Proliferation Treaty prepared to protect anyone against a threat by a nuclear power.

LET'S JUST TRY THAT AGAIN. WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BE PREPARED TO GO TO WAR TO DEFEND AND WAR AND POTENTIALLY NUCLEAR WAR?

The United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons, if need be, to protect the United States and Western Europe, all part of the NATO alliance. The United States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons if it seems to be in the...national interest. Elsewhere in the world those circumstances cannot be specified in advance. But notice I say, should be prepared to use nuclear weapons. If it is seen that the United States is so prepared, we will not have to use them.

DO YOU EVER WORRY ABOUT, AND YOU HEAR A LOT OF PEOPLE TALK ABOUT THE FOG OF WAR, THE KIND OF SARAJEVO KIND OF MODEL WHERE POSSIBLY THE DISPERSAL OF WEAPONS AROUND THE WORLD AND TACTICAL WEAPONS COULD LEAD INADVERTANTLY TO A CRISIS SITUATION IN WHICH THEY WOULD RISK BEING USED IN TRIGGERING A LARGE...?

There, there is the possibility of a, an unauthorized use or an unintended use, and it is that possibility that the United States and I presume the Soviet Union, have been seeking to minimize for these last 25 years. We have introduced for all of our nuclear weapons some kind of permissive action link to assure that weapons will not be used unless there is authorization. Indeed, much of our investment in new nuclear weapons per se, has been designed to increase the security of those weapons against misuse.

NOW, ARMS CONTROL. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF ARMS CONTROL AND HOW DO YOU EVALUATE THE ARMS CONTROLS RECORD? IN PARTICULAR, DO THESE AGREEMENTS WE'RE CURRENTLY WORKING ON, ARE THEY HEADED DOWN THE ROAD TOWARD DISARMAMENT OR...?

What is the purpose of arms control? Its purpose should be quite simple. To increase arms stability under circumstances in which one may reduce the level of nuclear weapons, but that's not its primary purpose. Its primary purpose is to increase stability and increase the security of the west. If we can... do that... and reduce nuclear weapons level, well and good.

IS THERE SENSE IN WHICH THE PUBLIC, I MEAN WE NEED TO ENGAGE IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS PARTLY BECAUSE THE PUBLIC DEMANDS IT?

Oh, I think that it is incumbent upon the American government, continuously, to negotiate with the Soviet Union on arms control measures. It is, first of all, I think a moral obligation to attempt to work towards a world in which the tensions between the two powers have been reduced. And part of that, though not the totality, is in arms control measures. Moreover, if the United States is seen to be failing, is resisting moving towards arms control measures, we will lose the war for public opinion in Western Europe. The West Europeans will say that the United States is unprepared to reduce tensions whereas Mr. Gorbachev is. So political pressures force us in that direction and even it weren't for Western European opinion, an American administration that was utterly recalcitrant on arms control issues would rapidly lose the support of the American people. Oh, it's sometimes said that Mr. Reagan in his early period through the harsh initial statements of the administration creates an American constituency for arms control in a few short months that Jimmy Carter had labored for four years to achieve and had failed to achieve.

DO YOU THINK THERE'S A PUBLIC MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT ARMS CONTROL, THAT THE PUBLIC THINKS THAT ARMS CONTROL IS, HEADED TO THE GOAL OF IT, IS DISARMAMENT, IS GETTING RID OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

The, the public belief to an excess degree is that somehow or other arms control negotiations will permit us to get rid of nuclear weapons in their entirety. That is wrong. We cannot get rid of nuclear weapons below some minimum level to provide us with assurance that some other party is not cheating or some third party is not surreptitiously acquiring nuclear weapons. And that is quite difficult. So we will always need to retain some minimum stockpile of nuclear weapons. Regrettably, the public has been encouraged in this direction by some of the statements from senior political leaders who have said that they are looking to a world without nuclear weapons as Mr. Reagan did after Reykjavik. That is a world in the sweet by and by. It will not come in our lifetimes and we ought not to think that it can. If we do so, it would be irresponsible of us.

IF THINGS GO WELL, WHAT KIND OF WORLD SHOULD WE LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING IN 30 OR 40 YEARS?

Well, if things go well, I think that both sides will retain some measurable military power but there will be monitoring arrangements such that that military power cannot rapidly be brought to bear in surprise attack. And as a consequence, the fear of surprise attack will be diminished. We will, I hope, have reduced, substantially reduced levels of military forces but the reduction in military forces should not be expected to be so large that it will result in instability between the two sides. It is more important to pay the costs of maining sufficient, maintaining sufficient forces for ourselves and presumably the other side will feel the same way so that we have a stable balance. Disarming in such a way that we are weaker than the other side and vulnerable or disarming in such a way that stabilities are then created is imprudent, even though many hold out hopes which are imprudent.

