GENERAL, CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR?

Uh, yes. I have a little experience. I joined the war in 1941, near Moscow. I finished the war in 1945 outside of Prague. The war took me in the southern direction: Kiev, Bucharest, Budapest, Vienna, Prague. By the end of the war, I was the commander of a motorized infantry battalion. I was wounded five times. So I cannot boast of having extensive operational experience. What I do have is sufficient experience on a tactical unit scale, four and a half years on the scale of regiment and division.

HOW DID YOU FIRST HEAR ABOUT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND HOW DID YOU...

At this time, we were already beyond Prague. The war has ended. News came that the American side, the United States, had carried out a nuclear weapon's test. This was reported to us, and then we learned that in August, 1945, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki happened. The whole world found out about this. I, as a soldier, understood then... since the war had ended, we assessed the situation, performing our allied duty, our armed forces, the Red Army, were preparing to enter the war against Japan. We understood at the time, and understand now, especially, that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by US pilots was not justified by military necessity. Japan actually stood on the brink of defeat and no need existed for the use of such barbaric weapons. Even now, when you look at the documents, including those of official figures of the United States, this position is confirmed. Read Eisenhower's "Years in the White House." Eisenhower explicitly states that the Japanese were on the verge of surrender and there was no need to use these terrible things on Japanese cities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States were of the same opinion that Japan was on the verge of surrender. Of course, this was known to President Truman, but despite this, he made the fateful decision. What motivated the actions of President Truman, why did this happen? Well, if I did not know it at that time, it is clear now that the primary goal was to intimidate Soviet Russia. In due time, or possibly at that same time, President Truman announced that he was tired of coddling the Soviets. In addition, President Truman hoped to use the atomic bomb to turn the United States into the lord of the world, to conquer the entire world, and to impose the so-called Pax Americana on the world. But you know the outcome. Well, these are historical facts.

...THE SOVIETS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS? FROM THE STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW, DURING THE AMERICAN MONOPOLY.

First of all, we have to figure out what did the people, what did humanity gain from the American nuclear monopoly? Cold War. Teetering on the brink of war. The creation of many thousands of military bases surrounding the Soviet Union. Creation of aggressive military blocs. And all of this was directed against the Soviet Union. Therefore, our attitude towards nuclear monopoly at that time and even from today's vantage point is natural. Now, there are many declassified documents which speak for themselves. Declassified are the US plans for a nuclear attack, at that time, against the Soviet Union. These included the "Charioteer", "Dropshot", and "Trojan" plans. These plans provided for a nuclear attack on the Soviet cities. As early as 1945, an attack was planned, a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Then, in 1948, '49, and '50, attack plans were made – first, a nuclear strike on 70 cities, then 100 cities, then 200 cities of the Soviet Union. All of these documents – we have them in our possession now, and when you read these, sorry for such a comparison, vile documents, one can't help but wonder: was this real? Yes it was, and it was not so long ago. That's what the nuclear monopoly of the United States meant in respect of the Soviet Union. Fortunately for all of the humanity, including for the US population, the nuclear monopoly did not last long. However, everything that the United States had a chance to accomplish during that time begs a question: what else could they have accomplished? And this legitimate question now comes to mind because the current US administration does not want to follow the Soviet Union and commit to the No First Use policy in respect of nuclear weapons.

Lots of politicos in Washington are talking today of the '50s. They say that their intention then was to use a nuclear monopoly for purely peaceful purposes. Although they could use it differently, that is to dictate their rules to the Soviet Union. But they never did it. Now, in order to answer these declarations, I want to go back to those days, those years. I am sure that, speaking of that time, the time when our Red Army had an unprecedented military experience, and nothing could stop its stream of fire; when only the allies' obligations had stopped the Soviet Army expansion. Speaking of yesterday, as well as today, I want to say that the nuclear monopoly wouldn't help the United States. The United States hadn't tried to dictate their will to the Soviet Union for the simple reason of not being powerful enough to do so. Their nuclear monopoly hadn't helped them. Whether speaking of today or of the past.

THAT TIME IT WAS A CONCEPT THAT THE NUCLEAR MONOPOLY HAD BALANCED SOMEHOW THE SOVIET ADVANCE IN THE FIELD OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THAT?

