DR. IKLE, THIS STORY REALLY BEGINS I GUESS WITH THE SS-20 MISSILE WHICH WAS FIRST TESTED IN 1974. IN SEPTEMBER '76 YOU WERE PROBABLY ONE OF THE FIRST PEOPLE PUBLICLY TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THESE MISSILES. WHAT WAS IT PARTICULARLY THAT CONCERNED YOU ABOUT THEM.

I recall well expressing concern in September '76 about the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 which we realized was going on or was about to unfold in front of us. And what upset us so much and what I focused on was the fact that there was no provocation for that missile, no justification. We had stopped having intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe. We had taken them out a long time ago and had now to replace them. And now here we had a SALT agreement, SALT I and negotiations on the SALT II, and suddenly the Soviet Union came with this large deployment of intermediate range missiles to which we had no counter deployment.

WHAT DID YOU THINK THE SOVIETS' AIM WAS IN DEVELOPING THE MISSILE?

Well we could only speculate what the Soviet Union was trying to do in deploying their SS-20 against Europe and Asia. It probably is in order to increase the dominance, the weight of their nuclear strengths and potential use of nuclear blackmail, and to have an edge in the overall nuclear coalition with the United States which was limited for the intercontinental missiles through the SALT agreements.

COULD YOU EXPLAIN TO US IN A LITTLE MORE DETAIL WHAT THE SIGNIFICANCE WAS OF THE FACT THAT THEY WERE INTERMEDIATE RANGE, THAT THEY WERE AIMED AT EUROPE RATHER THAN... WHY WOULD THEY HAVE MISSILES AIMED AT EUROPE WHERE THEY HAD ALL THESE OTHER THINGS ALREADY AT EUROPE? WHY WOULD THEY HAVE EXTRA MISSILES?

Our guess is what the Soviets realized is that the SALT negotiations and possible follow-on agreements were limiting the intercontinental range missiles and their desire to have an edge over the Atlantic alliance was therefore blocked in these intercontinental forces. But in the intermediate ranges there was no agreement so they figured they could go ahead. The door was open and they plowed through.

CAN YOU TELL US WHY THE CRUISE MISSILE WAS DEVELOPED?

The cruise missile permits exploiting the new technology that began to emerge in the 1960s for accuracy, for accurate guidance. One can deliver a a munitions with precision and you don't have to destroy a vast area in order to hit a military target. And the important application of the cruise missile was recognized early on, was for conventional munitions.

IN 1979, THE DUAL OR DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION WAS TAKEN TO DEPLOY CRUISE AND PERSHING, BUT ALSO TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS. IN YOUR OPINION, AND IN THAT OF LIKE MINDED MEMBERS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, HAD THAT BEEN A GOOD DECISION?

The from hindsight we can now say that the decision in '79 to deploy the missiles Pershings and cruise missiles at the same time to negotiate the elimination of the Soviet missiles in exchange for sta... taking out ours was a real success. At least it seems now with the agreement that hopefully will be viable for the indefinite future. The alliance had the preference all along, not to begin a new generation and then another one yet of missiles. The alliance stopped deploying missiles way back after the 1950s when we took out the intermediate range missiles in Europe that were deployed in Italy, Turkey, other places and preferred not to have such missiles threatening both sides. So when the Soviet came, Union came with their SS-20s we wanted to make one more try to get rid of this whole competition. Hence, the proposal of 1979.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IN THOSE EARLY YEARS, '81 TO '83, WAS UNITED IN ITS ATTITUDE TO ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION? WAS THERE A COHERENT POLICY?

I'm trying to think whether, what the disputes and discussions were in the early years of the first Reagan administration about arms control. Obviously there were differences, different ideas not to proceed. There was some hesitation I recall about making the proposal for zero-zero, for abolishing the missiles entirely. As I seem to recall, people in the state department thought this would never be accepted by the Soviet Union and it would be provocative or bad to make an agreement that could not be accepted. But the President Reagan liked that idea and of course promoted it ever since.

CAN I PUT TO YOU THE ARGUMENT WHICH IS SOMETIMES MADE BY PEOPLE IN EUROPE WHICH IS THAT NO ONE EXPECTED THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO IT AT THE TIME. I KNOW THEY HAVE SINCE BUT THAT IS THE ARGUMENT THAT NO ONE EXPECTED THEM TO AGREE TO IT AT THE TIME.

What is your question?

MY QUESTION IS DID YOU AT THE TIME EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO THE ZERO OPTION? WAS IT A SERIOUS NEGOTIATING POSITION?

One couldn't know whether they would agree to abolish the missiles and because there was the Pershing a threatening missile from the point of view of the Soviet Union. And it stood to reason that it would be desirable for them to get rid of it. They had a lot of intercontinental forces and if they could overcome their concern about matching European forces with large missile forces. It would seem not unreasonable for them to reach, to agree to the proposal of zero-zero.

DO YOU THINK THAT THE SOVIETS MADE ANY SERIOUS NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS, WERE NEGOTIATING AT ALL SERIOUSLY IN THAT PERIOD, UP UNTIL 1983 WHEN THEY WITHDREW FROM THE TALKS? DO YOU THINK THEY WERE SERIOUS AT ALL?

Between the time we made the first proposal for zero-zero missiles and the break up of the talks in '83 the Soviet Union tried primarily to mobilize opinion in Western Europe against the deployment and was... trying to outweigh all of the elections taking place in the United Kingdom, Germany, to see whether the positions of the left in Europe would lead to non-deployment of the missiles so that they could continue to expand their SS-20 force without being challenged to negotiate the abolition of these missiles.