THE QUESTION IS, WHERE DO YOU SEE THE GREATEST THREAT TO AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE NEXT LONG PERIOD OF TIME, WHETHER IT BE FROM THE SOVIET BLOC OR FROM OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD, INCREASING IN STRENGTH, OR JUST STABILITY, OR WHETHER YOU SEE IT BEING EXTERNAL OR INTERNAL IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC PROBLEM.

The United States must use its economic resources and its political capital to deal with the range of threats. The Soviet threat is perhaps the most dramatic, but it is not the only element and therefore not our only priority. We must maintain military forces sufficient to neutralize that Soviet threat and to deter the Soviet Union, but we are also interested in sustaining the economic position of the United States, internationally. If that becomes too weak then our capacity to intervene internationally becomes weaker and therefore we cannot devote so much in the way of resources to military matters that we undermine our international economic position. So we have two major priorities: our international political and economic role and our military and political role. They tend to become more or less important depending on the policies of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union is sounding bellicose, this world becomes bi-polar very rapidly. If the Soviet Union is sunny then the world becomes much more multi-polar and we look to competition from Japan or Germany or other countries. Those are two threats, and the third threat is, in effect, chaos in the Third World. Some minimum degree of order in the Third World is something very much in our interest and, from time to time, but I hope only very selectively, we may feel impelled to use our military power to bring about order in the Third World, or retain order in the Third World. In addition, we should recognize that the United States, along with the other great creditor nations, has an obligation to help Third World countries emerge from the various in degrees of poverty and other embarrassments in which they presently suffer.

IS THIS IN CONTRAST TO THE REAGAN DOCTRINE? WE HAVE LIMITED RESOURCES TO FIGHT THESE BATTLES...

I think that we must recognize that only those circumstances that actively cry out for American intervention should re-require American intervention, that the United States should not be prepared to go around the world seeking any group that will lift up the banner of liberty, or at least lift up a pro-American banner and then immediately rush in with support. Under those circumstances, we will quickly saturate the public's willingness to sustain the American government in taking measures that the government regards as necessary in the national interest in the United States.

WESTERN EUROPEANS FEEL THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT BE ALLOWING THE WORLD TO FALL INTO INSTABILITY PURELY THROUGH OUR LACK OF FISCAL DISCIPLINE. IS THAT A GREATER RISK TO OUR STABILITY, IN THE LONG RUN, THAN THE COLD WAR THAT SEEMS TO GO ON ENDLESSLY?

The greatest risk that we face, potentially, is the possibility of Soviet aggression. It is only a possibility and if we take the necessary measures that possibility can be reduced to a very low level. But it is the greatest risk, and those who talk about other risks are tending to discount the importance, though not the probability, of such Soviet aggression. In addition to that possibility, there are all sorts of other evils that can befall the United States and one of them is in process at the present time—becoming too dependent upon the importation of foreign capital, too vulnerable to the reaction of other countries, in terms of failing to provide funds to the United States or even withdrawing funds from the United States, that makes us economically vulnerable and undermines the basis of support for all of our policies, including military and political policies. And we have drifted into that kind of vulnerability in the course of the 1980s, partly through self-indulgence on the budget front, such that we no longer have the savings to sustain the level of investment activity in the United States that we believe that we require, and we import investable funds from the rest of the world. That has made us now the world' s largest debtor nation. One doesn't want to be melodramatic about such a shift in status, but there is a level of debt that embarrasses us in terms of our economic vulnerability and in terms of our ability to perform our responsibilities on the military and political front.

YOU'RE SAYING THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS OUR GREATEST THREAT BECAUSE OF THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH AND ANOTHER THREAT IS...

Mn-hmn.

RIGHT?

Right.

...THAT WE COULD [INAUDIBLE]

The greatest threat is the Soviet Union, but it...

LET'S START OVER AGAIN

The greatest threat is the Soviet Union, because military aggression, which this generation has not experienced, is much more devastating even than economic vulnerabilities, economic weaknesses, and we must sustain a level of deterrence against the Soviet Union so we have, in a sense, the luxury of a, of coping with these lesser threats. But when I say lesser threats, they are more probable and we need to understand that when we become dependent upon foreign sources of capital, as we are increasingly dependent in the United States, that we weaken our economic position; we make ourselves more vulnerable to unpredictable attitudes in other countries, and as a result of our economic vulnerabilities, we're less capable of carrying out the military and political responsibilities that have fallen to the United States since the close of World War II.

WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE GREATEST LESSON OF THE NUCLEAR AGE?

The greatest lesson of the nuclear age is the what shall I say, moral ambiguity of weapons systems. Nuclear weapons have brought to us a degree of military and political stability that the world has not seen in the course of recorded history. Military, nuclear weapons have maintained the peace in Western Europe for more than forty years. And the United States has been disengaged from major wars for a longer period than any other time in this century. On the other hand, nuclear weapons convey a degree of risk and a degree of devastation that means that we can never entirely embrace the benefits of nuclear weapons, without recognizing at the same time the risks that they convey. The world is morally an ambiguous place; it is not simple black and white.

WHAT PERSONAL EXPERIENCE HAVE YOU HAD, ANY TURNING POINTS IN YOUR VARIOUS ROLES AS A STEWARD OF THIS COUNTRY, THAT HAVE LED YOU TO CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS?

Well, I think that the first thing that I should emphasize was the need, as the Soviet Union built her counter-deterrent in the late sixties and early seventies, to shift American strategy in such a way that we could continue to perform the responsibilities that we had acquired, and most notably, to continue to provide extended deterrents for western Europe through the linkage of European security to our own strategic forces. This led to a change in doctrine.

[REQUESTS RE-PHRASE OF ANSWER ABOVE]

The greatest concern that I had when I was Director of Strategic Studies at the RAND Corporation was that the rise of the Soviet Union's missile forces, its new counter-deterrent, was eroding the credibility of the strategy that we were able to employ for some twenty-five years after the close of World War II and that we needed a new strategic doctrine that would continue to link the strategic forces of the United States to the protection of western Europe through extended deterrence. It was my good fortune, as it were to be called by the President to be Secretary of Defense and to put that new doctrine in place. I was also the Secretary of Defense—perhaps regrettably and certainly in a way that provided lessons learned—at the close of our venture in Southeast Asia. From such a venture one learned, I think, to be economical in the times that one applied American military power, and if that power was ever applied, it should be applied with a degree of sufficiency to achieve the political objectives that the United States had set for itself. It is also clear that the tolerance of the American public for sustaining this kind of obligation is not endless, and that unless we are able to achieve, discernably achieve, some kind of political objectives, public support will wane and the United States will fail in its policies. All of these things occurred in Vietnam. One must also recognize that the men and women of the military establishment become emotionally engaged in that kind of war, so that when the collapse occurred, despite the desire of the many senior officers to get back into the thing, in the face of a blanket injunction by the Congress that we should no longer use our military forces in Southeast Asia, we had to, in effect discourage our military people from their natural inclinations. It was my view at the time, we are not going to climb on that tar baby again, that we cannot afford to get back into Vietnam. Moreover, it would be illegal and politically unwise to attempt to go in that direction.

LET ME ASK YOU TO START WITH "THE LESSON THAT I TOOK FROM VIETNAM"...

The lesson, the lessons that I took from Vietnam during my tenure as Secretary of Defense, when the final collapse occurred in Saigon, is (1) one should be very sparing and economical in terms of those occasions in which one employs American military force. (2) That when one decides to employ those forces, they should be ap-applied in sufficient strength and with the appropriate strategy and tactics to achieve America's political objectives. (3) That unless one does so, that the American people's willingness to support these kinds of conflicts is not endless and that if a war seems to drift on endlessly, it will lose public support. Fourth, that in the case of Vietnam, the American military were inclined at the close, because of emotional attachments, to go back in and try and s-salvage South Vietnam even when South Vietnam had lost all of its military forces. There was-no way that that was going to occur and it was against congressional law that said Thou Shalt Stay Out of Southeast Asia. It would have been imprudent and politically unwise for us to attempt to jump back on that tar baby again, but it required considerable effort on my part to restrain some of our senior officers.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN, THAT DESPITE ALL OUR TREMENDOUS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR STRENGTH, EVEN THE MORE USABLE WEAPONS WE HAVE MADE, WE CAN'T HAVE OUR WAY IN A SMALL PLACE LIKE VIETNAM, OR NICARAGUA OR ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, AND THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE SAME PROBLEM, IN AFGHANISTAN?

What it means is that...

START AGAIN.

It is not foreordained that superpowers will have their way in dealing with Third World countries. If the will of those that one is attempting to cope with whether the United States in Vietnam or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, us such that it is not worth the costs, either economic or political, for the superpower to overcome that, those levels of resistance, then we will find it either us or the Soviet Union advantageous to cut it off. These Third World countries do not involve stakes sufficiently large for us to expend endless political and economic resources to work our will. That does not mean that we lack in power; it means, it hopefully implies that we have some judgment about the degree to which we want to invest that power.