No, of course not. That was nothing but an effort to externalize the US nuclear monopoly. It was impossible. It's hard to imagine that one side has nuclear force. The nuclear weapon were invented, they had started being developed; the United States had already possessed strategic nuclear forces... In 1948, the US nuclear weapons, had reached Europe: 90 American bombers were already based in Great Britain. The bombers were of that type which bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And they were aimed straight on the Soviet Union. We understood what the nuclear weapon meant--after the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, we had had to react quickly...to respond... we had to acquire our own nuclear weapons.

So in 1949 we'd got these weapons in the Soviet Union. But even at that time, when we obtained our nuclear weapons, the American nuclear blackmail still continued. Because the US nuclear superiority was absolute. Apart from it, the US territory was invulnerable. That is, the conditions were unequal. And, in the late '60s, when the Soviet Union had obtained its ICBMs, when the US territory became vulnerable...and...the Soviet Union had reached a parity with the US..only then the balance had been reached.

WHAT WERE YOUR PERSONAL FEELINGS WHEN YOU LEARNED ABOUT THE FIRST SOVIET SUCCESSFUL NUCLEAR TEST?

I felt proud for the Soviet people, for the Soviet working class, for the Soviet science, for the short period in which we managed to acquire such weapons. These weapons are barbaric, no doubt, but we've been forced to acquire them because the US kept gaining its nuclear power more and more, and the threat to the Soviet Union was getting more and more real. Therefore, we, young officers felt pride-first of all for our Soviet science. I want to say something about it. When in April 1969 President Nixon announced that the gap was over once and forever, these words also caused my personal feeling of pride for our Motherland, for the Soviet Union, for our Armed Forces. For we reached a military-strategic parity with the US, and this military-strategic parity between the US and the Soviet Union, and later between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is, undoubtedly, the historic achievement of Socialism. Soviet people...they suffered, as we say, "on their own skins" all the bitterness of WWII. We don't have a single family that hasn't lost somebody in the Second War. Therefore, Soviet people will never allow anybody to break the military-strategic parity. As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said yesterday, the Soviet Union position is that we're invincible economically, that we're not scared of space, we're unsurpassed in technology. Only parity, parity of the lowest possible level —and nothing else.

WHAT WERE PRIORITIES OF THE SOVIET STRATEGISTS WHEN THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE INVENTED. WAS THEIR PRIME CONCERN OF REACHING A NUCLEAR BALANCE IN EUROPE, OR THEY AIMED AT AMERICA STRAIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING?

To reach parity with the United States. Needed a military strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the US that came first. The Soviet military and scientific thought were concentrated on reaching that goal. Eventually we reached it.

IN 1946 OR 1950...WHAT WAS A SENSE IN THE SOVIET ARMY ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE AMERICAN ARSENAL?

We knew, it...and...there were different publications, about speed of American efforts to increase their quantity of atomic bombs. That time I didn't know, let say, a precise number of atomic bombs. But...I knew already about the atomic strategic bombers based in England. It was in 1948, when I was a student of the General Staff Academy, and my thought was already tuned strategically, as we'd been taught, and not in terms of tactic. Among others, we were evaluating the US nuclear potential, and in particular, those 90 atomic bombers...with one or two bombs aboard. That meant approximately 200 bombs, which was a real threat! 200 Hiroshimas! Therefore, we evaluated it then as a real threat to the Soviet Union. Not to forget that fact that in the years following, in 1949, '50, the Americans started to export their missiles to Europe. The "Matadors" appeared (in Europe) as well as "Mays", "Thors", "Jupiters"— the latter in the late '50s. The number of flying launchers had been increased. It was already here...in the Frunze Academy where I used to take a pencil and compute the numbers of atomic shells, atomic bombs, launchers of the American side. And the sad fact was that the balance was obviously a great deal better for the Americans. The preponderance was very big. Let's take mid '60s, for example. In 1960, the Americans had on their side more than 6,000 nuclear charges, while the Soviets had less than 300. That was the ratio... in 1960. Not to mention the '50s, when the ratio was even more favorable to the Americans. That's it.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN CHANGES OF THE STRATEGIC THOUGHT AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THAT? WHAT WERE THOSE CHANGES ABOUT?