AS YOU SAID THEY HAVE BEEN DEPLOYING THE SS-20 IN CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS. CAN YOU GIVE US SOME IDEA OF THE SCOPE OR THE SCALE OF THE EXPANSION OF THE SS-20?

Well it was an immense the Soviet Union made an immense monetary investment in developing the missile, the research and development phase. Then in building a... all these missiles and the spares, and the support facilities and the manpower costs is not just the cost of the missiles themselves but the personnel that goes with it. So it is really a large decision for them (a) to go ahead with it in the '70s, which we thought was very bad and foolish; and (b) now seems to get rid of them in compliance with the INF agreement.

HOW DO YOU INTERPRET THE CHANGE OF HEART ON INF THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PERFORMED?

The Soviet decision to finally agree to the zero-zero outcome on the missiles may have something to do with the change in government, the style of the government in Moscow, a new effort to engage the west maybe with long-term ideas about gaining the benefits of détente, of trade, credits, of slowing down the arms competition on the western side and permitting therefore the Soviet Union to slow it down and yet stay ahead by their measures and their felt needs. So it could be a long-term phenomena that is related with our economic problems as well.

IN 1982 THERE WAS THIS ONE PROPOSAL, WHICH DID SORT OF EMERGE, THE SO-CALLED "WALK IN THE WOODS." WHAT WAS YOUR OPINION OF THAT AND WHY WAS IT REJECTED IN WASHINGTON?

The so-called "Walk in the Woods" proposal had a rather complicated structure. It would not have gotten rid of all the SS-20s and would therefore have left us with a major verification problem. One of the important benefits of getting rid of all the SS-20s is that it makes verification somewhat less difficult. It's difficult enough even at zero. It's rather impossible if you permit some missiles because then you have to count them, and how do you count mobile missiles?

WAS IT A PROBLEM ALSO THAT IT WOULD GET RID OF THE P2 WHICH IN SOME WAYS WAS THE MOST POTENT PART OF THE 1979 PACKAGE?

The main defect of the so-called "Walk in the Woods" proposal was the failure really to come to grips in a fundamental way with the SS-20, and secondarily at the same time to... inhibit our forces by taking out one important component, probably the most important component.

THERE'S BEEN SOME AMOUNT OF EUPHORIA AROUND THIS YEAR IN THE PUBLIC PRINTS IN SUMMER AND AUTUMN ABOUT POSSIBLE DEALS. YOU, IN YOUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND IN YOUR ENTRIES AND THINGS, HAVE SOUNDED A NOTE OF SOME CAUTION. WHY DO YOU THINK WE STILL NEED TO BE SO CAUTIOUS IN THIS AREA?

I have a question. When are they going to show this?

JULY OF NEXT YEAR.

Whenever we go through a period of arms control agreements and summits and such things there's a tendency in the West to think that this is a sea change in the East-West relationship. Let us recall that the Soviet Union has been hostile to the West since its beginning that they have violated many agreements. And here I'm thinking less of the arms control agreements but our Yalta understanding of permitting democracy in Poland, of leaving Czechoslovakia independent like Finland, a part of a Soviet bloc. The attack on North Korea, the long history of the Berlin crisis and so on, Up to the invasion of Afghanistan in '79 and the troops still in Afghanistan. So one has to have a historic view of these fluctuations. I think in the long run one should try to promote a less hostile relationship, a less threatening relationship, and particularly a contraction of the massive Soviet military effort. But we have to realize that the competition doesn't stop just because we have reached an agreement. There'll be attempts made to get an advantage, do a little cheating or even do some large cheating to press ahead in areas which are unlimited to reach out into the Third World again, what have you. It was our experience after the 1972 agreements that there was the most biggest nuclear build-up in Soviet history after those agreements, contrary to the spirit and preamble of the ABM Treaty. And also there was the expansion under Brezhnev then into the Third World.

WHAT WAS SECRETARY GORBACHEV AFTER WHEN HE MADE THIS SO-CALLED DOUBLE ZERO PROPOSAL, IF I MAY CALL IT THAT, IN MAY OF 1987? IN OTHER WORDS, WHEN HE OFFERED TO TAKE OUT THE SHORTER INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES?

One of the maneuvers and tactics that the Soviets have been pursuing in arms control negotiations very often has to be — has been to inhibit testing of US or NATO weapon systems. And here we have to be very careful. While on the one hand many people who are work and think about arms control find limitations on testing, whether it's nuclear testing, missile testing of anti-satellite systems, find those limitations very attractive. They do get really to the, to the core of the Western capability to compensate for the quantitative advantages of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. They have far more tanks. They have far more artillery pieces. They have far more soldiers. Now, how have we been telling ourselves through all these years do we make up for that? We make up for that by somewhat better weapons technology. But if you stop testing then our compensating capability will eventually disappear. So we have to be careful on these test limitations. Only very few where they are in our joint interest.

IF A DEAL GOES THROUGH, THE INF DEAL, HOW DOES THAT LEAVE THE OVERALL POSITION IN EUROPE IN YOUR JUDGMENT?

Well was look back at the INF deal we'll see increasingly the main impact of it will have been that its political effect and its stimulus to further arms control negotiations and agreements. Giving us a certain feeling of détente and initially raising concerns about this US nuclear guarantee or this so-called coupling. But militarily there are, there are compensating measures. Militarily there are a lot of nuclear weapons still in Europe. There are nuclear weapons in the world which of course are being addressed through the...agreements, so the military importance is less than the political importance.