HOW CAN WE BRING OUR NUCLEAR FORCES TO BEAR? HOW CAN WE MAKE THEM USABLE, IN A SENSE. CAN WE WIN A NUCLEAR WAR? CAN WE USE THEM TO GAIN OUR ENDS?

The way that we use our nuclear forces is not to use our nuclear forces. That their existence implies that it changes the calculations of some hypothetical opponent in such a way that he refrains from doing that which might, if he did it, force us to use those nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons lies in their non-use, not their actual employment.

TO MAKE THAT THREAT CREDIBLE, MUST WE CONTINUALLY STRIVE TO MAKE OUR WEAPONS SEEM MORE USABLE?

Our weapons must always seem to be usable, in the sense that it is our political will to employ them if the opponent does something that we have announced in advance that he must not do, without drawing upon himself the threat that we would use those weapons. That does not mean that the weapons have to be more usable in any technical sense, but the political will must be perceived by the other side.

A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE SAID THAT EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND THE NEED TO FIND A TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE TO MAKE IT SEEM THAT WE COULD USE OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ADVANTAGE IS WHAT HAS CAUSED THE ARMS RACE, THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE FELT THAT THEY HAD TO MATCH US AT EVERY LEVEL AND THAT IT'S SORT OF A RECIPE FOR A NEVER-ENDING CYCLE OF MAKING MORE USABLE, CREDIBLE WEAPONS AND HAVING THEM MATCHED AND GOING ON TO THE NEXT TECHNOLOGICAL LEVEL.

Well, those who focus on technology as the source of the arms race are overlooking the activities of the Soviet Union and when such people say that the Soviet Union only is obliged to match us, they're overlooking history. What we see in the case of the Soviet Union is that the Soviets built their missile forces. American intelligence expected and the then Secretary of Defense expected that the Soviets would cease to build their ICBM forces as they proch—approached our own levels in numbers. They went on building, until their forces were 50 percent higher. They weren't matching us; they apparently wanted to exceed us, and the size of those nuclear weapons was immensely greater than ours. They were, they were deploying high-yield weapons when we were deploying low-yield weapons. So the notion that the Soviets are "only" driven by the United States and are being forced by our actions to match us, just disregards actual Soviet conduct. The Soviet Union has historically sought an edge. I believe that when Mr. Gorbachev says, and I trust that he is right, that the Soviet Union is turning towards a defensive strategy, that he is, in effect, saying that in the past the Soviets sought an offensive edge and we are prepared now to give up that search wait to see that the Soviet Union actually abandons that before reducing the guard of the United States and the west.

IT'S ALWAYS BEEN THOUGHT THAT AMERICA'S ADVANTAGE, BECAUSE OUR PEOPLE AREN'T WILLING TO GO OUT THERE AND PUT THEIR BODIES IN THE TRENCHES, IS OUR TECHNO, LOGICAL EDGE AND THAT IT WOULD BE SILLY FOR US TO NOT PURSUE WEAPONS IMPROVEMENT AND TO HAVE SOME KIND OF EDGE TO MAKE OUR THREAT OF FIRST USE CREDIBLE, IN A SENSE WE HAVE TO THINK THAT WE CAN PREVAIL AND WIN IN A NUCLEAR WAR. DO YOU THINK THAT WE NEED TO BE ABLE TO PURSUE THE TECHNOLOGY THAT CAN ENABLE US TO DO THAT?

It is not essential to have improved technology in order to convey a willingness to employ nuclear weapons. That depends upon political will and political perception. Technology may augment that perception of political will, but it is not essential. The United States, outside of the nuclear area, has long had the hope that somehow or other we could substitute capital for labor, or capital for military manpower, to be more precise, and that we could, as a result, fight a war without casualties, or with minimal casualties. That is something of an illusion. If a serious war comes, there will be casualties and there is no amount of sophisticated technology that is going to prevent casualties. In a sense, that was the error of judgment in Vietnam. We thought that, somehow or other, superior technology would give us a significant edge over Hanoi. Hanoi did not have the technology, but it had the political will and in the end that political will proved to outlast the technological capabilities that the United States brought to that struggle.

DO YOU THINK WE'RE ON THE CUSP OF A NEW ERA WHERE THE COLD WAR MAY BE ENDING, WHERE THERE ARE SHIFTING GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS?