Well, right after the death of Stalin, there was no drastic change in the strategic thought. But with the passing of time... well... certain points of the military science...Soviet military science, as well as of... in the Academy were reviewed, indeed. Well, what points were reviewed in particular? Following Stalin's instructions we all thought, that the aggressor is always being well-prepared to war. He is always stronger, striking first and could gain a success, while the defending side... being concentrated on purely defensive problems, being prepared solely to defend...should defend itself. This thesis is wrong. It's wrong. We reviewed it. Under the nuclear war conditions, this thesis is not just erroneous—it's really wrong. It's impossible to let the aggressor gain a success at the very first stages of conflict: that would be a fatal mistake. We changed this postulate... Well, there was a number of other points which we corrected while training our young officers. After the death of Stalin I was already lecturing in the Frunze Academy, and therefore taught the aforesaid corrections myself lecturing to my officers.

Hitler's army had reached Moscow. Comrade Stalin said that... then comrade Stalin invented a thesis, that counteroffensive is the most interesting kind of offensive, especially interesting one. In the present situation, this thesis is wrong, it doesn't fit. It's impossible today, when the war conflict is under way, the nuclear one, to invite the enemy to your own territory. It's a wrong theory. We gave it up.

HOW THE INVENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFLUENCED THESE CHANGES?

Among other factors --nuclear weapons influenced too. Naturally. Nuclear weapons, they... have direct influence on the structure of the armed forces, on their build-up, on theory, on practice, on military training, definitely. In that sense, too, of course.

PLEASE, GIVE US SOME COMMENTS ON THE WELL-KNOWN THEORY OF THE BOMBER GAP?

I can give you comments, of course. From early fifties the United States had started very actively their military build-up in all directions. And it goes on till today. Well, one needed to find some excuse. And they were always looking for these excuses - where? In that of the Soviet military threat, in the gap of the US weapons the "windows of vulnerability, etc. Well, at certain point, when the US after the WW II had something like 800 strategic bombers, when, after the nuclear weapons were employed, they possessed a real strategic armada they never the less kept continuing their strategic effort, expanding their strategic aviation, and... Well, it became necessary to justify. But how? That the Soviet Union has more strategic bombers. That the US were getting almost 10-15 times behind the Soviet Union. You see! They believed them. To those, who reasoned, that if the US were behind the USSR, than it was necessary to increase the military spendings, to build strategic bombers, to... finance the defense programs, and to build-up their military muscles. Here you are! As it occurred, it was a pure bluff. Or myth. After, the American administration itself admitted, "Yes, it was a bluff."

(INAUDIBLE QUESTION)?

The United States lagging behind... They're backward... Well, at present they're also trying to find some proves that... and... They're using the excuse that they're supposedly falling well behind the Soviet Union in the area of ground-based missiles. True, the Soviet Union has more ground-based missiles. But the fact is that the US have more submarine-based missiles. And, if to look at it as the whole, the missile potentials, the strategic ones, both are more or less equal. The trouble is, though, that the Americans would like to decrease that the Soviet Union has more of. And by no means they are prepared to decrease, which the Americans have in bigger quantities. Therefore, they keep saying: This is it, the Soviet Union has more ground-based missiles. What about the sea-based missiles, who has more?

I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THAT SPECIFIC EVENT IN WHICH KENNEDY... RUNNING HIS CAMPAIGN...CALLED FOR ELIMINATING THE MISSILE GAP.

I remember that period when Americans had concentrated their efforts on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. But that time the Soviet Union did not have a single rocket-launching submarine... while Americans already had a number of launching submarines. The thing is that the strategic developments took different directions; each had its own history; by no means it was a mirror-like development... We developed the ground-based ICBMs; the American side--their Navy missiles. Therefore it became a necessity... er... yet at that period to control the military build-up. But the American side chose the different way, they... er... set the goal to beat the Soviet Union also in the area of ground-based missies. And the arm-race had started!

CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THESE TWO DIFFERENT WAYS OF DEVELOPMENT?

Perhaps one should look at it from the point of view of the SALT I and SALT II negotiations. We have a great experience in negotiating the strategic control with the United States. We had had such negotiations with three American administrations.... Nixon, Ford, Carter... With Reagan's administration now... Ah... All the three former administrations always tended to approach the strategic potentials as the whole. It was the American idea of such an approach, not the Soviet one. That the strategic potentials can be compared only by cumulative principle; as the complexes. It is impossible just to pick up one particular component of any strategic forces and to start comparing it with the same component of the opposite side. It inevitably leads to distortion. That's why Nixon's people proposed openly: Put all your strategic cards on the table. Give us all your numbers. This is THE way to find some balance. So, we did it...we agreed. We disclosed our statistics, Americans theirs. And we began to compare the strategic potentials as the whole. And we did find a solution. We reached the SALT I and the SALT II agreements. It is not to forget that both treaties were results of considerable compromises. We made steps toward each other. We had had arguments, disagreements; Americans defended their positions very professionally. But... no matter what, the goals were seen clearly, we'd been ready to compromise, and the results had been achieved. Alas, nothing like that happens today.

WE'RE INVOLVED IN MAKING AN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM ABOUT MCNAMARA, TELL US ABOUT HIM— WAS HE REALLY UN EDUCATED PERSON?

No. I could tell that I think McNamara is one of the educated Americans. From the military point of view, too. Of all the Secretaries, I consider him as being the best one. Why? McNamara was practically the first one who started really planning his military build-up. Although McNamara inherited the triad... but... he... developed it, he enforced the achievements of this. As a matter of fact, the main trends of this development are relevant even today. They've been started in McNamara's time, but one can see the results of it yet today. Apart from it, even now the main criterion of efficiency of the US Armed Forces is based on McNamara doctrine of the "efficiency-cost" linkage. I personally mentioned it to McNamara himself. He said: You just making me compliments. "Not at all, I replied, it's just a fact.

DO YOU RECALL MCNAMARA'S SPEECH OF 1962? WHAT WAS THE SOVIET REACTION TO IT?

I remember it pretty well. When McNamara appeared with his theory of counter-force we received it as the proposal to the Soviet Union to establish some sort of rules regulating the limited nuclear war. That is, to fight the nuclear war the gentleman's style... This... of course, could not be taken seriously by us. Not seriously in sense of... that... that it is impossible to make a selection of purely military-industrial cities. Impossible... Then, and now. By the way, Americans themselves admitted afterward, that the concept of counter-powers can't survive critical analysts. Schlesinger proposed his concept of selected targets. It was the repeat of the McNamara's theory. And yet after, Pentagon decided that though the theory itself was good enough, but they definitely lacked the technical means, the necessary weapons to make it applicable... Because the weapons were not accurate enough, and... therefore... regardless to the American side's intentions the cities and population were under the threat of strike. McNamara himself made a research, that if to strike a missile base... if the Soviet Union would strike the missile base in Whiteman, Missouri, the population casualties will be around 10 million. And if the Soviet Union strikes all the strategic sites of the US, the civilian casualties would exceed 20 million! Which means McNamara's research nullified his own theory. Therefore, the results of his research just proved that our own position was right, the Soviet point of view was correct, that... there is no such thing as limited nuclear conflict, there cannot be thing like that. It's impossible to fight the nuclear war the gentlemen's style. If the nuclear war starts it would became a total world war in no time. That's why we insist on negotiating veto on any nuclear conflict, whether limited or a big one, rather than discussing possibilities of a limited nuclear exchange. And that... was the Soviet Union's position then, as it still is now.

Again, about McNamara?

TELL US ABOUT MCNAMARA'S DOCTRINE OF MAD. TELL US AGAIN ABOUT MCNAMARA.

As a military, what should I say? Again, a compliment to McNamara. These ideas of McNamara didn't come out of the blue. McNamara had done massive research with computers... in order to define his concept of assured destruction. McNamara had worked out his principle of "unacceptable damage"... Unacceptable damage... what that meant? That meant the annihilation of about one third of the entire population of the country, and two thirds of its industry. That's what the unacceptable damage means. Using this principle, the US Armed Forces were structured. At that time, as far as I recall, according to the aforementioned research, it was enough to possess a nuclear potential of 400 megatons in order to achieve this unacceptable damage, which means McNamara was pre-planning the US Armed Forces build-up, as well as their operations. What should I say? From the military point of view, it was a well thought-out approach, quite a scientific one. That is to destroy... to damage the other side on such a level that it ceased to exist... I also did some research myself, while working on my post-doctorate... and I should say that McNamara's research was rather accurate, as I found. It was close to reality. Therefore, it is to McNamara's credit, the fact that he had a realistic approach to the Armed Forces development. But I can say, speaking of today, that at present, both sides possess a power exceeding 4,000 megatons. If, according to McNamara, you need only 400 megatons to secure the unacceptable damage, now each side has 4,000 megatons! That means that each side can destroy its enemy as many as ten times. It is a result of research done by McNamara that is also applicable today.