I would hope that that there is going to be a change in the relationship between the two superpowers that it will be less given to threat. And I feel threats implicitly or explicitly provided by the Soviet Union, and more designed to a relaxation of tensions, so that both superpowers and the rest of the world can get on resolving other issues, economic, political improvement in social relationships within each of our countries. But the improvement, in terms of the climate does not mean that we can disband our military forces. The end of the Cold War does not mean, to some people, the reduction of tensions but the continued necessity to maintain our guard; it means that we can abandon the military posture of the United States, we can cease providing the resources for our military establishment. That is the road to ruin. In fact, the danger that lies in a diminution in tension is primarily in that it might lead to illusion in the west. Otherwise, it tends to be a very good development. You're not going to ask about your "patriotic 27 percent?"

OH YES, LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT THAT! I'M ALSO CURIOUS, YOU SEEM TO PUT IT ALL ON THE SOVIET UNION. HAS THE UNITED STATES EVER EXAGGERATED THE THREAT AND BUILT BEYOND WHERE WE SHOULD HAVE AND SORT OF PROVOKED RESPONSE?

Oh, certainly, the United States has, from time to time, over-reacted to Soviet actions. We built the Soviet movement into Afghanistan into a vast geopolitical enterprise, geopolitical momentum, and perhaps overreacted to that. But by and large, one should understand that the United States at the close of World War II was eager to demobilize, to bring the boys back home and to go on with what we thought had been a peaceful world before World War II. It was Soviet miscalculations, Stalin's miscalculations, that brought us back into the international engagement and by and large, it has been the perception, the correct perception in my judgment, of Soviet threats against western Europe and other places around the periphery of the Soviet Union, that has obliged the United States to respond. Sometimes we overreacted, but sometimes we under-reacted. Sometimes we have taken m—military steps to deflect the Soviet Union, but we have also taken economic steps generous economic steps, like the Marshall Plan that did so much to permit Western Europe to flourish once again after World War II. And I remind you that we offered Marshall Plan assistance to the Soviet Union and to her satellites and the Soviet Union turned it down.

THAT REMINDS ME OF DÉTENTE. WOULD YOU SUPPORT INCREASED TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, OR WOULD YOU SEE THAT AS HELPING THEM TOO MUCH?

I am prepared to see in increased trade with the Soviet Union, but it is not an end in itself. It must come in the total context of improved relationships including improvements in the military relationships, a reduction, I would hope, of the Soviet offensive capability directed against western Europe, a willingness of the Soviets to acquiesce in the right kind of confidence-building measures... Under those circumstances, I think we can afford more freely to trade with the Soviet Union. The problem with trade with the Soviet Union is not only that it creates this illusion that all our problems are over. The problem with such trade is that it feeds on itself and that various interest groups begin to see trade as an end in itself, rather than an instrument of national policy in dealing with the Soviet Union which continues to be a threat not only to the United States but to the whole free world. You going to talk about your 27 percent?

YOU MADE THE COMMENT EARLIER THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER BEEN OVERRUN, RECENT GENERATIONS HAVE NEVER HAD TO HAVE A WAR ON THEIR TERRITORY. THE EUROPEANS AND THE SOVIETS ARE VERY AFRAID OF WAR. THEY KNOW WHAT IT'S LIKE. WHAT DO YOU SAY TO A GENERATION THAT HAS LOST ITS CONNECTION WITH OTHER PEOPLE IN THE WORLD AND THE NEED, PERHAPS, TO GO TO WAR TO SUPPORT THEM? IS THAT A REAL DANGER, THAT THE YOUTH OF AMERICA ARE NOT THAT INTERESTED IN GOING TO WAR TO FIGHT FOR OTHER COUNTRIES?

Well, I think that it's probably desirable that the youth of America not want to get involved in a war. I would not want to see the American society or the youth of America particularly bellicose I would hope that American youth would continue to see that there is a necessity, both in terms of our ideals and in terms of our interests, in American forces coming to the aid of others, and I think that that probably is the case. That may not be admitted in polls, mind you, but when called upon, I think that the young people of America respond to that call. I can recall that in the 1930s, a poll of British youth, of Oxford youth—resolved that "this house states that we will not come to aid of king and country." Came World War II, those attitudes changed and changed suddenly. So I don't think that any hypothetical opponent of the United States ought to misjudge the ultimate spirit of this society and act imprudently as a consequence and I think that under the right circumstances, with the right leadership, American the American people including young Americans, will see the necessity of being engaged in conflict. That does not mean that American youth or the American society should embrace all conflict. There should be wariness about conflict; we should be very prudent in involving US forces abroad. That is the task of political leadership, to be wise. And it is the task of our military establishment and those who serve in it to respond accordingly when our true interests are under threat.