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO RESPOND TO THE MCNAMARA'S CONCEPT OF MAD. DO YOU, OR DID YOU CONSIDER THE CONCEPT AS THE VIABLE ONE?

No, we don't. We do not. We do consider nuclear weapons as the most dangerous ones; the nuclear tornado can easily destroy the entire population of the planet of Earth. Therefore, we don't have any concepts of that kind. We don't have a concept of "the first strike"; the "preemptive attack" concept, the "retaliative strike", etc. We simply do not have any concept of any nuclear war. Therefore all these concepts which were promoted by McNamara er... the Secretary of Defense Weinberger just signed, on January 31, a new directive on military development which, in fact... proved that the US should survive,...the nuclear war, and eventually win it. As it is planned, there would be a preemptive strike—we don't have any of such concepts; we are not discussing them. And we think that these concepts are all wrong; that these concepts are characteristic of the side that is preparing itself to a war...a nuclear war. As for the Soviet side, the Soviet leaders have declared over and over, that they'll never start a nuclear exchange. Never! Just to think of the enormous losses we suffered in WW II--20 million people!--Just for example, I'll give you the following figures: we ended the war in Berlin. It is 2,000 km from Moscow to Berlin. Divide 20 million into 2,000. That means that each kilometer of ground required the lives of 10,000 Soviet citizens to be buried... How could one ever imagine the Soviet Union preparing for a new war? We're saying that we don't need a nuclear war--and we actually don't need any war--we really mean it. And, you see now, especially today, when we have such grandiose, huge economic plans, we're the ones who need peace, peace and only peace.

WHAT ABOUT THE ARMS?

Arms must be eliminated. Today under the condition of parity, they serve as a pacifying factor, but it is only for today. The parity today is of such a level, that we're sitting on a nuclear mountain. And... the arms race continues. If the arms race expands into space, nuclear parity will stop playing, a pacifying role. The arms race will expand beyond our control. Then all events will acquire an irreversible character. Mankind will be pushed inevitably into nuclear war. That's why we propose to stop and eliminate nuclear weapons. People can survive without nuclear arms, so we, the Soviet Union, offer a realistic program of nuclear disarmament in order to let mankind enter the 21st century free of nuclear arms. This program is realistic. Unfortunately, we still have not received a response to this proposal.

IT WAS A TRAGIC AND PAINFUL PROCESS FOR THE US MILITARY STRATEGISTS TO RECOGNIZE A TOTAL USELESSNESS OF NUCLEAR ARMS AS A MILITARY FACTOR, AND TO START THINKING OF IT IN PURELY POLITICAL TERMS. CAN YOU RECALL ANY PERIODS CHARACTERIZING THE SIMILAR PROCESSES IN THE USSR'S STRATEGIC THOUGHT?

The Soviet Union always thought that nuclear weapons were barbaric ones, and never considered the possibility of using them. Therefore from the very first day of its invention, the Soviet Union has protested against these weapons, and always demanded that they be forbidden, to eliminate them all. This policy of the Soviet Union is strict and hasn't been changed since 1945. Neither Soviet politicians, nor its strategists ever thought that one should use nuclear weapons. Alas, I should agree with you, that the American side has always had these ideas. Always. Almost every American leader, be it Republican or Democrat, now, as well as before... all of them thought of the possibility of the nuclear option. They played the unlimited nuclear exchange card, the pre-emptive strike card, the unexpected attack card... and these options were considered by almost all American presidents. We never played this game.

O.K. YOU WANT TO STOP ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT WHAT TO DO WHEN THERE ARE NO REALISTIC CONDITIONS FOR IT. ISN'T IT A CERTAIN CONTRADICTION?

I can only say that our doctrine has always rejected a preventive nuclear option. Always... In the '60s, in the '50s, in the '70s, as well as today. Of course, if nuclear arms are used against the Soviet Union...what you think the Soviet Union should do? Only in that case, the Soviet Union would be forced to employ its nuclear weapons, only in reply. Only in that case. And nothing else. Here's the answer to your question.